|
|
| Fig. 1: Life-cycle cash-flow schematic for a nuclear power plant. (Image source: P. Dedeler, after Erdogdu. [6]) |
Turkey's electricity system is still anchored by fossil generation. In 2024, Turkey generated 347 TWh, with coal at 121.6 TWh (35.0%) and natural gas at 64.9 TWh (18.7%). Hydro, wind, and solar together supplied about 137 TWh (about 40%). [1] At the same time, Turkey is highly import-dependent for major fuels, relying on imports for oil (93%) and natural gas (99%). [2] These conditions frame nuclear energy less as a purely technical choice and more as an energy-security hedge against imported fuels and fossil-driven price volatility. Nuclear is typically justified as a predictable source that could displace part of fossil generation while supporting reliability.
Turkey's first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, is being developed under a 2010 intergovernmental agreement with Russia using a build–own–operate (BOO) structure. [3] In this model, the project company funds construction and recovers its investment through electricity sales over the operating life, rather than Turkey paying the full capital cost upfront. The plant is located at Akkuyu on Turkey's Mediterranean coast in Mersin Province, and it is planned as four VVER-1200 units with a combined capacity of roughly 4.8 GWe. [3,4]
Russia has longstanding reactor development and operating experience, including the BN-series sodium-cooled fast reactors (BN-350, BN-600, BN-800) and the proposed BN-1200. [5]
Because nuclear projects are heavily front-loaded in construction cash demands followed by decades of operating revenues and late-stage refurbishment and decommissioning obligations, the BOO framework is central to evaluating Akkuyu: it reduces the host state's near- term financing burden but can create long-horizon dependence and risk allocation questions extending through operation and eventual decommissioning (Fig. 1). [6]
Akkuyu agreement includes unusually explicit electricity sales terms. Turkey's state wholesale company, Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. (TETAS; Turkiye Elektrik Ticaret ve Taahhut A.S.), is to purchase power at 12.35 cents/kWh for 15 years, covering 70% of output from Units 1 and 2 and 30% from Units 3 and 4 during that period. After the initial 15 years, the project company is expected to pay 20% of profits to the Turkish government. These terms are the key economic numbers of the program because they define both the benefit (firm power) and the commitment (long-duration offtake at a set price). [3] As of public status summaries available in 2025, the units were not yet producing electricity, and Unit 1 was still being described as targeting first generation in 2026. [7]
For a newcomer nuclear program, regulatory credibility is part of feasibility. Turkey's nuclear governance has been reorganized in recent years, including establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Nukleer Duzenleme Kurumu, NDK) and updates to the legal framework. [8] Turkey's nuclear regulator defines a staged authorization pathway that includes permits for site preparation, construction, and commissioning, followed by an operating license. Public opinion and support is also critical in deploying nuclear power plants. Turkey's public opinion on nuclear power is mixed and strongly shaped by information quality: one large Turkish survey reported 42.3% support versus 31.1% opposition, and found a major knowledge gap (72% self-reported basic knowledge but only 24.9% answering basic questions correctly), implying that trust and transparent communication can materially influence acceptance. [9]
Turkey's nuclear program is best evaluated through two linked factors. First, the energy-security motivation is supported by very high import dependence for oil and gas and a 2024 power mix still anchored by coal and gas. Second, Akkuyu's BOO model converts nuclear deployment into a long-duration contractual structure, including a 15-year fixed-price offtake (12.35 cents/kWh) for specified portions of output and profit-sharing after the initial period. In practice, outcomes will hinge on whether the staged licensing framework sustains confidence and whether the BOO arrangement delivers reliable operation without unacceptable cost lock-in or long-term dependence.
© Pelin Dedeler. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] "Kamu İşletmeleri Raporu 2024," Ministry of Treasury and Finance, Republic of Türkiye, 2025, Table 13 [Public Enterprises Report 2024].
[2] "Turkey 2021: Energy Policy Review," International Energy Agency, March 2021.
[3] "Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on Cooperation in relation to the Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant at the Akkuyu Site in the Republic of Turkey," Directorate General for Laws and Desisions of the Prime Minstry, Republic of Turkey, May 2010.
[4] M. C. Kahraman, "Evaluating the Build-Own-Operate Model For Nuclear Power Plant Projects; A Case Study of Turkiye's First Nuclear Power Plant Agreement with Russia," Int. J. Energy Stud. 10, 957 (2025)
[5] A. Krishnamoorthi, "Nuclear Power in Russia," Physics 241, Stanford University, Winter 2024.
[6] E. Erdogdu, "Nuclear Power in Open Energy Markets: A Case Study of Turkey," Energy Policy 35, 3061 (2007).
[7] M. Schneider et al., "World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025," Mycle Schneider Consulting, 2025, Annex 5, Table 27.
[8] Ç. Pekar, "Nuclear Power Program in Turkey as a Nuclear Newcomer Country," Izmir J. Soc. Sci. 5, No. 1, 58 (2023).
[9] H. Oğul and M. O. Karaağaç, "Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power Plants in Turkey," Pamukkale University J. Eng. Sci. 25, 423 (2019).