For historians of the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear weapons program is a topic of obvious importance. The nuclear arms race was a central element in the Cold War, and much of the historiography of American Cold War policy has focused on nuclear weapons—on the decisions to build them, and on their role in foreign policy and military strategy. But American policy is only one part of the history of the Cold War. Comparable studies of Soviet nuclear policy are needed for a full understanding of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition, which dominated world politics for more than 40 years. This note reviews briefly some of the main sources I used for my Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

An extensive literature on Soviet nuclear policy was published in the West during the Cold War. This dealt primarily with two topics: the structure and development of Soviet nuclear forces, and Soviet thinking about nuclear war and the role of nuclear weapons in war. Some of these works retain considerable value, but the range of issues they could examine was necessarily limited. They were based primarily on data published by the U.S. government about Soviet nuclear weapons systems and on the statements of Soviet leaders about nuclear weapons, as well as on Soviet publications about foreign policy and military strategy, operational art, and tactics. It was not possible to analyze Soviet policy in terms of the interplay of individuals, institutions, and circumstances. The way in which we understood Soviet nuclear policy was therefore very different from the way in which we could think about American policies.
Soviet republics have begun collaborating
chivists in the United States and the former
has been aided by two developments. Ar-
East European science within social, intel-
mantically, and scholars have begun the im-
scientists and historians has increased dra-
ever, contacts between Western and Eastern
advent of
materials, political pressures kept analyses of
scholars had greater access to archival ma-
lished Soviet information; and while Soviet
 scarcely such works relied largely on pub-
various aspects of Soviet science, until re-
books, by Arnold Kramish and George
were written by Kurchatov’s brother-in-law,
Kiriłl Sin’el’nikov). His book is far more
informative than other Soviet publications of
the period, but it does not compare with the
work of Richard Hewlett and Margaret
Gowing and their colleagues. Some useful
works on nuclear science and the atomic
industry appeared in the Soviet Union at
about the same time.3 In 1976, Herbert
York’s classic The Advisors: Oppenheimer,
Teller, and the Superbomb was published,
throwing important light on Soviet thermo-
nuclear weapons development.6 Apart from
the books by Kramish, Modelséli, and York,
two papers I wrote on early Soviet nuclear
history during a year’s fellowship in the
International Security Studies Program of
the Wilson Center in 1978-79 were, as far as
I know, the only studies to appear in English
on that history.7

Since 1980, and especially in the last
four or five years, a great deal of new mate-
rial has become available on the history of
the Soviet project. New books have been
published in Russia and the West; the Soviet
and Russian press has carried many articles
by, and interviews with, participants in the
project; some key documents have been pub-
ished; and some relevant archives—though
not yet the most important ones—have be-
come accessible to researchers.8 There is as
yet no comprehensive history of the Soviet
project in Russian; recent work has been
devoted to clarifying particular aspects of
Soviet nuclear history. Nevertheless, this
has now become a fruitful area for research,
and significant studies may be expected in
the coming years.

What sources are now available for the
study of Soviet nuclear history? The answer
depends on what aspect one wants to study.
In my book I examine three main issues: the
development of Soviet nuclear weapons and
their delivery vehicles; the relationship be-
tween scientists and the political leadership;
and the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet
foreign and military policies. These issues
are often treated separately in studies of
Western policies, but I chose to weave them
together for two reasons, one practical and
one substantive. The practical reason is that
soures for the Soviet project are still, in
spite of greater openness, very much more
fragmentary than those for the American or
British projects. I hoped that viewing the
project from different angles would make up
for some of the deficiencies in the sources.
The substantive reason is that, as I hope the

Cold War Soviet Science:
Manuscripts and Oral Histories

by Ronald Doel and Caroline Moseley

The end of the Cold War has stimulated
new interest in the history of science in the
Soviet Union. While several Western histor-
ians have produced important studies of
various aspects of Soviet science, until re-
cently such works relied largely on pub-
lished Soviet information; and while Soviet
scholars had greater access to archival ma-
terials, political pressures kept analyses of
twentieth-century Soviet science limited to
internal technical developments. Since the
advent of glasnost in the late 1980s, how-
ever, contacts between Western and Eastern
scientists and historians has increased dra-
matically, and scholars have begun the im-
portant task of evaluating Soviet-era and
East European science within social, intel-
lectual, and political contexts. This process
has been aided by two developments. Ar-
chivists in the United States and the former
Soviet republics have begun collaborating
to assess archival sources for the physical
and biological sciences in the former Soviet
Union; and greater freedom of travel and
speech has enabled historians to conduct an
unprecedented number of oral history inter-
views with leading scientists and their fami-
lies in the former Soviet republics.

For more than two decades, the Center
for History of Physics of the American Insti-
tute of Physics (AIP), now located in College
Park, Maryland, has sponsored oral history
interviews with scientists in most branches
of the physical sciences, including physics,
astrophysics, and geophysics; these inter-
views are housed within its Niels Bohr Li-
brary. Its staff has also gathered information
on the papers of scientists and scientific
institutions throughout the world. In addi-
tion, the AIP houses several small collec-
tions of manuscript and printed materials
on the history of Soviet science. These sources
are described in greater detail below.

I. Archival Sources. Beginning in the
late 1980s, the Center for History of Physics
has employed some highly qualified research-
ers, including the Russian historian Alexei
Kozhevnikov, to assess archival holdings
for scientists and scientific institutions
throughout the former Soviet Union and
East European nations. Information about
known archival collections is found in a
database operated by the Center, the Interna-
tional Catalog of Sources for the History of
Physics and Allied Sciences (ICOS). Cur-
rently the ICOS database contains records of
45 collections which have been preserved in
10 different repositories in the former Soviet
Union. One of these repositories, the Ar-
chives of the St. Petersburg branch of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, is a particu-
rally rich source of physics-related collec-
tions. Its holdings include the papers of
Evgenij Gross, Abram Ioffe, Wladimir
Kistiakowsky, Yuri Krutkov, and others.

II. Oral History Sources. For several
decades, the Center for History of Physics
has sponsored oral history interviews with
physicists, astrophysicists, meteorologists,
geophysicists, and members of related disci-
plines. Over 600 interviews are available at
the Center; transcripts are available for many
continued on page 13
book shows, the issues are interrelated.

The quality of the sources on different aspects of Soviet nuclear history varies greatly. There is no good technical or administrative history of the Soviet project. (Indeed it is only recently that a technical history of the wartime work at Los Alamos has been published.) Some specialized technical accounts—of the first experimental reactor, of work on the first atomic bomb, and of the first plutonium production reactor—have been or are about to be published. But a detailed technical history cannot be written on the basis of existing material. The outlines of the technical history have to be pieced together from a variety of incomplete sources, and the same is true of the administrative history of the project.

Andrei Sakharov’s memoirs, for example, have to be used, along with the memoirs of people who worked with him, to sketch out the history of Soviet thermonuclear weapons development.

The richest group of sources is the material on the scientists who took part in the project. There is a three-volume set of Kurchatov’s collected works, which includes some memoranda he wrote for the government during and after World War II. There are two collections of memoirs about him; some of these are not very interesting, but others are highly informative about aspects of the project. There is an excellent study of Kurchatov and his research before he was appointed scientific director of the project. Many of the memoirs portray Kurchatov as a hero, but there is enough material to make possible a more nuanced picture of the man.

A great deal has been written about the Leningrad school of physics from which Kurchatov and other key figures in the nuclear project came: Abram Ioffe, the founder of this school; N.N. Semenov, who created the Institute of Chemical Physics from which the first members of the weapons group were drawn; Iu. B. Kharton, who headed the work on weapons design and development from 1943 on; Iu. B. Zel’dovich, who headed the theoretical work on weapons design; I.K. Kikoin, who was responsible for the gaseous diffusion method of isotope separation; L.A. Artsimovich, who took charge of electromagnetic isotope separation; G.N. Flerov, who discovered spontaneous fission; A.P. Aleksandrov, who occupied several important positions in the project.

Similar materials are available for other scientists in the project. Vladimir Vernadskii, a mineralogist with broad scientific interests, was a key figure in the early history of the project, and his papers, especially his correspondence and diaries, constitute a crucial source for its pre-Hiroshima phase. Several of Vernadskii’s students and colleagues played important roles in the project, among them Vitalii Khlopin, who headed research on the separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium, and Dmitrii Shcherbakov, who took part in the development of uranium mining. The materials on these men also throw important light on the project.

In the development of the atomic bomb Kurchatov relied heavily on physicists he had worked with in Leningrad. In 1948, however, he brought Moscow physicists, among them Igor Tamm and Andrei Sakharov, into the project to work on thermonuclear weapons. Sakharov’s memoirs are an important source for this history, and so too are the memoirs of those who worked with him. Gennady Gorelik (formerly with Institute of the History of Science and Technology, now with the Dibner Institute at MIT) has been interviewing those who worked with Sakharov, and his book on Sakharov promises to be a major contribu-

---

**Moscow’s Biggest Bomb:**

**The 50-Megaton Test of October 1961**

by Viktor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov

On 30 October 1961, Soviet Minister of Medium Machine Building Efim Slavsky and Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Moskalenko sent a telegram to the Kremlin:

To: N.S. Khrushchev, The Kremlin, Moscow: The test at Novaya Zemlya was a success. The security of the test personnel and of nearby inhabitants has been assured. Those participating in the tests have fulfilled the task of our Motherland. We are returning for the Congress.1

In Moscow, the 22nd Congress of the CPSU had already been in session for two weeks. It began its work in the newly-built Kremlin Palace of Congresses, which had just opened its doors for the first time. On October 30, the Congress delegates unanimously reached the sensational decision that

"Maintaining the sarcophagus with J.V. Stalin’s coffin is no longer desirable."

On the same day, Slavsky and Moskalenko reported on the test of a Soviet thermonuclear bomb of unprecedented power.

That morning, at 11:32 AM (Moscow time), there was a 50-megaton (MT) explosion over Novaya Zemlya island in northern Russia above the Arctic Circle at an altitude of 4,000 meters. The atmospheric disturbance generated by the explosion orbited the earth three times. The flash of light was so bright that it was visible at a distance of 1,000 kilometers, despite cloudy skies. A gigantic, swirling mushroom cloud rose as high as 64 kilometers.

The bomb exploded after having fallen slowly from a height of 10,500 meters, suspended by a large parachute. By that time the crew of the TU-95 “Bear” bomber, commanded by Major Andrei Durnovtsev, were already in the safe zone some 45 km from the target. The commander was returning to earth as a lieutenant colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union.

Efim Slavsky and Kirill Moskalenko, as deputies to the Congress, had arrived by plane on the day of the test to observe the explosion. They were aboard an IL-14 “crate” at a distance of several hundred kilometers from ground zero, when a fantastic scene appeared before them; one participant in the test saw a bright flash through dark goggles and felt the effects of a thermal pulse even at a distance of 270 km. In districts hundreds of kilometers from ground zero, wooden houses were destroyed, and stone ones lost their roofs, windows and doors; and radio communications were interrupted for almost one hour. At the time of the blast, the bomb’s designers and test supervisors, headed by Major General Nikolai Pavlov, the Chairman of the State Commission, were at the airfield near Olenya station on the Kola Peninsula. For 40 minutes they had no firm information on the test, or the fate of the bomber and the Tu-16 “Badger” airborne laboratory accompanying it. Only when radio contact with Novaya Zemlya was reestablished were they able to request information on the altitude of the cloud. It was clear

continued on page 19
tion to Soviet nuclear history. 29

Other important memoirs include those by V. A. Tsukerman and his wife Z. M. Azarkh, which deal with life and work at Arzamas-16, the Soviet equivalent of Los Alamos; 20 M. G. Pervukhin’s account of the origins of the wartime project; 21 those of N. A. Dollezhal’, chief designer of the first plutonium production reactors; 22 and of E. P. Slavskii, one of the early managers, and later Minister of Medium Machinebuilding. 23

Most of these sources are subject to the usual defects of memoirs: inaccuracies and vagueness as to dates, selective recall, and inflation of the memoirist’s role. They are, in addition, subject to the special problems of Soviet sources. The first of these is censorship and self-censorship. Beria is not mentioned once, for example, in the important volume of memoirs on Kurchatov published in 1988, even though Beria was in overall charge of the nuclear project and his relationship with Kurchatov is central to understanding how the project was run.

The second problem is that the Soviet project was highly compartmentalized, so that very few people had a comprehensive view of what was going on; this is one reason why the writings of Iulii Kharonitov, who headed weapons design and development at Arzamas-16 from 1946 to 1992, are so important. This compartmentalization has shaped how participants in the project have written about it. Golovin’s biography of Kurchatov, for example, makes much of Kurchatov’s scientific intuition. The recent publication of some of Kurchatov’s reports on the intelligence he received about the Manhattan Project makes it clear that his intuition about what should be done was based on a detailed knowledge of what the Americans were doing.

The scientists’ memoirs are nevertheless a crucial source for the history of the project. They convey something of the moral and political atmosphere in which the scientists and engineers worked; they reveal a good deal about relations between participants in the project; and they also illuminate some of the scientific and technical issues involved. They can be checked against one another, and sometimes checked against contemporary documents. This is especially so for the period up to 1941, when a good deal was published in scientific and popular science journals; but it is true to some extent for the later period as well.

Apart from Vernadskii’s papers, the letters of Peter Kapitsa are perhaps the most important contemporary source. Although he was directly involved in the project only for some months at the end of 1945, Kapitsa’s letters are critical for viewing the Russian physics community, the politics of science, and the early post-Hiroshima decisions. 24

An interesting angle on the Soviet project is provided by the German scientists who took part in it. Several of these wrote memoirs, of which the most interesting is by Nikolaus Riehl; 25 others who wrote memoirs are Max Steenbeck, Heinz Barwich, and Manfred Von Ardenne. 26 When German scientists left the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, some came to the West and were debriefed by U.S. intelligence. Some of those debriefings have been declassified and offer interesting insights about aspects of the Soviet project. 27 Andreas Heinemann-Grunder has interviewed some of the German scientists who worked on the project and incorporated those interviews into his research. 28 Norman Naimark’s forthcoming book on the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany will also add fresh evidence on the use made by the Soviet Union of German science and technology, and especially on the Soviet uranium mines in East Germany. 29

Some memoirs contain documents from private archives—reports, minutes of meetings, and letters—but only now are relevant official archives beginning to open up. Some archives have become accessible to researchers; others have released individual documents or sets of documents. The relevant Russian archives that are open to researchers, at least in part, are the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry; the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary History Documents, and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (both of which contain records of the CPSU Central Committee); and the State Archive of the Russian Federation. Since nuclear weapons policy was highly centralized under Stalin, the most important collections of documents are not open to researchers, even though selected documents from these collections have been made public or given to individual scholars. I obtained some documents from private and official archives in this way, through the good offices of Russian colleagues.

The most important single group of documents to have been declassified deals with atomic espionage. The KGB made a set of about 300 pages of documents available to the Institute for the History of Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Institute prepared most of these documents for publication in its journal Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki (Questions on the History of Science and Technology), 1992, no. 3, pp. 107-34, but the issue was withdrawn from publication in the fall of 1992 at the insistence of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power, on the grounds that information in two of the documents might contravene the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 40 (One of these documents was a report, based on information from Klaus Fuchs, providing a detailed description of the design of the plutonium bomb tested at Alamogordo on 16 July 1945; Kurchatov and Kharonitov took this report as the basis for the design of the first Soviet bomb.) Although the issue was withdrawn from circulation, copies did become available to researchers, and some of the documents have been published in an appendix to Pavel Sudoplatov’s memoirs. 41 These documents, especially the memoranda by Kurchatov commenting on the value of the intelligence, make it possible to chart the progress of the Soviet project during the war, and to see how information from Britain and the United States influenced the direction of Soviet work.

Several KGB officials who were involved in one way or another in atomic intelligence have written articles or memoirs, or given interviews to the press. Among these are A. S. Feklisov, who was Klaus Fuchs’s control officer in Britain after World War II; A. A. Iatskov, who was involved in atomic espionage in New York during the war; and Pavel Sudoplatov, who headed a special “Department S” which collated intelligence information in 1945-46. 42

Like all sources, these have to be assessed with care. 43 This is especially true of Sudoplatov’s book. Some of the claims made by Sudoplatov—especially that physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr knowingly passed secret atomic information to the Soviet Union—are dubious, and have been subjected to serious criticism. 44 Other aspects of his account—for example, about the status of the atomic project during the war—are quite misleading. 45 The reliability of Sudoplatov’s memoirs is, moreover, further
In our letters to you, Comrade M.G. Pervukhin [Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and a key atomic administrator] and I reported on the status of work on the uranium problem and of the colossal development of this work abroad. ... around this issue there has been created abroad a concentration of scientific and engineering-technical power on a scale never been seen in the history of world science, and which has already achieved the most priceless results.

In our country, despite major improvement in work on uranium in 1943-44, the situation remains completely unsatisfactory....

Though I know that you are extremely busy, in view of the historic meaning of the uranium problem I all the same decided to disturb You and to ask You to order an effort which would correspond to the potential and significance of our Great State in world culture.

The success of the Manhattan Project, so dramatically demonstrated at Hiroshima in August 1945, compelled Stalin to reorganize, accelerate, and expand the USSR’s atomic effort. But some difficulties persisted, including complaints by some scientists, most prominently the renowned physicist Pyotr Kapitsa, that the political leaders overseeing the project—especially secret police chief Lavrenti Beria—did not properly understand either the science or the scientists involved. The second document reproduced here shows that by late January 1946, Stalin was ready to move even more decisively to boost the secret atomic effort, and to satisfy the scientists’ wants and needs. Printed below are excerpts from Kurchatov’s handwritten notes from a conversation with Stalin, accompanied by Beria and Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, at the Kremlin on the evening of 25 January 1946. The notes, in Kurchatov’s archives, were published recently in an article by Yuri N. Smirnov, a veteran and historian of the Soviet nuclear weapons program. The timing of the conversation is particularly important in a Cold War context, for only a month earlier the Kremlin had agreed to the request of U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, during a conference of Soviet, British, and American foreign ministers in Moscow, to create a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission with the goal of establishing international control over all atomic energy and weapons. The document suggests that Stalin, like many U.S. leaders, had little faith in the negotiations, which in fact quickly stalemated and ended in failure later that year as both Washington and Moscow continued to work on nuclear weapons programs under national control. (The USSR exploded its first atomic bomb in August 1949, breaking the four-year American monopoly.)

January 25, 1946

The conversation continued for approximately one hour, from 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening. Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov, and Comrade Beria attended.

Basic impressions of the conversation. The great love of Comrade Stalin for Russia and for V.I. Lenin, about whom he spoke in terms of his great hope for the development of science in our country. [...] Viewing the future development of the work Comrade Stalin said that it is not worth spending time and effort on small-scale work, rather, it is necessary to conduct the work broadly, on a Russian scale, and that in this regard the broadest, utmost assistance will be provided.

Comrade Stalin said that it is not necessary to seek out the cheapest paths, ... that it is not necessary to carry out the work quickly and in vulgar fundamental forms.

Regarding the scholars, Comrade Stalin was preoccupied by thoughts of how to, as if, make it easier, help them in their material-living situation. And in prizes for great deeds, for example, on the solution to our problem. He said that our scholars are very modest, and they never notice that they live badly—that is bad in itself, and he said that although our state also had suffered much, we can always make it possible for several thousand persons to live well, and several thousand people better than very well, with their own dachas, so that they can relax, and with their own cars.

In work, Comrade Stalin said, it is necessary to move decisively, with the investment of a decisive quantity of resources, but in the basic directions.

It is also necessary to use Germany to the utmost; there, there are people, and equipment, and experience, and factories. Comrade Stalin asked about the work of German scholars and the benefits which they brought to us.


Misgivings were expressed regarding who they work for and what their activity is directed toward—for the benefit of the Motherland or not.

It was suggested that measures which would be necessary in order to speed up work, everything that is necessary, should be written down. What other scholars would it make sense to bring into the effort?

[...]
clouded by the impossibility of distinguishing Sudoplatov’s recollections from what has been added by his co-authors.

The controversy about Sudoplatov’s book has produced one benefit: the release of the memorandum (prepared by Sudoplatov) from Beria to Stalin about the visit of the Soviet physicist Iakov Terletskii to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in November 1945 (see the translation on pages 50–51, 57–59). It is good to have this memorandum published, but the way in which it has become public illustrates some of the problems that researchers face in working on the history of the Soviet nuclear program. It can be quite misleading to have individual documents plucked out of the archives, without a sense for the context in which they were filed. In this case we are fortunate that Terletskii left a detailed account of his visit to Bohr, and that Aage Bohr, Niels Bohr’s son, who was present at the meetings between Bohr and Terletskii, is alive and able to give his account of what transpired. Even so, Beria’s memorandum needs careful interpretation. Some of Bohr’s answers to Terletskii’s questions are garbled, which makes one wonder how the memorandum was put together. In question 10, for example, Bohr refers to a half-life of 7,000 years, which is close to the half-life of plutonium-240 from all processes, not for spontaneous fission (which is what he was asked about). Answer 22 does not seem to make much sense, as several physicists, including Aage Bohr, himself a Nobel Laureate, have pointed out. Finally, conclusions should not be drawn from the document without comparing it with the Smyth Report, the official account of the Manhattan Project which had been published by the U.S. government in August 1945. It is clear that Bohr, in his answers to Terletskii, did not go beyond what had already been revealed by the Smyth Report.

Russian historians of science are now working intensively on the history of the Soviet nuclear project. They have already written a great deal about the history of Soviet physics, and about the communities from which the leading figures in the nuclear project came. Since the late 1980s they have turned their attention increasingly to the social and political context of Soviet science, and more recently have begun to investigate the history of the Soviet nuclear project, conducting serious interviews with participants in the project and seeking to speed up the declassification of documents. The quality of this work is high. The journal Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki is the main vehicle for the new studies of Soviet nuclear history; the work of Viktor Frenkel’ and Gennady Gorelik has already been noted; and mention should also be made of the work of Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok.

The sources on the project itself, and on the relationships between scientists, managers, and political leaders, are far from satisfactory, but they are better and more numerous than Soviet sources on the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet foreign and military policy. Here the situation for the historian is different; while very little had been published before the breakup of the Soviet Union on the nuclear project itself, there was already a significant literature on Soviet foreign policy in the Cold War. This literature, based almost exclusively on Western archives, as well as on published Soviet sources, left many questions unresolved, however, and historians hoped—and continue to hope—that the opening of Russian archives would transform the situation.

### Chernobyl: The Forbidden Truth


Contact: University of Nebraska Press, 312 N. 14th St., Lincoln, NE 68588-0484; tel. 1-800-755-1105.

The opening of the archives has helped, but declassification is moving slowly. Foreign policy-making under Stalin was highly centralized—especially in relation to nuclear weapons—and the relevant archives (in particular the Presidential Archive) have not yet been opened to foreign researchers. Nevertheless, those archives which have become accessible have yielded interesting materials, and important documents have been released (albeit fitfully) from the Presidential Archive. Thus we have better sources now for the study of such nuclear-related issues as the Soviet entry into the war with Japan and the Soviet role in the Korean War. There are still huge gaps, however. Nothing has yet become available, for example, to clarify the nuclear aspect of the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948–49.

Memoirs are less helpful on foreign policy than on science. Gromyko’s memoirs are disappointing and must be treated with caution. N. V. Novikov’s memoirs are much more useful, especially on the immediate postwar period. The Molotov interviews are interesting, especially for conveying a sense of the mentality of the Stalinist leadership; and on some specific issues, like the date on which Kurchatov was shown intelligence information, Molotov’s memory is sound. The memoirs of Ivan Kovalyev, Stalin’s emissary to Mao Zedong, contain interesting material not only on Sino-Soviet relations but also on the role of nuclear weapons in Stalin’s foreign policy. Chinese sources have become very important for the study of Stalin’s foreign policy, especially for Soviet policy in the Korean War, and Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai have made good use of these sources in their study of the war’s origins.

After Stalin’s death in March 1953, and especially after Beria’s arrest a few months later, decision-making on nuclear weapons was decentralized. Stalin and Beria had held nuclear weapons decisions very closely, and had allowed very little discussion of nuclear weapons issues in the press or even in the government or the military. In 1954, however, the Soviet press began to carry articles about nuclear weapons and their effect on war and foreign policy. The CPSU Politburo (or Presidium as it was then called) now became involved in the discussion of nuclear weapons issues, and so too did the Central Committee. The July 1953 Central Committee Plenum also touched on the management of the nuclear project. The meeting was convened to condemn Beria, but his direction of the nuclear project did not receive serious criticism. He was charged, however, with having authorized the August 1953 hydrogen-bomb test without the approval of Georgii Malenkov, the premier. The implication of this criticism is that Beria was treating the nuclear weapons complex as his own personal fiefdom.

Unfortunately, not all the stenographic reports of Central Committee plenary sessions have been made available. I did not have access, for example, to the full report of the January 1955 CPSU CC Plenum, at which Georgii Malenkov was condemned for his remark that global nuclear war could lead to
the end of civilization; I had to rely on secondary sources that quoted excerpts from the speeches. Nevertheless the greater openness of the immediate post-Stalin years is very clearly reflected in the archives. It is the last four years of Stalin’s life that remain the most opaque and difficult period of Soviet foreign policy.

The same pattern holds for the study of military policy. New materials are now available on the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and also on the impact of nuclear weapons on post-Stalin military thought. But the great military buildup of 1949-53 has not yet been illuminated either by archival materials or by studies by Russian military historians. This period requires new sources and research.

For the first time, researchers on these topics in recent years have been able to interview senior Soviet participants in the relevant events. Clearly, interviews are a notoriously difficult source, because people’s memories are so often unreliable. Yet I found them enormously helpful—more so, in fact, than is evident from the notes in the book, because people I talked to helped me to evaluate what I had read, pointed me to new materials and questions, and gave me documents. Still, it was not always possible to cross-check what I was told with documentary sources, so I had to be careful in the use I made of interviews. I should note also that cooperation with Russian colleagues working in the same area was extremely helpful: they shared materials, ideas, and advice very generously.

In spite of the difficulties, Soviet nuclear history now has become an exciting area for research. It is intrinsically interesting because the issues it raises are of great importance, and because the people involved were remarkable. It is important for the history of the Cold War, and for the way in which we think about the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations.

A couple of years before completing my book I asked myself whether I should wait until new material appeared before finishing. I decided not to do so, mainly because I thought I had a more or less clear picture of what I wanted to say, and also because I thought a general map of the terrain might be useful to others working in this area. The history of the Soviet nuclear program is not likely to be exhausted by one account, any more than one book provides everything one needs to know about U.S. nuclear history. Nevertheless, I was pleasantly surprised by the evidence that has become available about the development of the weapons themselves, about the community of scientists who built the weapons, about the role of espionage, about the management of the project, and about the effect of the bomb on the military and foreign policies of Stalin and the post-Stalin leaders. The story is an important one, not merely for understanding the arms race and the Cold War, but also for understanding Soviet society and the survival in that society of the traditions of the Russian intelligentsia, personified by such men as Vladimir Vernadski, Peter Kapitsa, and Andrei Sakharov.


4. I.N. Golovin, I.V. Kurchatov (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1967). Two subsequent editions were published, with additional material. The third edition appeared in 1973. English translations were also published.

5. For example, Sovetskaia atomnaia nauka i tekhnika [Soviet atomic science and technology] (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1967); V.V. Igonin, Atom v SSR [Atom in USSR] (Saratov: izd. Saratovskogo universiteta, 1975).


13. Institute newspapers (for example, Kurchatovets, the newspaper of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow) and local newspapers (like the Arzamas-16 Gorodskoi Kur’t’er) carry interesting historical information that is often not available elsewhere.


15. I.V. Kurchatov, Izbrannye trudy [Selected Works] three volumes, ed. by A.P. Aleksandrov (Moscow, 1983).


18. On Ioffe’s school see Paul Josephson, Physics and Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); M.S. Sominskii, Abram Fedorovich Ioffe (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1964); and many publications by the Russian historian of science, Viktor Frenkel’, for example two very interesting articles on his father, the theoretical physicist Iakov Frenkel’, who worked at Ioffe’s institute; V.Ia. Frenkel’, “Zhar pod peplom,” Zvezda 9 and 10 (1991).


Kurchatovskii institut, 1993). (Most of this was published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993, under the title “The Khariton Version.”) Yu. Khariton, ”Iadernoee oruzhie SSSR: prishlo iz Americi ili sozdano samostoiatel’noe?” [“Nuclear weapons of the USSR: Did it come from America or were they created independently?”], Evestia, 8 December 1992.


24. G.N. Flerov, “Vsemu mozhem pouchit’sia u Kurchatova” [“We can learn everything from Kurchatov.”], in A.P. Aleksandrov, ed., Vospomnianija ob Iogre Vasil’eviche Kurchatove (Moscow: Nauka, 1988). Flerov talked to many people about his role in the initiation of the Soviet project, and his account of his letter to Stalin in the spring of 1942 has been widely reported in the popular Soviet literature. The most reliable of these popular accounts are two books by Sergei Nefedov: Tsvory [Creators] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiiia, 1979); and Prometei raskovannyi [Prometheus unbound] (Moscow: Detskaiia literatura, 1980), which are based on extensive interviews with project participants. The books were recommended to me by Flerov, as well as by others in the Soviet project. They are now curiosities rather than useful sources, in view of the material that subsequently became available.


26. Vernadskii’s statements on atomic energy are scattered throughout his writings. For early thoughts on the significance of atomic energy see V.I. Vernadskii, Ocherki i rechi [Essays and speeches] (Petrograd: Nauchnoe khimikotekhnicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1922). A wartime memorandum is published in Priroda 4 (1945). The most important sources are Vernadskii’s diaries and correspondence in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences; some relevant correspondence can be found in the Vernadsky Collection in the Russian Archives, Butler Library, Columbia University. See I.I. Mochalov, Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); Kendall E. Bailes, Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions: V.I. Vernadsky and his Scientific School, 1863-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).


28. A valuable collection, for example, is P.N. Lebedev Physics Institute, Andrei Sakharov: Facets of a Life (Gif-sur-Yvette: Editions Frontières, 1991). The English translation is very poor, but the volume is not yet available in Russian. [Ed. note: A Sakharov archive, containing materials smuggled out of the Soviet Union during his dissident years, has been established at Brandeis University.]

29. Among relevant articles that he has already published are: “Fizika universitetskaia i akademicheskaia” [“Physics in the university and the academy.”], Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki [Questions in the history of science and technology] 2 (1991), and “S chego nachinalo’s sovetskaia vodorodnaia bomba” [“What started the Soviet hydrogen bomb.”], Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki 1 (1993).

30. V.A. Tsukerman and Z.M. Azarkh, ”Liudi i vzryvy” [“People and explosions.”], Vzryva [Shrapnel] 9-11 (1990). These comments, published before Arzamas-16 could be mentioned by name.


33. E.P. Slavskii, “Kogda strana stoiala na plechakh idernykh tartanov” [“When the country was standing on the shoulders of nuclear titans.”], Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 9 (1993), 13-24.

34. P.L. Kapitsa, Pis’ma o nauke [Letters on science] (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989); see also J.W. Boug, P.E. Rubinin, and D. Shoenberg, eds., Kapitsa in Cambridge and Moscow (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1990). In December 1945 Kapitsa sent Molotov the outline of an article on atomic energy that he wanted to publish. For this see P.L. Kapitsa, Pis’ma Molotovu [“Letter to Molotov.”], Vestnik Ministerstva Inostroynykh Del SSSR [Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 10 (1990).


40. On this episode see my letter to the editor in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50:1 (Jan./Feb. 1994), 62-63. [Ed. note: Holloway wrote in response to an article describing the incident (Sergei Leskov, “Dividing the Glory of the Fathers,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49:4 (May 1993), 37-39) which implied that Khariton might have opposed publication of the issue containing the espionage documents in order to minimize public appreciation of the intelligence agencies’ contribution to the Soviet atomic effort as opposed to that of Soviet atomic scientists. Holloway wrote:]

Because I was involved in this incident, I would like to comment.

The documents throw a good deal of light on Soviet atomic espionage during World War II and on the KGB’s contribution to the Soviet atomic project. They include, for example, detailed assessments by Igor Kurchatov, scientific director of the Soviet project, of the value of the material obtained by the intelligence service.

The documents were referred to, and cited in, the Soviet—and then Russian—press in 1991 and 1992. In 1992, Anatoli Iatskov, a former KGB agent who had been involved in atomic espionage, gave photocopies to the Institute of the History of Science and Technology with the understanding that the documents would be published in the institute’s journal.

The journal’s plan was drawn to the attention of Yuli Khariton by Yuri Sirmov in September 1992. Khariton asked the Ministry of Atomic Power to stop publication of two of the documents, on the grounds that their contents would contravene the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

When the Russian government sought to ban publication, the editor of the journal in which the documents were to appear asked my opinion, since I had already seen galleys of the proposed publication. I consulted some U.S. colleagues who are knowledgeable about proliferation issues. They told me that publication of two of the 14 documents might well contravene Article I of the NPT. Article I states that nuclear weapons parties to the treaty (and that now includes Russia) “undertake . . . not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.” That was the response I sent to the editor of the journal.

In his article, Leskov dismisses this issue, saying that “even Edward Teller and Andrei Sakharov would not have been able to build a bomb” with the information that was to be revealed. But the issue is more complex and more serious than that. The criterion for declassification of nuclear-weapon-related information is not whether it would enable someone to build a bomb—the issue is whether the information could be helpful to someone who wanted to build a bomb.

Most of the technical information contained in the documents is already in the public domain, but many of the details of the bomb design are not. This information would not by itself enable someone to build a bomb—they would need the right materials, after all. But it might help someone who wished to build one. The information was certainly useful to the Soviet Union, and it provided the basis for the design of the first Soviet atomic bomb.

According to Leskov, copies of the journal were sent to subscribers in St. Petersburg before the government ban went into effect. No doubt the public dissemination of this information will not lead to immediate proliferation; but it would have been better, I think, if it had not been published. This may be a very cautious position to take, but the issue should not be dismissed lightly. Moreover, it is not surprising that the Russian government took action, given Western concern that the breakup of the Soviet Union would lead to the dispersion of information, specialists, and technology that would contribute to proliferation.

After dismissing the issue of proliferation, Leskov implies that Khariton tried to prevent the documents’ publication because it would be a blow to his reputation. (Khariton was chief designer and scientific director of the nuclear weapons laboratory at Arzamas-16 from 1946 to 1992.) This, I think, is unjust. Khariton had already acknowledged that the first Soviet atomic bomb was a copy of the first U.S. plutonium bomb (in an interview with me in July 1992, for example). I do
not believe that he tried to stop publication for personal reasons.

No one objected to the publication of the 12 non-design documents, which by themselves make it clear that Soviet scientists obtained extensive information from espionage. Unfortunately, by the time the ban on publication was issued, it was too late for the journal to remove the two design-rich documents in question. Through no fault of its own, the journal was put in an extremely awkward position.

Students of Soviet history hope that all the documents will appear before long, perhaps with excisions in the two documents on bomb design. What is needed is a procedure for declassifying historically important documents, even if they contain sensitive information—by removing the sensitive portions before publication. The Ministry of Atomic Power should institute a procedure of this kind. The KGB had reviewed these documents, but apparently only to insure that they would not reveal information about intelligence sources or methods, not to check the sensitivity of the weapon information they contained.

Mike Moore, editor of the Bulletin, wrote in his May [1993] “Editor’s Note” that “those who live longest write history.” In a certain sense this is true. It is only because he survived the end of the Cold War that Khariton has been able to write about the Soviet nuclear weapons program. His account is invaluable because he was one of the key people in the program from the very beginning. He has not used his recollections to aggrandize himself or to exaggerate the role that he played in nuclear weapon development. This increases the value of his testimony; and it is made more valuable by the fact that the history of the Soviet nuclear project is enshrined with legend and myth. Moore is incorrect if he means that Khariton has tried to shut out other accounts of the Soviet project.


43. There has been, for some years, a running battle between the KGB and the physics community about the Soviet atomic project. Some former KGB officials have claimed that Soviet physicists made no contribution to the development of the atomic or hydrogen bombs, and that everything was done on the basis of intelligence material. The physicists have acknowledged the important role of intelligence in Soviet atomic bomb development, but have argued that the intelligence could have been checked and used only by competent physicists, and have asserted, moreover, that intelligence did not help in the development of Soviet thermonuclear weapons.


45. Sudoplatov gives an exaggerated view of the size and scope of the project during the war.


47. [Ed. note: In an interview for a documentary (“The Red Bomb”) broadcast on the Discovery Channel in September 1994, Terletskiy recalled that he did not take notes during his meetings with Bohr, which may explain errors appearing in a memorandum composed subsequently.]


53. As yet unpublished.


David Holloway is Professor of Political Science, and co-director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, at Stanford University.
University, political scientist John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution, and the late RAND Corporation analyst Thomas W. Wolfe set to work on a history of the Cold War arms race. They completed the History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972 in 1980. Their five-year study produced an immense report; including tables, endnotes, and bibliographies, it runs over a thousand typescript pages.

Although prepared under official auspices, this was not “official history” in the conventional sense. Schlesinger requested a “thorough, objective, critical, and analytical history of the arms race,” particularly during the formative postwar years. It is evident that the authors were not constrained to follow a “Pentagon line” and were free to draw their own conclusions, some of which strayed quite far from received wisdom about the dynamic forces shaping the arms race. Nevertheless, the authors wanted their efforts to be policy relevant; they hoped to clarify thinking in the “defense community” to “improve … capacity for shaping U.S. programs and policies.” To that extent, this study can be seen as part of the documentary record of the Cold War, shedding light on the murky relationship between the universities, think-tanks, and the executive branch, particularly the role of intellectuals in interpreting and influencing national policy.

The study itself is an invaluable guide to the U.S. documentary record, aided by the fact that May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe (hereafter MSW) enjoyed the cooperation of other military organizations—including the Institute for Defense Analyses, RAND, the unified services, and the DOD Historical Office—which prepared huge chronologies, studies, and official and oral histories for use as research material. All of the scholars involved in the enterprise had varying degrees of access to a wide variety of classified material held at Presidential Libraries, the State Department, Department of Energy, Pentagon, and CIA. Some of this material, especially “Restricted Data” on nuclear weapons and derived from intelligence sources, apparently remains sensitive to this day. These problems made the Pentagon exceedingly reluctant to review the arms competition history for declassification. Thus, not surprisingly, but unfortunately, while most of the report has been declassified, important material on Soviet and American policy remains excised.

In spite of the redactions, the general line of argument remains relatively transparent. But rather than summarizing or assessing the study as a whole, this article discusses some of the questions raised in the chapters on Soviet-era defense planning and decision-making, strategic nuclear policy, and force deployments, particularly during the 1940s and 50s. The lack of primary sources on the Soviet side forced the authors to rely on “speculation and inference” using data from a variety of secondary sources and highly classified intelligence reports. Nevertheless, MSW produced some rich and provocative material on the range of motives that may have informed Stalin’s postwar military policy, the 1949-52 military buildup, Khrushchev’s strategic priorities, the Berlin/Cuban crises, and the mid-1960s ICBM buildup, among other issues. These analyses merit careful pondering by historians and political scientists alike.

The authors believe that Stalin expected an “antagonistic” relationship with Washington, yet also suggest that his postwar military decisions provided “little provocation” for a “stepped up competition in armaments.” Thus, taking into account postwar demobilization, Soviet forces were large enough to maintain domestic security, stabilize the East European sphere of influence, and possibly to support West European Communists. Anticipating more recent historiographic trends, they see Stalin as “extremely cautious,” but possibly mindful that if revolutionary scenarios materialized in Western Europe, military strength could deter counter-revolutionary intervention. Consistent with the idea of a cautious Stalin, MSW offer another explanation as well: that force levels “mirrored some of Stalin’s domestic concerns,” especially the possibility of instability brought on by reintroducing prewar levels of “discipline.” Alternatively, Stalin may have believed that his practice of assuring relatively equal funding for each of the services would provide capabilities for foreseeable military requirements while ensuring that the leaders of any one of them did not become too powerful.

The possibility that Stalin operated on non-rational grounds, like a “Nero or a Caligula,” is suggested in a perfunctory way. But the weight of the analysis on postwar developments assumes a pattern of political rationality however it may have expressed itself in particular decisions. This is certainly true of the discussion of the 1949-1952 buildup. For MSW, there are several issues for which there is insufficient data. One is the dimensions of the buildup itself; U.S. intelligence agencies may still not know the size of ground forces expansion during this period. Another problem is motive, the degree to which the buildup was “planned long in advance or … reflected a Soviet reaction to threatening gestures and language from the West.” The possibility that the buildup had something to do with the Korean War is considered, but MSW place greater emphasis on treating it as “primarily a response to fears aroused by Yugoslavia’s defection and the concurrent buildup” of U.S. and NATO forces. Indeed, citing Soviet public reaction to Truman’s January 1949 budget message, it is suggested that subsequent defense budget growth was “possibly the first instance of action-reaction in the Soviet-U.S. military competition.”

The authors carefully avoid concluding that USSR or U.S. strategic forces “developed … only in reaction to each other.” But they suggest that the influence of Western decisions was more than casual. For example, MSW find that Soviet decisions on ground force levels were reactive, following trends in the West. Thus, when in 1952-3 it became evident that NATO could not meet its ground force targets, the Soviets began to cut forces. Moreover, the authors believe that the heavy increase in U.S. spending on nuclear weapons and delivery systems during the Korean War era had a decided impact on Soviet military organization and deployments. PVO Strany, the organization in charge of air defenses, became an independent entity and secured resources that it used to encircle Moscow with SA-1 surface-to-air missiles—reportedly costing over a billion dollars—designed to destroy bomber aircraft.

The extent to which the U.S. nuclear buildup of the early 1950s contributed to intensified Soviet programs in that area is less certain. MSW believe Stalin responded to it with “sangfroid” because he was satisfied that relatively small nuclear forces were enough to deter attack and also constrain the influence of industrial managers. They also believe that heavy investments in nuclear reactors implied that Stalin’s priority was not so much producing deliverable weapons but developing the technological basis for
producing a modern and powerful arsenal. This, they suggest, may have dovetailed with Stalin’s conviction that nuclear weapons were relevant to supporting Soviet foreign policy rather than for actual military use. That emphasis was also consistent with Soviet military doctrine prior to the mid-1950s, which either ignored or downplayed the role of nuclear weapons and emphasized instead “permanently operating factors” such as national morale and cohesion.14

Central to MSW’s study is their discussion of the mid-to-late 1950s, which they see as a formative period for Soviet strategic doctrine and weapons systems. At that time the political and military leadership revised official doctrine about nuclear war; rather than minimizing the problem of a preemptive nuclear attack, they began to treat it as the preeminent danger and emphasized the importance of ready forces and preparation as well as arms control. More or less concurrently, the Soviets began to scale down their long-range bomber program and redirect resources toward ICBM and IRBM development. They did not, however, accelerate the latter; worried about the costs of military competition, they decided to make large investments slowly.15

MSW’s interpretation of these developments, which fed into U.S. decisions to hasten ICBM and SLBM programs, raises important questions that deserve further exploration when Russian Defense Ministry archives become available. The authors contend that during the mid-50s Soviet leaders concluded that bombers were useful for deterring an attack but not for “damage limitation,” i.e., for the “defensive purpose of minimizing the harm an enemy nation could do.” Believing that Washington was far ahead of them in ability to launch a crippling strategic attack, and perhaps overestimating U.S. air defense capacities, the Soviets reasoned that missiles, not bombers, could help them solve their problems, MSW suggest. Missiles, unlike bomber aircraft, were more or less unstoppable and could reach their targets quickly. While acknowledging the importance of various organizational and technological considerations, along with the persuasive abilities of rocket designer Sergei P. Korolev, MSW argue that a preoccupation with the “strategic defensive” was fundamental to explaining the shift in resources from bombers to missiles.16

The authors present a stimulating interpretation of Nikita Khrushchev’s unsuccessful “missile diplomacy” of the late 1950s and early ‘60s, an issue that has been of great interest to scholars.17 For MSW, Khrushchev’s missile rattling needs to be understood in terms of military pressure on him to reverse his policy of restraint on military spending. Noting that the bulk of Soviet effort lay in MRBMs and not ICBMs (such as the SS-7 and SS-8), they suggest that Khrushchev was content to pursue a “second best strategic posture” that could meet potential threats on the Eurasian periphery, in particular West Germany and China. At the same time, restraint on ICBM development might have been a way to encourage Washington to disengage from Western Europe. Alternatively, the Soviets may also have had a problem in meeting their ICBM production goals. In this context, perhaps Khrushchev and the Soviet military found a “strategic bluff” as useful and necessary for meeting political goals as well as for concealing the weakness in their strategic posture.18

Without access to Soviet military and Presidential archives, MSW’s hypotheses cannot be adequately tested; this problem is no less true for their reading of the early 1960s U.S.-Soviet crises—especially the Cuban Missile Crisis—and their impact on Soviet ICBM deployments in the following years. Like many analysts, the authors see the Soviet decision to deploy the MRBMs as motivated in part to defend Cuba and in part to offset U.S. strategic superiority, which had put Soviet nuclear forces in a situation that was “little short of desperate.”19 But they are puzzled by the military logic, noting that the small force of missiles would have “been inadequate to destroy enough of the American strategic strike capability to preclude severe retaliatory damage” to the Soviet Union. MSW provide two possible answers to this problem. One possibility is that the Soviets believed that their deployment was adequate to deter Washington in a crisis: the U.S. would avoid a confrontation rather than risking a few cities. The other, admittedly speculative, is that prospective targets were U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) command and control facilities that could not be reached from Soviet territory. With their MRBMs in Cuba, and in keeping with the Soviet’s strategic defensive orientation, they could hinder a “fully coordinated” U.S. first strike.20

MSW relate Khrushchev’s decisions on Cuba to a struggle with his Presidium colleagues over strategic force levels. Losing political clout after the U-2 affair and the retreat from the Berlin ultimatum (to sign a peace treaty with East Germany that would isolate West Berlin) in October 1961, Khrushchev was under greater pressure to allocate more resources to ICBMs. In this context, he may have seen the Cuban deployment as a way to contain military spending while giving the military more coverage of critical targets in the United States. Thus, “targeting the SAC command structure would help explain why the Soviets would undertake the very risky Cuban venture.”21

Whatever the purposes of the deployment may have been, MSW argue that the Missile Crisis’ outcome, with Moscow forced to back down and withdraw the missiles, acted as a “catalyst” by bringing to the surface latent dissatisfaction with Khrushchev’s “second best” approach if not his concern with Germany and China. Thus, U.S. “strategic pressure” touched off a two-year-long debate involving a major decision for significant deployments of third-generation ICBM systems: the SS-7 and SS-8 were abandoned and more resources poured into the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviets decided to develop the “Yankee class” submarine missile system. By 1965, MSW propose, the Soviets had completed basic decisions on force levels which remained relatively stable in the following years. And they further suggest that the intention behind these decisions was not strategic dominance or even serious “counterforce” capabilities, as the CIA’s “Team B” maintained in the mid-70s’. Rather, a basic purpose may have been parity with the United States. Indeed, if its priority was MRBM deployments on their territorial periphery, the Kremlin may well have seen parity as sufficient to support their political interests in a future crisis.22

Besides their overall assessment of the mid-1960s decisions, MSW raise specific questions about the characteristics of the missile deployments. For example, they are uncertain whether the Soviets developed the relatively inexpensive SS-11 ICBM in a “crash program” after the Cuban Missile Crisis or in 1961, becoming important later. In addition, solid information is not available on what the missile designers and the military had in mind when they developed
and deployed the heavy SS-9 ICBM. Returning to their earlier line of argument about command-and-control targeting, MSW use circumstantial evidence to conjecture that the SS-9’s mission may have been to disable the command-and-control system of the U.S. Minuteman missile complex. Perhaps that is why the Pentagon found the SS-9s worrisome; thus, one purpose of Johnson and Nixon-era SALT strategy was to “seek to dissuade the Soviet Union from further large-scale deployments.”

MSW raise a host of other interesting questions about Soviet decision-making in such areas as arms control, anti-ballistic missile systems, missile accuracy, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and fourth generation ICBM deployments of the early 1970s. Like the earlier material, the analysis is stimulating and deserves careful study. For example, the authors link the mid-‘60s ICBM buildup to the SALT process by suggesting that in the process of deciding force levels each side developed an interest in arms control. They argue that conditions for SALT existed by 1965, when both sides had made basic decisions about ABM systems and the Soviets had decided to match U.S. ICBM deployments and MIRV technology. Thus, SALT was “a matter of ratifying decisions on the size and basic technical competition which each side reached unilaterally.”

Declassification of some of the material once closely held by intelligence community—some of which may not even have been available to MSW—may shed light on some of MSW’s interpretations. For example, the CIA has begun to release its National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic forces, including NIEs that were produced during the “missile gap” debate of the late 1950s. Perhaps even more important, beginning in 1992 the CIA began to declassify documents on one of the most famous and most successful Cold War espionage cases, the defection-in-place of Soviet GRU (military intelligence) Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Penkovsky provided CIA with a treasure trove of classified material, some of which is now available in translated form. A highlight is the top secret edition “Special Collection” of the journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) provided to the Agency in 1961-62 by Penkovsky. More in the nature of “think pieces,” contributions to debates, etc., rather than policy and planning documents, the articles in the “Special Collection” clearly indicate important trends of thought in the Khrushchev-era high command. For example, the material documents the sometimes bitter controversy within the Soviet military over the extent to which strategy should depend on nuclear weapons and whether there remained a role for general purpose forces. In addition, some of the articles show that a number of articulate generals believed that it was essential to have an array of ICBMs at their disposal if they were to “fight against means of nuclear attack” with any degree of success. Such statements, which can be interpreted as pressure to raise the ICBM budget, make MSW’s line of argument about the strategically defensive character of Soviet planning all the more plausible.

In addition to the top secret articles from Voyennaya Mysl, the CIA has also declassified most of Penkovsky’s debriefings to CIA and SIS officials during visits to England and France during 1961 and 1962. Besides a remarkable statement on Soviet ICBM force deficiencies (“we don’t have a damn thing”), the transcripts contain a wide range of detail on nuclear weapons-related issues, including command and control, missile and weapons tests, anti-ballistic missile and air defense programs, tactical weapons, rocket types and missile technology, weapons dispersal, nuclear facilities and key military figures in the nuclear area. (An amusing revelation is the previously obscure “vodka crisis” of 1961; to ensure the availability of alcohol for missile fuel, the military crimped supplies for civilian use, thus creating a vodka shortage.) As with oral history, Penkovsky’s statements require corroboration and cross-checking to screen out inaccuracies and politically-driven interpretations. Nevertheless, the transcripts provide striking detail about personalities and issues during one of the Cold War’s tensest passages.

The Penkovsky material, much of which the CIA has yet to release, sheds some light on the Khrushchev era, but more than that will be needed to permit even a preliminary resolution of the interpretive problems that MSW broach. A program of oral history interviews with retired Soviet general officers and weapons designers could be particularly valuable for clarifying developments during the Khrushchev era and after. Oral histories may be essential when written records on some events no longer exist, but they are only a stopgap. It may well be that the eventual transfer of records from the Russian Presidential Archives to the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (the archival repository for post-1952 CPSU records) will enable researchers to test the various hypotheses developed by MSW. Nevertheless, a full picture of Soviet military policy during the Cold War will require the Russian Defense Ministry to develop programs for regularizing access to the archival collections under its control. If and when such material becomes available, the history of Soviet strategic program will only incidentally be a history of U.S. perceptions.

2. History, 634.
3. Since this essay was written, several important studies have become available that show how much can be accomplished without extensive access to Russian military archives; see, e.g., Thomas B. Cochran and Robert Standish Norris, Russian/Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production, National Resource Defense Council Working Paper NWD93-1, 8 September 1993; and David Holloway’s magisterial Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
4. [Ed. note: In what may be a hopeful portent, since this article was written the Russian military has declassified a limited amount of records pertaining to specific Cold War events, such as the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis (1961), and the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, it is too soon to tell whether these limited steps, taken in conjunction with particular political events or academic projects, will lead to more systematic declassification or even to easier and equitable scholarly access to those materials that are declassified.]
5. Some of the supporting studies have been declassified, e.g., IDA Study S-467, The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972 by L. Wainstein et al. (June 1975). Others are under declassification review, including the chronology used to prepare the study, as well as an IDA history of Soviet strategic command, control and warning.
6. Pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive, the Defense Department, CIA, and other agencies are now reviewing the classified.
9. Ibid., 82. For intelligence estimates on Soviet

10. Ibid., 257. Kathryn Weathersby of Florida State University is now preparing a major study of the role of the Korean question in Soviet policy during 1949 and 1950.

11. Ibid., 250. Others may argue that the first example was the Soviet atomic bomb program.

12. Ibid., 810-11.


14. Ibid., 280-83, 299, 302. For Stalin and nuclear weapons, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb.

15. Ibid., 315-33. See also Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine, 34-35, 42, which emphasizes ideas about deterrence in the new military thinking.


20. Ibid., 474-86, 664-65. The first interpretation is consistent with Garthoff’s reading (Reflections, 20-21). A second interpretation assumes that Soviet nuclear tests in 1961 may have alerted Moscow to the possibility that Electromagnet Pulse (EMP) effects could be used to cripple command and control machinery.


22. Ibid., 491-503, 643-45, 687-90, 704-708. See also Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 43-44. MSW note that the number of Soviet ICBMs deployed in the 1960s was “not wildly out of line with what Soviet planners might have projected as a matching response” to American programs as of 1963-1965. History, 707. For their criteria, see ibid., 660-63. The 1976 CIA “Team B” report has been declassified in the Modern Military Branch, National Archives.


24. History, 737-38.

25. One example can be found at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library: NIE 11-4-60, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1966,” 1 December 1960. See also the forthcoming collection of NIEs which the CIA hopes to publish in late 1994.


28. The CIA and DIA have yet to declassify the studies of the “Ironbark” and “Chickadee” material prepared by intelligence analysts at the time as well as the translations of many of the documents that Penkovsky provided. Some declassification review of some of this material may be underway.

29. For “we don’t have a damn thing,” which was a quotation of a statement by Gen. Sergei S. Varentsov, see “Meeting No. 4 at Leeds, England, 23 April 1961.” Initially dubious about the value of Penkovsky’s information—he was a “subsource about whom they knew nothing”—U.S. intelligence refused to include it in NIE 11-8-61 on Soviet strategic forces. See “Conversations with Messrs. Ed Proctor and Jack Smith Re Use of CHICKADEE Material in NIE 11-8-61,” 7 June 1961.


COLD WAR SCIENCE continued from page 2

of them. Although Center-financed interviews have largely focused on Western science, a fraction of these interviews discuss Soviet research, some extensively. Of particular interest are in-depth interviews with Viktor Ambartsument, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Fok, Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa, Alla Genrikova Massevich, and Mitrofan Stepanovich Zverev.

III. Biographical and Institutional Information. The Center for History of Physics also maintains files for individual biographical data and institutional histories. While the bulk of these materials concern Western and particularly U.S. scientists, a number of files contain information on prominent Soviet and East European scientists and scientific institutions. Researchers should phone prior to planned visits to ascertain whether material on particular individuals or institutions is available. Examples of information recently received by the Center include a manuscript by Vitaly A. Bronshten on the influence of V.T. Ter-Oganezov on the development of Soviet astronomy; copies of records relating to the Kharkov Physical Institute between 1926 and 1945; and photocopies of interrogation transcripts of two scientists (Lev Shubnikov and Vadim Gorsky) accused of espionage during the 1930s Stalinist purges.

For further information, contact the Niels Bohr Library, Center for History of Physics, American Institute of Physics, One Physics Ellipse, College Park, MD 20740, tel. 301-209-3175; fax 301-209-0882; e-mail nb@ai.p.

Ronald E. Doel is working on a history of scientists and the Cold War; Caroline Moseley is an associate archivist at the Center for History of Physics, American Institute of Physics.
AFTER STALIN

continued from page 1

Addressing the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Plenary Meeting on 3 July 1953, Avraami Zavenyagin, deputy head of the recently-created Ministry of Medium Machine Building, spoke proudly: “The Americans [after the first Soviet atomic test in 1949] saw that their advantages had gone, and at Truman’s order began the work on the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are no slouches. We took it up as well and, as far as we can judge, we believe we do not lag behind the Americans. The hydrogen bomb is tens of times more powerful than a plain atomic bomb and its explosion will mean the liquidation of the second monopoly of the Americans, now under preparation, which would be an event of ultimate importance in world politics.”

The country’s new leaders, Georgii Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev, having quickly solved “the Beria problem” inherited from Stalin, still faced another dangerous legacy—the confrontation with the United States. Stalin left to his successors his orthodox vision of international affairs, based on Leninist theory, the most staunch supporter and advocate of which in the Soviet leadership was Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov. Even as late as the June 1957 CC CPSU Plenum, Molotov still toed the orthodox line while giving lip service to the new currents in foreign policy: “We all understand and consider it to be necessary to conduct, promote and stimulate such measures which are conducive to the reduction of international tension. This is the foundation of our work on the strengthening of peace, on the postponement [emphasis added] and prevention of a new war.”

To Molotov, in other words, the world conflagration was just a matter of time and determining the proper moment for the explosion was just a matter of time and determining the proper moment for the explosion. The timing and context of the Soviet physicists’ initiative should be noted. As its title suggested—“The Danger of Atomic War and President Eisenhower’s Proposal”—the draft article sent by Malyshev to Khrushchev was, on its surface, intended to rebut the “Atoms for Peace” proposal advanced by Eisenhower to the United Nations almost four months earlier, on 8 December 1953; in his speech, the U.S. president had warned of the grave threat nuclear weapons posed to humanity, and proposed that the nuclear superpowers (the USA, USSR, and Britain) share their stocks of fissionable material to create an international pool for peaceful worldwide atomic energy development. However, while applauding Eisenhower’s conciliatory rhetoric, Moscow responded tepidly to the “Atoms for Peace” scheme, as did the Soviet physicists who authored the draft article. The spread and development of “peaceful” atomic energy technology, they noted sharply, leads “not to a reduction in, but to a proliferation of atomic weapons supplies.” Expertise in operating nuclear power plants “can also serve as a means for the further perfection of methods for the production of atomic energy for military purposes,” they pointed out, and atomic electric power stations “for peaceful purposes” may at the same time be an industrial and sufficiently cheap way to produce large amounts of explosive substances for atomic and hydrogen bombs—giving the example of an atomic energy plant with a 10,000-kilowatt
had “already twice informed the world about Dragon and the fact that the United States nuclear physicists specifically alluded to the ‘destruction of the human race,’ but about the need to prepare and mobilize all forces for the destruction of the bourgeoisie,” he was quoted as saying.

As David Holloway notes in his recent account, Molotov took an even harsher stand. “A communist should not speak about the ‘destruction of world civilization’ or about the ‘destruction of the human race,’ but about the need to prepare and mobilize all forces for the destruction of the bourgeoisie,” he was quoted as saying.
How can it be asserted [Molotov added] that civilization could perish in an atomic war?...Can we make the peoples believe that in the event of war all must perish? Then why should we build socialism, why worry about tomorrow? It would be better to supply everyone with coffins now...You see to what absurdities, to what harmful things, mistakes on political issues can lead.  

It remains unclear, at least so far as Khrushchev was concerned, whether this criticism was merely a means to discredit Malenkov as a leader or was instead a manifestation of genuine loyalty to dogmatic tenets. It is known, however, that Khrushchev, who ousted Malenkov in February 1955 from the post of head of state, and then pushed Molotov aside from the helm of foreign policy, soon revealed that he shared the same estimate of the danger of thermonuclear war he had recently condemned. The East-West summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, where Khrushchev already acted as the real leader of the Soviet delegation, demonstrated this as well.

During the summit, a memorable one-on-one conversation took place, with only Soviet interpreter Oleg Troyanovsky present, between Eisenhower and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi Zhukov—two famous military leaders of the Second World War. Each had a clear understanding of the power of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was first to show how much the growth of nuclear armaments worried him, stressing that “now, with the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, many notions that were correct in the past have changed. War in modern conditions with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapon became even more senseless than ever before.” Zhukov agreed and noted that “he personally saw how lethal this weapon is.” (Zhukov, in September 1954, had supervised a military exercise in the southern Urals at Totskoye, during which a 20-kiloton atomic bomb was dropped from a plane and 44,000 soldiers immediately thereafter staged a mock battle at the test site to simulate nuclear war under “realistic” conditions.)

Eisenhower continued: “Even scientists do not know what would happen if, say, in the course of one month 200 hydrogen bombs would explode and if the conditions would favor the spread of atomic dust.” In his answer Zhukov stressed that he “personally favors the liquidation of atomic and hydrogen weapons” and noted that “in the first days of war the United States would drop 300-400 bombs on the USSR,” and the Soviet Union retaliated in kind, “then one can imagine what would happen to the atmosphere.”

One is struck by the realism and responsibility of two professional military men who had become prominent statesmen. Still, Zhukov had undoubtedly spoken with Khrushchev’s advice and consent.

Therefore, one may infer that the physicists’ warnings had reached their target. The Geneva Summit, Khrushchev recalled many years later, “convinced us once again, that there was no pre-war situation in existence at that time, and our enemies were afraid of us in the same way as we were of them.”

No wonder that, already, in the documents adopted by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the thesis of the inevitability of a new world war resulting from the aggressive encroachments of imperialism and new “warmongers” was replaced with the thesis of durable “peaceful coexistence between different social systems.”

In subsequent years, profoundly concerned about the threat of thermonuclear war, Kurchatov did not cease his efforts to enlighten the country’s leadership about nuclear danger. “Early in 1957,” Andrei Sakharov recalled, “Kurchatov suggested... that I write something about the effects of radiation from the so-called clean bomb.”

Sakharov’s investigation enhanced understanding of the extreme danger of atmospheric nuclear tests not only to present, but to future generations. He estimated that the overall number of possible victims from the radiation impact of each megaton of nuclear explosion might approach 10,000 in the course of several thousand years following the test. His article ended with a seminal recommendation: “Halting the tests will directly save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and it also promises even greater indirect benefits, reducing international tensions and the risk of nuclear war, the fundamental danger of our times.”

Even before this article’s publication in a scientific journal in July 1958, Sakharov, again at Kurchatov’s suggestion, wrote another article on the dangers of atmospheric testing for a wide audience. It was translated into major languages and published, with the aim of reaching foreign readers, by many Soviet journals distributed abroad. In this campaign one again senses Kurchatov’s purposeful activity, but, what is especially significant, even Khrushchev’s personal involvement. As Sakharov recalled: “Khrushchev himself authorized the publication of my articles. Kurchatov discussed the matter twice with him and then referred some minor suggested editorial changes to me...Khrushchev approved the revised versions at the end of June and they were sent off immediately to the editors.”

On 31 March 1958, Khrushchev announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing—a move that may well have been influenced not only by the immediate political calculus, but also by the considerations of Soviet atomic physicists. In this context the words that Kurchatov spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960, three weeks before his sudden death—when he professed his “deep faith and firm knowledge that the Soviet people, and government would channel to the benefit of mankind” the achievements of atomic science—should be understood as an urgent plea to his country’s leaders.

But, as the Soviet missile and nuclear arsenal continued to grow and develop, it began to figure increasingly prominently, and menacingly, as an element of Soviet power diplomacy. This happened, for instance, at the climax of the Suez crisis in November 1956, when Moscow reminded British and French leaders of their nations’ vulnerability to Soviet rockets if they did not withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. Khrushchev and his supporters spoke later with pride about the good results allegedly produced by this flexing of nuclear muscles. Speaking on 24 June 1957 at a CC CPSU Plenum, Mikoyan (at Khrushchev’s prompting) recalled: “We were strong enough to keep troops in Hungary and to warn the imperialists that, if they would not stop the war in Egypt, it might come to the use of missile armaments from our side. All acknowledge that with this we decided the fate of Egypt.”

Khrushchev’s realization that the USSR had become a mighty nuclear power tempted the Soviet leader not only to play a sometimes tough game, but even to launch dangerous, reckless adventures, most egre-
giously with regard to the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, which brought the world to the edge of the thermonuclear precipice.

By then, Khrushchev had already learned that the atomic bomb could also be a potent force in internal, domestic struggles. Beria’s arrest on 26 June 1953, and the special CC CPSU Plenum dedicated to the “Beria affair” a week later, demonstrated that the Soviet nuclear capability had acquired unexpected weight in the eyes of the leadership of the country as a new, additional lever in political skirmishes and the struggle for power.

In the course of “unmasking” Beria at the July 1953 Plenum, the leadership troika of Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Molotov arranged that among the accusers would be the administrators of the Soviet atomic project, Beria’s recent subordinates: the Minister of Medium Machine Building Malyshev and his deputy Zavenyagin. Taking his political cue from the troika, Malyshev, in his speech at the Plenum, pointed to the following sins of Beria: “he put his signature on a whole number of important decisions without informing the CC and the government, for instance, on the working plan of 1953 for a very important research and development bureau working on the design of atomic bombs....He hid them from the government, signed them single-handedly, taking advantage of his position of the chairman of the Special committee.”

Zavenyagin seconded his chief, adding that “the decision to test the hydrogen bomb had not been reported to the government, had not been reported to the Central Committee, and was taken by Beria single-handedly.” Zavenyagin even took a slap at his former boss’s role in the atomic project: “Beria had a reputation of organizer, but in reality he was a die-hard bureaucrat....Decision-taking dragged on for weeks and months.” Malenkov set the tone and summarized the accusations in a crisp formula of political verdict. In his words, Beria had “positioned himself apart and began to act, ignoring the CC and the government in the crucial issues of the competence of the CC. For instance, without informing the CC and the government, he took a decision to organize the explosion of the hydrogen bomb.”

The proposition that Beria “positioned himself above the party” and was ready to crush it—aside from other purported “treasonous schemes” attributed to him (including the renunciation of “socialism” in the GDR, and a secret rapprochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia)—became the basis for his indictment and execution in December 1953. The recriminations against Beria as a chief of the atomic project were as bizarre as they were effective in the power struggle. In reality, Beria, being the high commissioner of the Soviet atomic project, was also the First Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CC CPSU, and, after Stalin’s death, one of the ruling troika. This provided him with more than sufficient authority in the framework of the atomic project. Moreover, according to many Soviet atomic veterans, the “die-hard bureaucrat” Beria had quickly given an appropriate impetus and scope to all works on the project, and if, instead, Molotov had remained in charge, the chances for rapid accomplishment of the project’s monumental tasks would have been slim. Finally, Malenkov and Zavenyagin’s accusation about the decision to test is simply absurd, for a month and a half still had to pass after Beria’s arrest until the explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen device. Not to Beria but to his accusers fell the decision to issue the actual authorization for the testing.

After Beria’s arrest, the atomic complex became a darling of “the party and the government” (as an official formula put it), guarded and controlled by the Defense Department of the CC CPSU, as well as by the military-industrial commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. But this did not stop Gorbachev in the days of Chernobyl, 30 years after the Beria accusations, from performing a traditional party somersault and making strange accusations at a Politburo session: “All is kept secret from the CC. Its officials could not dare to put their nose into this field. Even the questions of location of [nuclear power plants] were not decided by the government.”

New priorities, dictated by nuclear weapons, also played an exceptional role in Khrushchev’s ascendency and his struggle against the Old Guard. The March 1954 episode has already been mentioned, when Khrushchev subjected Malenkov, the head of the state, to sharp criticism for his thesis about “the end of civilization” in the event of thermonuclear war. By taking Molotov’s side in this debate, Khrushchev was able later, with his support, to remove Malenkov from the sphere of foreign and defense policy, claiming that he was “a bad communist” who “lacks toughness and falls under alien influence.”

After taking Malenkov down a notch, Khrushchev undermined Molotov. He continued to use the nuclear “topic” to accuse his rival, this time for conservatism and dogmatic “deviation.” The final clash between Khrushchev and Molotov took place at the June 1957 CC CPSU Plenum. As a target for his attack, Molotov chose a phrase Khrushchev spoke to The New York Times a month earlier: “Speaking in more definite terms about international tension, the crux of it, in the final analysis, is in the relations between the two countries—the Soviet Union and the United States of America.” Molotov, admitting that the USSR had become a great nuclear power, drew from it a conclusion that fit the party orthodoxy but was quite opposite to what Khrushchev meant—that while relying on this power, Molotov insisted that Moscow “must take special care to broaden every fissure, every dissent and contradiction in the imperialist camp, to weaken international positions of the United States of America—the strongest among imperialist powers.”

In a rejoinder, Khrushchev’s ally Anastas Mikoyan called Molotov “a dyed-in-the-wool conservative” and stressed that Khrushchev’s declaration “is correct in essence and corresponds to the accepted decision of the CC,” since it meant that “the question—to be or not to be for a war—in the present times depends on the biggest powers of the two camps, possessing the hydrogen bomb.” Continuing his allegation that the anti-Khrushchev (“anti-party”) group repudiates this crucial fact, Mikoyan said: “This is being done in order to subsequently...turn around our foreign policy, [which is] aimed at the relaxation of international tension.”

Khrushchev outwitted his competitors. Unlike Malenkov, whose estimate of nuclear danger sounded as a lonely shot in the dark, Khrushchev skillfully and repeatedly exploited the Soviet atomic project’s achievements and the nuclear issue in general in his tactical moves during the power struggle. Moreover, he advanced the new strategic concept of “peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist systems” and guaranteed its approval by the CPSU 20th Party Congress. Thereafter, Khrushchev’s bold declaration about the two nuclear powers could be defended as a new party line. Al-
though this declaration implied accepting Malenkov’s thesis, Khrushchev enjoyed a political net gain, since he emphasized not so much the threat of thermonuclear war as the equal responsibility of the USSR and United States for the fate of the world.

The first 10-15 years of the nuclear era brought fundamental change in the positions of the Soviet leadership on the issue of war and peace. The atomic bomb’s appearance led Stalin immediately to comprehend that it was a fact of supreme importance for the world and forced him, in a country devastated by the Second World War, to mobilize all available resources to create an atomic bomb of his own. Soon after Stalin’s death—and practically at the same moment as the American leadership—Soviet statesmen realized that the utilization of nuclear weapons threatened mankind with total annihilation.

However, the understanding of the dangers facing humanity in the nuclear epoch did not lessen but rather exacerbated the confrontation between the two leading powers. The race for nuclear-missile power and the confrontation between the two leading powers facing humanity in the nuclear epoch wrought fundamental change in the political net gain, since he emphasized not so much the threat of thermonuclear war as the equal responsibility of the USSR and United States for the fate of the world.

It was in the 1950s and early 1960s that the global view of war and peace held by statesmen in the two countries irrevocably changed. On the Soviet side the policy reorientation shifted away from the preparations for an inevitable new world war towards the construction of enduring peaceful relations with the United States and its allies. The new sources suggest that a critical role in the enlightenment of the Soviet leadership during that crucial period belonged to the designers of nuclear weapons themselves, primarily to Igor Kurchatov.

The subsequent two decades of the nuclear arms race, Soviet-American arms control negotiations, and, ultimately, “new thinking,” added relatively little to what had been understood in principle by the politicians of the 1950s. Despite the huge expenditures on new weapons systems, the endless speculations and maneuverings of political alliances, and major geopolitical changes, the basic priorities which had been dictated to mankind by the advent of the nuclear era remained the same—and they will remain a guideline into our future.

2. Stalin’s role in launching the Soviet nuclear program is well described and amply documented in David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). The deliverability of the thermonuclear weapon tested in August 1953 is noted in Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 307. The United States first tested the thermonuclear concepts employed in its hydrogen bombs by detonating a non-deliverable device on the island of Eniwetok in the South Pacific on 1 November 1952, and first tested a deliverable hydrogen bomb in March 1954.
5. Malyshev specifically suggested that the article could be signed by Academicians A.N. Nesmeyanov, A.F. Ioffe, D.V. Skobel’[‘]sin, and A.I. Oparin.
7. ibid., pp. 39, 40, 41.
8. ibid., pp. 42-44. The physicists’ arguments against the “Atoms for Peace” plan were incorporated into the formal Soviet rejection of the proposal conveyed by Foreign Minister Molotov to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later that spring. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, chap. 16.
13. Izvestia, 27 April 1954.
15. Aksyonin and Volobuev, XX s’ezd KPSS, 60.
The 1992 television documentary, “The Story of an Invisible Town,” also promoted the incorrect theory that “only after this explosion did the parties make concessions and sign the treaty.”

As a result of excessive secrecy and limited access to information, even some of the directors of the test formed incorrect impressions. For example, the director of the test site on Novaya Zemlya, Gavriil Kudryavtsev, mentioned that in our country “60-megaton and even 100-megaton (fortunately never tested) superbombs have appeared.” His explanation of their “appearance” is bizarre: “I think that the ‘secret’ is rather simple. In those days, the strike accuracy of our missiles was insufficient. The only way to compensate for this was to increase the power of the warhead.”

A completely fantastic idea about the 50-MT bomb appeared in 1992 in Pravda: “[this bomb] represents the yesterday of atomic weaponry. Even more powerful warheads have been developed by now.”

In fact, the 50-MT bomb tested on 30 October 1961 was never a weapon. This was a one-of-a-kind device, whose design allowed it to achieve a yield of up to 100 megatons when fully loaded with nuclear fuel. Thus, the test of the 50-MT bomb was in effect the test of the design for a 100-MT weapon. If a blast of such horrific magnitude had been conducted, it would have generated a gigantic, fiery tornado, engulfing an area larger than Vladimirskaya Oblast in Russia or the state of Maryland in the USA.

The explosion of the 50-MT bomb did not lead, as some suppose, to the immediate conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Negotiations to conclude the treaty continued for another two years. However, one may speculate that the explosion indirectly contributed to the talks’ success.

The 50-MT bomb never had any military significance. It was a one-time demonstration of force, part of the superpower game of mutual intimidation. This was the main goal of the unprecedented test. Superweapons are rejected by contemporary military doctrine, and the proposition that “now we have even more powerful warheads” is simply ridiculous.

What was the political situation? The relations between Moscow and Washington at the time of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September 1959 had been ameliorating, but the following May the espionage flight of Frances Gary Powers over the Soviet Union aggravated them seriously. The U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft batteries near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960. In the aftermath, the summit conference of Soviet, U.S., British, and French state leaders in Paris was aborted, and the return visit to the USSR of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower was cancelled. Cuba, where Castro came to power, became the object of passions, and the failure of the U.S.-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro Cuban emigres at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 was a great shock for the Kennedy Administration.

But the main arena of opposition between the USA and Soviet Union was Europe. The serious, seemingly insoluble question of a peaceful German settlement once again rose to the fore, with the status of West Berlin the focus of attention. The exhausting talks on arms reduction, accompanied by strict demands from the Western Powers to inspect the territories of participating parties, were unsuccessful. The Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban looked more and more gloomy although the nuclear powers (except France) were adhering to a voluntary test moratorium in the context of those talks. Meanwhile, hostile propaganda and recriminations between the USSR and the USA became the norm. Finally, the main event of that period which aroused a storm of protests in the West was the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.

In the meantime the Soviet Union sought self-reliance. It was the first to test an intercontinental ballistic missile and launch satellites into orbit, and the first to send a man into outer space. Having acquired immense prestige, among the Third World countries in particular, the USSR did not yield to the Western pressure and started active operations on its own.

Therefore, when by the end of the summer of 1961 international tensions grew unusually high, the course of events took on the peculiar logic of superpower politics. For a month and a half prior to the announcement by the Soviet government, we, the developers of nuclear weapons, began preparing to test new prototypes. We knew that the culmination of the series of tests planned in the USSR would be the explosion of the 50-MT device, which was designed to produce explosions of up to 100 megatons. In

50-MEGATON BLAST
continued from page 3
that the bomb design had worked.

Meanwhile, both aircraft and documentary crews observing the test were subjected to a most graphic experience. As one cameraman recalled: “The clouds beneath the aircraft and in the distance were lit up by the powerful flash. The sea of light spread under the hatch and even clouds began to glow and became transparent. At that moment, our aircraft emerged from between two cloud layers and down below in the gap a huge bright orange ball was emerging. The ball was powerful and arrogant like Jupiter. Slowly and silently it crept upwards.... Having broken through the thick layer of clouds it kept growing. It seemed to suck the whole earth into it. The spectacle was fantastic, unreal, supernatural.” Another cameraman saw “a powerful white flash over the horizon and after a long period of time he heard a remote, indistinct and heavy blow, as if the earth has been killed!”

Some time after the explosion, photographs were taken of ground zero. “The ground surface of the island has been levelled, swept and licked so that it looks like a skating rink,” a witness reported. “The same goes for rocks. The snow has melted and their sides and edges are shiny. There is not a trace of unevenness in the ground.... Everything in this area has been swept clean, scoured, melted and blown away.”

A twenty-minute film about the development and test of the 50-MT bomb was later shown to the Soviet leadership. The film concluded with the following remark: “Based on preliminary data alone, it is evident that the explosion has set a record in terms of power.” In fact, its power was 10 times the total power of all explosives used during World War II, including the atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities by the United States. It’s hard to believe that a bomb of such horrific magnitude had been tested on its own.

The explosion of the 50-MT bomb did not lead, as some suppose, to the immediate conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Negotiations to conclude the treaty continued for another two years. However, one may speculate that the explosion indirectly contributed to the talks’ success.

The 50-MT bomb never had any military significance. It was a one-time demonstration of force, part of the superpower game of mutual intimidation. This was the main goal of the unprecedented test. Superweapons are rejected by contemporary military doctrine, and the proposition that “now we have even more powerful warheads” is simply ridiculous.

What was the political situation? The relations between Moscow and Washington at the time of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September 1959 had been ameliorating, but the following May the espionage flight of Frances Gary Powers over the Soviet Union aggravated them seriously. The U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft batteries near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960. In the aftermath, the summit conference of Soviet, U.S., British, and French state leaders in Paris was aborted, and the return visit to the USSR of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower was cancelled. Cuba, where Castro came to power, became the object of passions, and the failure of the U.S.-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro Cuban emigres at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 was a great shock for the Kennedy Administration.

But the main arena of opposition between the USA and Soviet Union was Europe. The serious, seemingly insoluble question of a peaceful German settlement once again rose to the fore, with the status of West Berlin the focus of attention. The exhausting talks on arms reduction, accompanied by strict demands from the Western Powers to inspect the territories of participating parties, were unsuccessful. The Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban looked more and more gloomy although the nuclear powers (except France) were adhering to a voluntary test moratorium in the context of those talks. Meanwhile, hostile propaganda and recriminations between the USSR and the USA became the norm. Finally, the main event of that period which aroused a storm of protests in the West was the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.

In the meantime the Soviet Union sought self-reliance. It was the first to test an intercontinental ballistic missile and launch satellites into orbit, and the first to send a man into outer space. Having acquired immense prestige, among the Third World countries in particular, the USSR did not yield to the Western pressure and started active operations on its own.

Therefore, when by the end of the summer of 1961 international tensions grew unusually high, the course of events took on the peculiar logic of superpower politics. For a month and a half prior to the announcement by the Soviet government, we, the developers of nuclear weapons, began preparing to test new prototypes. We knew that the culmination of the series of tests planned in the USSR would be the explosion of the 50-MT device, which was designed to produce explosions of up to 100 megatons. In
the middle of July 1961, we began the development of this device. Some time thereafter, its actual construction and assembly began. Andrei Sakharov called the planned test “the crux of the program.”

The Soviet government made no secret of the planned superblast. On the contrary, it gave the world ample warning about the upcoming event and, in an unprecedented step, made public the power of the bomb under development. This leak corresponded to the goals of the political power game.

By October 24, the final report, including the proposed design of the bomb and the theoretical and design calculations, was complete. The specifications in the report were sent to design engineers and bomb assemblers. The report was co-authored by Andrei Sakharov, Victor Adamsky, Yuri Babaev, Yuri Smirnov, and Yuri Trunchev. While the contents of the report are not publicly available, I can say that the report’s conclusion contained the following statement: “A successful result from the test of this device opens the possibility of creating a device of practically unlimited power.”

At the same time, a bomber was prepared for the test, and a special parachute system for the bomb developed. The parachute system to permot the slow descent of the bomb, which weighed more than 20 tons, was unique. However, even if this parachute system had failed during the test, the bomber’s crew would not have been endangered, as the bomb contained a special mechanism which triggered its detonation only after the plane had reached a safe distance.

The Tu-95 strategic bomber which was to carry the bomb to its target underwent unusual modification. The bomb, around eight meters long and two meters wide, was too large to fit in the plane’s bomb bay; therefore, a non-essential part of the fuselage was cut away, and a special lifting mechanism attached, as was a device for fastening the bomb. The bomb was so huge that over half of it protruded from the plane during the flight. The plane’s whole fuselage, and even its propeller blades, were covered with special white paint for protection from the explosion’s intense flash. A separate airborne laboratory plane was also covered with the same paint.

In Arzamas-16, the secret nuclear weapons laboratory in the Urals, the bomb was assembled in a factory-shop on a special railroad flatcar, which after completion was camouflage as a regular freight-train car. It was necessary to build a railroad line right into the assembly-shop.

From time to time, we would naturally have doubts: would the device deceive us, would it fail at the moment of testing? Alluding to this, Sakharov said: “If we don’t make this thing, we’ll be sent to railroad construction.” At another moment, in the last phase of the job, when foreign protests erupted over Khrushchev’s announcement of the forthcoming superpowerful blast, Sakharov calmly observed that while the explosion might lead to the smashing of some windows in our embassies in two or three Western countries, nothing more would come of it.

Khrushchev defined his position in this way:

I want to say that our tests of new nuclear weapons are also coming along very well. We shall shortly complete these tests—presumably at the end of October. We shall probably wind them up by detonating a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 50,000,000 tons of TNT. We have said that we have a 100-megaton bomb. This is true. But we are not going to explode it, because even if we did so at the most remote site, we might knock out all our windows. We are therefore going to hold off for the time being and not set the bomb off. However, in exploding the 50-megaton bomb we are testing the device for triggering a 100-megaton bomb. But may God grant, as they used to say, that we are never called upon to explode these bombs over anybody’s territory. This is the greatest wish of our lives!9

In strengthening the defense of the Soviet Union we are acting not only in our own interests but in the interests of all peace-loving peoples, of all mankind. When the enemies of peace threaten us with force they must be and will be countered with force, and more impressive force, too. Anyone who is still unable to understand this today will certainly understand it tomorrow.10

Once, during a discussion with Sakharov, a pointed question was heard: “Why do we need to make ‘cannibalistic’ weapons like this?!” Sakharov smiled and said: “Nikita Khrushchev said: ‘Let this device hang over the heads of the capitalists, like a sword of Damocles.’”11

The test of the 50-MT bomb was a watershed in the development of nuclear weapons. This test demonstrated the global nature of the effects of a powerful nuclear explosion on the Earth’s atmosphere. The test of the bomb’s design confirmed the possibility of making a device of any power, however large.

For Sakharov, his involvement in the development of the 1961 superbomb marked a turning point in his years of work in thermonuclear weapons. This was the last device on which he worked intensely, seriously, and without hesitation.12 He accepted the proposal to make and test this awesome power bomb, motivated by a desire to demonstrate the absolute destructiveness and inhumanity of this weapon of mass annihilation, to impress on mankind and politicians the fact that, in the event of a tragic showdown, there would be no winners. No matter how sophisticated an opponent, the other side would find a simple, but crippling, response.

The device at the same time demonstrated the technological potentials available to humanity. Not without reason did Sakharov search for a worthy application for it. He suggested using superpowerful explosions to prevent catastrophic earthquakes and to create particle accelerators of unprecedented energy to probe the secrets of matter. He also advanced a plan to use similar explosions to deflect the course of heavenly bodies near earth, such as comets or asteroids, in the interests of mankind. But also, at that time, he was still preoccupied with the search for possible military applications of nuclear energy.

Ninety-seven percent of the power of the 50-MT bomb derived from thermonuclear fusion; that is to say, the bomb was remarkably “clean” and released a minimum of fission by-products which would elevate background radiation in the atmosphere. Thanks to this, our U.S. colleagues understood that our scientists also desired to reduce to a minimum the radioactive after-effects of nuclear testing, as well as to lessen the effect of radiation on present and future generations.

The fact that the 30 October 1961 explosion and its expected yield were announced in advance by political leaders
physicist Viktor Adamsky worked on the Soviet nuclear weapons program in Sakharov’s group at Arzamas-16, the long-secret nuclear laboratory. Physicist Yuri Smirnov is a Leading Researcher at the Russian Scientific Center “Kurchatov Institute” in Moscow. Both worked on the 50-megaton test.

Letters: Stalin, Kim, and Korean War Origins

10 December 1993

To the Editor:

Ms. Kathryn Weathersby’s otherwise informative article in your Fall 1993 issue (“New Findings on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18) shows how the study of hitherto secret Soviet archives can lead to erroneous conclusions if unaccompanied by an understanding of the general context of Communist policies in the given case. She argues that the initiative for the invasion of South Korea in 1950 came from the North Korean regime, rather than from Stalin, her “proof” that Kim Il Sung had on many occasions begged Stalin to be allowed to “reunite” the peninsula, before actually being allowed to try to do so. But what does that prove? Using analogical reasoning, one could argue that it was South Korea that initiated the war because Syngman Rhee had begged Washington to help it to do the same thing vis-a-vis the North.

The document—an internal Soviet memorandum—proves the opposite of Ms. Weathersby’s thesis. It states, “Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, noting that ‘such a large affair in relation to South Korea needs much preparation,’ but did not object in principle...At Stalin’s order, all requests of North Korea for delivery of arms and equipment for the additional units of the KPA were quickly met...But the end of May, 1950, the General Staff of the KPA, together with Soviet military advisers, announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin concentration at the 38th parallel.”* The idea to invade was clearly Stalin’s but, reasonably enough, he waited to permit and help in the venture only at what he thought was the right moment. The notion that in 1950, Kim or any other Communist leader, was in a position to pressure—compel or shame—the Soviets into doing something they had not planned in the first place, or that the North Koreans could have invaded without Soviet permission/command, cannot be seriously entertained.

The date of the document being 1966—the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute—makes rather debatable its assertion that Kim also obtained Mao’s agreement for the invasion. Even in an internal Soviet document there would have been a strong inclination to dilute Soviet responsibility for the invasion.

In an athletic event, a race is not is not initiated by the runners crouching down. The race is initiated by the starter shouting “go.” That is what Stalin did.

Yours sincerely,

Adam B. Ulam

* My italics.

Adam Ulam is professor emeritus and former director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and the author of numerous books on Soviet foreign policy.

K. Weathersby responds (4 November 1994):

Since the publication of the Fall 1993 Bulletin, additional documents have been released that further clarify the question of Stalin’s role in the outbreak of the Korean War. I have presented translations and analyses of these documents in The Journal of American-East Asian Relations. To summarize them briefly, they reveal that in January 1950 Kim Il Sung once more appealed to Stalin to grant him permission to launch a military campaign to reunify the Korean peninsula by force of arms. On 30 January 1950, Stalin indicated that he was “ready to approve” Kim’s request, and in the following months provided the necessary arms and expertise. The Soviet role was therefore essential, but it was as facilitator rather than initiator. This distinction does not negate Soviet responsibility for the bloodshed that followed, but it is critical for understanding the origins of the Korean War.

In May 1950 Stalin informed Mao Zedong that “owing to the changed international situation, the [the Soviets] agree with the Koreans’ proposal to proceed toward reunification.” However, he added, “the question must be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of a disagreement by the Chinese comrades, the resolution of the question must be put off until there is a new discussion.” Unfortunately, the Soviet documents released thus far do not clarify what Stalin meant by “changed international situation.” This is the key question, since we must understand why he approved military action in Korea before we can understand the larger picture of Stalin’s approach to the Cold War. I hope to describe in future issues of the Bulletin additional Soviet documents that have recently become available, including records on the Korean War that President Yeltsin has presented to the government of South Korea.
“The crisis years” of 1960-1962 are remembered as a peak of the Cold War, an apogee of the bipolar confrontation. Many consider them even more dangerous than the Korean War, when the military forces of West and East clashed and almost slipped into a global conflict. The early 1960s were all the more frightening since the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a fierce nuclear arms race, and two more states, Great Britain and France, had developed small nuclear arsenals of their own. By the end of the period the edge in this race clearly belonged to the United States such that, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington had at least nine times as many deliverable nuclear warheads as Moscow. After the summer of 1961 the Kennedy administration was perfectly aware of that fact, but, nevertheless, sweeping Soviet progress in ICBMs soon eliminated the impregnability of “fortress America” forever.

The loss of strategic invulnerability weighed as heavily on the American psyche as had the loss of the atomic monopoly (and China) in 1949. And, as before, this agitated state of mind offered fertile ground for spy-hysteria. This time, however, it did not reach the proportions of McCarthyism, but remained localized in government offices where cold warriors, especially true believers among them, began to talk again about a “master plan” of the Kremlin and the KGB to delude and disrupt the Western alliance in preparation for a decisive showdown between the two Cold War blocs. Some of them, most prominently James J. Angleton, head of the CIA’s counterintelligence department, tenaciously denied the reality of the Sino-Soviet split as a “hoax” designed to lull the West into complacency. Angleton, along with a Soviet defector, KGB major Anatoly Golitsyn, also believed that there was a KGB mole inside the CIA’s Soviet Division, and that Soviet intelligence was assiduously planting its illegals and agents, primarily displaced persons from Eastern Europe and Russia, in various high-placed positions in the West. They even claimed that former British Labour party leader Hugh Gaitskell had probably been murdered by the KGB, that his successor, Harold Wilson, was probably a KGB asset, and that the famous double agent Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) colonel, was also a Soviet plant.

The seemingly wild surmisings of an American counterintelligence officer become more understandable as we learn more about the strange “behind the mirror” world of spying, double-agents, and deliberate disinformation in which huge and well-funded rival intelligence services clashed with no holds barred. Intelligence at any time is a necessary and valuable instrument of a state’s foreign policy. But in the years of Cold War tension the intelligence services were more than just “eyes,” they were powerful weapons in propaganda warfare between the ideological blocs. Furthermore, in a situation of mutual fear produced by the nuclear deadlock, when mammoth armies confronted each other in Europe and around the world, intelligence networks were the only mobile force in action, the “light infantry” of the Cold War: conducting reconnaissance, but also trying to influence the situation in the enemy’s rear by means sometimes just short of military ones.

The plans and instructions related to operational work and intelligence sources, in particular involving planting agents abroad and using double-agents, justifiably belong to the most zealously guarded secrets of intelligence bureaucracies. But recently, thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians have acquired a rare chance to peek into the mysteries of one of the two intelligence giants of the Cold War—documents of the Committee on State Security (KGB). These are not papers of the First Main Directorate (PGU), which was responsible for foreign intelligence and which continues under the new regime in Russia and, of course, preserves its secrecy (although some of its former officers, Oleg Kalugin, Leonid Shebarshin, and Vadim Kirpichenko among them, have recently written memoirs). The documents in question were sent by the KGB to the Secretariat and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Com-
The KGB reports to Khrushchev

On 14 February 1961, Nikita S. Khrushchev received an annual report of the KGB marked “Top Secret—Highly Sensitive.” Only Khrushchev could decide who among the top Soviet leadership might see the report, in which the Collegium of the KGB informed him as the First Secretary of the CC CPSU and as a Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR about the achievements of Soviet foreign intelligence during 1960.

In this period, Khrushchev was told, 375 foreign agents were recruited, and 32 officers of the State Security were transferred abroad and legalized. The stations abroad obtained, among others, position and background papers prepared by Western governments for the summit conference in Paris in May 1960, including materials on the German and Berlin questions, disarmament, and other issues. They also provided the Soviet leadership with “documentary evidence about military-political planning of some Western powers and the NATO alliance as whole; [...] on the plan of deployment of armed forces of these countries through 1960-63; evidence on preparation by the USA of an economic blockade of and military intervention against Cuba”—the last a possible allusion to preparations for the forthcoming April 1961 CIA-supported invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs.6

The sheer numbers conveyed the vast extent of information with which the KGB flooded the tiny group of Soviet leaders. During one year alone it prepared and presented 4,144 reports and 68 weekly and monthly informational bulletins to the Party’s Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers; 4,370 documentary materials were sent to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; 3,470 materials to Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and the Head of the General Staff Alexander Vassilevsky; and 790 materials to other ministries and agencies.7

Soviet foreign intelligence appeared to have been particularly successful in “sigint” (signals intelligence) operations. The sprawling Service of Radio Interception and Code-Breaking of Diplomatic and Agent-Operational Communications of the Capitalist Countries, the innermost part of the KGB empire (analogous to the U.S. National Security Agency), managed to break many diplomatic and intelligence codes. During 1960 it reported deciphering 209,000 diplomatic cables sent by representatives of 51 states, and the most important among them—133,200—were reported to the CPSU Central Committee. The Kremlin therefore apparently eavesdropped on some of the West’s most classified communications.

True, there were clouds on the horizon. The enemy became increasingly sophisticated and difficult to penetrate. The Directorate of Counterintelligence confronted, according to the annual report, “serious difficulties” in 1960. “The adversary goes to great lengths,” the KGB complained. “For instance, the Committee noticed cases when the enemy’s intelligence officers met their agents on a beach and secretly exchanged materials while swimming. If it happens on a beach, they would lie close by, pretend they do not know each other and dig their materials in the sand, and then cautiously extract them.” There were more serious challenges than the “beach” method. U.S. intelligence, the KGB found, began to use a new type of heavily-protected codes. They wrote on a very thin (papirosse-type) paper prepared specifically for this purpose. Also a special plane was constructed in the USA to bring illegal agents to the USSR. “Since this plane is made of rubber-layered tissue,” the report said, “and can conduct flights at low altitudes, it has practically no chance, according to our experts, of being located by existing radar stations.”8

With the life of KGB officers and agents in the United States becoming increasingly rough due to the effectiveness of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI and harsh restrictions on travel for Soviet journalists and diplomats, the Committee tried to exploit the increasing trickle of Soviet visitors to the United States to include its operatives and agents. Another channel was sending younger KGB officers, Oleg Kalugin among them, as graduate and post-graduate students to Columbia, Harvard, and other American universities.

Yet nobody could replace illegals. The KGB in 1960 began to move its “sleepers” in other countries to the United States “with the aim of planting them in a job in American intelligence or intelligence schools.” One priority was “to insert KGB agents as professors of Russian, Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian languages in the language school of USA military intelligence in Monterey,” California.9

The report distinguished between old and new priorities of Soviet foreign intelligence. An old one was to ferret out, in competition with the GRU (Glavvazvedupr) or military intelligence, Western plans for rearmament and NATO’s level of combat readiness. New efforts were targeted, first, at scientific-technical espionage and, second, at elaborate propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The former had proved to be a stupendous success in the...
1940s, when the Soviets obtained detailed information on the wartime Anglo-American atomic bomb project, and it continued to be important as Cold War sanctions and barriers cut the Soviets off from Western technologies and industrial machinery.

During 1960, the KGB’s scientific-technical intelligence service reported that it stole, bought, and smuggled from the West 8,029 classified technologies, blueprints, and schemas, as well as 1,311 different samples of equipment. A special target in this regard was, of course, the United States. On 7 April 1960, the Central Committee had directed the KGB to prepare a “prospective working plan of the intelligence service of the Committee of State Security at the Council of Ministers against the United States of America.” The plan, presented on 10 March 1961, postulated a wide array of measures. Among them were efforts to insinuate agents into U.S. scientific-technical centers, universities, industrial corporations, and other institutions specializing in missile building, electronics, aircraft, and special chemistry. The KGB planned to use “third countries” as a springboard for this penetration campaign. Its agents in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were to worm their way into scientific, industrial, and military research and consulting institutions of these countries with access to American know-how or subcontracting to U.S. military agencies. Agents residing in England, Austria, Belgium, West Germany, and Israel were instructed to move to the United States with the goal of finding jobs in the military-industrial sector.

It also planned to organize “on the basis of a well-screened network of agents” several brokerage firms in order to obtain classified scientific-technical information and “to create conditions in a number of countries for buying samples of state-of-the-art American equipment.” One such firm was to be opened in the United States, one in England, and two in France. The KGB also prepared to open in a European country a copying center that would specialize copying blueprints and technical documentation in the fields of radioelectronics, chemistry, and robotics.

Some orthodox anti-communists in the CIA, known as the fundamentalists, were tipped off by the Soviet defector Golitsyn about an alleged KGB “monster plot” to create a strategic web of deception. According to Golitsyn, the KGB’s new chairman, Alexander Shelepin, the energetic and imaginative former leader of Young Communist League, revealed this plot in May of 1959 to the KGB establishment. Golitsyn even maintained, contrary to all evidence and logic, that the political and military split between China and the USSR after 1959 was a fake, just a facet of Shelepin’s diabolical master plan.

There was no such “master plan” in the KGB. But under Shelepin the Committee indeed hatched several schemes of strategic and tactical deception: to conceal Soviet intentions and weak spots from the West, as well as to disrupt consensus in Western societies and alliances on policies, means, and goals for waging the Cold War. In the plan presented to the Central Committee on 10 March 1961, mentioned above, for example, the KGB proposed “to carry out disinformation measures on the information that American intelligence obtains about the Soviet Union; to pass along the channels of American intelligence disinformation on economic, defense, and scientific-technical issues; to disinform the USA intelligence regarding real intentions of Soviet intelligence services, achieving thereby the dispersion of forces and means of the enemy’s intelligence services.” The deception went side by side with blunt slander campaigns and forgery. In its 1960 report, the KGB took pride in operations carried out to compromise “groupings and individuals from the imperialist camps most hostile towards the USSR.” The Committee publicized in the West 10 documentary pieces of disinformation, prepared in the name of state institutions and government figures of capitalist countries, and 193 other disinformation materials. The KGB took credit for staging a number of rallies, marches, and pickets in the United States, Japan, England, and other countries. It claimed to be instrumental in engineering 86 inquiries of governments and presentations in parliaments and 105 interviews of leading figures in these countries. In addition it asserted that it had helped organize 442 mass petitions to governments, distributed 3,221 million copies of various leaflets, and published abroad 126 books and brochures “unmasking aggressive policies of the USA” and its allies, as well as 3,097 articles and pieces in the media. The Committee reported that it had instigated all this through 15 newspapers and magazines on the KGB payroll.

During the early Cold War and later, both U.S. and Soviet intelligence services used penetration, deception, and propaganda to groom potential allies and neutralize enemies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Each had a record of successes and failures during the 1950s. The KGB successfully played on French suspicions of West German militarism to frustrate ratiﬁcation of the European Defense Community (EDC), the Western plan to create a “European army.” The CIA had its own triumph in Iran by overthrowing Prime Minister Mossadeq and opening the way for conversion of that country into a mainstay of Western defense structures in the Middle East for a generation.

But U.S. intelligence failed during the 1950s to establish a network of inﬂuence in Eastern Europe, not to mention the Soviet Union itself. The KGB even in 1960 acted under the impression that it could do better in the United States, using the growing fatigue with the Dulles-Eisenhower hard line and growing public support for U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. The Committee pledged, in accord with its April 1960 instruction, to establish closer contacts with liberal Democrats in the U.S. Congress and to encourage them “to step up their pressure for improvement of relations between the USA and the Soviet Union and for settlement of international problems through negotiations.” The KGB concentrated its propaganda efforts, it reported, on “left-wing trade unions, Quakers, pacifist, youth and other social organizations,” and was even ready “to provide those organizations and some trusted individuals with the needed financial assistance in a clandestine way.”

According to the plan, the KGB proposed to subsidize the “American progressive publishing house ‘Liberty Book Club’ in order to publish and disseminate in the USA and other capitalist countries books prepared at our request.” The experiment seemed to promise further successes, since the KGB intended to internationalize it by opening club affiliates in England, Italy, and Japan. In a spirit of innovation, demonstrated in those years, the Committee also “studied the possibility of using a major American public relations agency for the distribution in the USA of truthful information about the Soviet Union.” These and similar undertakings required a lot of money, and some KGB operatives like Konon.
Molody (Gordon Arnold Lonsdale) were encouraged to engage in lucrative businesses in the West and then funnel the profits into KGB foreign accounts.20

A special division of the KGB was busy fabricating disinformation on the production in the United States of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the development of new means of mass destruction. Faked documents, innuendo, and gossip were used to undercut U.S. positions and influence among delegations of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries in the United Nations and “to promote disorganization of the American voting machine in the structures of the UN.” There were even attempts to sidetrack tariff talks among Western countries and “to use financial difficulties of the United States for strengthening of mistrust in the dollar.”

On the KGB’s list of targets in the propaganda warfare campaign were all the predictable suspects: U.S.-led regional alliances (NATO, SEATO, and CENTO) and U.S. military bases abroad, all denounced as tools for American meddling into the internal affairs of host countries. The Committee also contemplated a terrorist strike at Radio Liberty and the Soviet Studies Institute in Munich “to put out of order their equipment and to destroy their card indexes.” Inside the United States this warfare was to be spearheaded against the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a counterpart of the KGB psychological warfare division, and “the reactionary militarist group in U.S. ruling circles - [Nelson] ROCKEFELLER, [Lauris] NORSTAD, A. DULLES, E. [J. Edgar] HOOVER, as well as their allies in pushing an aggressive course in other countries.”21

One name on the hit list was that of Allen W. Dulles, experienced in the espionage trade since the late 1930s and since 1953 presiding over the Central Intelligence Agency.22 In 1960-1961, Dulles became the chief target of the KGB’s vendetta.

The Hunt for Allen Dulles

The Dulles brothers had long inspired complex feelings inside the Soviet leadership. Time and again Vyacheslav Molotov and then Nikita Khrushchev betrayed an apprehension of them bordering on respect-ful awe. Khrushchev, in his typical manner, even engaged personally in a semi-public feud with Allen Dulles boasting that he read his briefing papers prepared for President Eisenhower and found them “boring.” The Soviet leaders had some reasons to believe that their sources of “humint”—“human intelligence” garnered from agents and illegals—were many times greater than those of their American adversary. After a flurry of defectors following Stalin’s death, the political and military intelligence apparatus had been reorganized, and its discipline and morale seemed to be restored. But the hull proved short-lived. From the mid-fifties onward Khrushchev’s policies of reducing the KGB empire and curbing its operatives’ privileges produced a new spate of treason. The response was ruthless: a new head of the First Main Directorate (PGU), Alexander Sakharovsky, reportedly took draconian measures to root out a plague of “defecting”; he personally pushed for operations designed to eliminate post-Stalin “traitors” Aleksandr Orlov, Vladimir Petrov, and Piotr Deriabin who had fled to the West and cooperated with Western counterintelligence.23 (Evidently all three operations failed or were abandoned, since none of the three defectors was assassinated.)

Until the spring of 1960, Soviet foreign intelligence had reasons to believe it had a sound edge over its American counterpart. During 1960, Soviet operatives, together with “friends” from East European security forces, reportedly penetrated Western embassies in Eastern Europe on 52 occasions. They succeeded in illegally smuggling to the USSR five U.S. intelligence officers. They had a high-placed mole in the British counterintelligence M15—George Blake—another one in NATO headquarters in Brussels, and many lesser ones.

But Allen Dulles had struck back with a new technological breakthrough: U-2 planes and then reconnaissance satellites to overfly and photograph the USSR. Shelepin sounded the alarm and in September 1959, during Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, he sent a memo to the Department of Defense Industry of the Central Committee proposing a program to monitor the U.S. satellite “Discoverer.” He proposed to obtain “directly and by agents” the data on frequency ranges used by transmitters on these satellites. Ivan Serbin, head of the Department, agreed that the issue was grave enough and sent Shelepin’s memo for consideration to the Commission on military-industrial is-
sues at the Council of Ministers.24

In fact, the U.S. space reconnaissance program produced a minor panic among Soviet academics who consulted for the KGB. Two of them, Academician L.I. Sedov and doctor of physics and mathematics G.S. Narimanov, warned in September 1959 that the “Discoverer” satellites could be successfully used by the Americans for military and intelligence purposes, “to put out of work our defense installations with electronic equipment over a large territory.” With the help of satellite equipment, Shelepin reported, from a height of 200-300 km it would be possible efficiently to photograph stretches of the Earth of 50-90 km in width and 150,000 km in length.25

In other words, the KGB alerted the Soviet leaders in a timely fashion to the coming intelligence revolution. Khrushchev’s reaction to the downing of an American U-2 seven months later, in May 1960, was, therefore, anything but surprise. The political slight, and even humiliation, that Khrushchev saw in this affair to himself and his country provoked his furious response. He disrupted the summit in Paris and irreparably ruined his relations with Eisenhower.26 But in his opinion the U.S. president, though he accepted responsibility for the intelligence flights, merely shielded the real culprit: Allen Dulles. So Khrushchev, his considerable venom concentrated on the debonair socialite spymaster, evidently asked Shelepin to prepare a plan to discredit the CIA chief. Three weeks after Khrushchev’s return from Paris, Shelepin’s plan was formally approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

The document,27 printed below, offers an extraordinary window into the state of mind and the methods of Soviet intelligence at the height of the Cold War confrontation with the United States:

> [Handwritten note across top: “To the Secretariat [for signatures] (round the clock 28 among the secretaries) [—] M. Suslov, N. Mukhitdinov, O. Kuusinen’29]  

**USSR**  
Committee of State Security  
Council of Ministers of the USSR  
7 June 1960  
**CC CPSU**

The failure of the intelligence action prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
with the plane “Lockheed U-2” caused an aggra-
vation of existing tensions between the CIA and
other USA intelligence services and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and also provoked
protests by the American public and certain mem-
bers of the Congress, who are demanding inves-
tigation of the CIA activities.

The Committee of state security considers it
advisable to make use of this newly complex
situation and to carry out the following measures
targeted at further discrediting CIA activity and
compromising its leader Allen DULLES:

1. In order to activate a campaign by
DULLES’ political and personal opponents:
   a) to mail to them anonymous letters using
      the names of CIA officials criticizing its activity
      and the authoritarian leadership of DULLES;
   b) to prepare a dossier which will contain
      publications from the foreign press and decla-
      rations of officials who criticized the CIA and
      DULLES personally, and to send it, using the
      name of one of members of the Democratic Party,
      to the Fulbright Committee [the Senate Commit-
      tee on Foreign Relations] which is conducting an
      investigation into CIA activities in relation to the
      failure of the summit;
   c) to send to some members of Congress, to
      the Fulbright Committee, and to the FBI specially
      prepared memos from two or three officials of the
      State Department with attached private letters,
      received (legally) from now deceased Ameri-
      can diplomats, which would demonstrate CIA
      involvement in domestic decision-making, the
      persecution of foreign diplomats who took an
      objective stand, and which also would point out
      that, for narrow bureaucratic purposes, the CIA
      puts deliberately false data into information for
      the State Department;
   d) to study the possibility and, if the oppor-
      tunity presents itself, to prepare and disseminate
      through appropriate channels a document by
      former USA Secretary of State F. DULLES, which
      would make it clear that he exploited the
      resources of A. DULLES as leader of the CIA to
      fabricate compromising materials on his private
      and political adversities;
   e) to prepare, publish and disseminate abroad
      a satirical pamphlet on A. DULLES, using the
      American writer Albert KAHN who currently
      stays in Moscow to write the pamphlet.

2. With the aim of further exposing the
activities of American intelligence in the eyes of
the public and to create preconditions with which
the FBI and other USA intelligence services
could substantiate their opinion about the CIA’s
inability to conduct effective intelligence:
   a) to fabricate the failure of an American
      agent “Fyodorov,” dropped in the Soviet Union
      by plane in 1952 and used by organs of the KGB
      in an operational game with the adversary.
      To publish in the Soviet press an announce-
      ment about the arrest of “Fyodorov” as an Ameri-
      can agent and, if necessary, to arrange a press-
      conference about this affair;
   b) to agree with Polish friends about the
      exposure of the operational game led by
      the organs of the KGB along with the MSS PPR
      [Ministry of State Security of the Polish People’s
      Republic] with a “conduit” on the payroll of
      American intelligence of the Organization of
      Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) “Melnikovists.”
      To this end to bring back to Poland the Polish
      MSS agent “Boleslav,” planted in the course of
      this game on the OUN “conduit,” and to arrange
      for him to speak to the press and radio about
      subversive activity by American intelligence
      against the USSR and PPR. To arrange, in
      addition, for public appearances by six American
      intelligence agents dropped on USSR and PPR
      territory as couriers of the “conduit” in the course
      of the game;
   c) to suggest to the security bodies of the
      GDR that they arrange public trials for the re-
      cently arrested agents of American intelligence
      RAUE, KOLZENBURG, GLAND, USCH-
      INGER and others.
   d) To arrange for wide coverage of the trials’
      materials in the media of the GDR and abroad;
   e) to disclose the operational game “Link”
      that the KGB conducts with the adversary and to
      organize public statements in the media aimed at
      foreign audiences by the agent “Maisky,” a former
      commander of the “security service” of the For-
      eign [Zakordonnikh chastei] OUN (ZCh OUN),
      who had been transferred to Ukrainian territory in
      1951 and used by us for this game.
   f) Along with revelations about the anti-people
      activity of the ZCh OUN, “Maisky” will reveal
      American and British intelligence’s use of the
      anti-Soviet organizations of Ukrainian emigra-
      tion in subversive work in the Soviet Union;
   g) Since about ten agents of the MSS of the
      GDR who “defected-in-place” to American intel-
      ligence have accomplished their missions and
currently there is no prospect of their being fur-
ther utilized, it should be suggested to our Ger-
mans friends to stage their return on the basis of
disagreement with USA aggressive policies. In
particular, this measure should be carried out with
the participation of our friends’ agent
“Edelhardt” who had been assigned by an affili-
ate of American intelligence in West Berlin to
gather spy information during his tourist trip
around the USSR. To organize one or two press
conferences on these affairs with a demonstration
of the spy equipment he received from American
intelligence;
   h) to discuss with our Polish and Albanian
      friends the advisability of bringing to the atten-
      tion of governmental circles and of the public of
      the United States the fact that the security agen-
cies of Poland and Albania for a number of years
      had been deluding American intelligence in the
      operational games “Win” and “John” and had
      obtained millions of dollars, weapons, equip-
      ment, etc. from it.

3. To utilize, provided our Hungarian friends
agree, the American intelligence documents they
obtained in the U.S. mission in Budapest [the
underlined words were inserted by hand—ed.] to
compromise the CIA and to aggravate the differ-
ces between the CIA and other intelligence
services by publicizing some of the documents or
by sending them to the FBI.

If necessary, the necessary documents should be
forged using the existing samples.

4. In order to create mistrust in the USA
government toward the CIA and to produce an
atmosphere of mutual suspicion within the CIA
staff, to work out and implement an operation
creating the impression of the presence in the CIA
system of KGB agents recruited from among
rank-and-file American intelligence officers, who,
following their recruitment, admit their guilt,
allegedly on the order of Soviet intelligence. To
stage for this purpose a relevant conversation
within range of a [CIA] listening device, as well
as the loss of an address book by a Soviet intel-
ligence officer with the telephone number of a CIA
official; to convey specially prepared materials to
the adversary’s attention through channels ex-
posed to him, etc.

5. To work out and implement measures on
blowing the cover of several scientific, commer-
cial and other institutions, used by the CIA for its
spy activities. In particular, to carry out such
measures with regard to the “National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration” [NASA] and the
“Informational Agency” of the USA [U.S. Inform-
cation Agency (USIA)].

6. In order to disclose the subversive activi-
ties of the CIA against some governments, politi-
cal parties and public figures in capitalist coun-
tries, and to foment mistrust toward Americans in
the government circles of these countries, to
carry out the following:
   a) to stage in Indonesia the loss by American
      intelligence officer PALMER, who is personally
      acquainted with President SUKARNO and ex-
      erts a negative influence on him, a briefcase
      containing documents jointly prepared by the
      MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR
      which apparently belong to the CIA station in
      Jakarta and which provide evidence of USA
      plans to utilize American agents and rebel forces
to overthrow the government of SUKARNO;
   b) to carry out measures, with regard to the
      arrest in February of this year in the UAR [United
      Arab Republic] of a group of Israeli intelligence
      agents, to persuade the public in the UAR and
      Arab countries that American intelligence is linked
to the activities of those agents and coordinates its
      work in the Arab East with Israeli intelligence.

To compromise, to this end, American intel-
ligence officers KEMP and CONNOLLY who work
under cover of the UN commission observ-
ing the armistice in Palestine;
   c) to prepare and implement measures to
      make public the fact that American intelligence
made use of the Iranian newspapers “Fahrman” and “Eteliat,” specifically mentioning the names of their agents (Abbas SHAHENDEH, Jalal NEMATOLLAKHI);

d) to publish articles in the foreign press showing the interference of American intelligence in the domestic affairs of other states, using as an example the illegal American police organization in Italy, found and liquidated at the end of 1959, that “worked on” Italian political parties under the direction of one of the diplomats at the American embassy;

e) to prepare and publicize a document by an American intelligence officer in Japan Robert EMMENSE in the form of a report to the USA ambassador [to Japan Douglas] MACARTHUR [II] into which information will be inserted about a decision allegedly taken by American intelligence to relocate “Lockheed U-2” planes temporarily to Japan, and then, in secrecy from the Japanese government, to return them to their old bases.

7. To work out measures which, upon implementation, would demonstrate the failure of the CIA efforts to actively on a concrete factual basis use various émigré centers for subversive work against countries in the socialist camp.

In particular, using the example of the anti-Soviet organization “The Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” (SBONR), to discredit in the eyes of American taxpayers the activities of American intelligence in funding émigré organizations. To bring to light, along with other measures, real or forged American intelligence documents on its finances and guidance of subversive activities of the SBONR.

8. With the means available of the KGB to promote inquiries in the parliaments of England, France and other countries of their governments about their attitude to the hostile actions of USA intelligence intended to aggravate international tension.

9. To arrange public appearances by distinguished public and political figures of the East and West with appropriate declarations denouncing the aggressive activity of American intelligence.

10. To prepare and publish in the bourgeois press, through available means, a number of articles on the activities of the CIA and its leaders on the following questions:

   a) about how A. DULLES used his position to promote his own enrichment. In particular, to demonstrate that DULLES gets big bribes from the “Lockheed” corporation for allocating contracts to produce reconnaissance planes. To indicate that the source of this information is the wife of a vice-president of “Lockheed” corporation and well-known American pilot Jacqueline COCHRAN, who allegedly leaked it in France on her way to the USSR in 1959;

   b) about the CIA’s violation of traditional principles of non-partisanship on the part of the USA intelligence service. To demonstrate that in reality the CIA is the tool of reactionary circles in the Republican Party, that it ignores the Senate, the Congress and public opinion in the country;

   c) about the unjustifiably large expenditures of the CIA on its staff and its multitudinous agents and about the failure of its efforts to obtain information on the military-economic potential and scientific-technical achievements of the Soviet Union;

   d) about the unprecedented fact that the American embassy in Budapest is hosting Cardinal MINDSZENTY, furnishing evidence that the Americans are flouting the sovereign rights of the Hungarian People’s Republic and demonstrating the sloppy work of American intelligence that damages American prestige in the eyes of world public opinion;

   e) about the CIA’s flawed methods of preparing spies in the [training] schools at Fort Jersey (South Carolina) and in Monterey (California). To draw special attention to futility of efforts by the CIA and by DULLES personally to build a reliable intelligence [network] with emigrants from the USSR and the countries of people’s democracies. To present a list of names of American intelligence officers and agents who have refused to work for DULLES on political, moral and other grounds:

   f) about utilization by the CIA leadership of senior officials from the State Department, including ambassadors, for subversive and intelligence operations that cause great harm to USA prestige. In particular, to cite the example of DULLES’ use of American ambassador [to South Korea Walter P.] MCCONAUGHY in subversive plans in Cambodia and then in South Korea;

   g) about the activities of American intelligence in West Berlin in covering officers of West German intelligence services with documents of American citizens.

11. To approach the state security leadership in countries of people’s democracy requesting that they use available means to discredit the CIA and to compromise A. DULLES.

Asking for your agreement to aforementioned measures,

   CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE
   [signature] (A. Shelepin)

The signatures of Mikhail Suslov, Nikolai Mukhitdinov, and Otto Kuusinen showed that the responsible members of the Secretariat had approved the document—a process that could not have taken place without Khrushchev’s assent as well. On 3 November 1960, Shelepin reported to the Central Committee on the KGB’s progress in carrying out the plan. On 25 February 1961, after the Kennedy Administration came to power in Washington, the KGB again returned to the operation against Dulles, an Eisenhower holdover who for the time being remained in his post. The KGB suggested measures “to foment mistrust towards the leadership of American intelligence on the part of the Kennedy administration and the intelligence services of the allies.” Among other things, the KGB intended “to create among Americans an opinion that documentary information leaks directly from the staff of the CIA.” It also plotted “to arrange through a ‘double’ channel, known to the adversary, a transmittal from Washington of a real classified instruction signed by DULLES and obtained by the KGB.” Also proposed were measures “aimed at discrediting the activities of American intelligence directed at the removal from the political arena of politicians and governments, in particular in India and Turkey, who are not welcomed by the USA.”

It would be tempting to try to track down all the “incidents” produced by this elaborate planning. It is obvious, however, that the Kennedy administration was looking for a pretext to replace the old cold warrior atop the CIA, and one presented itself after the April 1961 failure of the CIA-trained expedition against the Castro regime at the Bay of Pigs. Soviet intelligence had known about the preparation and evidently Castro’s border troops were all in readiness, tipped off by Moscow (and The New York Times, for that matter) and ready to teach Americans a bloody lesson. Broadly speaking, the KGB in this case won a considerable victory over its overseas enemy. In late September 1961 Dulles announced his retirement, which went into effect two months later.

But the battle between the two intelligence giants continued, and between April 1961 and October 1962 Soviet intelligence suffered terrible blows from internal treason: senior GRU officer Oleg Penkovsky served a precious 18 months as a source for the Western intelligence community. In May 1961, KGB officer Yuri Loginov became an agent for U.S. intelligence. In December 1961, Anatoly Golitsyn defected from Helsinki. In June 1962, Yuri Nosenko, deputy head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, internal security and counterintelligence, began passing classified Soviet docu-
ments to the CIA (and in February 1964 he, too, would defect). The scale tilted abruptly in the CIA’s favor.

The Crisis in Berlin...and in the KGB

The disastrous wave of betrayal and defections in the KGB occurred at a moment of maximum international tension between the Moscow and the West, marked by the Berlin and the Cuban crises. This was not simply a coincidence. In the cases of some double-agents and defectors, among them Penkovsky and Nosenko, psychological and ideological, not material motives, prevailed. As Khrushchev raised the ante, bluffing against Washington, some informed members of the Soviet post-Stalin elites felt acutely uncomfortable. Khrushchev seemed unpredictable, mercurial, reckless, and just plain dangerous—not only to the West but to those Soviets growing accustomed to peaceful coexistence and the relative luxuries it allowed for the chosen members of the nomenklatura. The seemingly permanent state of nerve-wracking crisis, coinciding with a drastic expansion of cultural and human contacts across the Iron Curtain and the weakening of Stalinist fundamentalism in the East, strained loyalty to and belief in the regime and system, and in some cases pushed individuals to switch sides.

The KGB’s foreign intelligence and other divisions were heavily involved in various ways in the Berlin Crisis. They tested the temperature of U.S. and NATO reactions to Khrushchev’s threat to sign a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic which would give the GDR control over Western access routes to West Berlin. One scoop came when Khrushchev decided to let the East German communists close the sectorial border between the East and West Berlin, a decision resulting in the infamous Wall. On 4-7 August 1961, the foreign ministers of four Western countries (the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany) held secret consultations in Paris. The only question on the agenda was: how to react to the Soviet provocations in Berlin? In the course of these meetings Western representatives expressed an understanding of the defensive nature of Soviet campaign in Germany, and unwillingness to risk a war.36 In less than three weeks the KGB laid on Khrushchev’s desk quite accurate descriptions of the Paris talks, well ahead of its rival, the GRU. The intelligence materials correctly noted that, in contrast to the West Germans, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk supported talks with the Soviet Union aimed at preservation of the status quo ante. However, the KGB and GRU warned that pressure in the alliance was forcing the Americans to consider economic sanctions against the GDR and other socialist countries, as well as to accelerate plans for conventional and nuclear armament of their West European allies, including the West German Bundeswehr.37

Another line of KGB involvement in the crisis concerned strategic deception. On 29 July 1961, KGB chief Shelepin sent a memorandum to Khrushchev containing a mind-boggling array of proposals to create “a situation in various areas of the world which would favor dispersion of attention and forces by the USA and their satellites, and would tie them down during the settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin.” The multifaceted deception campaign, Shelepin claimed, would “show to the ruling circles of Western powers that unleashing a military conflict
over West Berlin can lead to the loss of their position not only in Europe, but also in a number of countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa.” Khru什chev sent the memo with his approval to his deputy Frol Kozlov and on August 1 it was, with minor revisions, passed as a Central Committee directive. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense were instructed to work out more “specific measures and present them for consideration by the CC CPSU.”

The first part of the deception plan must have pleased Khrushchev, who in January 1961 had pledged, before the communists of the whole world, to assist “movements of national liberation.” Shelepin advocated measures “to activate by the means available to the KGB armed uprisings against pro-Western reactionary governments.” The destabilizing activities started in Nicaragua where the KGB plotted an armed mutiny through an “Internal revolutionary front of resistance” in coordination with Castro’s Cubans and with the “Revolutionary Front Sandino.” Shelepin proposed to “make appropriations from KGB funds in addition to the previous assistance 10,000 American dollars for purchase of arms.” Shelepin planned also the instigation of an “armed uprising” in El Salvador, and a rebellion in Guatemala, where guerrilla forces would be given $15,000 to buy weapons.

The campaign extended to Africa, to the colonial and semi-colonial possessions of the British and the Portuguese. The KGB promised to help organize anti-colonial mass uprisings of the African population in British Kenya and Rhodesia and Portuguese Guinea, by arming rebels and training military cadres.

Nor did Shelepin forget the Far East. An ardent supporter of Sino-Soviet reconciliation, he played this “Chinese card” once again. He suggested “to bring to attention of the USA through KGB information channels information about existing agreement among the USSR, the PRC [People’s Republic of China], the KPDR [Korean People’s Democratic Republic; North Korea] and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam; North Vietnam] about joint military actions to liberate South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan in case of the eruption of armed conflict in Germany.” The Soviet General Staff, proposed Shelepin, together with the KGB, “should work out the relevant disinformation materials” and reach agreement “with Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese friends about demonstration of military preparations in those areas.”

Next came the bubbling cauldron of the Middle East. Shelepin planned “to cause uncertainty in government circles of the USA, England, Turkey, and Iran about the stability of their positions in the Middle and Near East.” He offered to use old KGB connections with the chairman of Democratic party of Kurdistan, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, “to activate the movement of the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey for creation of an independent Kurdistan that would include the provinces of aforementioned countries.” Barzani was to be provided with necessary aid in arms and money. “Given propitious developments,” noted Shelepin with foresight, “it would become advisable to express the solidarity of Soviet people with this movement of the Kurds.”

“The movement for the creation of Kurdistan,” he predicted, “will evoke serious concern among Western powers and first of all in England regarding [their access to] oil in Iraq and Iran, and in the United States regarding its military bases in Turkey. All that will create also difficulties for [Iraqi Prime Minister Gen. Abdul Karim] KASSIM who has begun to conduct a pro-Western policy, especially in recent time.”

The second component of the Shelepin grand plan was directed against NATO installations in Western Europe and aimed “to create doubts in the ruling circles of Western powers regarding the effectiveness of military bases located on the territory of the FRG and other NATO countries, as well as in the reliability of their personnel.” To provoke the local population against foreign bases, Shelepin contemplated working with the GDR and Czechoslovakia secret services to carry out “active measures...to demoralize” military servicemen in the FRG (by agents, leaflets, and brochures), and even terrorist attacks on depot and logistics stations in West Germany and France.

One of the more imaginative strands in the web of Soviet strategic deception concerned the number and even existence of new types of arms and missiles. Along with the General Staff, the KGB long practiced a dubious combination of super-secrecy and bluffing, thereby producing a series of panic assessments in the West about “a bomber gap” and then a “missile gap.” This time Shelepin asked Khrushchev to assign to his organization and the military the task of making the West believe that the Soviets were absolutely prepared to launch an attack in retaliation for Western armed provocations over West Berlin. The disinformation package included the following tasks:

— to convince the West that Soviet land forces were now armed with new types of tanks “equipped with tactical nuclear weapons”;
— to create a conviction among the enemy “about a considerable increase of readiness of Rocket Forces and of the increased number of launching pads—produced by the supply of solid liquid ballistic missiles of medium range and by the transfer from stationary positions to mobile launching positions on highways and railroads which secure high maneuverability and survivability”;
— to spread a false story about the considerable increase in the number of nuclear submarines with solid-fuel “Polaris” missiles;
— to bring to Western attention “information about the strengthening of anti-aircraft defense”;
— to disorient the enemy regarding the availability in the Soviet Air Forces of “new types of combat-tactical aircraft with ‘air-to-air’ and ‘air-to-ground’ missiles with a large operational range.”

It is not clear when Shelepin learned about Khrushchev’s decision to close the sectoral border between East and West Berlin, but the Wall went up just two weeks after his letter. It seems that the Wall took some heat off the problem. But in October-November 1961, the KGB and the military leadership evidently still believed that the signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR was possible and designed its “distraction” measures anticipating that this treaty would be a source of serious tension with the West. Indeed, sharp tension did arise in late October when U.S. tanks confronted two Soviet tank platoons in Berlin near Checkpoint Charlie.

On November 10, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and KGB Deputy Chief Peter Ivashutin asked the Central Committee Secretariat to approve, in addition to the crisis contingency planning by the military forces, deceptive steps “directed at producing in the adversary’s mind a profound
conviction that the Soviet Union firmly intends to use force in response to military provocations of Western powers and has at its disposal all necessary combat means.” The KGB took upon itself the task “to inform Western intelligence through unofficial channels that the Soviet Union has taken necessary measures to strengthen its troops in the GDR and to arm them with more modern tactical missiles, newer tanks, and other armaments sufficient for the delivery of a quick and crushing response strike on the adversary.”

Through the same channels KGB intended “to increase the adversary’s belief in the high maneuverability and mobility of Soviet armed forces and their readiness, in case the West unleashes an armed conflict in Germany, to move within a minimal time up to the battle lines of the European theater. To convey as a proof thereof that this summer, during the exercises in the Near-Carpathian and other military districts, some divisions demonstrated an average speed of advancement of about 110-130 km per day.”

Along the lines of Shelepin’s proposal, the KGB’s military-industrial consultants suggested other disinformation steps. Perhaps echoing Khrushchev’s boast that his missiles could “hit a fly in the sky,” the Committee proposed to convey to U.S. intelligence the information that during its recent series of atomic tests—in Sept.-Oct. 1961—the Soviet Union successfully “tested a superpowerful thermonuclear warhead, along with a system of detecting and eliminating the adversary’s missiles in the air.”

The KGB laboratories fabricated “evidence” for U.S. intelligence about the situation in the Soviet Union of the problem of constructing simple but powerful and user-convenient atomic engines for submarines which allow in the short run increasing considerably the number of atomic submarines up to fifteen.” (The ever-vigilant Shelepin deleted the number from the text—the super-secretive Soviets excised numbers even in disinformation!)

Finally, the KGB received instructions “to promote a legend about the invention in the Soviet Union of an aircraft with a close-circuited nuclear engine and its successful flight tests which demonstrated the engine’s high technical capacities and its safety in exploitation.” “On the basis of the M-50 ‘Myasischev’ aircraft, with consideration of the results of those flight tests,” according to this disinformation, “a strategic bomber with nuclear engines and unlimited range has been designed.”

Even now, reading those documents gives one chills down the spine. Determined to deal with their opponent from a position of strength, and possessing the intoxicating capacity to hide or invent information, to deceive and to bluff, Kremlev leaders went too far, to the very brink where the fine line between deterring an attack and preparing for one blurred altogether. To make matters worse, Khrushchev often held his cards so close to his chest that even his closest subordinates could not guess his true intentions. Inside the KGB there were many levels of knowledge, to be sure, but it seems, for instance, that the famous “Bolshakov channel” and the sensitive information that passed along it to the Kennedy administration during the Berlin crisis were sometimes not reported even to the KGB’s highest hierarchy, only to the CPSU General Secretary. No wonder that a great number of junior and senior officials in the Soviet military and intelligence elites were scared to death. Some of them were convinced that Khrushchev was crazy and had become a victim of his own “hare-brained schemes.” This scare still waits to be described by a creative quill. But one of its most tangible traces was a stream of well-positioned defectors.

In his June 1960 plan to discredit Allen Dulles and the CIA, quoted earlier, Shelepin had envisioned fostering “an atmosphere of mutual suspicion within the CIA staff” by fostering fears of KGB penetration within the agency. In fact, as Shelepin hoped, a paranoid “mole-hunt” in the Western intelligence community did occur, but apparently as a by-product of authentic defectors from Soviet intelligence rather than because of Shelepin’s deliberate deception campaign. Major Anatoliy Golitsyn became a pivotal figure in this regard. He was the least informed of the new crop of KGB defectors, but the echoes of Shelepin’s grandiose plans reached his ear. It has been argued, with some justification, that the harm that this stocky Ukrainian defector caused to careers and environment in the CIA could have been done only by a Soviet double-agent. The alliance between Golitsyn and CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton was indeed more ruining for American operatives who fell under suspicion in the frantic “mole-hunt” than for real KGB agents.

It is ironic that KGB leadership had no premonition about this at all. There is, indeed, newly available evidence about how painful Golitsyn’s defection was to the KGB. On 28 July 1962, a new KGB chief, Vladimir Semichastny, wrote to Shelepin, now promoted to the Party Secretariat:

According to reliable evidence American intelligence is preparing a broad campaign of provocation against the Soviet Union that will involve a traitor of Motherland GOLITSYN and other traitors, along with double-agents and provocateurs.

“The Americans count on this provocation,” continued Semichastny while ignoring the irony of his words, “to dispel to some extent the impression among the public that the USA is an organizer of world espionage, and to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is conducting active intelligence work in all countries.”

The Committee proposed “measures to discredit GOLITSYN” in the eyes of his CIA debriefers by implicating him in a felony. According to the plan, the newspaper Soviet Russia was to publish an article about a trial that allegedly had been held in Leningrad on a case of hard currency smuggling. The KGB would “let Americans know, without mentioning GOLITSYN’s name, that this article has something to so with him.” In case Golitsyn came up “with slanderous declarations,” the KGB planned to arrange more publications about his invented criminal background and to demand, after that, from the U.S. government through official channels the “extradition of GOLITSYN as a criminal.”

As a last resort, Semichastny asked for Party sanction “to carry out an operation on his [GOLITSYN’S] removal.”

Scorpions in a bottle

Glasnost on Soviet intelligence activities has yet to reach the level achieved by the American side during the congressional hearings of the Church and Pike committees in the mid-1970s. But the documents found recently in the CC CPSU archives do shed considerable light on KGB operations and indicate, without mincing words, how ambitious, various and extensive were KGB ac-
tivities, especially against the “number one enemy,” the United States. There is little doubt that almost any document on the Soviet side has its U.S. counterpart in Langley still hidden from public view.\(^9\) The process of mutual emulation started after the defection of Soviet cypher clerk Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa, Canada, in the summer of 1945. Ever since then the American intelligence agencies and the FBI, seconded by Soviet defectors, argued that they needed more discretionary resources and rights to match a well-prepared and ruthless enemy.

The KGB documents prove that the enemy was, indeed, ingenious, resourceful, and prepared to go very far. The emphasis on disinformation and on the use of various groups and movements in the “third world” had, of course, been a direct continuation of the OGPU-NKVD tradition in the 1920s-1940s.\(^80\) Back then, the Soviet intelligence leaned extensively on the networks of the Comintern and other individuals sympathetic to the Soviet “experiment.” This network suffered from blows and defections as a result of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign and its spectacular unveiling at the February 1956 CPSU Twentieth Party Congress. But the collapse of colonial empires and the surge of radicalism and nationalism in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East was a bonanza for Soviet intelligence, bent on expanding their contacts in those parts of the world.

The KGB, no doubt, fulfilled orders from the top. Khrushchev’s support of “wars of national liberation” was a big step toward the globalization of Soviet foreign policy, and therefore of the Cold War. It is clear from the KGB documents, however, that even at that time of escalating covert superpower rivalry in the Third World, the Kremlin leadership retained clear Realpolitik priorities: with the exception of those posted in Cuba, Soviet intelligence agents in Third World countries were used by the Soviet leadership and its external arm, the KGB’s First Directorate, as pawns in a geostrategic game centered firmly on Berlin.

Yet, the KGB had its own distinctive impact on the Cold War. The documents presented in this article challenge the myth that KGB officials (and some American counterparts as well) like to promulgate: that the intelligence services of both sides, by increasing “transparency” about the adversary’s intentions and capabilities, thereby contributed to stability and predictability in a dangerously polarized world. Some intelligence efforts that were genuinely devoted to reconnaissance, and reduced fears of a surprise attack, may well have done so.

But the games of deception, disinformation, and distraction designed by the KGB masterminds had a deleterious effect on global stability. They certainly contributed to the perception in Washington of expansive Soviet ambitions. In some cases they even exacerbated the danger of armed conflict. And the elaborate plots to sow the seeds of mistrust between the U.S. leadership and intelligence agencies was dictated by anything but a clear comprehension of how dangerous this kind of conspiracy had become in the nuclear age.

The legacy of the covert activities undertaken by the KGB and CIA at this key juncture of the Cold War was ambiguous: besides the function of obtaining and relaying objective information to their respective leaders, the two rival intelligence organizations behaved, to borrow Oppenheimer’s classic description of the nuclear predicament, like two scorpions in a bottle, prepared to sting each other until death.

The fact that the Cold War in the 1970s and the late 1980s looked more like a “long peace” appeared to have limited impact on the mentality of intelligence officials in Washington and Moscow.\(^51\) By then, the KGB’s First Directorate concentrated even more on technical-scientific espionage, which reflected, on the one hand, a long-standing symbiosis between the Soviet intelligence services and the military-industrial nexus, and, on the other, a distancing from “cloak and dagger” covert activities. Vladimir Kryuchkov, later a KGB chief and conspirator in the August 1991 hardline coup attempt, was to a large extent a product of this specialization in scientific-technical espionage.

The paranoia of Kryuchkov, who to this day believes that the West was nurturing a “fifth column” to demoralize and subvert Soviet society, as well as that of his CIA counterpart Angleton, was underpinned and “substantiated” by the shady games and counter-games in which the two intelligence services had engaged all during the Cold War. The alleged existence of American “agents of influence” inside Soviet society and even government—a key tenet of Kryuchkov’s homilies for vigilance—had been, indeed, a matter of pride for the CIA since the 1970s and can now, to a very limited extent, even be documented from U.S. government sources.\(^52\)

But the paranoia, even when it fed on realities, remained for the most part a self-deception. The KGB’s methods and proclivity for Jesuitical twists of imagination distorted the minds of Kryuchkov and many others. While the whole atmosphere of the Cold War existed, this mind-frame was contagious and spread like cancer.

There was always a sound and pragmatic side to intelligence: the collection and analysis of information. There were failures and errors in this work, but, in general, the record shows considerable accuracy and consistent objectivity, at least as far as the specific actions and motives were concerned. But the darker side of intelligence activity, linked to the Cold War mentality and actions, always co-existed with the former, sometimes casting a long shadow. The resources spent on intelligence operations related to psychological warfare and deception had a dynamic of diminishing returns: the disruption caused by them in the enemy’s camp rarely justified the money and efforts spent on them.

1. [Ed. note: It is clear that the United States enjoyed massive numerical superiority in strategic nuclear weapons over the USSR at the time of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but the precise ratio of deliverable nuclear weapons has not been definitely ascertained. Several accounts have used a ratio of 17-1, e.g., Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 44-45. A recent accounting of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, based in part on statistics recently declassified by the U.S. Department of Energy, implied a ratio of closer to nine-to-one at the time. It showed that in 1962 the United States had a total stockpile of 27,100 warheads, including 3,451 mounted on strategic delivery vehicles, and the USSR possessed a total stockpile of 3,100 warheads, including 481 strategic weapons. (Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Notebook: Estimated U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-94,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50:6 (Nov-Dec. 1994), 58-59.) However, the table did not reflect disparities in strategic delivery vehicles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which overwhelmingly favored the United States.]


3. See Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espio-
nage Against the West (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Leonid Shevarshin, Ruka Mosky [Arm of Moscow] (Moscow: Center-100, 1992), and Iz Zhizni Nachalniki Razvedki [From the Life of the Head of Intelligence] (Moscow: International Relations, 1994), and Yadirov, A., Iz arkhiva razvedchika [From the Archive of an intelligence officer] (Moscow: International Relations, 1993).

4. The author encountered the KGB documents used in this article while conducting research in Moscow in late 1992, for a book on Soviet leaders and the Cold War, in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (known by its Russian acronym, TsKhSD, for Tsentr Khranseniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii), located at B’inka 12 in Staraya Ploshchad’ (Old Square). This is the archive containing the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee. The author was also, at the time, researching the 1960-62 period for his paper on U.S.-Soviet crises for the Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History organized by the Cold War International History Project and held in Moscow in January 1993 in cooperation with TsKhSD and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Universal History. At that conference, some of the KGB documents cited in this article were described in a paper (“The Mentality of Soviet Society and the Cold War”) by Russian historian Vitaly S. Lelchuk (Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences), sparking a general discussion of the intelligence service’s role in the Kremlin’s handling of the U-2 affair.

Although the KGB archives for this period remain closed to scholars, with the limited exception of an arrangement with Crown Publishers to publish a series of books on selected topics, scholars have been able to conduct research on an increasingly regular basis in the archives of the CPSU CC (TsKhSD) and the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Recent Documents (RTsKhIDNI), the Russian Foreign Ministry (MID) archives, and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Moreover, the promulgation of several Russian laws and regulations mandating a 30-year-rule for most archival files, including Politburko records, inspires hope that a more thorough analysis of Khurshchev’s foreign and intelligence policies is becoming possible. For details on the Russian archival scene, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 18-39. For more on the KGB archives, see the report by Arseny Roginski and Nikita Okhotin, circulated in 1992 and slated for publication as a CWIHP Working Paper; Amy Knight, “The Fate of the KGB Archives,” Slavic Review 52:3 (Fall 1993), 582-6; and Yevegenia Albats, The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present and Future (New York: Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1994).


6. Ibid., I. 147.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., I. 154.

9. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 133-142, esp. 141-142.

10. KGB to Khruzhchev, “Report for 1960,” 14 Febru-

ary 1961, cited above.

11. The 7 April 1960 directive was cited in KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, Fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, l. 133. The original directive was not located.

12. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, cited above.

13. Ibid., ll. 136-137.


15. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, cited above, I. 140.

16. KGB to Khruzhchev, “Report for 1960,” 14 Febru-
ary 1961, St. 179/42c, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 74, l. 1149.

17. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, l. 1137.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


21. The above two paragraphs are based on KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85 l. 138-139. [Ed. note: Nelson Rockefeller, a member of the country’s wealthiest families, Governor of New York State, and briefly a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960, had been a Special Assistant to Eisenhower on Cold War psychological warfare strategy; Gen. Lauris Norstad was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); A. Dulles headed the CIA and J. Edgar Hoover was FBI director.]


Witness—A Soviet Spymaster

Schecter,

are discussed in Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatolii,

of State, 14 October 1958, in U.S. Department of State,

believe that today greatest potential threat to stability
ability 

to disrupt stability almost endless. Thus we

He spent last eleven years in exile in Soviet Union. His

through returned Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani.

[on Iraqi Prime Minister Kassim-ed.

another point

stated that “Communists also have potential for attack

on Iraqi Prime Minister Kassim-ed.” on another point

through returned Kurdish leader Mullal Mustafa Barzani.

spent last eleven years in exile in Soviet Union. His

appeal to majority of Iraqi Kurds is strong and his ability 
[to] disrupt stability almost endless. Thus we

believe that today greatest potential threat to stability and even existence of Qassim’s [Kassim’s] regime lies in

hands of Communists.” See Gallman to Department of

State, 14 October 1958, in U.S. Department of State,

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960,

Vol. XII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,

1993), 344–46. Barzani’s alleged ties to the KGB are
discussed in Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P.

Schecter, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted


42. Shlepin also proposed an initiative to entice

Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, a Third World

leader avidly courted by both East and West, into throwing his support behind the Kurds. Shlepin sug-
gested informing Nasser “through unofficial channels” that,
in the event of a Kurdish victory, Moscow “might take a benign look at the integration of the non-Kurdish part of Iraqi territory with the UAR”—the United Arab Republic, a short-lived union of Egypt and Syria re-
fecting Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism—“on the con-
dition of NASSER’s support for the creation of an independent Kurdishistan.” Shlepin to Khrushchev,

29 July 1961, in St.-191/75g, 1 August 1961, TsKhSD,

fond 4, opis 13, delo 81, ll. 131-32. When a Kurdish

rebellion indeed broke out in northern Iraq in Septem-
ber 1961, the KGB quickly responded with additional

proposals to exploit the situation. KGB Deputy Chair-
man Peter Ivashutin proposed—“In accord with the
decision of the CC CPSU...of 1 August 1961 on the
implementation of measures favoring the distraction of

the attention and forces of the USA and her allies from

West Berlin, and in view of the armed uprisings of the

Kurdish tribes that have begun in the North of Iraq”—

to: 1) use the KGB to organize pro-Kurdish and anti-

Kassim protests in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan,

Guinea, and other countries; 2) have the KGB meet with

Barzani to urge him to “seize the leadership of the

Kurdish movements in his hands and to lead it along the
democratic road,” and to advise him to “keep a low
profile in the course of this activity so that the West did
not have a pretext to blame the USSR in meddling into
the internal affairs of Iraq”; and 3) assign the KGB to

recruit and train a “special armed detachment (500-700
men)” drawn from Kurds living in the USSR in the
event that Moscow might need to send Barzani “various

military experts (Artillerymen, radio operators, demo-
lition squads, etc.)” to support the Kurdish uprising. P.

Ivashutin to CC CPSU, 27 September 1961, St.-191/10c,

3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, 
ll. 1-4. The uprising continued until a group of Ba’athist

military officers overthrow Kassim in spring 1963, and

of course the Kurdish problem remains unresolved

more than three decades later. For an overview of

Kremlin policy on the Kurdish issue, written before the

opening of Soviet archives, see Oles M. Smolandsky with Bettie M. Smolandsky, The USSR and Iraq: The

Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, N.C.: Duke Uni-


43. In particular, Shlepin envisioned operations to

set ablaze a British Air Force fuel depot near Arzberg in

West Germany, and to stage an explosion at a U.S.

military-logistics base in Chionin, France. Ibid., l.133.

44. Ibid., ll. 133-134.

45. The above five paragraphs are based on Ivashutin

and Malinovsky to CC CPSU, 10 November 1961, in

St. 2/35c, 14 November 1961, TsKhSD, fond 14, opis
14, delo 1, ll. 10-14.

46. Georgi Bolshakov was a GRU officer who acted

under the cover of a press secretary at the Soviet

Embassy in Washington in 1961-62. He often met with

Robert Kennedy, the President’s brother, delivering

Khrushchev’s personal messages, mostly orally. See

Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and


47. See Mangold, Cold Warrior, and Wise, Mole-Hunt,

passim.

48. Semichastny to Shelepin, 28 July 1962, in St. 33/77c,

imprisoned and exiled for his efforts to declassify the


52. In a December 1976 briefing, CIA representatives

informed the incoming Carter Administration National Security Council staff officials Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron of “current Soviet agents and the nature of the materials they provide us. Brzezinski and Aaron seemed quite impressed, though Brzezinski wondered whether such agents could not be used to pull off a rather massive disinformation operation against the U.S. [Bill] Wells [from the CIA] explained why this is not likely.”

Brzezinski, soon to become Carter’s national security

advisor, “said he would like to be briefed in detail on

‘agents of influence’ that belong to us abroad.” He explained that “he did not want to be surprised in

meeting with or dealing with foreign VIPs, if in fact

those VIPs were our agents of influence.” CIA, Memo-

randum for the Record on a meeting with [presumptive] 

National Security Adviser Brzezinski, 30 December 1976. The document was declassified by the CIA in

January 1994 and is available on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
New Research on the GDR
by Christian F. Ostermann

The Germans, as the British historian Mary Fulbrook recently pointed out, have "peculiarly vitriolic and problematic ways of 'reckoning with the past.'" A case in point is the way in which Germans have confronted the archival remnants of the German Democratic Republic. The first four years after the collapse of the GDR witnessed everything from the destruction and confiscation of historical records, including police raids on and calls for the complete closing of the East German communist party (SED) archives, to parliamentary investigating committees, to the establishment of new research institutions, and—more recently—to the opening of almost all records of the former GDR. The following essay covers some of the more recent developments of interest to Cold War historians.

The Ministry of State Security Records

Politically, the most controversial legacy of the SED regime was the records of the former Ministry for State Security (MfS/Stasi), many of them saved by citizens' groups from being destroyed by Stasi employees in the GDR's last days. Extremely sensitive for privacy and security reasons, the MfS records were entrusted by the German Unification Treaty of 1990 to the Sonderbeauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staatssicherheitsdienstes (Special Commissioner of the Federal Government for the Files of the former State Security Service, usually referred to as the "Gauck Agency" after its director, Joachim Gauck).

In December 1991, access to the records was granted on the basis of the "Stasi Records Law" (StUG). The Stasi files are located in the central archives of the former MfS in Berlin and in various regional (district) archives. According to the StUG, the Stasi records, encompassing more than 500,000 feet of documents, are open to all interested researchers. Exemptions exist, however, for documents of supranational organizations and foreign countries and files relating to intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence.

The Soviet Occupation: Moscow's Man in (East) Berlin
by Norman M. Naimark

The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG in Russian, SMAD in German) ruled the eastern zone of the defeated and occupied country from June 1945 until the creation of the German Democratic Republic in the fall of 1949. Given SVAG's importance to modern German and Soviet history, it is surprising that there have been so few scholarly studies of its policies, organization, and actions. Yet when one recalls both that Soviet and GDR historiography refused to recognize that Soviet activities in Germany were determined by an occupation regime and that West German historiography, especially between the late 1960s and 1989, was often unwilling to ask hard questions about the origins and legitimacy of the East German state, the lack of attention to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany is easier to understand. Particularly in the West, the reticence of historians was also reinforced by the paucity of primary sources on SVAG's activities. With Soviet and GDR archives closed to researchers from both the West and East, there was little hope for a breakthrough in the historiography of the Soviet presence in Germany.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, historians have begun to come to terms with Moscow's role in the development of East German communism and the creation of the GDR. But despite the availability of important new sources in the archives of the former East German communist party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and access to individuals who took part in the building of the East German state, very little progress has been made in advancing our understanding of the ways in which the Soviet military government worked. Who determined Soviet policies in the eastern zone of Germany? How were decisions reached? Who was responsible for implementing policies in Germany itself? What did Soviet occupation officers think they were doing in Germany? We have known generally what happened in the Soviet occupation zone and across East Germany, but it is time to ask how the occupation was actually implemented on the ground.

Ed. note: One of the most intense controversies of the "Stalin Note" of 10 March 1952 in which the Soviet leader resolved the division of Germany. In essence, Stalin claimed that foreign armies on the condition that the country would have to reassess its situation. Two versions of that conversation exist, one in German archives. They show that Stalin, angry at the communists to "organize your own state" on the "day to day" basis. Since the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had only a few years earlier, it is unclear whether this is the existing state of affairs, or whether it signified the permanent role of the GDR in the German reunification process.

The excerpt from the Soviet minutes of the conversation of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), G. N. Spyryadin, Deputy Director, Institute of Universal History, on the continued on page 45
The GDR Oral History Project
by A. James McAdams

In November 1994, the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University opens a major new archive, a collection of over 80 oral histories of leading politicians and policymakers from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The collection has been compiled by the GDR Oral History Project, whose aim was to record on tape some of the still vivid memories of the former leaders of East Germany, so that in 50 or 100 years (the amount of time Socialist Unity Party [SED] general secretary Erich Honecker predicted the Berlin Wall would last) future students of German history would have a unique source for assessing the driving motivations of the individuals who once made up the country’s dominant political culture. Of course, no series of interviews alone can realistically relate the entire history of a state. Nevertheless, the researchers felt they could preserve for posterity a segment of that experience by interviewing a select group of individuals who could reasonably be characterized as the East German political elite.

New Evidence on Khrushchev’s 1958 Berlin Ultimatum
Translation and Commentary by Hope M. Harrison

The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961 has long been seen as “Khrushchev’s crisis,” but at last there is some documentation indicating that at least the initiation of the crisis really was the Soviet leader’s personal handiwork. Remaining in Berlin after the Cold War International History Project’s conference on the “Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives” in Essen and Potsdam, Germany on 28 June-2 July 1994, I was fortunate enough to be one of the first scholars to gain access to the freshly-opened archives of the former East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While working in this archive, I found in the files of State Secretary Otto Winzer a document, translated below, written by the East German ambassador to Moscow, Johannes König, and dated 4 December 1958. In the document, König summarized information he gleaned from various Soviet Foreign Ministry officials about the process leading up to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November 1958 and notes of 27 November 1958, which launched the Berlin Crisis.

In Khrushchev’s November 10 speech, at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in the Sports Palace in Moscow, he asserted that the Western powers were using West Berlin as an outpost from which to launch aggressive maneuvers against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other countries of the socialist camp, including Poland. The impending atomic armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), he declared, threatened to further exacerbate this situation. Khrushchev stated that the Western powers had broken all quadripartite agreements concerning Germany, particularly the agreement for the demilitarization of Germany, and that the only part of the Potsdam Agreement the West continued to honor was the part stipulating the four-power occupation of Berlin. This situation, in which the West used West Berlin for aggressive purposes...
poses against the East, could not go on any longer, he declared, and the situation in Berlin, “the capital of the GDR,” must be normalized.3

In lengthy notes to the Western powers on November 27, Khrushchev elaborated on what he had in mind to “normalize” the situation in Berlin. Khrushchev’s proposals were seen as an ultimatum in the West, especially because they set a six-month deadline for negotiations. Khrushchev reiterated in stronger and more detailed language what he had said on November 10 and then declared that he viewed the former agreements on Berlin as null and void. He insisted that a peace treaty be signed with Germany and that West Berlin be made into a “free” and demilitarized city. If sufficient progress on these issues had not been achieved among the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France within six months, Moscow would sign a separate treaty with the GDR and transfer to it German reunification would “leave this question to be decided by a group of states where capitalist states have three voices, and the socialists have only one. But what would you say if it was proposed to submit the question of German reunification for decision by a group of states of a different composition, for example, composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, China, and the Soviet Union. You, of course, would not be enthralled with this proposal, since you would know for sure that these states would support the socialist development of all of Germany.” Khrushchev must have hoped that opening a diplomatic offensive against the West would give him added leverage in four-power policies on Germany.

The following document discloses that Khrushchev dictated several pages of guidelines for officials in the Third European Department (responsible for Germany) of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to follow in formulating the November 27 ultimatum. He also met with several of these officials on November 19 to discuss his ideas in detail. It seems that one of these ideas of Khrushchev’s was that of creating a “free-city” in West Berlin. (The record of his 1 December 1958 eight-hour conversation with visiting Sen. Hubert Humphrey also notes that Khrushchev “said he had given many months of thought to [the] Berlin situation and had finally come up with his proposal of a so-called free city.”) The document authored by König is the only one I have seen from an archive in Moscow or Berlin which points to the direct involvement in formulating a specific policy by a specific leader. Unfortunately, I did not find accompanying documents in the archives containing the actual dictated notes Khrushchev gave to the Foreign Ministry officials or records from the November 19 meeting he had with these officials. Clearly, it would be particularly revealing to have these documents.

The document below not only confirms Khrushchev’s central role in formulating the ultimatum, but also the role of the Foreign Ministry’s Third European Department since at least 6 November 1958. Several times, König notes that officials of the Third European Department were apprised of and deeply involved in the preparations. If officials in the Third European Department had advance knowledge of critical parts of Khrushchev’s November 10 speech, the information given to Raymond Garthoff by Sergio Mikoian (son of then-Presidium member Anastas Mikoian) that “the speech had not been discussed and cleared with the other Soviet leaders” is probably erroneous.4

The document also illuminates the bureaucratic workings of the East German side. While the East German leaders had been discussing ideas about a “special note” to the Western powers since September, the East German leaders in Berlin told their Foreign Ministry officials, especially officials at the embassy in Moscow, very little, if anything, about this or much else, it seems. This obviously hampered the work of Foreign Ministry officials.5

Finally, the document indicates several times that the Soviets were careful to proceed gradually and cautiously in implementing the threats contained in the ultimatum so as to gauge the Western reaction. This is typical of Khrushchev. His diplomacy of 1958-1962 showed that he liked to push the West “to the brink,” but that just before the brink, he would wait to see what the West would do and would generally adjust his policies accordingly. The Soviet emphasis seen in this document on acting gradually and continually monitoring the West’s reaction would be repeated in the plans for building the Berlin Wall in 1961.6

Comments on the Preparation of the Steps of the Soviet Government Concerning a Change in the Status of West Berlin

On the preparation of these actions (the composition of Comrade Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November and the notes of the Soviet government to the governments of the three Western powers, the GDR and the Bonn government), in which the [Soviet] MID [Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and especially its Third European Department played a critical part. Already several days before Comrade Khrushchev’s appearance on 10 November 1958 on the occasion of the Soviet-Polish friendship meeting, comrades from the MID let it drop on 6 November that Comrade Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November would bring “something new” with regard to the German question. The Soviet comrades would not, however, hint a word about the substance of the “news.”

On 10 November, a few hours before Comrade Khrushchev’s appearance, I was still in the
speech. measures announced in Comrade Khrushchev's proposals for the next steps for carrying out the Western powers and so as to make from these 1945 so as to prepare arguments for shattering which were concluded or made between the oc-
department was occupied for days with studying of the Third European Department that the entire
assumption that ideas about concrete steps devel-
opped gradually at first and perhaps were subject to certain changes.

We know from information from comrades of the Third European Department that the entire
Department was occupied for days with studying all agreements, arrangements, protocols, etc.,
which were concluded or made between the occu-
ping powers with regard to West Berlin since 1945 so as to prepare arguments for shattering assertions made by Bonn and the governments of the Western powers and so as to make from these [i.e., old agreements, etc.—H.H.] concrete pro-
posals for the next steps for carrying out the measures announced in Comrade Khrushchev’s speech.

The MID was essentially finished with this work on 19 November 1958. According to
information from Soviet comrades, the work on the comprehensive document was finished on this day and the document was submitted to the Council of Ministers for ratification. On this occasion, we learned that this document was supposed to comprise about 20 pages and was supposed to be presented to the three Western Powers, the GDR and West Germany soon. Thus, at this time we did not yet learn that there were 3 different documents. The Soviet comrades who gave us this news for “personal information” emphasized that they probably would not be telling us anything new, since “Berlin is informed and surely the same practice must exist with us as on the Soviet side, namely that the ambassador concerned absolutely must be informed about such issues regularly.”

This comment: “You have of course already been informed by Berlin” was made to me a few other times so as to make clear that we should not expect official information on the part of the local [i.e. Moscow] MID.

In the conversation we conducted with the relevant Soviet comrades, it was said that a com-
prehensive argumentation was provided in the planned document for establishing the repeal of the agreements concerning Berlin (of September 1944, May 1945, and the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters [of September 1955]) and that these functions would be transferred to the competence of the GDR. With this it was already mentioned that it is planned to hold official negotiations with the GDR on this. At the same time a hint was made that the Soviet Union would probably not be averse if it should prove to be expedient and necessary also to speak with the Western powers about this issue.

In the negotiations with the GDR, the issue of the transfer or the taking over of the relevant
functions will be discussed. The key question in this is when, i.e., at which point in time and how
the whole thing should be carried out. Our leading comrades, with whom consultations have taken place, also expressed the view that in this one must not place too much haste on the day, but must go forward gradually, step by step.

In this conversation the Soviet comrade in question thought [very realistically, as it turned out—H.H.] that the Berlin issue would remain at the center of attention for at least one year if not even longer. On this issue hard conflicts with the Western powers will arise. To my comment: “The Western powers will not want to conduct a war for the sake of Berlin” followed the answer: “Our Presidium proceeds from the same assumption.” My comment that ultimately the issue would come to a crisis for the West as a prestige issue and that therefore in my opinion everything must be done so as to facilitate retreat for the Western powers on this issue was acknowledged as correct.

In this connection it was noted by the Soviet comrade that the issue of great significance is what should happen with West Berlin after an eventual withdrawal of the Western troops. This issue plays a large role in the considerations of the Soviet comrades.

Thus, in this conversation, the issue of the transformation of West Berlin into a free city was not yet dealt with.

It was emphasized that in this connection public opinion is also of great significance. One cannot resolve this issue if one has not prepared the basis for this within the population. A correct argumentation vis-à-vis the population so as to win them over for the planned steps is thus of great importance.

In this connection, it was also mentioned that Comrade Khrushchev personally gave ex-
tremely great attention to the preparation of the new steps regarding the Berlin question. He personally participated in the preparation of the documents. He submitted to the comrades of the Third European Department his thoughts on the entire problem on several type-written pages which he had personally dictated and asked the comrades to observe this point of view in the composition of the documents and the determination of particular measures.

Comrade Khrushchev personally received on 19 November for a discussion several respons-
able officials of the Third European Department of the MID who were occupied with the Berlin issue and spoke with them in great detail about the entire problem.

The first mention that the Soviet proposals would include the demilitarization and neutral-
ization of West Berlin was made to me by Comrade Il’ichev on 22 November when I sought him out on another matter. He again emphasized that he wanted to give me “exclusively for my personal information” several hints about the contents of the planned documents. In this connection he mentioned that it was planned to propose giving West Berlin the status of a free city.

Comrade Il’ichev emphasized on this occasion that the Soviet side was ready to negotiate with the three Western powers on the Berlin question, but only on the basis of the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement in West Germany, [including] for example, demilitarization, denazification, decartellization, repeal of the prohibi-
tion of the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands], etc.

Concerning further actions regarding Ber-
lin, Comrade Il’ichev also emphasized that these would proceed step by step.

To my question as to whether the planned documents would be given to all nations which took place in the war against Germany, Comrade Il’ichev answered that they would be given only to the three Western powers as well as to Berlin and Bonn. To my question as to whether the delivery would occur in Moscow or Berlin and Bonn, Comrade Il’ichev answered, “probably in Berlin.”

After the delivery of the documents, they will wait 2-3 weeks so as to digest the reaction of the other side and then take a new step.

Regarding the negotiations with the GDR or the transfer to the GDR of the functions which are still being exercised by the Soviet side, this will also probably proceed gradually.

I asked Comrade Il’ichev again about the contents of the talks between [Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Andrei] Smirnov and [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer. Comrade Il’ichev confirmed that Smirnov had sought this talk. He once again merely explained the point of view which was expressed in Comrade Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November 1958. Regarding this, Adenauer responded that he could not understand Soviet foreign policy. Precisely now when the first signs of a détente were noticeable at the Geneva negotiations, the Soviet government would create new tension with its statement concerning Berlin.

An explanation of why Smirnov conducted this conversation at all in view of the fact that the Soviet government stands by the point of view...
that Berlin is a matter which does not concern West Germany but is a matter of the GDR was not given to me by Comrade Il'ichev.20

Since the publication of the document to the GDR, the 3 Western powers, and West Germany on 27 November 1958, we have not had another opportunity to speak with Soviet comrades about these questions.

From the above remarks, in my view one can without doubt draw the conclusion that the Soviet comrades already have firm views about the execution of the measures proposed in the documents mentioned.21 This applies especially in regard to the concrete steps concerning the transfer of the functions still exercised by the Soviet side in Berlin and on the transit routes between West Germany and Berlin.

The concrete steps and forms for the execution of the other measures in regard to West Berlin [presumably meaning the free-city proposal—H.H.] will probably not remain uninfluenced by the statements and responses by the Western powers and by developments within West Berlin itself.

As far as the entire problem is concerned, immediately after Comrade Khruščev’s speech of 10 November 1958 I remembered the conversation which took place at the end of 1957 in Berlin on the occasion of the negotiations for the settlement of issues which were still open [in Soviet-East German relations—H.H.] and in which Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and then-Ambassador Pushkin from the Soviet side and Deputy Ministers Comrade Winzer and Comrade Schwab as well as Ambassador König took part.22 As is known, Ambassador Pushkin already expressed the view then in the course of this free and open discussion that it is not impossible to resolve the Berlin question already before the resolution of the German question.23

Moscow, 4 December 1958

König

* * * * * * *

(Source: Political Archive of the Foreign Ministry. Files of: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic. Files of: the State Secretary. A17723)

1. Due to a tip from Doug Selvage, a Ph.D. student in history at Yale University, who is conducting extensive research in Polish and German archives for his dissertation on Polish-German relations, 1956-70.

2. For access to these archives, interested scholars to locate relevant documents. This may refer to the somewhat different notes sent to the United States, Great Britain, and France, but there were also notes sent to both German governments, making five different documents...—H.H.]

3. Generally the Western powers declared that the Soviets did not have the right to change the situation in Berlin unilaterally and asserted that the Soviets were obliged to safeguard the communications routes between West Berlin and West Germany for the Western powers. At a news conference on 26 November 1958, however, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perhaps opened a window for Soviet strategy by adding that the United States might be prepared to treat East German border officials as agents of the Soviet Union, although not as representatives of a sovereign state of East Germany. “News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Dulles Reasserting the ‘Explicit Obliga- tion’ of the Soviet Union to Assume ‘Normal Access to and Egress From Berlin,’ November 26, 1958.” U.S. State Department, ed., Documents on Germany, 1944-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 9446), 546-52.—H.H.]

11. Commenting on the process of building the wall in a letter to Ulbricht on 30 October 1961, Khruščev praised the decision of the 3-5 August 1961 Warsaw Pact meeting “to carry out the various measures gradually and not to come to serious complications.” SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NL 182/1206.


6. Khruščev’s note to Adenauer on 18 August 1959, Archiv Vnesheini Politiiki Russkoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation], Referentura po FRG (file group on the FRG), Opis (list) 4, Portfel’ (portfolio) 9, Papka (file) 22.


9. On high-level Soviet-East German talks leading up to the ultimatum, see Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose,’” 18-20.

10. On this lack of communication and the resulting frustration of East German Foreign Ministry officials, see the letter from König to Winzer on 5 December 1958, MFAA, Staatssekretär, A17723; and “Stenografische Niederschrift der Botschafterkonferenz im Grossen Sitzungssaal des Hauses der Einheit” am 1/2 Februar 1956 (“Stenographic Protocol of the Ambassadors’ Conference in the Large Meeting Hall of the ‘House of Unity’” on 1-2 February 1956’), Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv [of the SED] (SAPMO-BArch, ZPA) [Foundation of the Archives of the Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archival, Central Party Archive], J IV 2/201-429.

11. Comments on the process of building the wall in a letter to Ulbricht on 30 October 1961, Khruščev praised the decision of the 3-5 August 1961 Warsaw Pact meeting “to carry out the various measures gradually and not to come to serious complications.” SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NL 182/1206.

12. [Generally the Western powers declared that the Soviets did not have the right to change the situation in Berlin unilaterally and asserted that the Soviets were obliged to safeguard the communications routes between West Berlin and West Germany for the Western powers. At a news conference on 26 November 1958, however, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perhaps opened a window for Soviet strategy by adding that the United States might be prepared to treat East German border officials as agents of the Soviet Union, although not as representatives of a sovereign state of East Germany. “News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Dulles Reasserting the ‘Explicit Obligation’ of the Soviet Union to Assume ‘Normal Access to and Egress From Berlin,’ November 26, 1958.” U.S. State Department, ed., Documents on Germany, 1944-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 9446), 546-52.—H.H.]

13. [According to another document I have seen, two days prior to this date, on November 17, Pervukhin “informed [Ulbricht] about the proposed measures of the Soviet government regarding the four-power status of Berlin.” “Zapis’ besedy s tovarishchem V. Ul brikhom 17.11.58g” (“Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade W. Ulbricht 17.11.58”), from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 24 November 1958, Tsentr Khranenie Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TKhSSD) [the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation—the post-1952 Central Committee Archives], Rolik (microfilm reel) 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo (file) 77. Thus, either one of these dates is wrong, or Pervukhin was extremely confident that the “proposed measures” would be ratified by the Council of Ministers.—H.H.]

14. [It is not entirely clear what the three different documents were. This may refer to the somewhat different notes sent to the United States, Great Britain, and France, but there were also notes sent to both German governments, making five different documents.—H.H.]

15. [East German Foreign Minister Lothar Bolz and Soviet Foreign Minister V.A. Zorin appended to the “Treaty on Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” of 20 September 1955 an exchange of letters detailing rights of control over inter-German and inter-Berlin borders and the communications routes between Berlin and West Germany. See Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR und Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, ed., Beziehungen DDR-UdSSR, Vol. 2 (Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1975), 996-8.—H.H.]

16. [See “Zapis’ besedy s tovarishchem V. Ul brikhom 17.11.58g” (“Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on 17 November 1958”), from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 24 November 1958, TsKhSSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 77, in which Ulbricht told Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Pervukhin: “Regarding concrete steps towards implementing the Soviet government’s proposals for transferring to GDR organs the control functions which have been carried out by Soviet organs in Berlin, ... perhaps we should not hurry with this, since this would give us the opportunity to
keep the adversary under pressure for a certain period of time." Ulbricht’s justification for going slowly aside, this is a rare instance in which the East German leader was not pushing the Soviets to move faster on giving up their control functions in Berlin to the GDR.—H.H. [17. It may be that the Soviet official in question here had some reason to believe that Khrushchev’s declared intention of transferring Soviet control functions in Berlin to the GDR was more of a threat to get the Western powers to the bargaining table than a serious intention. While it proved very useful as a threat, Khrushchev knew that carrying it out in practice would mean relinquishing some Soviet control over the situation in Berlin to the GDR. As the crisis progressed, Khrushchev came to the conclusion, no doubt based in large part on Ulbricht’s obvious attempts to wrest control from him and further exacerbate the situation in Berlin, that he did not want to do this. See the argument made in Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’,” and idem., “The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961,” paper presented to the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994.—H.H.]

18. [The next step was taken on 10 January 1959, when the Soviets submitted a draft German peace treaty accompanied by a note to the three Western powers and sent copies of these to all of the countries that had fought against Germany in World War II, as well as to both German states. For the text of the note to the United States and the draft treaty, see Documents on Germany, 585-607.—H.H.]

19. [The reference is to the disarmament negotiations which began in Geneva on 31 October 1958 between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The negotiations ultimately resulted in a treaty on the partial banning of nuclear testing which was signed by the three powers in Moscow on 5 August 1963. On these negotiations, see Christer Jönsson, Soviet Bargaining Behavior. The Nuclear Test Ban Case (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).—H.H.]

20. [The East Germans were often frustrated at Soviet attempts to maintain or improve relations with the West Germans. The Soviets were always walking a fine diplomatic line of trying to maintain good relations with each part of Germany while not overly alienating the other part in the process. While Khrushchev’s prime concern was the support, protection, and strengthening of the GDR, he also had economic, military, and political reasons for maintaining good relations with the FRG.—H.H.]

21. [Presumably, this refers to the Soviet intention to move forward slowly and cautiously with the transfer of some Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to the GDR. —H.H.]

22. [It is possible that König is actually referring to a meeting that took place on 12 December 1956 (as opposed to 1957) in which several remaining “open issues” in Soviet-East German relations were discussed. See König’s account of the meeting, “Bericht über eine Unterrichtung mit stellvert. Aussenminister, Gen. Sorin” (“Report on a Conversation with Deputy Foreign Ministry Comrade Zorin”), 14 December 1956, SAPMO-Arch. ZPA, NL 90/472.—H.H.]

23. [Pushkin was not the only leading Soviet or East German official who believed that the Berlin issue could (and perhaps should) be resolved before the resolution of the entire German question. The next Soviet Ambassador to East Germany after Pushkin, Mikhail Pervukhin, also believed this, as did Soviet counselor Oleg Selianinov and Peter Florin, the head of the International Department of the SED Central Committee. See “O polozhenii v Zapadnom Berline” (“On the Situation in West Berlin”), 24 February 1958, report written by two diplomats at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, O. Selianinov, counselor, and A. Kazenov, second secretary, TsKhISD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; and “Zapis’ besedy s zav. mezhdunarodnym otdelem TsK SEPG P. Florinom” (“Record of Conversation with the Head of the International Department of the SED CCP, Florin”), 12 May 1958, from Selianinov’s diary, 16 May 1958, TsKhISD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76. Both are cited in Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’,” 5-6. Considering how this document concludes, it is ironic that as the crisis actually progressed, it was the East German leadership far more than the Soviet leadership that wanted to resolve the Berlin question separately from and before a general German settlement.—H.H.]

The author is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics at Brandeis University and a Fellow at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. She completed her Ph.D. in Political Science at Columbia University. After spending an extended period of time in Moscow and Berlin using the then-newly opened archives of the former Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU Central Committee and of the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and secret police (Stasi), she completed her dissertation, The Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961 (Ann Arbor: MI: University Microfilms International, 1994). She is currently revising her dissertation for book publication.

CWHIP Fellowships

The Cold War International History Project offers a limited number of fellowships to junior scholars from the former Communist bloc to conduct from three months to one year of archival research in the United States on topics related to the history of the Cold War. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Applicants should submit a CV, a statement of proposed research, a letter of nomination, and three letters of recommendation; writing samples (particularly in English) are welcomed, though not required. Applicants should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States.

For the 1994-95 academic year, CWHIP awarded fellowships to Milada Polisenska, Institute of International Studies, Prague (four months); Victor Gobarev, Institute of Military History, Moscow (four months); and Sergei Kudryashov, History Editor of “Rodina” and “Istochnik”, Moscow (four months).

Send applications to: Jim Hershberg, Director, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560, fax (202) 357-4439.

GDR Research

continued from page 34

terrorism, and secret West German records. All administrative, policy, and personal records are available in principle, some however only in a sanitized form (e.g., names deleted under the privacy exemption).

Due to the files’ sensitivity and time-consuming preparatory screening efforts involved, as well as the massive demand—1.8 million private research applications registered as of mid-1993—research at the Gauck Agency requires researchers to plan well ahead (currently the waiting time is one year). Applications for scholarly research will only be accepted if they deal broadly with MfS history. More than 1,200 academic and 1,500 media research applications have been received so far.

The agency’s “Education and Research Department,” established in 1993 with a staff of 83 and charged with facilitating research, is also engaged in research projects of its own, covering subjects central to MfS history such as “The MfS and the SED,” “The Anatomy of the MfS” (eventually to be published as an MfS “handbook”), “The Sociology and Psychology of the ‘Informal Informants,’” and “The Potential and Structure of Opposition in the GDR.” Several useful reference and historical works have been published, such as “Measure ‘Donau’ and Operation ‘Recovery’: The Crushing of the Prague Spring 1968/69 as Reflected in the Stasi Records” (Series B, No. 1/94). The Gauck Agency held a conference on “The MfS Records and Contemporary History,” in March 1994, and plans a symposium on “The MfS and the Churches” for early 1995.5

Coming to Terms with the History and Legacy of the SED-Dictatorship

In an effort to expand beyond the narrow public focus on the Stasi records, the German Parliament (Bundestag) decided to create a parliamentary committee for research on the history of the SED dictatorship (Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland,” [Study Commission “Coming to Terms with the History and Legacy of the SED-Dictatorship in Germany”]). Following a parliamentary initiative of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in February 1992, the Bundestag established the Enquete Kommission in its 82nd session on 12 March
1992. The committee, headed by Rainer Eppelmann of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (CDU), consisted of parliament members and historians (among them Bernd Faulenbach, Alexander Fischer, Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Hermann Weber, and Manfred Wilke). According to a motion passed by the Bundestag on 20 May 1992, the committee was to “make contributions to the political-historical analysis and political-moral evaluation” of the SED-dictatorship.8

This was to include, in particular: (1) the structures, strategies, and instruments of the SED-dictatorship (e.g., the relationship of the SED and state, the structure of the state security organs, the role of the “bourgeois bloc parties,” and the militarization of East German society); (2) the significance of ideology and integrating factors such as Marxism-Leninism and anti-fascism (as well as the role of education, literature, and the arts); (3) human rights violations, acts and mechanisms of repression, and the possibility for further restitution of victims; (4) the variety and potential of resistance and opposition movements; (5) the role of the churches; (6) the impact of the international system and in particular of Soviet policy in Germany; (7) the impact of the FRG-GDR relationship (e.g. Deutschlandpolitis); inner-German relations, influence of West German media on the GDR, and activities of the GDR in West Germany); and (8) the significance of historical continuity in German political culture in the twentieth century.9

In over 27 months, the committee organized 44 public hearings with more than 327 historians and eyewitnesses and contracted 148 expert studies, producing a massive collection altogether of over 15,000 pages of material on the SED-dictatorship. On 17 June 1994, the committee presented a final report of over 300 pages which sums up some of the findings, reflecting politically controversial issues through “minority voices.”11 While the committee’s main focus, as reflected in the report, was the SED apparatus, the Ministry for State Security, and political persecution and repression, much of the committee’s work became heavily politicized, as the ensuing parliamentary debate over the validity and success of the various brands of “Deutschlandpolitik” (Konrad Adenauer’s “policy of strength” vs. Willy Brandt’s “policy of small steps”) demonstrated.12

Similarly, the role of the former “bourgeois” political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), proved to be highly controversial. The report contains excellent sections on the East German resistance movement, the MfS, and the early history of the GDR. In its final section, the report gives a brief survey of the Germany-related holdings of various Russian archives as well as criteria for the use of the SED and MfS records.

Of the 148 expert studies to be published along with the hearings in 1995, the most interesting for Cold War historians include the following (only short title given): War Damages and Reparations (L. Baar/W. Matschke); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition 1969-1982 (W. Bleek); State and Party Rule in the GDR (G. Brunner); War Damage and Reparations (Ch. Buchheim); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (G. Dalos); On the Use of the MfS Records (R. Engelmann); “Special Camps” of the Soviet Occupation Power, 1945-1950 (G. Finn); The Wall Syndrome—Impact of the Wall on the GDR Population (H.-J. Fischbeck); Germany as an Object of Allied Policy, 1941-1949 (A. Fischer/M. Rissmann); Reports of the Soviet High Commission in Germany 1953/1954: Documents from the Archives for Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (J. Foitzik); German Question and the Germans: Attitudes Among East German Youth (P. Förster); International Framework of Deutschlandpolitis, 1949-1955 (H. Graml); Deutschlandpolitis of the SPD/FDP Coalition, 1969-1982 (J. Hacker); Case Study: 9 November 1989 (H.-H. Hertle); The Self-Representation of the GDR in International Human Rights Organizations (K. Ipsen); Deutschlandpolitis of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (W. Jäger); Deutschlandpolitis of the Adenauer Governments (C. Kleffmann); Opposition in the GDR, From the Honecker Era to the Polish Revolution 1980/81 (C. Kleffmann); West German Political Parties and the GDR Opposition (W. Knabe); Patriotism and National Identity among East Germans (A. Köhler); NVA [the East German New People’s Army], 1956-1990 (P.J. Lapp); Deutschland-politis of the Erhard Government and the Great Coalition (W. Link); International Conditions of Deutschland-politik, 1961-1989 (W. Loth); The Berlin Problem—the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961/62 (D. Mahncke); Cooperation between MfS and KGB (B. Marquardt); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (L. Mehlhorn); Alternative Culture and State Security, 1976-1989 (K. Michael); Deutschlandpolitis of the Adenauer Governments (R. Morsey); Western Policy of the SED (H.-P. Müller); The Role of the Bloc Parties (Ch. Nehrig); Opposition Within the SED (W. Otto); Establishment of the GDR as a “Core Area of Germany” and the All-German Claims of KPD and SED (M. Overesch); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (G. Papcke); the “National” Policy of the KPD/SED (W. Pfeiler); Deutschlandpolitis of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (H. Potthoff); Transformation of the Party System 1945-1950 (M. Richter); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (M. Richter); Deutschlandpolitis of the SED (K.H. Schmidt); The Integration of the GDR into COMECON (A. Schüler); Influence of the SED on West German Political Parties (J. Staadt); Opposition within the LDPD (S. Suckut); Operation “Recovery”: The Crushing of the Prague Spring as Reflected in the MfS Records (M. Tantscher); The Round Table and the Deposing of the SED: Impediments on the Way to Free Elections (U. Thayssen); On the Function of Marxism-Leninism (H. Weber/L. Lange); The German Question: Continuity and Changes in West German Public Opinion, 1945/49-1990 (W. Weidenfeld). While the expert studies are officially not yet available, transcripts of the hearings can be obtained from the Bundestag.13

Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv

Next to the Stasi files, the records of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), comprising over 26,000 ft. of documents, as well as the records of former Communist front organizations such as the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Democratic Women’s League (DFB), the Cultural League, the National Democratic Party (NDPD), the Foundation for Soviet-German Friendship, and the Free German Union Federation (FDGB), constitute the most important sources for the history of the GDR.
These records are now in the custody of an independent foundation within the Federal Archives system, the Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen [SAPMO] der DDR im Bundesarchiv,” created in April 1992 and fully established in January 1993 according to an amendment to the Federal Archives Law.¹⁴

Thus, in contrast, to the 1991-1992 period—when the SED records were by and large still in the hands of the successor organization to the SED empire, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and located in the Central Party Archives in the former “Institute for Marxism-Leninism” (IML)—full access to the SED papers has now been assured with the establishment of the foundation and its integration into the Federal Archives. Even the internal archive of the SED politburo is now accessible to researchers. There are few restrictions on the use of the records, primarily those pertaining to privacy exemptions. The Stiftung also houses the huge holdings of the former IML library with its massive collection on international and German communism, international and German workers’ movements, and GDR history.¹⁵ The records of the former “bourgeois” political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), were taken over by the FDP-sponsored Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus in Gummersbach and the Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (affiliated with the CDU) in St. Augustin, respectively. Unclear as of now is the fate of the files of the West German Communist Party (KPD), currently in the custody of the party leadership and not accessible for research.¹⁶

**Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam**

Consistent with its traditional task as custodian of all central/federal German government records, the Bundesarchiv was entrusted with records of the former GDR government. Since access to government records, according to the German Archival Law, is granted on the basis of the 30-years rule, GDR government records are available for the 1949-1963 period at the Bundesarchiv’s Potsdam branch, the former Central German Archives of the Deutsches Reich.¹⁷ Since the corresponding SED records (technically considered private rather than state) are open through 1989-90, East German records differ considerably in their degree of accessibility.

**Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten**

The disparity in the treatment of records according to whether they are officially categorized as state or private crucially affected the fate of the records of the former East German foreign ministry (MFÄA). In contrast to the “open door” policy which governed most SED records, the FRG Foreign Ministry, traditionally conservative in declassifying records, until recently refused to allow access to the MFÄA files which it had seized upon unification. Political sensitivity on the part of the FDP-dominated foreign ministry, rather than the need for meticulous review and organization as the foreign ministry claimed, explained the steadfast refusal of the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) to release the MFÄA records, many scholars believe. However, due to parliamentary and public pressure, the AA has now opened its archives to researchers. As of August 1994, MFÄA records for the period up to 1963 (30-years rule) are accessible,¹⁸ although prior application for research is required.¹⁹

**The New Institutional Landscape**

One of the new institutional experiments on the German research scene is the “Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien” (FSP)—Center for Contemporary Studies—of the Förderungsgesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben, an affiliate organization of the Max Planck Foundation.²⁰ Funded by the Federal Government for a transitional period (until 1995), at least initially, the institute, under the directorship of Jürgen Kocka and Christoph Kleismann, has evolved into one of the leading centers for GDR history. Research at the FSP focuses on the history of the GDR “in a broad context and in comparative perspective,” emphasizing an understanding of East German history as “part of long-term historical processes” and thus reaching back to the late 19th and early 20th century. Rooted in the peculiar German tradition of independent research institutes, the institute’s unique character derives from the fact that its fellows, for the most part East Germans, come from different political backgrounds, thus including ex-SED members as well as dissidents. The institute stresses an interdisciplinary approach to GDR history and therefore is comprised not only of historians but economists, political scientists, and cultural analysts as well as Germanists. With a growing number of Western Germans, the institute is a rare experiment in bridging the East-West gap and expediting the professional rehabilitation of scholars from the ex-GDR. Interestingly, the scientific discourse at the FSP has usually not split along the East-West faultline. Criticism of the institute’s personnel policy—and especially the inclusion of politically-compromised members of the former East German academic elite—has been voiced by Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle of the Independent Historians League and is partly responsible for the founding of the Potsdam Office of the Munich-based Institute for Contemporary History.²¹ Current FSP research projects include industrial problems in the GDR (J. Roesler, B. Ciesla); the legacy of Nazism and the tradition of resistance in East and West Germany (J. Danyel, O. Groehler); SED Germanlandpolitik (L. Lemke); the SED’s concept of a “Socialist nation GDR” (J. Reuter); reparations and Soviet policy towards Germany (J. Lauffer); SED history (M. Kaiser); socialization and youth under the SED dictatorship (L. Ansorg, S. Hader, J. Petzold); agrarian reform and collectivization in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1945-1960 (A. Bauernkämper); the SED’s policy towards Jews (M. Kellner); the social history of the People’s Police (T. Lindenberger); bureaucracy and parties in the GDR (M. Kaiser, F. Dietze); and dissident traditions in the GDR and Poland (H. Fehr). In June 1993, the FSP made its debut with a symposium on “The GDR as History,” followed in October 1993 by a conference on “The Divided Past: The Post-War Treatment of National Socialism and Resistance in the Two German States.” Along with Essen University, the FSP co-hosted the June 28-July 2 conference on “New Evidence from the Eastern Archives. The Soviet Union, Germany and the Cold War, 1945-1962,” sponsored by the Cold War International History Project. The FSP’s fellowship program is open to foreign researchers.²²

The **Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung** (Mannheim Center for European Social Research), Section “GDR” (Director: Hermann Weber), the leading research institute for the his-
tory of the GDR in Western Germany, organized an international symposium in February 1992 on “White Spots in the History of the World Communism: Stalinist Purges and Terror in the European Communist Parties since the 1930s.” In 1993, the Mannheim Center edited a systematic listing of current research projects pertaining to GDR history. Published by the Deutscher Bundestag as “Forschungsprojekte zur DDR-Geschichte” in 1994, it lists 759 such projects, 51 of which fall into the categories “The German Question,” GDR foreign relations, and GDR military history. Researchers interested in registering their project should contact the Mannheim Center. The Center’s main current project is a six-volume history of the GDR, 1945-1990, based on the new sources. In 1993, the institute started publishing “Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-forschung” [Yearbook for Historical Research on Communism] and is continuing a document collection on “Opposition and Resistance in the GDR.” Other projects include a history of the FJD, 1945-1965 (U. Maehlert); a history of the Deutschlandpolitik of the bloc parties; and a study of the role of anti-fascism in the early years of the GDR.

Another organization on the GDR research scene is the Forschungsverbund SED-Staat\(^6\) at the Free University of Berlin, a research association established in 1992 under the energetic guidance of Manfred Wilke and Klaus Schroeder. The Forschungsverbund was a deliberate effort to break with the prevailing tradition of Western research on the GDR, a tradition which had come to de-emphasize the fundamental difference in political values in favor of a reductionist understanding of the East-West German rivalry as the competition of two models of modern industrial society both determined by technological processes. In contrast, the Forschungsverbund concentrates its research on the SED’s totalitarian rule. Current projects deal with the establishment of the SED (M. Wilke); the relationship of the SED and MfS (M. Görtemaker); the central SED apparatus and the establishment and stabilization of the GDR dictatorship (K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); the SED’s relationship with the churches (M. Wilke); Communist science policy in Berlin after 1945 (B. Rabeih, J. Staadt); the SED and August 21, 1968 (M. Wilke); the Deutschlandpolitik of the SED (K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); opposition within the SED since the 1980s (K. Schroeder); and a number of aspects of GDR industrial development. Most recently, the Forschungsverbund published a documentary collection on the plans of the Moscow-based KPD leadership\(^7\) and a collection of essays on “The History and Transformation of the SED State.” The association is preparing major editions of the SED’s role in the 1968 Czech Crisis as well as in 1980-81 Polish Crisis and on the “crisis summits” of the Warsaw Pact.

At the Federal Institute for Russian, East European and International Studies (BIOst) in Cologne, a federally-funded research institute, F. Oldenburg is engaged in a larger study on Soviet-GDR relations in the 1980s, and G. Wettig is researching Soviet policy in Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s as well as the Soviet role during the collapse of the GDR.\(^8\) The Archiv des deutschen Liberalismus of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Gummersbach has completed a research project on the history of the LDPD 1945-1952, and in December 1993 hosted a colloquium on “Bourgeois Parties in the GDR, 1945-1953.” Apart from the records of the (West) German Free Democratic Party (FDP), the archives now houses the records of the former LDPD, accessible for the years 1945-1990. The institute grants dissertation fellowships.\(^9\)


3. For the development prior to 1993 see Axel Frohn, “Archives in the New German Länder,” in Archives in the New German Länder, ed. by Klaus Schreiber (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 17-34.

4. For the MfS archives, contact Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der DDR, Karl-Renn-Straße 1-3, 10117 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-2313-7895; fax: 30-2313-7800.


6. SAPMO, Wilhelm-Pieck-Str. 1, 10119 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-442837.


10. The archives are open Mondays through Fridays 8:30 am to 12:30 pm. To apply for permission to use the MfA files and for information on the further procedure contact Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Postfach 1148, 53001 Bonn, FRG, tel.: 22-172161; fax: 22-172160.


13. Further information on the institute can be obtained from Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeitgeschichtliche Studien, Förderungsgesellschaft wissenschaftliche Neuohrbaten mbH, Am Kanal 4/4a, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-2800512; fax: 331-2800516.


15. The archives are open Mondays through Fridays 8:30 am to 12:30 pm. To apply for permission to use the MfA files and for information on the further procedure contact Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Postfach 1148, 53001 Bonn, FRG, tel.: 22-172161; fax: 22-172160.


19. Edited by Klaus Schroeder (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994).

20. Edited by Klaus Schroeder (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994).

21. BIOst, Lindenbornstr 22, 50823 Köln, FRG, tel.: 221 5747110; fax: 221 5747129.


relationship to policymaking; we particularly emphasized former members of SED policy institutes, such as the Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Politics and Economics. Finally, as the Oral History Project grew, we decided to develop a fourth group of interviewees in order to cast light upon the transition from the GDR to unified Germany. This category was drawn from former dissidents who became politicians, including such wide-ranging personalities as Markus Meckel, Lothar de Maiziere, Jens Reich, and Wolfgang Ullmann.

From the outset, the project’s organizers were confronted with a question that all oral historians face: how to find an appropriate balance between the competing norms of “richness” and “rigor.” Rigor involves the kind of rigidly-structured interviews that lend themselves to social scientific generalization and even quantification; richness, in contrast, favors the unique political and personal story of each individual to be interviewed. On the side of rigor, we provided all of our interviewers with a concrete set of core questions to guarantee that the interviews would not be entirely random. Nearly all those interviewed were asked previously formulated questions about their family background and social class, particular path to political engagement, views on the German national question, perceptions of the outside world, and personal experience with policymaking in the GDR.

Yet, if we leaned in any particular direction in developing the project, it was in favor of richness. Clearly, we did not have the resources to interview the number of representatives of the GDR elite that would have been required for quantitative social-scientific analysis. We also found that it was best to tailor many of our questions to the individuals’ own experiences, since we were dealing with very different sorts of people, with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. Some, for example, had worked closely with major figures like Walter Ulbricht; others had been uniquely positioned to understand major events, such as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. We did not want any of these memories, however idiosyncratic, to be lost to future historians. Finally, we believed that after the formal questions were posed, it was crucial to let our discussion partners speak for themselves about what mattered most in their lives. Sometimes they took the interviews in directions that we could not have anticipated.

Not surprisingly, we initially approached our interviews with certain guiding preconceptions about how our discussions might progress and what we might discover. As the Oral History Project developed, some of these assumptions were borne out; but provocatively, others were not. In every case, however, our successes and failures turned out to be enormously revealing about the nature of the project itself and about East German history.

Our first preconception was that we might have a hard time getting some of the most senior SED officials to talk openly about their past. This concern turned out to be unfounded; in the majority of cases, they seemed to speak freely about their experiences, particularly when we assured them that we were not interested in “sensationalist journalism.” With only a few exceptions—primarily, those facing criminal prosecution—it was quite easy to gain access to these former leaders, even to individuals who had granted no other interviews to westerners. We had an unexpected advantage: for the most part, we were Americans, indeed Americans from the well-known Hoover Institution. In the perception of many of our interviewees, we were worthy victors. Many were actually thrilled to welcome representatives of the “class enemy” into their living rooms, provided that we would not turn over their interviews to one of the “boulevard newspapers,” like the Bildzeitung. Three eastern German social scientists also conducted interviews for us. They had the advantage of knowing how to speak the “language” of their former leaders. On balance, our main advantage seemed to be that no members of the Oral History Project came from former West Germany, which was still regarded by our interviewees with suspicion.

In retrospect, the readiness of these individuals to speak with us should probably not have been so surprising. After all, by depositing their thoughts in a major archive, we were assuring them that we were taking their experiences seriously, preserving their views for posterity, and perhaps even helping them to believe that their lives had not been lived in vain. This is no minor consideration in view of what happened to the GDR. Naturally, future scholars must reach their own conclusions about the honesty and sincerity of each interview. Occasionally, we detected moments of outright dishonesty. Sometimes our interviewees simply refused to talk about embarrassing moments in their lives (e.g., association with the Stasi). There was also a recurring tendency for younger individuals, or those lowest on the old hierarchy, to portray themselves as something they were not before 1989—such as closet reformists or enthusiastic Gorbachev supporters. There were also frequent lapses of memory; some older interviewees remembered the “anti-fascist struggles” of the late 1920s with absolute clarity, but could not recall the 1950s at all.

These sorts of problems afflict all oral histories. Yet, there were many moments when we could not help but be struck by the candor of our interviewees. Many showed a surprising readiness to talk about issues that we expected to be embarrassing to them. The best example of this was the Berlin Wall, which they nearly always defended in animated terms. From the first days of the interview project, there was also a telling recognition among the leading representatives of the SED elite that they had lost the battle with the West and that they were beginning to accept this reality. Thus, there was none of the crazed rambling and denial that one found in previously published interviews with Erich Honecker. Among several interviewees, there was even a notable respect for their former opponents, such as the East German dissident Bärbel Bohley, and the late West German Green Petra Kelly. Undoubtedly, there were many points where one wanted more self-criticism from our discussion partners. Yet, some of our interviewers wondered whether this same quality would have been available from comparable politicians in the West. As one eastern German interviewer reflected: “Any political elite has to confront issues involving moral integrity in the daily course of its activities, and each individual must make his peace with truth as he can.”

Our second preconception was that we could use such interviews to uncover new facts about the GDR. No doubt, anyone listening to the hundreds of hours of tapes in this collection will encounter a number of interesting facts about distinct events in the East German past (for example, about the mysterious death of planning minister Erich Apel in 1965, about the lack of East German
involvement in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and about the banning of the Soviet publication Sputnik in 1988). Moreover, the interviews also serve to undermine many of the stereotypes that scholars have cultivated about some of East Germany’s best-known politicians; sometimes the “good guys” turn out to be not so good in the recollections of their former associates, and the “bad guys” not nearly so bad.

Yet, one of our most interesting findings is how little most policymakers, including many members of the SED elite, actually knew about some of the most important events and controversies of the East German past. We feel that this says a lot about the nature of politics in the GDR. This really was a system which kept all politically significant facts restricted to very few people. We discovered that even at politburo meetings, leaders discussed very little of substance. The most important decisions were frequently made by two or three individuals walking in the woods on a weekend. In these instances, expertise rarely played a major role.

Even if we did not acquire the full stories about some of the events in the GDR past that interested us most, the opportunity to discuss such issues as the construction of the Berlin Wall or the SED’s opposition to Gorbachev was unique. Indeed, future scholars may find that these interviews provide a natural complement to the mountains of written documents that have recently become available to us in such collections as the SED Central Party Archives in Berlin. For in the latter case, we have huge new reservoirs of historical facts, but frequently lack the personal perspectives necessary to interpret them.

A third preconception was that we would learn much more about policymaking processes in the GDR. This turned out to be true, although not for the reasons we envisioned. Initially, we thought that by interviewing individuals at different levels of the SED’s decision-making apparatus, we would be able to construct a rough flow chart of authority, showing how decisions moved upward, downward, or outward in a complex hierarchy. Not only did we never encounter such structures, but we received constant affirmation that, by the 1980s, no well-established hierarchies existed at all. As we have already suggested, absolute power was concentrated in very few hands, and all other expressions of political activity took place on a highly informal and personalized basis. Even the SED politburo had the character of a rubber stamp, to the extent that there were differences among its members—and these did exist on some questions—they were only expressed on a private basis over the lunch table at the ruling body’s Tuesday meetings. It is striking that even those who might have been considered personal cronies of SED General Secretary Erich Honecker did not feel that they controlled very much. They, too, felt like cogs in the socialist wheel.

In contrast to this image of a faceless, even amorphous policymaking culture, there was also provocative agreement in many of the interviews that politics in the GDR had not always been so uniform and that it had changed over time, particularly since the 1950s. Those individuals who were politically active in East Germany’s first decade were practically unanimous in conveying an image of policymaking during that period that is conspicuously more collegial than anything later experienced in the GDR. Among them, there was a consensus that East Germany’s first leader, Walter Ulbricht, was only a primus inter pares in the early 1950s, and that those around him could and did oppose his views on a regular basis. These findings seem to concur with the written records in the SED archives.

Finally, we came closest to meeting our fourth preconception: that we could record our interviewees’ views on the great issues and great debates of the GDR past. In this case, we were listening to people’s memories of their perceptions, regardless of how well they knew the details of an issue. They could say what was important to them, and what was not. Many spoke passionately about matters that had once been life or death questions for their country. This was, above all, true of the long-disputed German national question. In contrast to some Western scholarship which has held the GDR’s national policy to be little more than a tactical diversion, all of the interviews conveyed a strong sense that, at least until the early 1960s, if not later, the SED leadership genuinely believed that it was offering a valid German path to socialism. Ulbricht emerges as practically obsessed with the issue, and much of his downfall in 1970-1971 can be explained in terms of this obsession.

Similarly, the Oral History Project offers a very nuanced perspective of the complex relations that existed between the GDR and its superpower ally, the USSR. It will not surprise anyone to hear that some differences existed between East Berlin and Moscow. But future scholars may be impressed by the extent of these differences, as recorded in the interviews, and by how far back they reach in East German history (e.g., in Ulbricht’s efforts to push through the economic reforms of the New Economic System in the 1960s, despite manifest Soviet opposition). Additionally, the Oral History Project affords a unique perspective on the East German-Soviet conflict that emerged in the 1980s with the rise of Gorbachev’s reformist leadership. Standard Kremlinological approaches to the study of communist leadership might lead one to expect the GDR politburo to have been divided into factions of “Gorbachev opponents” and “Gorbachev supporters,” with comparable divisions existing within the Soviet leadership over policy to the GDR. But aside from a few slight exceptions, we were surprised to find almost no evidence of factional divisions over the GDR’s relationship with Moscow.

Of all of the great issues of the East German past, the interviews offer perhaps the clearest picture of the evolution of East Berlin’s relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. They depict an exceptionally close relationship between the two German states, in fact, one which defies all assertions that the essence of West German policy was to hold the German question open for some future resolution. With German reunification now an accepted fact, future scholars may be intrigued to hear, from the eastern German perspective, how seriously Bonn took the GDR’s leaders and how much of West German policy was predicated upon the assumption that the Berlin Wall would remain in place for “50 or even 100 years.”

In sum, while the GDR Oral History Project does not presume to offer a complete or unbiased perspective on East Germany’s history, we believe it is a valuable source of information and interpretations for future scholars to use as they seek to make sense of the GDR’s past. We are not aware of any comparable, publicly accessible projects on the GDR’s history, particularly in Germany itself, although much smaller interview collections on the history of inter-German relations in the 1960s and the roots of the East German revolution of 1989 are being as-
sembedd. Nor do we know of any similar efforts to capture the memories of comparable political elites in other East European states, although the Hoover Institution is now beginning a similar interview project on the old Soviet elite. Therefore, we hope that the Oral History Project will inspire researchers seeking to lay the foundations for future scholarship on countries as diverse as Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia.

Once the GDR Oral History Project is formally opened in November 1994, all interviews in the collection will be equally accessible to interested scholars, provided that interviewees have not previously requested copyright restrictions on the use of the material. For further information on the collection, contact:

Dr. Elena Danielson  
Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA  94305-6010  
Phone: 415-723-3428; Fax: 415-723-1687  
E-mail: Danielson@Hoover.Stanford.edu

Prof. A. James McAdams  
Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies  
University of Notre Dame  
Notre Dame, IN  46556  
Phone: 219-631-7119; Fax: 219-631-6717  
E-mail: A.J.McAdams.5@ND.edu

1. The GDR Oral History Project was initiated in 1990 by Professor A. James McAdams of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. It was made possible largely through the financial assistance of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Other supporters included the Center for German Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the John Foster Dulles Program in Leadership Studies at Princeton University. The Hoover Institution is currently supporting the transcription of all of the interviews in the collection. The GDR Oral History Project would not have been possible without the generous assistance of a number of experts on the history of the GDR. Aside from A. James McAdams, interviewers for the project included Thomas Banchoff, Heinrich Bortfeldt, Catherine Epstein, Dan Hamilton, Gerd Kaiser, Jeffrey Kopstein, Olga Sanders, Matthew Siena, John Torpey, and Klaus Zechmeister. Elena Danielson of the Hoover Archives played a central role in the project, cataloguing all of the interviews and arranging for their transcription.

A. James McAdams is Associate Professor of Government and International Relations at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame and the author of Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton University Press, 1993).

SOVIET OCCUPATION  
continued from page 34

viet zone, but have been unable to document how and why these events occurred.

The career of Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) S. I. Tiul’panov is central to any analysis of Soviet decisionmaking in the eastern zone. Tiul’panov was in charge of the Propaganda (later Information) Administration of SVAG, and he dominated the political life of the Soviet zone as no other Russian (or for that matter East German) figure. One can argue about the extent of his power and the reasons why he was able to exert so much influence on the course of events. But there can be little question that his machinations can be detected behind virtually every major political development in the zone. A clear understanding of Tiul’panov’s responsibilities and activities would go a long way towards elucidating the dynamics of Soviet influence in Germany in the early postwar years.

The partial opening of the Russian archives over the past three years has made possible a much more reliable rendition of Tiul’panov’s work in the eastern zone. In particular, the former Central Party archives in Moscow, now called the Russian Storage Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (RTsKhIDNI), which contain the records of the CPSU Central Committee through 1952, contain important communications between Tiul’panov and his Central Committee bosses. We learn from these communications that Tiul’panov was under constant investigation by his superiors in Moscow and that his goals and methods of work were repeatedly questioned by party officials. His reports and those of his superiors make it possible to tear down the monolithic facade presented to the outside world (and to the Germans) by Soviet Military Headquarters in Karlshorst. Historians have known that Tiul’panov fell into disfavor in the late summer of 1949 and that he was removed from his position shortly before the creation of the GDR in October. But they have been able only to speculate about the reasons why this happened. With the opening of the Central Committee archives and the willingness of the Tiul’panov family to turn over documents related to S. I. Tiul’panov’s career to Russian historians, the puzzle associated with Tiul’panov’s removal can also be solved.

The following excerpts have been transcribed from a recent collection of documents on Tiul’panov and SVAG, published in Moscow and edited by Bernd Bonwetsch, Gennadi Bordiugov and Norman Naimark: SVAG: Upravlenie propagandy(informatsii) i S. I. Tiul'panov 1945-1949: Sbornik dokumentov [SVAG: The Propaganda (Information) Administration and S. I. Tiul’panov 1945-1949: A Document Collection] (Moscow: “Rossiia Molodaia,” 1994), 255 pp. The collection comprises primarily materials from RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 128, but also contains several documents from other opisy and from the Tiul’panov family archive. The translated excerpts from the first document printed below provide a glimpse into Tiul’panov’s understanding of his political tasks in the fall of 1946. Here, Tiul’panov provides a frank assessment of the parties and personalities important to furthering the Soviet cause in Germany. The second document is a translation of the 17 September 1949 report recommending his removal and detailing the trumped-up charges against him. As best we know, Tiul’panov was recalled from Berlin to Moscow at the end of September, shortly before the GDR’s official creation.

I would like to thank Andrei Ustinov for his help with the translation from the Russian. As a rambling stenographic report, the translation of the first document required considerable editing.

Document I: From S. Tiu’panov’s Report at the Meeting of the Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to Evaluate the Activities of the Propaganda Administration of SVAG — Stenographic Report, September 16, 1946

... What is the situation in the party itself today?

— I believe that in no way should even theSED’s victory in the district elections be overestimated. There are a number of obvious major shortcomings that threaten the worker, Marxist, and pro-Soviet nature of theSED, which it strived to attain at the outset and remain important in its work [today].

Most importantly, since the unification [of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in theSED in April 1946] there has been a noticeable decline in party work within theSED itself. There is a marked political passivity among the former members of the SPD, which will long be felt among members of theSED. The Social Democrats still feel frustrated by the attitudes of ourapparat; the commandants have treated them...
with cautious distance; and they felt that they were not trusted completely and that they were treated inequitably. We have gotten past this by now to a certain extent, but not completely.

Secondly, even the most farsighted Communists feel the need to discuss every issue with the Social Democrats in order not to offend them, [and this] has led to a lessening of flexibility within the party. We sensed this especially during the elections and referendum. One can also feel this in the Central Committee of the party.

Full attention has been given to the technical questions of the organization, but not to its political character. Organizational questions of the party were considered, while issues having to do with the party’s internal machinery and the apparatus were considered, while issues having to do with the apparatus and with the masses, especially in Berlin, were obviously neglected. This was demonstrated by the fact that there were no [SED] leaders at the biggest enterprises. The Social Democrats took advantage of this [fact] and strengthened their position in Berlin precisely in the large enterprises and among the basic [workers’] organizations.

Despite the merger of the parties, there is still a sense that two distinct groups exist. The results of the elections, which were discussed in the Saxon party organization, offer [only] the most recent example. The results of these elections prompted extremely heated debates. First of all, they [the Saxon party members] were disconcerted by the results because they had counted on a much higher percentage of the vote, reflecting the extent to which they overestimated their influence among the masses. They were overly compliant because they could count on our administrative support. They were reassured by the fact that they had more paper, posters and other resources, and, if necessary, there was always the possibility to put some pressure [on the population]. This led in Saxony to a major overestimation of their influence on the masses. It was immediately obvious at the Saxon party meeting...that there was a group of Social Democrats talking on the one hand and a group of earlier Communists on the other. One still notices this everywhere....

Organizationally the party is also still not fully formed, which can be seen in the fact that the exchange of party membership cards has not yet been implemented, or, if it has been implemented it has been done in such a way that the individual’s files are processed but they keep their old membership cards. Both Social Democrats and Communists keep their cards. And when you talk to them, they pull out their old membership cards and say: “I am a former Communist and member of the SED.” This shows that the party is not fully accepted as a real Marxist party....

We have another dangerous problem here. —And I don’t even know whether it is the more dangerous...and that is the presence of sectarianism among some former Communists. This sectarianism is expressed in conversations, which are held in private apartments and sometimes during the course of [party] meetings. They say that we [Communists] have forfeited our revolutionary positions, that we alone would have succeeded much better had there been no SED, and that the Social Democrats are not to be trusted. Here is an example for you: once one of my instructors came and said: “I am a Communist, so it’s not even worth talking to him [a Social Democrat], you can tell him by sight.” These are the words of the Secretary of the most powerful organization [in Berlin] and this kind of attitude is cultivated by [Hermann] Matern. This is not to mention [Waldemar] Schmidt, who has gone so far as to invent the existence of a spy apparatus among Communists [allegedly] to inform on Social Democrats [in the SED]. This is over now, but serious problems remain.

At the moment, it is hard to evaluate the strength of sectarianism among the [former] Communists, but one could estimate that in the Berlin organization approximately 10 percent [of the members] are so discontented that they are ready to join another group in order to break off with the SED. The problem is less serious in other regions. From the point of view of the Communists [in the SED] the party is considered to be more solid [than among former Social Democrats]. But there is the danger that these Social Democrats hold key positions, and their group has much more power. It is impossible to evaluate the phenomenon of sectarianism in a simple manner, because, at the same time, the right wing [the Social Democrats] dreams of the day when it will be able to drop out of the SED. [They] have established contacts with the Zehlendorf [SPD] organization (we even have names) and with the [Western] Allies.

Nothing is simple. The same [Otto] Buchwitz, who completely supported the unification, supervised the process in Saxony, and had served time in [Nazi] prisons, when he comes here [to Berlin] he stays with those Social Democrats who are members of the Zehlendorf organization. When he was confronted with this fact, he responded: “But he is my old friend, and our political differences are not relevant.” Therefore, contacts between the Berlin Social Democrats [in the SED] and this group [the Zehlendorf, anti-SED Social Democrats] sometimes have the character of a party faction, and sometimes simply of Social Democrats getting together.... We should very cautious with them.

Therefore, there are two wings [in the party.] There is another major shortcoming of the Central Committee of the SED and its district committees. They do not seek out and develop new cadres who can work consistently with the party aktiv.

In addition, the party is just beginning the theoretical elucidation of all of our earlier dis-agreements [with the Social Democrats]. The journal, “Einheit,” which has [Otto] Grotewohl among its authors, as well as others, is still rarely read by the regular members of the party, and moreover, it is seldom read by [SED] functionaries.

There still remains in the party a whole list of major [unanswered] questions. The time has come to ask these questions clearly. Otherwise the party may become dominated by opportunistic and conciliatory members. Deviations from Marxist positions pose a substantial danger for the party. There is a significant percentage of petit-bourgeois members [in the SED]; 40 percent to 51 percent workers. Still, neither the Communists nor the Social Democrats understand the new forms shaping the struggle for power, the movement towards socialism. They do not understand that the SED is not a tactical maneuver, but the situation by which they can achieve [... that which was accomplished in our country by different means. They do not speak about the dictatorship of the proletariat, but about democracy. [Still], they have no understanding of the nature of the struggle after World War II.

Then there is another issue; the party can very easily retreat into nationalistic positions. My comrades and I observed this even at the large meetings. When Grotewohl spoke in Halle about social questions and equality between men and women, he was greeted very quietly. But as soon as he touched upon the national question, all 440 thousand [sic] applauded.

Recently this issue was raised at the large party meeting in Chemnitz. They argued that they did not have to orient themselves either on the Soviet Union or on Great Britain. They should be oriented on Germany. That said that Russian workers live badly and that they, the Germans, should think only about the German working class.

And now I would say the following. I am not sure that for all that the party proclaims on its banners, [whether] they have managed to distinguish between the correct national viewpoint on this question and the nationalistic and chauvinistic [one]. In all the major addresses and reports in the pre-election period, in the speeches addressed to wider audiences, the contents diverged from our censored versions. As a way of demonstrating confidence in themselves, they carried this to extremes. This was the case, when, at Poland’s border, Pieck stated that soon the other half [Polish-occupied Germany] would be theirs. After Molotov’s speech, they [the SED party leaders] were given permission to state that as a German party they welcomed any revision of the borders which would improve the situation of Germany....

They are allowed to make this statement, but we run the danger of allowing the party to revert to extreme nationalism. Despite this, the SED’s propaganda was unable to convince the popula-
tion that the party is a real German party, and not simply the agents of the occupation authorities. There are still countless such shortcomings and failures of [the SED’s] propaganda....

Here is the principal question — how should the party develop? Those whom the Old Social Democrats call functionaries, understand their connection with the party in this struggle, and we firmly count on them. They are the basic party unit; they are those who call the party aktiv. All the rest at best carry their membership cards and pay their party dues, but do not view the party’s decisions as binding. An example of this is Leipzig. Neither the provincial leadership [of the Saxon SED] nor Berlin understand the conditions in Leipzig. Twice they met and twice they rejected the positions of the Central Committee and the [provincial] committee. This is [not serious] under the conditions here, but in a different situation, such as during the Reichstag elections, these questions will require great attention.[...]

As for the situation in the [SED] Central Committee itself. Grotewohl is the central figure after Pieck in the Central Committee; and he enjoys authority among and the respect of not only Social Democrats but also Communists. (I am still working especially closely with him. I visit him at his home. He has not visited me yet, but I would like to invite him to mine.) All of his behavior demonstrates that he sides with Marxist positions quickly and firmly, and for him there is no problem of speaking up at any meeting, and of speaking up very strongly and saying: if we look at the struggle in our social life, then we will crush our enemies by force of arms. However, at the beginning [of the occupation] he would have never used this expression, but he [now] sees and feels that these things are acceptable. Nevertheless, he has a very well-known past as a Social Democrat. I remember how he hesitated before he came to [his present stance]. I remember his [hesitation] during his last discussion with the Marshal [Zhukov, in February 1946], when there was only he [Grotewohl] and no one else, and the Marshal tackled the question of the political situation — whether or not he [Grotewohl] wanted or did not want to join with the Communists, this was the political choice. [Zhukov] pointed out the differences between us and the [Western] Allies. Nevertheless, [said Zhukov,] I am used to fighting for the interests of the working class, and we, if necessary, will crush all [opponents].

Grotewohl demanded permission to travel to another zone. He went, reviewed [the situation], and said, I will go along with you [the Soviets].

In conjunction with a new [wave of] dismantling and with the fact that difficulties [in the economy] will not diminish but may even get more serious, the danger exists that if we leave here that we will leave behind only one such figure [as Grotewohl], that even in the Central Committee we don’t have prominent figures who would be able to lead the masses during the transition.

Fechner—the second Social Democrat, who wavers a great deal, a powerful parliamentary agitator, activist, a member of the Reichstag.... He appears to be a rather amorphous figure, not much of a battler, though he has produced a number of fine documents, denouncing [Kurt] Schumacher [of the SPD West].

Of the other Social Democrats who are there—Lehmann, Gniffke: one can rely on them with considerably less certainty. In the provinces we have only one such figure — Buchwitz, on whom one can rely, but he is the age of Pieck....

As for the Communists, Pieck is undoubtedly the most acceptable figure for all party members. Pieck is the all-around favorite, but often he says things that he should not; he too easily accepts compromising alliances and sometimes states even more than the situation permits.

I do not see any sectarianism on Ulbricht’s part. Ulbricht understands organizational work, and he can secretly forge any political alliance and keep it secret. But Ulbricht is not trusted as a person. He speaks with greater precision and he understands [the political situation] better than anyone else. But they [members of the SED] don’t like Ulbricht; they do not like him for his harshness. Moreover, relations between Grotewohl and Ulbricht are not satisfactory. Recently Grotewohl said [to Ulbricht]: you know, Pieck is the leader of the party, not you. However, at big meetings, Ulbricht always commands a great deal of respect, and even more for his efficiency at the meetings of the Central Committee, of the district committees, of functionaries, and others....

Now I will move to the characterization of the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party]. The LDP was regarded by all of us as a counterweight to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union], which during the last year, from the beginning of the liberation though all of 1945 until the beginning of 1946, constituted the major party (within the framework of democratic organizations), to which were attracted reactionaries [and] anti-Soviet elements who were looking for outlets to express their discontent.

I will begin with the CDU. We understand perfectly well that it is impossible to change the position of the hostile classes and that it is impossible to make this party pro-Soviet. But we can accomplish the goal of depriving [the CDU] of the possibility of making anti-Soviet and ambiguous statements; [we] can strengthen the scattered democratic elements in this party. Therefore, when this party turned out to be an obvious threat and synonymous with everything reactionary, we undertook to arrange the replacement of [Andreas] Hermes with [Jakob] Kaiser [in December 1945]....

Currently, this party has a very diverse composition, comprised of the following elements: first of all, there is a significant group of workers and Catholic peasants, but mainly [the CDU includes] those who belonged [before the war] to the Center Party. Approximately 15 to 20 percent of the party is comprised of office workers and bureaucrats....

For a long time, we thought of the LDP as a counterpoint to the CDU. I would even say that we promoted [the LDP] artificially. In October and November of last year, we used [the LDP] every time we had to put pressure on the CDU. In other words, we sucked a snake at our own breast. And in fact, before these elections this party never enjoyed any credit [among the population] or any authority....

[Now I will speak about] the leadership of the Kulturbund.** We have come to the firm conviction that it is now time to replace [Johannes R.] Becher. It is impossible to tolerate him any more. I spoke against [his removal] for a long time, and we had many reservations. But now, especially in connection with [the process of the] definition of classes and the intensification of the political struggle, we must prevent the Kulturbund from becoming a gang of all the members of the intelligentsia. We need it to become the cultural agency of the democratic renewal of Germany, as well as a society for [promoting] cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The Kulturbund... has to be changed and has to have its own leading aktiv. Without them, it [the Kulturbund] can only be of harm and not of use, and Becher cannot and does not want to change it.

In his intellectual aspirations, Becher is not only not a Marxist, but he is directly tied to Western European democratic [thinking], if not to England and America. He is ashamed to say that he is a member of the Central Committee of the SED. He hides this in every way. He even never allows us to call him Comrade, and always Herr Becher. [He] avoids any sharp political speeches in the Kulturbund. Becher is well known enough; in the current situation he represents the progressive intelligentsia. He would not, and did not want to, let [Erich] Weinert into the Kulturbund. He did not want to let [Friedrich] Wolf take part in it, and he despises all party work [...]

Source: RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 128, delo 149; SVAG Sbornik, pp. 155-176.)

* [Local (Gemeinde) elections were held in the Soviet zone on 1-15 September 1946; State Assembly (Landtag) and Regional Assembly (Kreistag) elections in the Soviet zone, as well as voting for the Berlin city government, were conducted on 20 October 1946.—N.M.]

** Kulturbund refers to the Kulturbund fuer demokratische Erneuerung—the Cultural Association for Democratic Renewal. See David Pike, The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 80-88. — N.M.
Document II: Report of the Deputy Chief of the GPU (Main Political Administration) of the Armed Forces of the USSR, S. Shatilov, to Politburo member G. Malenkov on the Dismissal of Tiül’panov

September 17, 1949
Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Comrade Malenkov G.M.

I request permission to relieve Major General TIUL’PANOV Sergei Ivanovich of his post as Chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, placing him under the command of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces.

It has been established that the parents of Major General TIUL’PANOV were convicted of espionage: the father in 1938, the mother in 1940. The wife of TIUL’PANOV’s brother was in contact with the Secretary of one of the embassies in Moscow—an agent of English intelligence; her father was sentenced to be shot as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization. TIUL’PANOV’s brother and his brother’s wife are closely connected with the family of Major General TIUL’PANOV S.I.

At the end of 1948, organs of the MGB [Ministry for State Security] in Germany arrested LUKIN — TIUL’PANOV’s driver — for traitorous intentions and for anti-Soviet agitation. LUKIN’s father betrayed his Motherland in 1928 and fled to Iran.

Major General TIUL’PANOV concealed the facts of the arrests and convictions of his father, mother, and relatives from the party, and he did not indicate these in his biographical information.

A number of employees of the Information Administration departments have been arrested lately on suspicion of espionage, and several were recalled to the Soviet Union from Germany for the reason of political unreliability. Major General TIUL’PANOV took no initiative in instituting these measures against the politically compromised persons. He did not approve of these measures, although he expressed no open opposition to them.

The arrested LUKIN, TIUL’PANOV’s driver, testified that TIUL’PANOV revealed his negative attitudes in the driver’s presence. Fel’dman, the former employee of the Information Administration who is now under arrest, testified that TIUL’PANOV made criminal bargains with his subordinates, engaged in extortion, and received illegal funds. There were 35 books of a fascist nature seized from TIUL’PANOV’s apartment.

By his nature TIUL’PANOV is secretive and not sincere. Over the last year he has behaved especially nervously, taking different measures to find out about the attitude of the leading organs in Moscow towards him.

I regard it as undesirable to keep Major General TIUL’PANOV in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. I consider it necessary for the sake of the mission to relieve him of his post and not to let him reenter Germany. The Main Political Administration contemplates using TIUL’PANOV to work within our country.

Comrades Vasilevskii and Chuiakov support the proposal to relieve Major General TIUL’PANOV of his duties in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.

17 September 1949

SHATILOV
(Source: RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 118, delo 567; SVAG Sbornik, pp. 233-234.)

Norman M. Naimark is Professor of History at Stanford University; his The Soviet Occupation of Germany, will be published by Harvard University Press in 1995.

STALIN AND THE SED
continued from page 35

Minutes of conversation with com[rade]. Stalin of leaders of SED W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, and O. Grotewohl

Present: Comrade Molotov, Malenkov, Bulgannin, Semyonov (ACC [Allied Control Commission])

7 April 1952

Com[rade]. Stalin said that the last time W. Pieck raised the question about the prospects for the development of Germany in connection with the Soviet proposals on a peace treaty and the policy of the Americans and British in Germany. Comrade Stalin considers that irrespective of any proposals that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. It would be a mistake to think that a compromise might emerge or that the Americans will agree with the draft of the peace treaty. The Americans need their army in West Germany to hold Western Europe in their hands. They say that they have there their army [to defend] against us. But the real goal of this army is to control Europe. The Americans will draw West Germany into the Atlantic Pact. They will create West German troops. Adenauer is in the pocket of the Americans. All ex-fascists and generals also are there. In reality there is an independent state being formed in West Germany. And you must organize your troops. The line of demarcation between East and West Germany must be seen as a frontier and not as a simple border but a dangerous one. One must strengthen the protection of this frontier.

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, opis 1, delo 303, list 179.)

Following are notes of the same meeting taken by Pieck, discovered in the SED archives in Berlin, in Rolf Badstubner and Wilfried Loth, eds., Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1953 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 396-97 (translation by Stephen Connors):

Final Discussion on 7 April 1952—11:20 p.m. in Moscow

St(alin): up to now all Proposals rejected
Situation: no Compromises
Creation of a European-Army—not against the SU [Soviet Union] but rather about Power in Europe
Atlantic Treaty—Independent State in the West
Demarcation line dangerous Borders
1st Line Germans (Stasi), behind [it] Soviet soldiers
We must consider terrorist Acts.

Defense:
Reinstate the liquidated Soviet garrisons
3000
Armaments must be furnished, immediately russian Arms with Rounds [of ammunition]
Military Training for Inf[antry], Marine, Aviation, Submarines
Tanks—Artillery will be supplied also [a] Rifle division
Hoffmann—24 Units—5800
Not Militia, but rather [a] well-trained Army.
Everything without Camour, but constant.

Village:
Also Establishment of Productive-Associations in Villages,
in order to isolate Large-scale farmers.
Clever to start in the Autumn.
create Examples—Concessions
Instructors at their Disposal.
force No one
[Do] not scream Kolchosen [Soviet collective Farm]—Socialism.
create Facts. In the Beginning the Action.
—way to Socialism—state Production—is soci
cialistic

Better Pay of the Engineers
1 : 1.7
2-3 x more than workers
Apartment
11-12000 Rbl [Rubles] to Academics
pay qualified workers better than unqualified

Propositions not dealt with
Party not dealt with Party conference
KPD [Communist Party of Germany]
Economic conference
Unity Peace treaty—agitate further
significance of Soviet overtures toward the West to resolve the German Question both before and after Stalin’s death in 1953. Some scholars (such as Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth of Essen University) contended that new evidence from the GDR archives, such as the notes of SED leader Wilhelm Pieck, suggest that Moscow’s proposals constituted a serious opportunity to unify Germany on acceptable terms—and, by implication, to end the division of Europe and the Cold War itself—but others argued that recent disclosures from Soviet archives confirmed the opposite, that they were advanced as a propaganda tactic to undermine the Western Alliance’s plans to arm West Germany.

At Potsdam, U.S. and German scholars addressed topics that were virtually taboo during the GDR era, such as the regime’s attitudes toward Jews and the legacies of the Nazi era, and the misdeeds of Soviet occupying forces, including widespread instances of rape. In addition, representatives of various German archives containing GDR materials discussed the status of their holdings. The conference program follows:


Panel 2: Soviet Policy and the Division of Germany.


Panel 4: Roundtable on the Stalin Notes. Chair: Rolf Steininger (Inst. for Contemporary History, Innsbruck); Papers: W. Loth (Essen U.); A. Chubarian (Inst. of Universal History, Moscow); Vojtech Mastny (SAIS Bologna Ctr.); G. Wettig (BIOst); Ruud van Dijk (Contemporary Hist. Inst., Ohio U./Athens)


Closing Remarks: Charles Maier (Ctr. for European Studies, Harvard U.)


ATOMIC ESPIONAGE AND ITS SOVIET “WITNESSES”

by Vladislav Zubok

No trial jury should render a guilty verdict without solid evidence, and neither should scholars. Therefore historians and scientists reacted with deep skepticism when in his recently-published memoir, Special Tasks, Pavel Sudoplatov, a notorious operative of Stalin’s secret service, asserted that the KGB received secret atomic information from several eminent scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr.1 Sudoplatov’s claim that Bohr had knowingly given sensitive atomic data to a Soviet intelligence operative in November 1945, thereby helping the USSR to start its first controlled nuclear chain reaction for the production of weapons-grade plutonium,2 generated particular surprise and disbelief given the renowned Danish physicist’s towering reputation for integrity and loyalty in the scientific world.

Only two months after Sudoplatov’s “revelations,” however, an important piece of contemporary evidence surfaced. Sudoplatov’s original 1945 memorandum to Stalin via Lavrenty Beria, retrieved from “Stalin’s File” (papka Stalina) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF),3 refutes the allegation that Bohr improperly helped the Soviet atomic program and clandestinely passed secret Manhattan Project data to Beria’s messengers. Notwithstanding journalistic claims to the contrary,4 Sudoplatov’s contention that the approach to Bohr was “essential to starting the Soviet reactor” has proved to be a mere fantasy.

The cloud over Bohr should have been dispelled, but a larger question remains unanswered: how should one judge the claims of a group of “witnesses” from the Soviet secret police, intelligence, and elsewhere who have recently commented on Soviet espionage activities in 1941-1949 and their significance for Moscow’s atomic program? The situation evokes an old Russian proverb: “Lying like an eyewitness.” Indeed, the claims of these “witnesses” are suspect for a number of reasons, including the possibility of hidden agendas, personal biases, and the corrosive effect of time on human memories even when there is no deliberate intention to distort them, a danger that is particularly acute when people attempt to recall events concerning a subject beyond their expertise and comprehension.

That seems to be the major problem of most KGB commentators on atomic espionage, especially since only a tiny group of intelligence officers at various stages controlled the Kremlin’s atomic “networks” in the United States (Gaik Ovakimian, Leonid Kvasnikov, Anatoli Yatskov, Semen Semyonov) and in Great Britain (Vladimir Barkovsky, Alexander Feklisov). And even they, at the time of their operational work, were nothing more than conveyor belts of technical data between foreign sources and Soviet scientists.

The scientific head of the Soviet atomic program, Igor Kurchatov, sometimes with the help of his closest colleagues, formulated requests for technical information. Only he, and after August 1945 other members of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Soviet atomic project, could competently evaluate the materials provided by Klaus Fuchs and other spies. Kurchatov and other consumers of intelligence knew little or nothing of sources and methods, while Kvasnikov, Yatskov, Feklisov, and others knew very little of the progress of atomic research and development back home. Bohr’s interrogator, the scientist Y. Terletsky, according to a later interviewer, “had no real knowledge of what was going on in the Soviet project, thus Beria was not afraid of sending him abroad.”5 Kurchatov and his people compiled a questionnaire for Bohr and trained Terletsky to use it before his mission. Feklisov received a similar briefing from an unnamed “atomic scientist” before going to London to serve as control officer for Fuchs. “I had regrettably a weak knowledge of atomic matters,” admitted Feklisov in a considerable understatement.6

Stalin and Beria, the powerful secret police chief who after Hiroshima was given charge of the Soviet atomic project, effectively used this compartmentalization of information to prevent any leaks abroad. This system succeeded brilliantly when Western intelligence failed to penetrate the Soviet atomic project or predict the date of the USSR’s first atomic test in August 1949.7 Yet, a half century later, this very success produces misunderstandings...
THE KGB MISSION TO NIELS BOHR: ITS REAL “SUCCESS”

by Yuri N. Smirnov

The reminiscences of Pavel Sudoplatov, a former Lieutenant General of the USSR NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, later the Ministry of Internal Affairs), recently published in the West, attracted widespread attention. And though his book Special Tasks, written with the participation of three co-authors, is not yet known to Russian readers, responses to it have appeared in our country as well. And the chapter which Sudoplatov devoted entirely to Soviet atomic espionage elicited the most interest.

The explanation is simple: it’s the first time one of the “main chiefs” in this area (during the 1945–46 period) started to speak, particularly one who enjoyed Beria’s special sympathy. Moreover, Sudoplatov suddenly “revealed” a piquant “detail”: that the elite of the American atomic project, including world-famous physicists Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, and others, allegedly cooperated with Soviet intelligence to pass atomic secrets to the USSR.

Naturally, this last claim provoked a storm of indignation from veterans of the Manhattan Project, most prominently from Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, and Victor Weisskopf. Teller stressed that the sensational chapter of Sudoplatov’s book, in his opinion, “is certainly wrong in many essential parts and quite possibly wrong in every respect.” Some readers even concluded that the chapter was meant as a provocation.

But the emotional response to Sudoplatov’s book obscured one very significant detail which explains a greater truth. Sudoplatov is already 87 years old. And being of such a venerable age, he decided, without going near any documents, to describe from memory the most important events, which demand particular precision, and with which he dealt literally half a century ago. Naturally, his co-authors had to assume even more responsibility. Unfortunately, preference was not given to real, confirmed facts, but to cheap, inflated sensation. Where all this led—we will see in a very telling example.

For illustration I will use the most portentous episode described in Sudoplatov’s “Atomic Spies” chapter—the Russian physicist Yakov Terletsky’s special trip to see Bohr in Copenhagen in November 1945. Paradoxical as it may be, this episode illustrates Beria’s insidious calculations and Bohr’s noble, selfless humanism, as well as political leaders’ cynical desire to subordinate epochal scientific achievements to the goals of “big” policy. For Beria and Sudoplatov were not the only actors in this episode—the shadows of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin are visible as well.

Let’s turn to the facts.

At the end of October 1945, at Beria’s order, two employees of the “S” Department for atomic intelligence activities under Sudoplatov—his deputy head, Colonel Vasilevsky, and the physicist Terletsky, as well as the interpreter Arutyunov—were sent to Denmark to establish contact and speak with Bohr. They managed to meet Bohr at his institute twice, on 14 and 16 November 1945. As the result of this operation, Bohr’s answers to 22 questions which his visitors had asked of him were brought to Moscow and put at the disposal of physicist Igor V. Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear weapons effort.

If we evaluate these plain facts as did the head of the “S” Department, Sudoplatov, at the time, or as did Beria, who headed the institution which carried out this operation, then the espionage approach was undoubtedly a great success. But let us not hurry to final conclusions; let us first see how Sudoplatov himself described Terletsky’s mission, goals, and results in his recent book:

A pivotal moment in the Soviet nuclear program occurred in November 1945. The first Soviet reactor had been built, but all attempts to put it into operation ended in failure, and there had been an accident with plutonium. How to solve the problem? One idea, which proved unrealistic, was to send a scientific delegation to the United States to meet secretly with Oppenheimer, Fermi, and Szilard. Another suggestion to solve the problem of the balky reactor was to send [the renowned Soviet physicist Peter] Kapitsa to see Bohr in Denmark. Kapitsa by that time was no longer a member of the continued on page 54
and even tensions between the intelligence community and the community of atomic scientists in the former Soviet Union.

For much of the Cold War, the Soviet intelligence elite believed firmly that its activities contributed to the prevention of war and to a stable peace in the dangerous nuclear era. The “old-boys club” of the KGB’s First Directorate viewed its role in the breaking of the U.S. atomic monopoly with increasing pride, and the appearance of (mostly Western) books on the Cold War which described Western plans for “atomic warfare” against the USSR augmented this feeling and deepened the desire for further successes.8

In time, those perceptions and dimming recollections blurred together into “memories.” Feklisov’s book, for instance, is the first in a series of publications, linked with the Association of Russian Intelligence Veterans, ostensibly intended to promote a serious, unsensational view of the history of Soviet intelligence. The book takes into account some published documents as well as the criticism of the earlier journalistic publications on this subject by Yuli Khariton and other nuclear veterans. Nevertheless, it adds to the list of errors and oddities. Feklisov asserts that the Smyth Report (August 1945) contained “disinformation, in order to lead astray scientists from other countries and, first and foremost, the USSR” in their atomic research. He also alleges that Robert Oppenheimer, director of the secret wartime weapons lab at Los Alamos, “asked to include” Fuchs in the British scientific mission that came to the United States to participate in the Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer, according to Feklisov, also “refused to sign” the Smyth Report because it was “one-sided and deluding.”10 None of these “facts” survive serious scrutiny, but they provide telling indicators of the Soviet intelligence community’s perceptions of the motivation of the U.S. government and foreign atomic scientists.

In another episode described in the book, Fuchs allegedly told Feklisov during their secret meeting in February 1949: “The team of Kurchatov is advancing full speed to the goal… From your questions it is absolutely clear that soon the whole world will hear a voice of the Soviet ‘baby’.” It is indeed possible that Feklisov learned about the impending Soviet test from his “source.” But it is highly improbable that Feklisov would reveal to Fuchs the name of the head of the Soviet “team.”

On the same page Fuchs “tells” Feklisov: “I am sure that the Soviet comrades, of course, will be able to build an atomic bomb without foreign assistance. But… I want the Soviet government to save material resources and reduce the time of construction of nuclear weapons.”11

The thesis that intelligence gave the Soviet project a “short cut” on its road to the bomb is the strongest argument of “atomic” intelligence veterans. Yet, even this assertion is questioned by the scientific director of Arzamas-16 (the long-secret Soviet nuclear weapons design laboratory), Yuli Khariton, who points out that in spite of a good haul of atomic secrets in 1945, the obtained materials “still required an enormous amount of work on a great scale by our physicists before they could be ‘put to use.’”12 And Stalin himself, when he met Kurchatov on 25 January 1946, told the physicist not to spare resources, but to conduct “works broadly, on the Russian scale.”13

At least one of Feklisov’s “memories” (that Oppenheimer was instrumental in bringing Fuchs to Los Alamos) was “shared” by Pavel Sudoplatov. Yet, it is important to distinguish between Special Tasks and the memoirs of “atomic” intelligence officers like Feklisov. Sudoplatov’s “oral history,” when it strays beyond the limits of his expertise or immediate experience, hangs on the thread of half-forgotten, half-distorted hearsay. Time pressure on the authors (who squeezed out the book between August 1992 and late 1993),14 plus their extraordinary secretiveness, evidently precluded serious fact-checking. And Sudoplatov’s experience with the atomic intelligence was far more shallow than the publicity surrounding the book implied. He headed Department “S,” an intelligence arm of the Special Committee, the board in charge of the atomic project, for only a year, from September 1945 to October 1946, and it is even questionable whether he had access to operational files.16

Sudoplatov implies that he had developed good relations with atomic scientists (among them Kurchatov, Kikoin, and Alikhanov) by treating them to “lunches and cocktail parties in a Western style.”17 Indeed, he may have been trying to dispel fear that the scientists, justifiably, felt towards the henchmen under the Stalin-Beria-Merkulov command, who suddenly became their collaborators and supervisors.

After a brief stint in Department “S,” Sudoplatov plunged back into a familiar world of sabotage, disinformation games, and assassinations-on-request. In a word, he continued to link his career to a repressive, murderous arm of the NKVD-KGB. The arrogance, cynicism, and mistrust of intellectuals of many people from this branch contrasted with the cultural sophistication found among most officers from the technical-scientific intelligence service. The eminent Soviet physicist Pyotr Kapitsa complained in his letter of 25 November 1945 to Stalin, for example, that Beria “in particular” conducted himself on the Special Committee like a superman. “Comrade Beria’s basic weakness is that the conductor ought not only to wave the baton, but also to understand the score. In this respect Beria is weak.”19

In time even Beria learned to treat scientists with respect, and some of the NKVD-GULAG’s most capable administrators (Makhnev, Zaveniagin, Zernov, and others) excelled in managing the atomic project. The project’s unique quality and scale, in the eyes of all its principal collaborators, overshadowed the early contributions of “atomic spies.” Sudoplatov, however, did not share this experience.20 With a different personal agenda (after all, he wanted to rehabilitate himself, not to defend the honor of the KGB), Sudoplatov appears to have quickly responded to the blandishments of his American co-authors and/or publisher to produce an “atomic chapter” with little substance at hand.

Even less reliable than Sudoplatov’s “atomic spies” chapter are the writings of Sergei Beria,21 the only son of Lavrenty Beria and Nina Gegechkori, who in 1950 was catapulted from the student desk of a military academy to the position of chief engineer of the Special Bureau (SB-1) of the Third Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers, assigned with the task of building a defense system against a feared atomic aerial attack on Moscow. Along with his father and mother, he was arrested in 1953 and only after a long period of isolation could resume his work inside the missile industry in Ukraine. Despite the fact that he never had any part in the atomic project or
esionage. Sergio Beria stepped into this mine-field in an ill-conceived attempt to rehabilitate his father, with the confidence of a desperado who has nothing to lose.

Hence his laughable allegation that Robert Oppenheimer lived “at the end of 1939” at Beria’s dacha near Moscow. With a reference to Gen.-Col. Ivan Serov, he writes that Stalin at Potsdam was “very upset” when he learned about the successful Trinity test. In response to Stalin’s questioning, Beria allegedly said that “plutonium has been already obtained, and the construction of the bomb’s design is underway.” For anyone familiar with the stages of the Soviet atomic project, even in sketchy form, there is not enough room for sufficient insertions of “sic” and “?” in this quotation. Also: assessing the first Soviet nuclear test in Semipalatinsk in August 1949 (which he claims to have observed through “a telescope” from a bunker), Sergio Beria stated that Kurchatov and the rest of the State Commission “did not interfere in the course of the tests” and that “nothing depended on Kurchatov” since the “device” was already transferred to the military. In fact, the military controlled only the testing-site, not the bomb, and the State Commission (Beria, Kurchatov, Zaveniagin, Khariton, and Zernov) gave the order for the detonation.

It is astounding that Beria-junior and the persons who interviewed him dared to publish this mishmash of absurdities. But, as another Russian proverb goes, “paper can bear anything.”

Beria’s book lies beyond the pale, as does much of the “Atomic Spies” chapter in Special Tasks. The responsible officials and veterans of Soviet/Russian intelligence rejected Sudoplatov’s allegations with regard to atomic intelligence. On 4 May 1994, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (FIS) admitted that Soviet espionage, though it rendered “an important and qualified service... in the interests of the state,” had “played only a subsidiary role” in the development of the Soviet atomic bomb.

But even after this announcement, some present-day FIS colleagues of Sudoplatov, after checking their files, confirmed to a Moscow journalist that “the advice given by the Nobel Laureate [Bohr] played a role in helping to get the first Soviet reactor going.” That claim sharply contrasts with Kurchatov’s expert conclusion on the results of Terletsky’s mission in November 1945, and that of leading Russian physicist Yuri Smirnov (Kurchatov Institute) in 1994. And it betrays a woeful lack of expertise.

What lessons can be drawn from the case of “eye-witnesses” of Soviet “atomic” intelligence? One conclusion is clear. Only the knowledge of the veterans of Soviet atomic project and Western nuclear physicists, combined with balanced and painstaking research by Cold War historians, can integrate the revelations about “atomic espionage” into usable and trustworthy history. The distance between the two is as big as that between raw uranium ores and weapons-grade plutonium.

2. Ibid., esp. 181, 196, 205-207, 211-12.
7. A memorandum of the CIA’s Office of Reports and Estimates on 20 September 1949 cited the opinion of the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee that a Soviet bomb “might be expected” only in mid-1950 as “the earliest possible date.” That was three weeks after the test of Soviet bomb! See Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 319.
8. There is a similarity between many Soviet atomic scientists and intelligence officers: they saw the Cold War as a sequel to the Great Patriotic War, and regarded the U.S. atomic monopoly with the same concern as they regarded the rise of Nazi Germany.
9. Feklisov, Za okeanom, 150.
10. Ibid., 145-46, 150.
11. Ibid., 159.
Committee on Problem Number One because of his conflict with Beria, Voznesensky, and Kurchatov. Since Bohr had turned down Kapitsa’s invitation to the Soviet Union in 1943, and because of the internal conflicts in the scientific community, we decided to rely on scientists already in the project who were also intelligence officers. We decided that Terletsky should be sent to see Bohr in the guise of a young Soviet scientist working on a project supervised by Academicians Ioffe and Kapitsa.

Bohr readily explained to Terletsky the problems Fermi had at the University of Chicago putting the first nuclear reactor into operation, and he made valuable suggestions that enabled us to overcome our failures. Bohr pointed to a place on a drawing Terletsky showed him and said, “That’s the trouble spot.” This meeting was essential to starting the Soviet reactor.

When Niels Bohr visited Moscow University in 1957 or 1958 to take part in student celebrations of Physicists Day, the KGB suggested that Terletsky, then a full professor at the university and a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, should not meet with Bohr. Terletsky saw Bohr, who seemed not to recognize him.

It is possible to reproach Sudoplatov’s co-authors at once for shoddy research: Terletsky was never a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Bohr participated in the students’ festival at Moscow University on 7 May 1961. Moreover, in fact Kapitsa, precisely as a member of the Special Committee headed by Beria, was even involved in preparations for Terletsky’s mission (Kapitsa was relieved from his activity on the atomic bomb, and hence from participation on the Special Committee, only on 21 December 1945).

But the most serious error in Sudoplatov’s account of this episode in Special Tasks concerns his description of the reason for the approach to Bohr—allegedly difficulties in starting the first Soviet nuclear reactor. His version is consistent with his private 1982 petition to the CPSU CC for rehabilitation, in which he noted: “When an accident happened at one of the Soviet nuclear projects, into which hundreds of millions of rubles had been invested, and our scientists found it difficult to repair the situation, Department S assigned one of its staff, a young physicist, to go to Denmark and meet with the world-known physicist Niels Bohr; the information he brought back enabled us to eliminate the damage, bring the facility back to normal, and thus speed up the building of the nuclear bomb.” Though the reactor is not explicitly mentioned, the word “accident” remains prominent.

But on this very important point Sudoplatov—not only in 1994, but already in 1982—had become confused or forgetful. In fact, at the time of Terletsky’s November 1945 mission, Kurchatov’s collective was still the only Soviet atomic project in Moscow. And the surviving veterans, who had worked with Kurchatov, unanimously dismiss Sudoplatov’s “legend” as false and even nonsensical. For, they point out, they started preparation of the chamber for the first Soviet atomic reactor and the construction of the building for it only at the beginning of 1946! And the reactor itself was started without any complications on 25 December 1946.

Besides, if Sudoplatov was to inform the leadership in writing about the results of the meeting with Bohr promptly after Terletsky’s return from Copenhagen, would he really have kept silent about having obtained information which “enabled us to eliminate the damage, bring the facility back to normal, and thus to speed up the building of the nuclear bomb”? Of course not! The funny part is that a super-secret report on the results of the meeting with Bohr, as an indication of the Cheka’s success, would have been sent at once to nobody but Stalin personally. Yet, in spite of the fact that Lieutenant General Sudoplatov was marked as the executor of this unique document, 16 pages long and signed by Beria, there is not even a hint in it of any accident which our physicists had had or of any difficulties with the start-up of an (actually as yet non-existent!) Soviet atomic reactor.

Beria informed Stalin:

Niels BOHR is famous as a progressive-minded scientist and as a staunch supporter of the international exchange of scientific achievements. This gave us grounds to send to Denmark a group of employees, under the pretense of searching for equipment which the Germans had taken from Soviet scientific establishments, who were to establish contact with Niels BOHR and obtain from him information about the problem of the atomic bomb.

The comrades who were sent: Colonel VASILEVSKY, the Candidate of physio-mathematical sciences TERLETSKY, and interpreter-engineer ARUTUNOV, having identified appropriate pretexts, contacted BOHR and organized two meetings with him.

In the course of the conversations BOHR was asked several questions which were prepared in advance in Moscow by Academician KURCHATOV and other scientists who deal with the atomic problem.

Now we have reached the most interesting part: what is the meaning of “appropriate pretexts”; what was the nature of the questions prepared in Moscow; and what was so secret in the information Bohr “betrayed” to his Soviet interlocutors, if his answers were as they appeared in the secret document sent to Stalin? After we have dealt with these questions, we will have no trouble in evaluating the true “outcome” of the approach to Bohr. But first let us recall one circumstance, which is extremely vital for an understanding of the whole situation.

That is that on 12 August 1945, the U.S. government published the so-called “Smyth Report” as a book in the United States, the basis of which was specially declassified data on the creation of the atomic bomb, General Leslie R. Groves, the leader of the Manhattan Project, noted in the foreword to the publication that it contained “All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time without violating the needs of national security,” but sternly admonished that “Persons disclosing or securing additional information by any means whatsoever without authorization are subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act.” In other words, in the West limits were set, within which it was possible to discuss freely technical questions related to the atomic bomb. Naturally, the Smyth Report was immediately put at the disposal of Kurchatov and his workers. Here in the USSR the book was quickly translated into Russian and by 10 November 1945, when
Terletsky was still waiting for his meeting with Bohr, it had already been prepared for publication. Therefore, Terletsky’s assertion, having on November 16 received from Bohr a copy of the “Smyth Report,” that “we were, excuse me, the first Soviet people who had seen it,” turns out to be untrue. As Bohr’s biographers have pointed out, when he returned to Denmark from the USA in late August 1945, he brought a copy of the Smyth Report with him. Moreover, Bohr acquainted colleagues at his institute with it, and the Association of Engineers of Denmark even persuaded him to give a lecture on the topic. And though he asked journalists to refrain from exaggerations, the extraordinary information which had become generally available produced such a strong impression that one Copenhagen newspaper reported the lecture under the headline: “Professor Bohr reveals the secret of the atomic bomb.” The lecture which provoked so much fuss took place on 3 October 1945, over a month before Bohr’s meetings with Terletsky.

Now Beria’s report to Stalin about the meeting with Bohr has been declassified, and anyone can see, by comparing it with the Smyth Report, that Bohr’s answers, as well as the questions put to him (which is especially noteworthy and surprising!), practically do not exceed the parameters of generally accessible information. I used the word “practically” because, being a theoretical physicist, Bohr in two or three cases permitted himself some short general theoretical remarks, which even so did not convey any secret technical information. At the same time, answering his visitors’ very first question, Bohr declared firmly: “I must warn you that while in the USA I did not take part in the engineering development of the problem and that is why I am aware neither of the design features nor the size of these apparatuses, nor even of the measurements of any part of them. I did not take part in the construction of these apparatuses and, moreover, I have never seen a single installation. During my stay in the USA I did not visit a single plant.” (How can we not but recall here again Sudoplatov’s absurd tale about the technical recommendation which had supposedly been obtained from Bohr on starting the first Soviet reactor!)

True, merely as a curiosity, I can say that Bohr once crossed the bounds “permitted” by the Smyth Report. Specifically, he said that every split uranium atom emits more than two neutrons, while in Smyth’s book a less definite formula is used—“someplace between one and three neutrons” were emitted, on average—and the precise number (2.5) was considered secret in the USA until 1950. Nevertheless, by saying this Bohr did not reveal any secret, because even before the war physicists had published that 2.3 neutrons are emitted in the course of the disintegration of a uranium atom.

Finally, Bohr was quoted as making a short remark, consisting of just a few words, of a theoretical nature, starting from a most questionable hypothesis that, as he is supposed to have put it, “during the explosion uranium particles move at a speed equal to the speed of the neutrons’ movement.” Kurchatov, naturally, noted this, and in his comments pointed out that Bohr’s remark “must undergo theoretical analysis, which should be the task of Professors LANDAU, MIGDAL and POMERANCHUNK.” In fact, the thematic “gain” of Terletsky’s visit to Bohr was limited to this abstract, theoretical remark, which was of only hypothetical character, and which did not contain any secret technical information. It is no coincidence that Kurchatov, in his laconic (only half a page!) commentary on Bohr’s answers, which was among the documents sent by Beria to Stalin, noted only this remark of the Danish physicist along with the observation that “Bohr gave a categorical answer to the question about the methods which are used in the USA to obtain uranium 235”—information which, with many more details, could easily be gleaned from the Smyth Report, already long publicly available.

Thus Bohr did not communicate any secrets to Terletsky, but he did not miss an opportunity to tell him:

We need to consider the establishment of international control over all countries as the only means of defense against the atomic bomb. All mankind must understand that with the discovery of atomic energy the fates of all nations will be very closely intertwined. Only international cooperation, the exchange of scientific discoveries, and the internationalization of scientific achievements, can lead to the elimination of wars, which means the elimination of the very necessity to use the atomic bomb. This is the only correct method of defense. I have to point out that all scientists without exception, who worked at the atomic problem, including the Americans and the English, are indignant at the fact that great discoveries become the property of a group of politicians. All scientists believe that this greatest discovery must become the property of all nations and serve for the unprecedented progress of humankind...atomic energy, having been discovered, cannot remain the property of one nation, because any country which does not possess this secret can very quickly independently discover it. And what is next? Either reason will win, or a devastating war, resembling the end of mankind.

Now we know that these words and Bohr’s position were immediately brought to Stalin’s personal attention. And, it seems to me, in this fact we find the only genuine success of Terletsky’s trip to Bohr, rather than the mythical “secrets” which the great scientist supposedly divulged. Previously, Bohr had expressed his view on the atomic bomb—that it was impossible for a nation to retain an atomic monopoly indefinitely on a basis of secrecy, and that consequently international control was the only hope of preventing a secret nuclear arms race leading to catastrophe—in a meeting with President Roosevelt in August 1944, and he heard from the American president words of support. (In a confidential memorandum, Bohr had already warned Roosevelt that “on the basis of the prewar work of Russian physicists it is natural to assume that nuclear problems will be in the center of their interest.” Yet Churchill, with whom Bohr had also discussed the issue (in May 1944), rejected the scientist’s arguments out of hand, and, having persuaded Roosevelt to shun Bohr’s plea to notify Stalin of the existence of the wartime Anglo-American atomic project (during their summit at Hyde Park, New York, on 18-19 September 1944), exclaimed to an aide: “The President and I are seriously concerned about Professor Bohr. How did he come into this business? He is a great advocate of publicity...He says he is in close correspondence with a Russian professor [Kapitsa]...It seems to me Bohr ought to be confined, or at any rate made to see that he is very near the edge of mortal crimes.”

That is why it would be very naive to
think that Bohr, knowing about the concern over his activities in powerful quarters, could allow himself even the tiniest carelessness when he met Terletsky and his companions. Now the following information emerges, according to recent reports in Danish newspapers.22 The middle man in the organization of Bohr’s meeting with the Soviet agents who were visiting Copenhagen was not, as is asserted in the Sudoplatov book,23 the Danish writer Martin Andersen Neke; rather it was a professor at Copenhagen University, Mogens Fog, a former minister of the government and reportedly a secret member of the Danish Communist Party, who viewed the Soviet Union sympathetically. In early November 1945, Fog asked Bohr whether he could meet confidentially with a Soviet physicist who had come to Copenhagen with a letter from Kapitsa. Bohr replied that any sort of secret meeting was out of the question, and agreed only to a completely open conversation. Niels Bohr’s son, Aage Bohr, writing in the Danish press, related other details, noting that Bohr had immediately alerted not only the Danish intelligence service to the approaching meeting, but also British and even U.S. intelligence. According to Aage Bohr, he had participated in all of his father’s meetings with Terletsky and, though neither of them took any notes in either meeting, “father ascribed great significance to the fact that another person was present and later could explain what had actually happened. Moreover, in January 1946 the leader of the American atomic project, General L. R. Groves, had sent a special agent to Denmark in order to clarify the details, and Niels Bohr had said that Terletsky had requested information about nuclear weapons.”24

But there was one more reason for Bohr to understand the situation. He could hardly have refused to meet any of the Soviet physicists if they happened to be in Copenhagen, especially as Terletsky had a letter of recommendation to Bohr from his old friend Academician Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa. One must assume that this probably was the principal “appropriate pretext” about which Beria reported to Stalin. At the insistence of Beria, with whom Kapitsa’s relations had already been ruined, Kapitsa had written a letter to Bohr dated 22 October 1945 which introduced “the young Russian physicist Terletsky” as a “capable professor of Moscow University.” Kapitsa stressed that Terletsky “will explain to you the goals of his foreign tour.”25 Yet in his letter Kapitsa did not call Terletsky his friend, as would be customary in other circumstances. Thus an important element, a kind of password in the developed style of friendly scientific correspondence, was missing, and this may well have alarmed Bohr (it immediately attracted the notice of Kapitsa’s widow, Anna Alekseevna, when she saw the letter).26

As Kapitsa’s former associate, P. Rubinin, later noted, this letter cost Pyotr Leonidovich a lot: he could not but suffer, understanding that he had been exploited (and probably not for the last time) by Beria.27 The cup turned out to be overfilled and the letter to Bohr became the last drop. A month later, Kapitsa sent his famous letter to Stalin in which he gave a sharply negative evaluation of Beria and declared further cooperation with him impossible. And a month after that, Kapitsa was discharged from work on the atomic bomb and fell into long disfavor. Now the reader can judge what is left of Sudoplatov’s fantasies about the meeting with Bohr and how they relate to real facts. Veterans of “atomic” espionage should understand a simple thing: nobody is denying or diminishing the role played by the intelligence services in the furthering of the Soviet atomic program. But so this role does not turn into a caricature, the “atomic” spies themselves more than anyone must play their part. They need to accept that only competent specialists, particularly physicists familiar with the nuclear weapons field, together with veterans of the atomic project, can accurately say which espionage materials played a positive role and contributed concretely, and which proved useless or even counterproductive (there were such too!).

Terletsky, recalling his meeting with Bohr nearly 30 years later, noted: “Bohr said that in his opinion, all countries should have the atomic bomb, particularly Russia. Only the spread of this powerful weapon to various countries could guarantee that it wouldn’t be used in the future.”28 It is not surprising that this distorted thesis was appropriated by certain Russian journalists and that Niels Bohr was rapidly transformed into a supporter and propagandizer of the idea of global nuclear proliferation. (I am not speaking here about the entirely curious article “The Bomb,” published in Moskovskii komsomol’s,30 the author of which, having become a victim of his own technical incompetence, got it into his head to demonstrate that while Bohr was “not a spy, not a KGB agent,” he had evidently been moved by his idealistic conceptions to relate to Terletsky “priceless and top secret information.”29)

At the same time, in the document sent by Beria to Stalin about Terletsky’s conversation with Bohr and which, naturally, was not put together without Terletsky’s participation, there is no evidence that Bohr made any such comments. On the contrary, while he spoke about the necessity of the “exchange of scientific discoveries and the internationalization of scientific achievements,” Bohr, at the same time, referring to the atomic bomb, supported the “establishment of international control over all countries” as the only method of defense against it. Of course, over the course of three decades Terletsky could forget the essence of Bohr’s remarks and distort them, and for him it was just a hop and a skip to a top secret document. More important, the formulation of the answers ascribed to Bohr in the document which lay on Stalin’s desk, cannot be accepted as irreproachable and precise, given the way Terletsky himself described their preparation: “All day Arutunov and I tried to reconstruct Bohr’s answers from memory. This turned out not to be such a simple task, since Arutunov, despite his phenomenally trained memory, while not understanding the subject had been in no position to remember everything verbatim, while I didn’t understand everything from Arutunov’s translation and had to recall how Bohr’s answers had sounded in English; after all, passively I knew some English, like everyone who had finished the Physics Faculty [FizFak] at MGU.”31

From all this it is clear that in order to evaluate Bohr’s position on the atomic bomb we had best base ourselves on his own publications. In his June 1950 “Open Letter to the United Nations,” which most fully and clearly articulated his views on the issue under discussion, Bohr stressed that “any great technical undertaking, whether industrial or military, should have become open for international control.” In the same letter he stands up for the necessity of “universal access to full information about scientific discoveries,” including “the industrial exploitation of the sources of atomic energy.”32 In other words, atomic weapons under international control, and the scientific achievements for the benefit of all mankind.
And now we know that, thanks to the KGB, Bohr was able to send that message straight to Stalin himself in 1945.

3. Actually, having learned that Bohr had fallen into a dangerous situation and had escaped from occupied Denmark to Sweden, P.L. Kapitsa on 28 October 1943 sent Bohr a letter with an invitation to move with his family to the Soviet Union. This was a purely humanitarian gesture from Kapitsa, who was worried by the fate of his colleague and friend and wished to help him in a dangerous situation.

Conjecture to the effect that Kapitsa invited Bohr to the USSR primarily so that the great physicist would participate in the Soviet atomic project does not have even the slightest foundation. In a letter to V.M. Molotov on 14 October 1943, Kapitsa, having noted that he had found out by chance about Bohr’s escape, wrote, “I think that it would be very good and appropriate if we proposed our hospitality here in the Union to him and his family during the war. Even if he is unable to accept our proposal, it makes sense to do this. If you consider all this correct, then either the Academy of Sciences [can invite him]...or simply less officially, I can write the invitation.” [P.L. Kapitsa, Letters About Science [Pis’ma k nauke] (Moscow: Moscow Worker, 1989), 207.]

Bohr replied to Kapitsa from London on 29 April 1944: “Dear Kapitsa, I don’t know how to thank you for your letter of October 28, which I received via the Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Zinchenko, a few days ago after my return from America. I am deeply touched by your faithful friendship and full of thanks for your magnanimous invitation....” [Kapitsa, Letters About Science, 209.]

The exchange of letters between Kapitsa and Bohr attracted the attention of Western intelligence services, and it evidently fanned Churchill’s suspicions toward Bohr. [Ruth Moore, Niels Bohr: Man and Scholar [Niels Bohr—Chełovek i uchenyi] (Moscow: Mir, 1989), 389.]

4. Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks, 205-207.
5. Ibid., 211-212.
8. The document is reprinted in Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks, 479-81.
11. Ibid., p. xiii.
17. Ralph Lapp, New Power (Moscow: IL, 1954), 42.
18. Presenting such a conclusion as a document of required evaluation of the results of Terletsky’s mission, Kurchatov evidently limited himself to a compliment suitable to the occasion. He could not do otherwise, recognizing that Beria, the main organizer of the entire operation, was not only the chief of the country’s intelligence and punitive organs, but also was at the same time the main administrator of the Soviet atomic project, i.e., his immediate superior.
19. Moore, Niels Bohr, 386-88. [Ed. note: The fullest account and analysis of Bohr’s efforts to convince U.S. and British leaders prior to Hiroshima of the need to inform Stalin about the Manhattan Project officially in the hope of heading off a postwar nuclear arms race may be found in Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Knopf, 1975); citations from 1987 Vintage edition, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Original of the Arms Race.]
23. Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks, 206.
27. Ibid.

Physicist Yuri N. Smirnov is a Leading Researcher of the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute and a veteran of the Soviet nuclear weapons program. This article is a revised version of one which appeared in the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 22 June 1994, Translation for the CWIHP Bulletin by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

### DOCUMENT II:
The Interrogation of Niels Bohr

1. **Question:** By what practical method was uranium 235 obtained in large quantities, and which method now is considered to be the most promising (diffusion, magnetic, or some other)?

   **Answer:** The theoretical foundations for obtaining uranium 235 are well known to scientists of all countries; they were developed even before the war and present no secret. The war did not introduce anything basically new into the theory of this problem. Yet, I have to point out that the issue of the uranium pile [kotol; reactor—ed.] and the problem of plutonium resulting from this—are issues which were solved during the war, but these issues are not new in principle either. Their solution was found as the result of practical implementation. The main thing is separation of the uranium 235 isotope from the natural mixture of isotopes. If there is a sufficient amount of uranium 235, realizing an atomic bomb does not present any theoretical difficulty. For separation of uranium 235, the well-known diffusion method is used, and also the mass-spectographic method. No new method is applied. The Americans succeeded by realizing in practice installations, basically well-known to physicists, in unimaginably big proportions. I must warn you that while in the USA I did not take part in the engineering development of the problem and that is why I am aware neither of the design features nor the size of these apparatuses, nor even of the measurements of any part of them. I did not take part in the construction of these apparatuses and, moreover, I have never seen a single installation. During my stay in the USA I did not visit a single plant. While I was there I took part in all the theoretical meetings and discussions on this problem which took place. I can assure you that the Americans use both diffusion and mass-spectographic installations.

2. **Question:** How can the space charge of the ionic beam in a mass-spectrograph be compensated for?

   **Answer:** If the gas from the vacuum chamber is pumped out completely, we will have to think about a way to compensate for the volume...
charge of the ionic beam. But if the gas from the chamber is not pumped out completely, it is not necessary to worry about compensating for the volume charge. Or, in fact, compensation for the volume charge of the ionic beam is accomplished by means of the incomplete pumping of gas from the vacuum chamber.

3. **Question:** Is it feasible to execute a uranium pile using a natural mixture of isotopes and ordinary water as a moderator?

**Answer:** The question of using ordinary water as a moderator was raised, yet the idea was not realized in practice. The uranium pile with ordinary water is not used. I think that the use of ordinary water as a moderator is not expedient, because light hydrogen absorbs neutrons well, thus turning into heavy hydrogen. This idea is not popular in America. Originally the Americans intended to build piles with heavy water as a moderator, but production of heavy water requires huge expense. During the war the Americans discovered that graphite can serve as a good moderator. They developed this idea in practice and implemented it on a gigantic scale. The construction side, the arrangement and the measurements of this pile, is not known to me.

4. **Question:** What substance is used for cooling the uranium blocks themselves?

**Answer:** Normal water is used for cooling the uranium blocks. The problem of cooling the uranium piles is extremely complicated, since cooling the piles literally requires whole rivers. We note that the water used for cooling is brought almost to boiling.

5. **Question:** What is the temperature change of the multiplication factor, what is the numerical equivalent of the temperature coefficient of the multiplication factor? Or what does the curve representing the relationship between the multiplication factor and temperature look like?

**Answer:** The mere fact that the uranium pile is working means that the dependence of the multiplication factor on temperature is not significant. Otherwise, as the result of the violent reaction, the pile would explode. I cannot provide the numerical significance of this dependence, but evidently it is of an insignificant size. However, this factor must not be ignored. It is necessary to maintain the pile in a certain state by regulating the amount of water coming into it. Normally uranium cores are kept in cold condition. It is necessary to keep in mind that if the pile’s working regime is disrupted, the pile can be easily spoiled. We also note that the possibility of regulating the uranium pile is provided by the existence of a long period of time /about a second and more/ between the fission of the nucleus and the emission of slowed neutrons, which comprise 1% of the total number of emitted neutrons.

/Then BOHR on the basis of his work, done with [Princeton University physicist John A.] WHEELER, explained this thesis to Prof. TERLETSKY in detail./

6. **Question:** Are there other supplementary methods for regulating the uranium pile?

**Answer:** For this purpose, regulating substances which absorb neutrons are loaded into the pile.

7. **Question:** Which substance is used as the absorber?

**Answer:** It seems that the absorbent rods are made of cadmium.

8. **Question:** How many neutrons are emitted from every split atom of uranium 235, uranium 238, plutonium 239 and plutonium 240?

**Answer:** More than 2 neutrons.

9. **Question:** Can you not provide exact numbers?

**Answer:** No, I can’t, but it is very important that more than two neutrons are emitted. That is a reliable basis to believe that a chain reaction will most undoubtedly occur. The precise value of these numbers does not matter. It is important that there are more than two.

10. **Question:** What is the number of spontaneous disintegrations [i.e., fissions—ed.] within a segment of time for all the mentioned substances /uranium 235, uranium 238, plutonium 239, plutonium 240/?

**Answer:** Few spontaneous disintegrations take place, and in calculations it is not necessary to take them into consideration. The period of spontaneous fission is approximately 7,000 years. I can’t cite the precise numbers, but you yourself understand that with such a period of spontaneous disintegration, there is no reason to expect it to influence the process significantly.

11. **Question:** In order to obtain a large quantity of uranium 235, is either the diffusion method or mass-spectographic method used alone, or are these two methods also used in combination?

**Answer:** The Americans use both methods and, besides, they use the combination of these two methods. I think that the combination of these two methods is most effective, because if we presume that we have 0.5% of uranium 235 and if, as a result of applying the diffusion method by passing it through a cascade, we increase the uranium content by 5 times, then by putting the uranium after that into the chamber of a spectograph, we can accelerate the process by 5 times. I do not know for certain, but I think that the Americans use the combination of these two methods very widely.

12. **Question:** How stable is the multi-stage machine?

**Answer:** The fact that diffusion cascades of very many stages already work in the USA shows that the process can and does take place. And it is not new. As you know, the German scientist [Gustav] HERTZ long before the war proved already that this process was possible, when he split helium, neon.

13. **Question:** How is high productivity achieved using the mass-spectographic method; is it by constructing a large number of ordinary spectographs, or by constructing a few powerful spectographs?

**Answer:** Both. You cannot imagine what an enormous number of huge spectographs the Americans built. I do not know their size and number, but I know that it is something incredible. From the photographs which I saw it is possible to conclude that these are gigantic buildings with thousands of apparatuses installed in them, and that many plants like this were built. In such a way the Americans built a large number of big spectographs.

14. **Question:** By what method is it possible to obtain high ion charges of uranium or its compounds?

**Answer:** By constructing a large and powerful mass-spectograph.

15. **Question:** Does the pile begin to slow as the result of slag formation in the course of the fission of the light isotope of uranium?

**Answer:** Pollution of the pile with slag as the result of the fission of a light isotope of uranium does occur. But as far as I know, Americans do not stop the process specially for purification of the pile. Cleansing of the piles takes place at the moment of exchange of the rods for removal of the obtained plutonium.

16. **Question:** How often is plutonium removed from the machine and how are the terms for the removal determined?

**Answer:** I do not know for sure. By unconfirmed hearsay, the removal of the rods takes place once a week.

17. **Question:** Does plutonium 240 split under the influence of slow neutrons? Has the possibility of plutonium 240 fission been proved experimentally?

**Answer:** It is known that the fission of all even isotopes, uranium 234, uranium 238 and plutonium 240, requires significantly more energy than uneven isotopes /let’s recollect [Austrian physicist Wolfgang] Pauli’s principle/, and that the energy released by plutonium 240 must be equal to the energy released by the fission of uranium 239. At this point BOHR, illustrating his speech with graphs from his works, gave a detailed foundation for the fact that the question of using plutonium 240 is not very sensible./ So far nobody has proved by experiment that it is possible to split plutonium 240.

18. **Question:** Does a uranium pile using heavy water as a moderator exist, or are all working piles uranium-graphite?

**Answer:** All piles working in the USA have graphite moderators. You evidently know that production of heavy water demands an enormous amount of electric power. Before the war the production of heavy water was organized only in Norway. And we all bought heavy water there.
We note that during the war the Germans applied much effort in order to carry out processes with heavy water, but they did not manage to collect the amount of heavy water sufficient to start a pile. The Americans found it possible to use graphite as a moderator and accomplished this idea with considerable success. Therefore, as far as I know, they gave up using piles with heavy water for industrial production. The Canadians chose another way, deciding to construct piles with heavy water, but these piles have not been activated for the same reason: they cannot accumulate for this purpose the necessary amount of heavy water. I consider it necessary to stress that I received this information during informal conversations with my colleagues.

19. Question: Of which substance were atomic bombs made?
Answer: I do not know of which substance the bombs dropped on Japan were made. I think no theoretician will answer this question to you. Only the military can give you an answer to this question. Personally I, as a scientist, can say that these bombs were evidently made of plutonium or uranium 235.

20. Question: Do you know any methods of protection from atomic bombs? Does a real possibility of defense from atomic bombs exist?
Answer: I am sure that there is no real method of protection from atomic bomb. Tell me, how can you stop the fission process which has already begun in the bomb which has been dropped from a plane? It is possible, of course, to intercept the plane, thus not allowing it to approach its destination—but this is a task of a doubtful character, because planes fly very high for this purpose and besides, with the creation of jet planes, you understand yourself, the combination of these two discoveries makes the task of fighting the atomic bomb insoluble. We need to consider the establishment of international control over all countries as the only means of defense against the atomic bomb. All mankind must understand that with the discovery of atomic energy the fates of all nations have become very closely intertwined. Only international cooperation, the exchange of scientific discoveries, and the internationalization of scientific achievements, can lead to the elimination of wars, which means the elimination of the very necessity to use the atomic bomb. This is the only correct method of defense. I have to point out that all scientists without exception, who worked on the atomic problem, including the Americans and the English, are indignant at the fact that great discoveries become the property of a group of politicians. All scientists believe that this greatest discovery must become the property of all nations and serve for the unprecedented progress of humankind. You obviously know that as a sign of protest the famous OPPENHEIMER retired and stopped his work on this problem. And PAULI in a conversation with journalists demonstratively declared that he is a nuclear physicist, but he does not have and does not want to have anything to do with the atomic bomb.

I am glad to note that today in the local newspaper there appeared a report that [British Prime Minister Clement] ATTLEE and [U.S. President Harry] TRUMAN began a consultation with the USSR on the establishment of international control over the use and production of atomic bombs. Yet, I have to point out I view such reports in local newspapers very skeptically. But the mere fact that ATTLEE, TRUMAN, and [Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie] KING conduct these negotiations is very notable. Let us see where they will lead.1 We have to keep in mind that atomic energy, having been discovered, cannot remain the property of one nation, because any country which does not possess this secret can very quickly independently discover it. And what is next? Either reason will win, or a devastating war, resembling the end of mankind.

21. Question: Is the report which has appeared about the development of a super-bomb justified?
Answer: I believe that the destructive power of the already invented bomb is already great enough to wipe whole nations from the face of the earth. But I would welcome the discovery of a super-bomb, because then mankind would probably sooner understand the need to cooperate. In fact, I believe that there is insufficient basis for these reports. What does it mean, a super-bomb? This is either a bomb of a bigger weight then the one that has already been invented, or a bomb which is made of some new substance. Well, the first is possible, but unreasonable, because, I repeat, the destructive power of the bomb is already very great, and the second—I believe—is unreal.

22. Question: Is the phenomenon of overcompression of the compound under the influence of the explosion used in the course of the bomb explosion?
Answer: There is no need for this. The point is that during the explosion uranium particles move at a speed equal to the speed of the neutrons’ movement. If this were not so the bomb would have given a clap and disintegrated as the body broke apart. Now precisely due to this equal speed the fissile process of the uranium continues even after the explosion.

—00000—

* * * * * *

DOCUMENT III: Kurchatov’s Evaluation

Top secret

EVALUATION

of the answers given by Professor Niels BOHR to the questions on the atomic problem.

Niels BOHR was asked two groups of questions:
1. Concerning the main directions of the work.
2. Those containing concrete physical data and constants.

Definite answers were given by BOHR to the first group of questions.

BOHR gave a categorical answer to the question about the use of methods for obtaining uranium 235 in the USA, which completely satisfied the correspondent member of the Academy of Science Prof. [Isaak Konstantinovich] KIKOIN, who put this question.

Niels BOHR made an important remark dealing with the effectiveness of using uranium in the atomic bomb. This remark must undergo a theoretical analysis, which should be the task of Professors [Lev Dai] LANDAU, [A.B.] MIGDAL, and [Isaak I.] POMERANCHUK.

Academician /KURCHATOV/

“... of December 1945”

1. [On 15 November 1945, at a summit in Washington, Truman, Attlee, and King issued a tripartite declaration recognizing the impossibility of defense against the atomic bomb or keeping a national monopoly over atomic weapons or science, and calling for the United Nations to create a commission to establish international exchange of scientific information. This policy led to the unsuccessful UN talks over the Baruch and Gromyko plans for international control.—ed.]
MORE DOCUMENTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

The previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 3, Fall 1993, pp. 1, 55-69) contained a selection of translated documents from the Russian archives on Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, and here the series continues. Several documents were provided by the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its Russian acronym), the archive containing the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee, in connection with the January 1993 conference in Moscow organized by CWIHP in cooperation with TsKhSD and the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Scholars working with CWIHP provided others, including several from a special TsKhSD collection known as Fond 89, which contains Soviet documents declassified for the 1992 Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU and other special occasions. The CWIHP Bulletin hopes to publish more translated documents from the archives of the USSR/CPSU and other former communist states in forthcoming issues, and welcomes submissions of documents (and short introductions) from scholars conducting research in East-bloc archives.

I. Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, 1950—“Clarifications”

In the spring of 1950, the most tightly held secret in the world was that preparations were going forward for North Korea to launch a massive military assault on South Korea in a concerted drive to unify the peninsula, divided since the end of World War II, under communist rule. For decades, scholars could only guess at the dynamics of the mystery-shrouded exchanges among the leaders of North Korea, the USSR, and the newly-established People’s Republic of China. However, the previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin included a declassified document from the Russian archives clearly indicating that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had repeatedly petitioned Soviet leadership for its blessing to launch the attack, and that he finally received a green light from Stalin during his visit to Moscow in April 1950. In that document, a 1966 internal Soviet Foreign Ministry report, it was also stated that following this meeting in Moscow, in May 1950, “Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.” (See “New Findings on the Korean War,” translation and commentary by Kathryn Weathersby, CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18, quotation on p. 16.)

The following two documents shed further light on the interplay between Stalin and Mao as Kim sought Beijing’s approval. They were among more than 200 documents totaling over 600 pages from the Russian Presidential Archives concerning the Korean War that were given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-Sam during the latter’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, and were made available to the CWIHP Bulletin by the South Korean Embassy in Washington. The first document is a coded telegram sent to Moscow on the night of 13 May 1950 from the Soviet Embassy in Beijing. It relayed a request from Mao, conveyed via Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, seeking Stalin’s “personal clarifications” of his stand on a potential North Korean action to reunify the country. Mao sought the information after hearing a report from Kim, who had arrived that day in the Chinese capital for a secret two-day visit and clearly claimed that he had received Stalin’s blessing. The second document, a coded telegram from Moscow to Beijing, contained Stalin’s personal response. Using the code-name “Filippov,” Stalin confirmed his agreement with the North Korean proposal to “move toward reunification,” contingent on Beijing’s assent.

Particularly noteworthy is Stalin’s suggestive yet cryptic statement that the Soviet leaders (i.e., Stalin himself) had altered their stance, after long resisting Kim’s appeals, due to the “changed international situation.” Exactly what had changed? “Filippov” doesn’t say, but the apparent timing of his conversion certainly engenders speculation. According to previously disclosed Soviet documents, Stalin had indicated as early as 30 January 1950 that he was “ready to approve” Kim’s request for permission to attack the South, and to render material assistance to assure its success, although he noted, “Such a large matter needs preparation.” (See documents quoted in Dmitrii Volkogonov, “Sleduyet li etogo boyat’ sia?” [“Should we fear this?”], Ogonyok 26 (June 1993), 28-29, cited in Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58.) Stalin’s statement in a coded telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang came less than three weeks after U.S. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s famous National Press Club speech in which he excluded Korea, and other mainland locations, from the American “defensive perimeter” in Asia. Though Acheson’s speech was primarily devoted to the subject of China, and though he was merely echoing statements by U.S. military leaders in his definition of American military strategy in the Pacific, his statement may have been seen in Moscow as lending credence to the argument that Washington would not intervene militarily to rescue South Korea from being overrun. But of course, Stalin may also have been alluding to other, far more momentous developments on the international scene, especially the Chinese Communists’ consolidation of power after militarily routing their Guomindang opponents, and the Soviets’ own success the previous autumn in ending the four-year U.S. nuclear monopoly.

As for Mao, the sequence of events (perhaps by Stalin’s design) clearly put him on the spot. Though exhausted by the decades-long civil war, and still gearing up for an assault on the Nationalist redoubt on Taiwan, Mao and his comrades in Beijing may well have felt compelled to endorse Pyongyang’s action in order to demonstrate to Stalin their revolutionary mettle, zeal, and worthiness to spearhead the communist movement in Asia—especially given the rather cool and skeptical welcome Mao had received when he had visited Moscow the previous December. Perhaps, as some scholars contend (most prominently Bruce Cummings in his two-volume study), fullscale war between North and South Korea was bound to erupt at some point in any case, since both sides’ leaders were eager to achieve reunification. Yet it appears that Kim was able to strike first on his own schedule by exploiting the mutual suspicion and competition between the two communist giants. The Bulletin plans to publish further reports bearing on the Korean War in future issues. Commentary by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP Director; translations by Vladislav M. Zubok, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., and Kathryn Weathersby, Florida State University, Tallahassee.
Ciphered Telegram  Strictly Secret
Making copies is forbidden

[Stamp: “Declassified 14 December 1993”]

From PEKING

For immediate report to comrade Filippov.

Today on May 13, at 23 hours 30 minutes Chou En-lai paid a visit to me and, following the instructions of Mao Tse-tung, let me know the following:

1. Kim II Sung and minister of foreign affairs of the Korean People's-Democratic Republic Po Siang-Yung arrived in Peking on May 13 this year.

2. In the evening comrade Mao Tse-tung has had a meeting with them. In the conversation with comrade Mao Tse-tung the Korean comrades informed about the directives of comrade Filippov that the present situation has changed from the situation in the past and, that North Korea can move toward actions; however, this question should be discussed with China and personally with comrade Mao Tse-tung.

3. The Korean comrades will stay in Peking for 2 days.

In connection with the abovementioned comrade Mao Tse-tung would like to have personal clarifications of comrade Filippov on this question, which, according to the previous telegram from comrade Filipov transferred by the [Soviet] Ambassador to China (N.V.) Roshchin, were to follow in the coming days.

The Chinese comrades are requesting an urgent answer.

13/5-50. Roshchin

II. Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956:
A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis

In this strikingly frank assessment, forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Foreign Ministry informs the Kremlin that in the wake of the Hungarian and Suez crises in the fall of 1956, admiration for the United States has risen and Soviet stock has plummeted in the newly-independent Asian countries that had formerly belonged to the European colonial empires. The December 1956 report on the crises’ impact in the “Colombo Countries”—referring to Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, all former colonies which had gained independence since World War II, and signatories of an agreement on economic cooperation in the Ceylonese capital of Colombo—must have been particularly galling to the Soviet leadership since the countries it covered, especially India, were targets of Moscow’s ardent post-Stalin diplomatic offensive to woo members of the emerging bloc of “non-aligned” nations to its side in the Cold War. In 1955, Khrushchev had hosted Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Moscow and then paid his own visit to India and Burma, and had also called on Tito in Belgrade in an effort to patch up Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which had grown bitterly hostile under Stalin.

The Foreign Ministry analysis, however, suggested strongly that recent events had dealt this strategy a serious blow. In all the “Colombo countries,” it reported, there had been a “significant increase” in anti-Soviet views, in public, official, and diplomatic arenas, even among leftists; a disillusioned New Delhi, in particular, had officially told Moscow that the invasion of Hungary “shattered the belief of millions of people who had begun to view the USSR as the defender of peace and rights of the weakest people,” and Nehru was reported to be coordinating with Tito in condemning Moscow’s actions, and also tightening ties with China and the United States.

Even worse, the report noted a sharp increase in the prestige of the United States and Eisenhower personally, who had welcomed Nehru to Washington in late December 1956. By opposing (at least diplomatically) both the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Anglo-French-Israeli coordinated military assault to capture the Suez Canal from Egypt and its nationalist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Eisenhower had enhanced his credibility as a defender of the rights of small nations against interference by larger powers. This assessment accorded with that of U.S. diplomatic observers, who sensed an historic opportunity to draw India closer to the United States. (See, e.g., the cable from the U.S. ambassador in India, 7 December 1956, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, VIII, 319-25.) But it contrasts with subsequent analysis of Henry Kissinger that “the Soviet Union’s acts in Hungary cost it no influence among the Nonaigned, while the United States garnered no additional influence among that group as a result of its stand over Suez.” (Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 563-64.) In at least some
nonaligned countries, and at least for the short term, the Soviet analysis shows, the conduct of the superpowers in Hungary and Suez had indeed reduced the USSR’s influence and raised that of the United States. Introduction by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; document provided by Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Moscow.

* * * * * * *

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

To Comrade ORLOV, A.L.

I forward a copy of a note prepared by the Committee of Information, USSR MFA, “The Influence of Events in the Near East and in Hungary on relations of the “Colombo countries” toward England, the USA, and the Soviet Union.”

The note has been sent to the leadership of the MFA USSR.

Attachment: On 8 pages.

(Signed) I. Tugarinov

“28” December 1956
No. 1869/2

* * * * * *

nm. 32

Copy
Top Secret
Copy No. 30

The Influence of Events in the Near East and in Hungary on the Attitudes of the “Colombo Countries” Toward England, the USA, and the Soviet Union

I.

The latest events in the Near East and in Hungary led to the appearance of certain new elements in the attitudes of the “Colombo Countries” toward England, the USA, and the Soviet Union.

During the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt, an anti-English mood was sharply strengthened in the “Colombo Countries.”

In these countries, demands were put forth for the breaking of relations with England and for the withdrawal of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon from the British Commonwealth. Also, on November 3, the Parliament of Indonesia unanimously took the decision to recommend to the government that it review the question of the breaking of relations with England, should the English forces not be withdrawn from Egyptian territory.

One of the most prominent personalities of the Indian National Congress Party [Chakravarti] RAJAGOPALACHARI, suggested that India withdraw from the British Commonwealth in the event that England rejected the decision of the UN regarding the question of aggression against Egypt. Many Indian newspapers and political parties supported RAJAGOPALACHARI’s demand. Analogous demands were put forth in Pakistan and in Ceylon.

The governments of the “Colombo Countries” also officially considered the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt. However, they restrained themselves from taking any actions which might be evidence of a retreat by these countries from the policy which they followed earlier in relation to England. At a press conference on November 2, in response to a question as to whether India might apply these or other sanctions against England, NEHRU answered, “We are not thinking about sanctions.” On November 9, NEHRU directly said that India would act incorrectly, if it were to withdraw from membership in the British Commonwealth because of the actions of England in Egypt. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, [S.W.R.D.] BANDARANIKE on November 12 spoke in a similar vein against a suggestion that India and Ceylon withdraw from the British Commonwealth.

The President of Pakistan, Iskander MIRZA, who recently visited Iran, in a conversation with diplomatic representatives from Arab countries accredited to Teheran, announced that “such a great colonialistic power, such as England, has at its disposal huge military powers, and it is capable of any actions.” Therefore, in questions involving England, it is necessary to follow “a more moderate course,” and not to take headstrong “adventurist steps.”

Such a position on the part of the ruling circles of the “Colombo Countries” is explained first of all by the sufficiently significant degree to which these countries are economically and politically dependent on England. English capital continues to hold a dominant position in the leading branches of the economies of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, particularly in the plantation economy, manufacturing industry, and also in internal and foreign trade. In India, for example, according to information in our possession, more than 72% of long-term foreign investment is English, and this accounts for more than 30% of the all the money invested in the Indian economy.

In India and Pakistan there remain a significant number of English “advisors” and various types of “consultants,” and several Englishmen even occupy official government positions.

A decent number of Englishmen remained in the armed forces of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. As in the past, the general staffs of the armed forces of these countries, along with many officers, are trained in England.

A significant part of the bureaucratic apparatus of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon is preserved from the time of English colonial rule, and supports continued ties with England. The main role in the matter of the continued membership of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon in the British Empire is played by the fact that the great bourgeois and land-owning circles of these countries are not interested in breaking economic and political relations with England.

Currently, as England has begun to withdraw its troops from Egypt, expressions of criticism toward the actions of England in Egypt have almost completely ceased in the “Colombo Countries.”

And so, the English aggression towards Egypt has not led to any sort of noticeable worsening of relations of these countries with England, although, it is without doubt that in connection with her aggressive actions in the Near East, England’s prestige in Asian countries has been damaged severely.

II.

Recently, in reaction to the events in Hungary, there has been a significant increase in speeches hostile to the Soviet Union in the “Colombo Countries.” These speeches are found in their most extreme form in Pakistan and Burma.

In the ruling circles of the “Colombo Countries” an analogy was made between the English-French-Israeli aggression in Egypt and the participation of Soviet forces in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary. In particular, a November 14 declaration of the Prime Ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon reads, “each of them has independently already expressed their uneasiness about these events (in Egypt and Hungary—Committee on Information) and their strong disapproval and their chagrin in connection with the aggression and the intervention of great powers against weak countries. This is a violation of a condition of the UN Charter, and also a direct violation of the spirit and letter of the Bandung Conference declaration and the principles expressed in it.”

In the above-mentioned declaration, The Prime Ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon demanded that Soviet forces be quickly withdrawn from Hungary, and that the Hungarian people be granted the right “to decide for themselves the question of their future and to create the government that it wishes to have, without any sort of outside meddling.”

The “Colombo countries” adhered to this position—which is basically unfriendly toward the USSR—during the U.N.’s consideration of the so-called Hungarian question. The Pakistani delegation, occupying a position on the Hungarian question which is openly hostile to the Soviet Union, even was one of the co-authors of a five-
country resolution which called for intervention in the Hungarian matter. According to information received from our Chinese friends, the government of Burma considers the application of sanctions against the Soviet Union in relation to its actions in Hungary a possible step.

In the memorandum of the Indian Government handed to Comrade GROMYKO on 17 December 1956, the current position of the Soviet Union is judged in its essentials, and it is asserted that “the events in Hungary shatter the belief of millions of people, who had begun to view the USSR as the defender of peace and rights of the weakest people.”

It should be noted that the evaluation of the Hungarian situation by the “Colombo Countries” corresponds to a significant degree with the Yugoslav point of view on this question. According to information in our possession, NEHRU and [Burmese Prime Minister] U BA SWE support close contact with Yugoslavia on the Hungarian question.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that NEHRU, in his speech to the Indian Parliament on 20 November 1956, underlined that TITO is in a position to give a correct evaluation of events in Europe and that India, in working out its foreign policy program, to a certain degree is led by his evaluation. Besides this, NEHRU, speaking about Tito’s speech in Pula [Yugoslavia—ed.], noted that to him many points in this speech seem correct.

The Government of India is in full accord with the position of Yugoslavia regarding [overthrown Hungarian leader] Imre NAGY. And so, NEHRU, in his conversation with CHOU EN-LAI which took place on 3 December 1956, expressed India’s disagreement with the actions of the Soviet government on this question. According to NEHRU, “facts of this type are extremely unfavorable for the USSR.”

Recently, many political parties, organs of the press, and a range of leading political figures of the “Colombo countries” have begun to speak very critically of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, pointing out in this regard that the events in Eastern Europe bear witness “to the insincerity of the Soviet Union” and about its unwillingness to consistently adhere to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

The following comments from the Indian press are representative of these opinions. According to the newspaper “Indian Express,” Soviet policy, which preached its devotion to the principles of “panch shil” [Ed. note: This refers to the “five principles”—of mutual respect, nonaggression, noninterference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—espoused by Nehru to apply to Indian-Chinese relations, and to international relations generally.] is now unmasked. The influential newspaper “Hindustan Standard” wrote in November 1956 that the Soviet government “by its actions in Hungary has made the most vulgar mistake in the post-Stalin epoch. The trust and good wishes which it received in recent months have quickly disappeared, and now, after this there may follow even more serious events.”

The Prime Minister of Burma U BA SWE said directly that the policy of the Soviet government is directed toward undermining the foundations of the United Nations.

NEHRU, touching on the situation in Hungary, announced at the opening of a UNESCO conference on November 5: “Now we see that the five principles are just words which have no meaning for certain countries that assert the right to resolve problems by means of overwhelming force.”

In his 20 December 1956 speech at the American United Nations Association, NEHRU asserted that Hungary “had been forced to function in a way which contradicts the will of the residents of the country.”

Judging by facts in our possession, one of the reasons for the cooling off in attitudes toward the Soviet Union in the “Colombo countries” is found in the not entirely exact fulfillment of our trade obligations by Soviet enterprises, which causes dissatisfaction in a range of countries. So, for example, Burmese business circles express serious complaints relating to delays in the delivery of most Soviet goods and violations of terms in the fulfillment of contracts.

Recently, representatives of certain political circles and organs of the press in the “Colombo countries” have spoken in favor of a review of the policy of these countries toward the Soviet Union. And so, the newspaper “Hindustan Times,” which is close to the Indian government, wrote that events in Eastern Europe and the Near and Middle East “oblige India to review its foreign policy.”

At the same time, it must be noted that the relationships of the “Colombo countries” with other countries of the Socialist camp—and particularly with the PRC—have recently undergone further development. Bearing witness to this, for example, are such facts as the extremely friendly reception which CHOU EN-LAI was given in India, and the journey of U NU to the PRC, which took place during the sharpening of the situation in Hungary.

III.

Recent events in Hungary and in the Near East and the position of the USA during these events have made possible an increase in the prestige of the USA in Asian countries.

The general tone of the coverage of the events in Egypt and in Hungary in the press of the “Colombo countries” was extremely favorable toward the USA. The statements of a number of press organs included positive evaluations of the role and actions of the USA in settling the conflict in the Near and Middle East, and also in regard to the question of the situation in Hungary. In this way, the USA was assigned the role as the most active supporter of a peaceful settlement of the situation in Egypt.

The fact that the reelection of President Eisenhower received a favorable reaction in the “Colombo countries” is also noteworthy. Many newspapers in those countries, including those of leftist orientation, expressed satisfaction over the re-election of EISENHOWER as President, viewing it as a “firm guarantee of the maintenance of peace.”

Recently, in the press of the “Colombo countries” there have appeared reports of a possible change in the positions of these countries toward the USA. In particular, in certain reports of Indian newspapers it has been mentioned that it makes sense for India to revise its foreign policy so as to move closer to the USA.

Regarding this, the fact that the USA over a short period of time has taken real steps toward a rapprochement with India has special meaning. In January 1956, the government of the USA announced that it had rescinded a previously-taken decision to reduce economic aid to India by 10 million dollars, and, besides this, had decided to provide India, free of charge, 100 thousand tons of steel products required for restoration and reconstruction of the Indian railroad network. In March 1956, the government of the USA gave India 26 million dollars for the purchase of various types of machinery, and in August 1956 concluded with NEHRU’s government an agreement to provide India agricultural products worth 360.1 million dollars, of which 65% would be given in the form of a loan and 15% in the form of a grants.

The government of the USA is also trying to broaden its political contacts with India and to draw India closer to the USA on a range of international questions. With this goal, the government of the USA, according to information for the Soviet Embassy in Delhi, made it clear to the Indians that the USA wished to renew negotiations towards conclusion of an Indo-American treaty on friendship, trade, and navigation.

The above American measures are received favorably by the Indian government, which is interested in receiving necessary economic aid from the USA. NEHRU himself manifests a certain inclination towards rapprochement with the USA. It is deserving of attention that precisely after the events in Hungary and in the Near East, NEHRU agreed to accept EISENHOWER’s invitation, and visited the USA in December
1956, even though he earlier, as is well known, had avoided a trip to the USA for a long time.

As is well known, the joint communiqué about NEHRU’s negotiations with EISENHOWER, published 20 December 1956, does not contain any concrete agreements. At the same time, it mentions that both sides affirm the existence of a broad area of agreement between India and the USA, who are linked by tight bonds of friendship, based on the compatibility of their goals and adherence to the highest principles of free democracy.”

During his visit to the USA, in one of his speeches (20 December) NEHRU strongly lauded America’s “morally leading” role in the Middle East crisis and the events in Hungary.

It is entirely possible that, as a result of NEHRU’s negotiations with EISENHOWER, a real improvement in Indo-American relations will take place, and that could negatively impact the relations of India with the USSR.

Judging by reports in the press, in the near future an increase in American aid to Pakistan, Burma and other “Colombo countries” will be proposed. The Burmese government, with has previously refused aid from the USA, has already at the present time entered into negotiations about receiving American loans. There is reason to suggest that in the near future there could take place a certain strengthening in the relations of the USA with the other “Colombo countries.”

Genuineness affirmed:
Deputy Chairman, Committee of Information,
USSR Foreign Ministry.

Correct: [signed] I. TUGARINOV

“28” December 1956
Attachment to No. 1869/2

(Source: TsKhSD.)

III. “A Typical Pragmatist”:
The Soviet Embassy Profiles
John F. Kennedy, 1960

In August 1960, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko forwarded to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy. Khrushchev had met JFK once before—briefly, during a visit to the United States the previous fall, when he was introduced to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Though “impressed” by the young congressman, Khrushchev considered Adlai Stevenson, the unsuccessful Democratic challenger in 1952 and 1956, to be “the most acceptable” candidate to succeed Eisenhower, and the most likely to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. (Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 507; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 488.)

But the twice-defeated Stevenson had rejected a third bid, and at the July 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles, Kennedy had emerged as his party’s standard-bearer to take on Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Nevertheless, for the Soviet leader, choosing a favorite in the U.S. presidential campaign was easy. Khrushchev saw Nixon, his protagonist in the “Kitchen Debate” at a 1959 Moscow trade fair, as an “aggressive” anti-communist who “owed his career to that devil of darkness McCarthy”—and Khrushchev’s post-Camp David fondness for the Eisenhower Administration had dissipated after the U-2 affair in May, which aborted a planned East-West summit in Paris as well as Ike’s anticipated visit to the USSR. Kennedy probably didn’t hurt his stock in Moscow by saying that he, unlike Eisenhower, would have apologized for the spy flight, and Khrushchev later told JFK (at their June 1961 Vienna summit) that he had “voted” for him by delaying the release of the captured U.S. pilot Francis Gary Powers until after the election. (Khrushchev Remembers, 508; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 490-91.)

Still, as Khrushchev later conceded, despite having a clear preference, “We had little knowledge of John Kennedy,” other than that he was “a young man, very promising and very rich—a millionaire... distinguished by his intelligence, his education, and his political skill.” (Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 488-89.)

Khrushchev’s initial assessment was probably informed, at least in part, by the profile reproduced below, prepared by charge d’affaires Mikhail Smirnovsky. Though it inevitably mentions JFK’s wealthy background, the profile does not dwell on his “class consciousness” and presents a straightforward, no-nonsense analysis of his political background, development, and views; his personality; and, of greatest interest to the Kremlin, his likely impact, if elected, on U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite minor slips (Kennedy only narrowly defeated Henry Cabot Lodge in the 1952 Senate race, not by “a wide margin”), what emerges is a surprisingly plausible, balanced, and even nuanced appraisal not so different from those advanced by many subsequent historians, although not so glowing as to satisfy Kennedy’s most ardent admirers or hagiographers. Foreshadowing Khrushchev’s later description of his counterpart as “flexible,” the embassy finds JFK a “typical pragmatist,” ready to change positions according to shifting calculations of situations and his own interests (as evidenced by his fence-sitting on McCarthy, and his alliance with conservative Democrat Lyndon Johnson despite embracing the title “liberal”). It describes a cautious, dispassionate, energetic yet deliberative politician who can also be sociable and “charming” when required, aman with “an acute, penetrating mind” able to quickly grasp the essence of a situation, and to understand people well. Yet it judges that Kennedy, “while not a mediocrity,” lacks the necessary attributes of originality, philosophical depth and “breadth of perception” to be considered “an outstanding person.”

As to JFK’s views on international affairs, the profile presciently senses the “quite contradictory” strains that would characterize U.S.-Soviet ties during his brief presidency. On the positive side, from the embassy’s view, there is Kennedy’s criticism of Eisenhower policies he sees as dogmatic and worse, failures, e.g., “liberating” Eastern Europe and shunning communist China; his support for a nuclear test ban and other arms control measures; and his belief, in contrast to some hardliners, that high-level U.S.-Soviet talks were, in general, worth pursuing. At the same time, though, it correctly notes that Kennedy’s envisioned path to a superpower “modus vivendi” was conditioned upon a significant U.S. military build-up that would allow Washington to deal with Moscow from a “position of strength”—and such a course, the embassy states ominously, would “in practice signify a speeding-up of the arms race and, therefore, a further straining of the international situation” with all its attendant consequences. Worse, on Berlin, Khrushchev’s top priority, JFK was “outright bellicose”—ready to risk nuclear war rather than abandon West Berlin.

Thus, one finds the essential ingredients that would characterize Kennedy’s relations with Khrushchev once JFK entered the White House—a tough stance on inter-
national questions, especially Berlin, that would lead to some of the sharpest crises of the Cold War, yet also the desire to reduce the danger of nuclear war and the flexibility to seek a dramatic improvement in relations once circumstances changed, these latter qualities would animate the relaxation in superpowers in 1963, epitomized by JFK’s American University speech and the signing of a limited test-ban treaty, that was cut short by Kennedy’s assassination. Introduction by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; document provided by Vladislav M. Zubok, National Security Archive, Washington, DC; translation by Benjamin Aldrich-Moody.

* * * * * * *

To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev I send an analysis on Kennedy which is of interest, sent by the USSR Embassy in the USA (by charge d’affaires Comrade Smirnovsky) A. Gromyko 3 August 1960

* * * * * * *

JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY (John Fitzgerald Kennedy) [English in original—ed.]

/Political character sketch/

John F. Kennedy was born on 29 May 1917 in Brookline, a suburb of Boston, Massachusetts, in a rich family of Irish extraction.

Kennedy received his secondary education in private schools. After finishing high school in 1935 he spent a semester studying in England in the London School of Economics, then studied for some time at Princeton University /USA/, from which he transferred to Harvard University /USA/, which he completed with honors in 1940 with a degree in political science. In 1940 Kennedy attended a course of lectures in the trade-and-commerce department of Stanford University.

Not long before the Second World War Kennedy visited a series of countries in Latin America, the Near East, and Europe, including the Soviet Union.

In 1941, Kennedy voluntarily entered the Navy, where he served until 1945, commanding a motor torpedo-boat in the Pacific military theater. In 1943 he was injured. [He was] Awarded a medal for displaying heroism in saving the lives of the members of his crew.

After demobilization Kennedy got involved in journalism; he was present in 1945 at the first conference of the UN in San Francisco and at the Potsdam conference in the capacity of a special correspondent of the agency “International News Service.”

In November of 1946, Kennedy was elected United States Congressman from the Democratic party in one of the districts of the state of Massachusetts; in 1948 and in 1950 he was re-elected to Congress from this same district.

In 1952, Kennedy was elected to the USA Senate from Massachusetts, having beaten his Republican opponent, Senator Henry Lodge, by a wide margin. In 1958 Kennedy is elected Senator for another term. He is a member of two important committees in the Senate — the Committee on Foreign Affairs, where he chairs the Subcommittee on International Organizations, and the Committee on Labor Affairs and Social Welfare, in which he chairs the Subcommittee on Labor Affairs, as well as being a member of the Joint Economic Committee in Congress.

At the convention of the Democratic Party in 1956, Kennedy was a candidate amongst the contenders for the post of USA vice-president, although he was defeated.

Immediately after this, that is in 1956, Kennedy began actively preparing to declare his candidacy for the Presidency of the US in the 1960 elections, having composed in past years a branching and well-organized personal political machine. (According to the press, Kennedy at this time had already expended more than two million dollars on his election campaign.)

In the end, despite initial serious doubts in Democratic Party circles about his candidacy, doubts which stemmed from Kennedy’s belonging to the Catholic Church and his relative youth, at the Democratic Party convention which took place in Los Angeles from 11 - 15 July, Kennedy prevailed, having amassed on the first ballot 806 votes with a minimum of 761 votes, after which his candidacy was confirmed unanimously.

Kennedy’s position regarding domestic policy in the USA

In his general philosophical views Kennedy is a typical pragmatist. Accordingly, in his political activity he is not governed by any firm convictions, but by purely pragmatic considerations, defining his positions on any given concrete circumstances and, most importantly, on his own interests.

During the years that he was in Congress, Kennedy’s positions on a given matter, or on analogical matters was not seldom inconsistent and contradictory, and in especially controversial political situations Kennedy generally preferred to avoid revealing his position; an example is his behavior concerning the McCarthyist-profascist tendency in USA political life in the beginning of the 1950s. While not attaching himself personally to this tendency, Kennedy simultaneously avoided condemning the movement, even when the majority of his colleagues in the Senate expressed opposition to McCarthy’s actions in 1954.

All this deprives Kennedy of a clearly expressed political persona, and although in the past few years he has acquired the label of a “liberal,” in fact his “liberalism” is rather relative, as is evidenced in particular by his present political alliance with the representative of the reactionary southern wing of the Democratic party, Lyndon Johnson.

In general and in view of the aforementioned facts, Kennedy’s position regarding the most important aspects of domestic life in the USA can be characterized in the following way.

Like the majority of other Democrats, Kennedy advocates greater governmental intervention in the economic life of the country with the goal of artificially stimulating it by large governmental expenditures on both military needs and on all sorts of programs in the social sphere.

He advocates abolishing the present Republican policy of “hard money” with its high interest rates, which, he believes, is leading to a worsening of the economic situation.

Another method of economic stimulation, believes Kennedy, is the expansion of consumer demand with the aid of a certain income tax cut for definite categories of people: in particular, persons with low incomes. But at the same time he openly announced that he will not hesitate to raise taxes if he considers it economically justified and indispensable for attaining serious political goals.

In the area of agriculture, Kennedy before 1956 spoke out in support of the current Republican policy of variable process for agricultural produce. However, over the past few years, clearly considering the upcoming elections, he switched to the position of advocates of prices supports for agricultural produce at a high level and the reduction of percentage rates on farm credit. On the whole, Kennedy advocates strict control of agricultural production through the limits on the size of the harvest and cultivated land. Kennedy stands for a program of wider distribution of agricultural surplus within the country and abroad.

In the area of work legislation Kennedy came out against the adoption of the famous Taft-Hartley law, not, however, because of its anti-labor character, but because he considered it too inflexible. Along these lines he now advocates revoking this law, proposing to offer the President “maximum freedom to choose the means” in the struggle with strikes instead of the harsh system of measures established by the Taft-Hartley law.

Kennedy himself is the author of a series of bills impinging on workers’ rights, in particular, their right to picket, and leading to the establishment of governmental control over trade union
activity.

At the same time, Kennedy advocates an increase of unemployment benefits and federal government aid to regions especially burdened with unemployment, as well as a hike in the legal minimum wage and a widening of the group falling under the minimum wage law.

In the issue of civil rights Kennedy quite logically advocates granting Negroes rights equal with Whites’ in all areas of life, observing, however, “proper procedure,” i.e. to be implemented by administrative power in compliance with the relevant laws.

In keeping with the general Democratic emphasis on implementing different social programs, Kennedy supports federal allocations for the construction of homes with low rents and slum liquidation; he stands for federal aid to construct school buildings and increase salaries for school teachers and instructors in higher education; for increasing pension sizes; for medical aid to the elderly along the lines of a social service.

Kennedy’s position on USA foreign policy issues

On issues of USA foreign policy and, above all, on the aspect of chief importance in foreign policy—relations between the USA and the USSR, Kennedy’s position, like his position on domestic policy in the USA is quite contradictory.

Kennedy views relations between the USA and USSR as relations of constant struggle and rivalry, which, on different levels can, however, in his opinion, take on different concrete forms.

Considering that in the world there is a conflict of “basic national interests” of the USA and USSR and that because of this one cannot expect fundamental change in their relations, Kennedy nevertheless grants the possibility of a mutually acceptable settlement of these relations on the basis of a mutual effort to avoid nuclear war. For this reason Kennedy, in principle, advocates talks with the Soviet Union, rejecting as “too fatalistic” the opinion that “you can’t trust” the Soviet Union, that it “doesn’t observe treaties,” etc.

In connection with this Kennedy openly criticizes the position of the USA government and the West as a whole on the question of disarmament, pointing out the West’s lack of a concrete plan in this area. For his part, he proposed to create in the USA a single government organ which would develop a “viable program of disarmament” as well as plans for the transition of the American economy from a military to a peaceful orientation and different programs of international cooperation in the socioeconomic sphere. However, in speaking about the need for the United States to develop a realistic plan for disarmament, Kennedy has in mind not some far-reaching program of full liquidation of armaments and military forces of the two states, but instead, again some plan to control existing armaments and military forces with just some reductions.

Kennedy quite logically argues for attaining an agreement on halting nuclear weapons testing, believing that the renewal of these tests could compromise the military position of the USA in view of the threat of widening the circle of countries possessing nuclear weapons. In his letter of 30 April 1960 Kennedy informed Eisenhower that if he, Kennedy, were elected president he would renew the moratorium on all underground nuclear tests, if an agreement about such a moratorium were to be attained between interested countries during Eisenhower’s administration.

During the course of events connected with the provocative flights of American U-2 airplanes and the ensuing disruption of the summit conference, from Kennedy came the announcement that in the President’s place he would not have allowed such flights on the eve of the summit, and in the situation developing in Paris would have considered it possible to apologize to the USSR for the flights /but not to punish the guilty parties, since in this situation he himself was guilty/.

While placing blame for the fact of the disruption of the summit with the Soviet Union, nevertheless Kennedy sees the fundamental reason for what happened in the fact that the Soviet Union, in his opinion, actually found it more advantageous to use the incident with the U-2 plane for the maximum political effect, rather than going to a summit under conditions when the USA, as Kennedy admits, came to the summit completely unprepared for serious and wide-ranging bilateral talks.

However, Kennedy sees the main reason for the USA’s inability, given present conditions, to conduct such talks with the USSR in the USA’s loss of a “position of strength” over the past 7-8 years. Kennedy considers the restoration of this “position of strength” the main task facing the USA and a necessary precondition for renewing high-level talks with the USSR. “Until this task is completed,” states Kennedy, “there is no sense in returning to a summit meeting.” And further: “Above all we must make sure that henceforth we conduct talks from a position of strength—of military strength, economic strength, strength of ideas, and strength of purpose.”

In keeping with this conception, Kennedy, having earlier been a supporter of big defense spending “until the attainment of an agreement on disarmament,” now in all his public statements emphasizes the absolute necessity of strengthening the USA military capability, not shying away from a significant increase on defense spending. With the goal of liquidating the present gap in USA-USSR “nuclear strike capability,” Kennedy proposes implementing a program of “constant vigilance” for USA strategic aircraft, reorganizing the system of USA bases, inside the country and abroad, and simultaneously accelerating the development and expanding production of different missiles. At the same time, Kennedy proposes modernizing conventional forces once having made them maximally mobile and able to fight “lesser wars” at any point on the globe.

In this way, while in principle advocating a search for a modus vivendi in USA-USSR relations in order to avoid worldwide military conflict, Kennedy at the same time stands for such paths to a modus vivendi which in practice signify a speeding-up of the arms race and, therefore, a further straining of the international situation with all the consequences that result from this.

On such issues as the Berlin question, Kennedy’s position is outright bellicose: he openly announces that the USA should sooner start a nuclear war than leave Berlin, since “being squeezed out of Germany, and being squeezed out of Europe, which means being squeezed out of Asia and Africa, and then we’re /the USA/ next.” He sees the possibility of involving the UN in some capacity in the Berlin question only as a means of strengthening the position of the Western powers in West Berlin, not as a way of replacing them there.

Kennedy considers the policy of the former Republican administration of “liberating” the countries of people’s democracy [i.e. East European Soviet Satellites—ed.] as unrealistic and having suffered complete failure. However, he is not inclined to admit on this basis the irreversibility of the changes in those countries. He proposes simply to conduct a more flexible policy in relation to countries of people’s democracy, trying gradually to weaken their economic and ideological ties with the Soviet Union by granting them America “aid,” widened trade, tourism, student and professorial exchanges, by creating American information centers in those countries, and so on. Kennedy was, in particular, the initiator of a Senate amendment to the famous “Battle bill” in order to grant the President wide discretion in granting economic “aid” to European countries of people’s democracy. Kennedy reserves a special place for Poland in the plan to detach countries from the socialist camp, considering it the weakest link in the group.

Kennedy also considers the USA policy toward the People’s Republic of China to be a failure, insofar as it was unable to achieve its basic goal—the subversion of the country’s new order. While admitting the necessity of “reevaluating” USA policy toward the PRC, Kennedy doesn’t propose, however, that the USA quickly recognize the PRC de jure and lift its opposition to the PRC’s admission to the UN, raising in this connection the usual provisos about the PRC’s “aggression” and so on. At this point he only advocates drawing in the PRC to talks about the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, insofar as this
is dictated by practical necessity, and, following this, also about the establishment of cultural and economic contracts between the USA and PRC. In regards to this Kennedy does not conceal the fact that he sees such contacts above all as a means of penetrating the PRC and collecting information about its internal condition. While advocating a “reduction in tensions in the region of Taiwan” and a refusal to “defend” the Chinese coastal islands of Matsu and Quemoy, Kennedy supports continued USA occupation of Taiwan itself and readiness to “defend” the island.

In keeping with his general stand on strengthening the position of the USA in the world, Kennedy lends great importance to strengthening NATO and in general to the issue of USA allies. In connection with this Kennedy holds to the opinion that NATO should be, on one hand, “a vital, united, military force,” and on the other, an organ for overcoming political and economic differences between participating nations and for coordinating their policy towards weakly developed countries.

Kennedy considers the issue of policy toward weakly developed countries, along with that of the renewal of US military strength, to be of the utmost importance in terms of the outcome of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist worlds. In order to prevent a further increase in the influence of the USSR and other socialist countries in the weakly developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Kennedy proposes that the USA, in conjunction with its Western European allies and Japan, work out broad long-term programmes of economic aid to these countries along the lines of the “Marshall plan.” Kennedy gives India especial attention in plans for aid to weakly developed countries, considering the economic competition between India and the PRC to be of decisive importance in the struggle for Asia. At the same time Kennedy is quite critical of the practice of bringing weakly developed countries into military blocks such as SEATO and CENTO, which, in his opinion, unlike NATO, are “paper alliances,” concluded moreover “with reactionary governments that do not have the support of their peoples,” and which for this reason do not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weaken the position of the USA in these countries and regions.

Kennedy as a person

Kennedy himself and his supporters now are trying however possible to create the impression that he is a strong personality of the caliber of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a leader of the new generation able to lead the country to “new heights.”

Judging, however, on the strength of the available evidence about him, Kennedy, while not a mediocrity, is unlikely to possess the qualities of an outstanding person.

He has, by all accounts, an acute, penetrating mind capable of quickly assimilating and analyzing the essence of a given phenomenon, but at the same time he lacks a certain breadth of perception, the ability to think over a matter philosophically and make appropriate generalizations. By the make-up of his mind he is more of a good catalyst and consumer of others’ ideas and thoughts, not a creator of independent and original ideas.

In keeping with this Kennedy is very attached to the institution of advisors called upon to suggest interesting ideas and to work up detailed reports on various problems, but makes the final decision on serious problems himself, not entrusting this function to his underlings.

Kennedy understands people well and in general is a good organizer, as is evidenced, in particular, by the harmonious and efficiently-running apparatus he has put together for his election campaign.

Temperamentally, Kennedy is a rather restrained, dispassionate, and reserved person, although he knows how to be sociable and even “charming”—it is this latter quality in particular which explains the popularity Kennedy gained in the primary elections in a series of states throughout the nation.

Kennedy is very cautious and avoids taking hasty, precipitous decisions, but does not display excessive indecision. Kennedy is the author of three books: *Why England Slept* (1940), *Profiles in Courage* (1956) and *Strategy of Peace*—a collection of his speeches (1960), as well as a significant number of magazine articles.

During the post-war years Kennedy has received honorary doctorates from many American universities and colleges.

He is a member of the organizations: “American Legion,” “Veterans of Foreign Wars,” and “Knights of Columbus.”

Kennedy’s family is among the 75 richest in the USA. It is worth, by different accounts, between 200 and 400 million dollars. John F. Kennedy’s personal income at present is about 100,000 dollars a year. However, in his electoral campaign he has the broad financial support of his father and other members of the family; many of whom—his brother and sister—are taking part personally in the campaign.

Kennedy’s father-Joseph P. Kennedy, now 71 years old, first acquired the family fortune by various forms of speculation on the stock market and by commerce in alcoholic beverages. At present he is one of the leading figures in the Boston financial group. In the first years of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency, Joseph P. Kennedy supported his political program; he was the first head of a committee on securities and of the marine committee. From 1937 to 1940 he was the US ambassador to England; however he was forced to resign because of differences with Roosevelt’s foreign policy: he spoke out against USA military aid to England, was a supporter of Chamberlain’s Munich policy and in general sympathized with Hitler. (This fact is now being used by John F. Kennedy’s opponents in order to compromise him in the eyes of the voters.)

John F. Kennedy was married in 1953 to Jacqueline Bouvier, the daughter of a rich New York banker. He has one daughter, Caroline, born in 1957.


* * * * * *

IV. “Spill-Over” from the Prague Spring—A KGB Report

In early November 1968, KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov presented a secret, 33-page report to the CPSU Central Committee about the mood of Soviet college students. The report was transmitted after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but it had been completed sometime before then, and had been circulating within the KGB. It is not clear precisely who drafted the report, but Andropov’s cover memorandum and the report itself indicate that the author was a college student in Odessa who had recently finished his degree. Presumably, the author was a KGB informant during his student days, but that is not entirely clear from the document. What is clear is that the author was capable of offering trenchant, first-hand observations about the younger generation in the USSR. He frequently expressed disapproval of the behavior and “worldview” of Soviet youth, but was remarkably candid in his analysis and did not hesitate to bring up “negative phenomena” such as students’ profound cynicism toward the official ideology and propaganda, their receptivity to Western culture and ideas, the resentment that most students felt toward the Soviet Union’s “fraternal” allies, the high incidence of excessive alcohol consumption and sexual promiscuity, and the entrenched anti-Semitism of Russian and Ukrainian students.

Of particular interest is a section of the report dealing specifically with the impact of the Prague Spring, the reform movement that swept the Czechoslovakian communist party, and society, in early 1968. That section, as well as Andropov’s cover memorandum, is translated here. The full text of the report is available in Moscow at TsKhSD.
the repository for the post-1952 archives of the former CPSU Central Committee.

The report’s conclusions about the “spill-over” from Czechoslovakia are extremely important because they go against conventional wisdom. Western observers have generally assumed that Soviet students were indifferent to hostile toward the Prague Spring. Although ferment and rebelliousness were rife in 1968—in France, in the United States, and even Poland—the prevailing view has been that Soviet students were notable mainly for their political apathy. But if the author of this report and the KGB’s “other sources” are correct, the mood among Soviet students in 1968 was far more restive than previously believed. The Czechoslovakian reforms, according to the report, were of great interest to Soviet students in Odessa. The author noted that only a small number of the students he had encountered were opposed to the reforms, whereas a large majority favored the Prague Spring and hoped that similar changes might come to the USSR. Whether this was true of students all over the Soviet Union is unclear, but the author implied that his findings did indeed apply to the country as a whole. (It is worth remembering, however, that the report was compiled before the invasion. If appropriate data were available, it would be interesting to compare students’ pre- and post-invasion views.)

Andropov himself clearly attached high credibility to the author’s findings. He emphasized that the report “coincides with the views of our other sources” and “deserves close attention,” and affirmed that the KGB would “take account of this information” in its efforts to “prevent politically harmful developments among our youth.” Thus, the excerpts from the report presented here can be safely construed as a reflection of the KGB’s own concerns about the domestic “spill-over” from the Prague Spring. Even if those concerns were at times overstated—either deliberately or inadvertently—the mere fact that they existed helps account for the KGB’s antipathy toward the Prague Spring. Combined with other trends in the Soviet Union at the time, most notably the increased activity and visibility of the dissident movement, the prospect of encountering widespread unrest among Soviet college students was enough to convince KGB officials that the sooner the Czechoslovak reforms ended, the better. Document intro-

duced, translated, and provided by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

* * * * * * *

THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

5 November 1968

SECRET

A document has been received at the Committee for State Security in which a number of judgments are set forth about contemporary students and youth.

The author of the document is a college student who has been in the company of many young poets, artists, and performers, and who has taken part in the competitions of the “Club for the Happy and Quick-Witted” (GHQ). [The GHQ was a popular television program—M.K.]

Despite the immaturity of the author and his obvious subjectivism when analyzing certain matters, the document, in our view, merits close attention, since many of the propositions in it coincide with the views of our other sources.

Taking account of this information, the KGB is adopting measures to study negative processes and to prevent politically harmful developments among our youth that might arise from these processes.

Attachment: Document numbering 33 pages.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

[signed] Andropov

* * * * * * *

ATTACHMENT

The concept of a “student” in our country encompasses an extraordinarily large number of people. However, the present essay is intended to describe and analyze the behavior of full-time undergraduate students, who are potentially, by virtue of a number of factors, the most socially unstable and most easily swayed group in the population. These factors include the group’s relative youthfulness, the daily contacts the members have with others like themselves, the members’ lack of material obligations (for the most part) before their families, and so forth.

STUDENTS AND THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Students’ attitudes toward the ongoing situation in Czechoslovakia are of two main types. On the one hand, indignation is expressed toward the “brothers,” whom we “have been subsidizing for so many years” and who are now responding with vile ingratitude. This group of students, among whom are participants in the Hungarian events, demand decisive measures and the use of military force. However, this group is small in number.

The rest of the students, who generally take pleasure in anything that causes problems for or conflicts with the official line, are watching the ongoing situation in Czechoslovakia with benevolent curiosity. They have no real sense of what all this can lead to. They are impressed by the Czech students, who have become a major social force. Some even contemplate (albeit hypothetically) the possibility of repeating the Czech experience in our own country. In a discussion with the author of this review, a third-year student said: “It’s interesting to think whether such events could take place here. I personally would take part if they did.”

What has attracted especially great interest is the creation of opposition parties. The very word “opposition” is something students find appealing, and even the most thoughtful of them regard the creation of an opposition party as a solution to the paradox they have encountered: “The struggle for the Soviet regime is against the Soviet regime.” Hence, they are following events in Czechoslovakia with great interest. The excesses cited in the Soviet press seem largely harmless to them, and the official commentaries seem too pointed.

The place where students are afraid of the situation that has unfolded is China....

The events in Poland, given their brief duration, did not attract special attention. From time to time, rumors circulate about anti-Semitic purges in Poland. The Russian segment of the students and the Ukrainians would welcome such developments.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 48, Ll. 120-153.)

V. Andropov Analyzes the ABM Negotiations, 1971

The document below provides a fascinating glimpse into Soviet intelligence collection, analysis, and support of diplomatic negotiation. It is generally well informed on American negotiating positions and the preferences of various agencies in Washington with respect to the issues in the SALT negotiations in mid-April 1971. Although sources are not directly indicated (with such vague references as “according to information we
have received”), there are indirect references including references to “experts close to U.S. government circles,” and one reference to a conversation of U.S. SALT delegation chief Gerard Smith with “a diplomat from one of the U.S. allies.” The KGB was also privy to the fact that Kissinger was negotiating with a Soviet representative (Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin) through a “private channel,” and to at least the main lines of the negotiation—about which neither the CIA, nor the U.S. SALT delegation, were informed at that time.

At one point, while noting that unofficial U.S. sources had been used to inform the Soviet side that the administration wanted an agreement in 1971, presumably to pressure the Soviet Union to achieve progress, the KGB report notes that “in a private talk” Kissinger had commented that it might be preferable for Nixon to attain a pact closer to the next election—which, of course, is what occurred (the SALT I and ABM treaties were signed during Nixon’s summit in Moscow in May 1972).

In one instance, the KGB analysis made the same error as some American scholars in attributing views presented in the U.S. president’s annual foreign policy report to Nixon personally, contrasting one such point to a view expressed by Kissinger in his talks with Dobrynin—unaware that Kissinger was the chief author of the president’s foreign policy report.

The KGB analysis is straightforward, without evident commitment or bias with respect to pending Soviet policy decisions. All in all, it is an impressive document—unlike some other KGB analyses that have become available. Commentary by Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; document provided by the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Moscow.

*** *** *** ***

**USSR**

The Committee for State Security
19 April 1971
No. 983-A To Comrade USTINOV, D.F.
Moscow

The available data bears witness to the fact that the position of the USA on the problem of limiting the arms race remains the same. Nixon’s government proceeds from the fact that the suggestions introduced by the American delegation last August in Vienna provide the basis for achieving an agreement advantageous to the United States. It will use all means to strive for the consolidation of the quantitative balance of strategic weapons between the USA and the USSR at the present-day level, trying to preserve definite advantages in the most important kinds of strategic weapons. In the course of the negotiations, at the end of February 1971, while talking to a diplomat from one of the U.S. allies, the head of the American delegation, Smith, announced that the USA intended to conduct the negotiations firmly, in order to obtain the agreement of the USSR on limitation of offensive strategic weapons. Experts, close to the U.S. government circles, state that the main goal of the USA in the negotiations remains the achievement of an agreement on limitation of the number of big Soviet offensive inter-continental ballistic missiles.

According to information we have received, as far as the present stage of the negotiations is concerned, U.S. government bodies devote their main attention to studying the possibility of achieving a separate agreement on anti-missile defense systems. As noted by American experts, the USSR proposal on limiting the deployment of ABM systems to means necessary for the defense of Moscow and Washington D.C., introduced during the previous stage of the negotiations, put Nixon in a kind of difficult position. On the one hand, as for its contents, the Soviet proposal is very similar to the one on ABM introduced by the US before, together with other questions, and that’s why it would have been difficult for Nixon to reject it completely. On the other hand, Nixon couldn’t refuse to deploy the “Safeguard” ABM system, since it would have been difficult for him to explain this concession in his country. Some time ago he managed, with great difficulty, to get agreement on the allocation of the means needed for its deployment, having persuaded the Congress that ABM “Safeguard” could provide effective defense from a possible USSR first strike, and that its creation would save the USA further big new expenditures on a quantitative increase in offensive strategic weapons.

The harshest objections to the Soviet proposal will come from Pentagon officials, who assert that if it is adopted without the simultaneous achievement of an agreement on strategic offensive weapons the Soviet Union will continue its unlimited increase in its fleet of missile-carrying nuclear submarines and big land-based IBM missiles (“SS-9”) configured with MIRVed warheads, and, as a result it will get an opportunity to make a “preventive strike,” which could eliminate the majority of American “Minutemen” ICBMs.

Pentagon representatives also express concern that a separate agreement on limiting the deployment of ABM systems to the defense of just the capitals of both states could inspire strong opposition to the MIRV-type warheads deployment program in Congress and U.S. political circles. Air Force representatives insist on continuing the intensive deployment of a broad system of “Safeguard” ABM.

The ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] attitude is more flexible. It introduced a proposal which provides an opportunity to conclude a separate agreement on ABM systems, under the condition that negotiations on the limitation of the number of offensive strategic weapons will be carried out at the same time, and that during the negotiations the USSR and the USA will undertake the obligation to “freeze” the number of their strategic offensive weapons. Kissinger regarded this as the basic variant during a private channel exchange of opinions on ABM with a Soviet representative.

According to information from American sources, the USA National Security Council (NSC) is studying the proposal of a temporary agreement on the limitation of ABM systems deployment during the period of negotiations on limiting strategic offensive weapons along with a simultaneous “freeze” of offensive nuclear weapons at the present level.

Nixon’s comments about the negotiations in his message about USA foreign policy indicate that he, evidently moving away from the more flexible position which Kissinger expressed to us, is more inclined to accept the Pentagon’s point of view.

Nevertheless, Nixon is not interested in aggravating relations between the USSR and the USA during the presidential campaign, and that is why, while holding to a really rigid position during the negotiations, including the ABM question, he at the same time will try to create an impression of constructivism and flexibility in his approach to Soviet proposals. Tough, uncompromising declarations in official propaganda, to the effect that in the negotiations the USA will firmly insist on its position that a separate agreement on ABM without a corresponding agreement on limitation of offensive nuclear weapons is unacceptable, should, in Nixon’s conception, favorably highlight a possible American proposal to conclude a separate agreement on ABM limitation, which would include the preservation and even further development of the “Safeguard” ABM system in the USA, while at the same time limiting the ABM systems in the USSR to those necessary just for the protection of Moscow.

Judging by information in our possession, the NSC, while preparing recommendations for the American delegation to the negotiations in Vienna, again strongly opposed the inclusion of American means of forward basing on the agenda, motivated in its position by the fact that otherwise the whole structure of NATO would have to be changed, and the USA would lose an important
military advantage, as a result of which the general strategic balance would be changed to the advantage of the USSR. The NSC pointed out that the means of forward basing could be a subject for discussion during negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Countries on the question of balanced limitation of armed forces in Europe.

According to certain information, one of the variants studied by the NSC provides for the American side to put forward a proposal to simultaneously “freeze” the existing number of Soviet intermediate and medium range missiles and the American means of forward basing if, due to great differences in points of view on means of forward basing, the negotiations will come to a dead end and appear to be under threat of breakdown.

Through unofficial channels the Americans inform us that Nixon’s government, while “sincerely wishing” to achieve concrete results during the negotiations, at the same time “can’t wait endlessly” and is interested in achieving an agreement with the USSR by the end of 1971, because the beginning of the electoral campaign will make it difficult for him to bargain with the USSR. But the intent of these statements, it seems, is to influence the position of the USSR during the negotiations. According to existing information, Kissinger in a private talk said that from a political point of view it may be more beneficial for Nixon if the agreement with the USSR were to be achieved closer to the presidential elections. According to a statement by the American representative to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the USA is ready to conduct at least three more rounds (the present one included) of negotiations, striving first of all to get the agreement of the USSR on limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, not being sure that they will manage to obtain the agreement of the USSR on a complex accord on the limitation of ABM systems and strategic offensive weapons on terms acceptable to the USSR, the Americans might put forward a proposal for partial agreement. Most probably it would be a proposal to limit ABM deployment to the “Safeguard” system for the USA and an ABM system around Moscow for the USSR.

And if American attempts to obtain a separate, favorable to them, agreement on ABM systems fail, they would prefer just to conclude a treaty on measures for reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and USSR.

CC CPSU is informed.

Head of the State Security Committee
[signature] ANDROPOV

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 193, Ll. 33-38.)

VI. From Hesitation to Intervention: Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979

Despite the declassification of numerous high-level Soviet documents, the precise reasons behind the USSR’s massive, ill-fated military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 remain murky. If anything, the unveiling over the past few years of records of internal Kremlin deliberations and Soviet-Afghan exchanges in the months prior to the intervention have in some ways intensified the mystery, because they demonstrate that Soviet leaders, including CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, were keenly aware that the direct introduction of outside military forces for use against the Kabul government’s opponents would be a political catastrophe, incurring bitter resentment among the Afghan people and handing a propaganda victory to Soviet opponents around the world. Yet, ultimately, the decision to go ahead with the intervention was taken anyway. (Two English-language accounts of the run-up to the invasion that make extensive use of the new Soviet documentation are Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979,” International History Review 16 (Feb. 1994), 49-69; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 977-1075.)

The documents below offer some indication of the apprehension Soviet leaders felt about sending military forces in the spring of 1979, as well as of the secretiveness surrounding the actual decision to intervene when it was finally made. The first documents concern a visit to Moscow in March 1979 by Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki, whose communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had come to power in the bloody April 1978 coup or revolution (the term depends on who tells the story) that overthrew the non-aligned Daoud government. Since then, his regime had faced rising internal opposition—from Islamic activists who resented the imposition of atheistic and modernist ideas, from fiercely independent tribes who disliked increasing centralization, and, after the dissolution of a short-lived alliance, from the PDPA’s own “Parcham” faction, which Taraki’s more militant “Khalq” faction had methodically purged from the government.

Taraki’s hastily-arranged trip to Moscow had been occasioned by the most serious outbreak yet to threaten his rule, a violent rebellion in the Afghan city of Herat that broke out in mid-March which saw the defection of army units and the killing of Soviet advisers and Khalq officials. CPSU CC Politburo records show that from the outset of the uprising, Soviet leaders considered, yet rejected, urgent telephone appeals from Taraki and his powerful deputy, Hafizullah Amin, to send in Soviet military forces to help the evidently shaky Afghan army suppress the spreading revolt. During a Politburo meeting “About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Our Possible Moves” on March 17, when the situation in Herat appeared grave, the discussion seemed to focus on the unacceptability of allowing the government’s opponents to get the upper hand, as the following comments by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin indicated:

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear—we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won’t have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree—we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we’ve already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force....

Yet, on March 18, as the Politburo continued to deliberate, a consensus emerged, led by KGB chairman Andropov, against direct Soviet military intervention. Even Gromyko, despite his admonition only a day before that Afghanistan must not be surrendered, gave an impassioned, indeed prescient warning against dispatching troops.

ANDROPOV. We know Lenin’s teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever type of situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, but that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a
On March 20, Taraki traveled to Moscow to plead in person with Soviet leaders for renewed economic and military support to overcome the Afghan government’s domestic enemies. The records of the ensuing conversations make clear that the prime question on the agenda was Kabul’s request for external military intervention. Prior to seeing Brezhnev, Taraki met first with Prime Minister Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov, and Politburo member Boris N. Ponomarev. Bayed by reports that troops loyal to him were regaining control in Herat, Taraki listened as Kosygin explained the Politburo’s decision—vowing eternal Soviet-Afghan friendship and enhanced Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military aid, but urging the Afghans to be self-reliant when it came to actual fighting (using an eerily ironic example). Introductions by Jim Hersberg, CWIHP director; translations below by Danny Rozas; documents provided by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

* * * * *

Distributed to the members
and candidate members
of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Subject to return
(General office, 1st sector)

No. P499

Top Secret

SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF MEETING
of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO,
D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV with
N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979

A.N. KOSYGIN. The Politburo has entrusted us to discuss with you all questions which you believe necessitate an exchange of opinions. As I have already mentioned to you, your meeting with L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first word should be given to you, but since one important question from your side has already been raised, I would like to first set forth our opinion, and then we will attentively hear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the friendship between Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional, dictated by some temporary viewpoints, but calculated for ages. We have given and will continue to give you assistance in the fight against all enemies which act against you at the present time and against those enemies with which you may clash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situation which has developed in your country, we looked for ways to assist you which would best serve the interests of our friendship and your relations with other countries. There may be various ways of solving the problems which have developed in your country, but the best way is that which would preserve the authority of your government among the people, not spoil relations between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and not injure the international prestige of your country. We must not allow the situation to seem as if you were not able to deal with your own problems and invited foreign troops to assist you. I would like to use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people withstood a difficult war with the USA and are now fighting against Chinese aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. They only need to be genuinely united, and created into new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin already to create new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at the given time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the present situation. One only needs to deal with the matter correctly. Let’s take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy would quickly entrenched itself there, that the city would become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o’clock in the morning, the military town in Herat where the mutinous part of the 17th infantry division is located, after air-bombardment strikes has been taken by a battalion of [paratroops?] supported by tanks from Kandahar. Troops loyal to the government are strengthening and evolving success.

Our assignment for the current time period as we see it is to defend you from various interna-
tional complications. We will give you assistance with all available means—ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel for use of the most modern types of weapons and military machinery, which we are sending you. But the deployment of our forces in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately alarm the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multiprunged consequences. This, in effect, would be a conflict not only with the imperialist countries, but also a conflict with one’s own people. Our mutual enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet forces appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy on Afghan territory military groups hostile to you. I would again like to underline that the question of deploying our forces has been examined by us from every direction; we carefully studied all aspects of this action and came to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve, but would worsen. One cannot deny that our troops would have to fight not only with foreign aggressors, but also with a certain number of your people. And a people does not forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be vindicated.

With direct Soviet military intervention ruled out, Kosygin and Taraki go on to discuss diplomatic and political steps to bolster Kabul, particularly in regard to neighboring countries. Kosygin notes that Moscow sent notes to Iran and Pakistan to warn them “in all seriousness not to meddle” in Afghan affairs, and had received a promise to respect Afghan sovereignty and only deliver humanitarian aid to refugees from Pakistani leader Mohammed Zia ul-Haq—a commitment Taraki finds hard to credit, since he blames Zia for “creating camps” to arm guerrillas against his rule. “We are not so naive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq,” replies Kosygin, “but whatever the case may be, the statement has been made and it is binding.” The implications of a recent Iranian order to expel foreign workers are also discussed, with Taraki speculating that exceptions may be made for American helicopter specialists and Kosygin noting that “it is possible that we may have more specialists in Iran than do the Americans.” Taraki expresses concern that a mass influx of Afghan workers expelled from Iran might include rebel sympathizers. Though he insists that “the majority of people remain on our side” and that “We are doing everything [possible] to rule the country not by force of arms, but by revolutionary-democratic means,” Taraki then shifts the conversation to requests for additional military supplies, probing again for the possibility of Soviet (or other foreign socialist) combatants to use them:

N.M. TARAKI. I wanted to touch on the question of the needs of the Afghan army. We would like to receive armored helicopters, an additional number of armored transports and military infantry vehicles, as well as modern means of communication. Also, maintenance personnel would be of great help to us.

D.F. USTINOV. It seems that we are talking about MI-24 helicopters, which have bullet-proof armor. We will give you 6 such helicopters during June-July and 6 more in the fourth quarter of this year.

N.M. TARAKI. We have great need for these helicopters, and it would be good if they arrived together with pilots.

A.N. KOSYGIN. We can send you maintenance specialists, which would take care of these helicopters at the airport, but, of course, not battle crews. We have already spoken about the matter.

D.F. USTINOV. You must prepare your own pilots. We are training your officers, and you can expedite their release.

N.M. TARAKI. Perhaps we can get helicopter pilots from Hanoi or some other country, for example, Cuba?

A.N. KOSYGIN. As I have already said earlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnam a great deal, but they never asked us to send them our pilots. They only asked for technical specialists. We are training 400 Afghan officers. Choose the people you need, and we will expedite their training.

N.M. TARAKI. We would very much like the delivery of helicopters to be expedited. We have a great need for them.

D.F. USTINOV. But, at the same time, you must worry about pilots for these helicopters.

N.M. TARAKI. Of course we will do that. If we cannot find them in our country, then we will look elsewhere. The world is big. If you do not agree with that, then we will search for pilots from among the Afghans studying with you, but we need trustworthy people, and among the Afghan officers who we sent to study in the Soviet Union earlier there are many “Muslim brothers” and Chinese sympathizers.

D.F. USTINOV. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 [are] helicopter pilots.

N.M. TARAKI. Good. However, the problem is that we don’t know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud’s regime, members of the “Muslim Brotherhood” and the pro-Chinese “Shoalee Javid” organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out. Promised an assortment of free military assistance—not only helicopters but reconnaissance vehicles, anti-aircraft units, troop transports, technical advisers, and training—Taraki bargains for increased shipments of free wheat, pleading poverty, poor harvests due to land confiscations, and abrogations by Turkey and Pakistan of promised deals. Kosygin, bargaining hard, notes that the Afghans lack the capacity to transport deliveries of wheat beyond what the Soviets were offering, and that since Kabul was “ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money.” He suggests giving the available funds to Moscow, which could then purchase American wheat and transfer it to Afghanistan: “Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat.” Taraki then requests that Moscow build for Kabul a 1000-kilowatt radio station, “which would allow us to broadcast propaganda throughout the world. Our radio station is weak. While any slanderous declaration of some religious leader is spread throughout the world through foreign organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our radio station remains almost unheard.” Ponomarev counters that “We are taking energetic measures to spread propaganda about the successes of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan],” for instance reprinting Taraki’s speech in Pravda and broadcasting it to Moslem countries, and offers to send a “specialist in propaganda.” Kosygin defers the radio request for further study. Then the question of military advisers crops up again, and Taraki once more seeks an opening to secure Moscow’s support for using foreign pilots and tank operators, to the obvious irritation of Kosygin, who not only rebuffs the idea sharply but issues a pointed warning to Taraki to act more judiciously toward his own advisers:

D.F. USTINOV. Concerning additional shipments of military machinery, a need will arise for additional military specialists and advisers.

N.M. TARAKI. If you believe that such a need exists, then, of course, we will accept them. But won’t you allow us, after all, to use pilots and tank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N. KOSYGIN. When referring to our military specialists, we mean mechanics who service military machinery. I cannot understand why the question of pilots and tank operators keeps coming up. This is a completely unex-
expected question for us. And I believe that it is unlikely that socialist countries will agree to this. The question of sending people who would sit in your tanks and shoot at your people—this is a very pointed political question.

N.M. TARAKI. We will see how we can use those Afghani soldiers who were sent to study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you to accept for training those people who we will select ourselves.

D.F. USTINOV. We will, of course, accept them for training.

A.N. KOSYGIN. To sum up this conversation, we can ascertain that there remains the question of the construction of a powerful radio station. There remains also the question of expediting the deliveries of military technology. You, as we understand, will select helicopter pilots from the officers training with us. If you have any other requests or desires, you may inform us through the Soviet ambassador and the chief military adviser. We will carefully review them, and will react accordingly.

We will continue to use political means to defend the DRA from its imperialist aggressors. Our press will also support the DRA.

We think it important that within your country you should work to widen the social support of your regime, draw people over to your side, insure that nothing will alienate the people from the government. And finally, not as a matter of discussion but as a wish, I would like to express my ideas on the importance of a very careful and cautious approach towards your staff. One should take care of one’s staff and have an individual approach towards it. Have a thorough and good understanding with each person before hanging any labels on them.

The meeting breaks up after Kosygin assures an obviously disappointed Taraki that Moscow would reconsider its stand against sending troops should Afghanistan be subjected to foreign aggression:

A.N. KOSYGIN. If an armed invasion of your country takes place, then it will be a completely different situation. But right now we are doing everything to insure that such an invasion does not occur. And I think that we will be able to achieve this.

N.M. TARAKI. I pose this question because China is persistently pushing the Pakistanis against us.

A.N. KOSYGIN. When aggression takes place, then a completely different situation arises. The Chinese were convinced of this through the example of Vietnam and are biting their elbows now, so to speak. As for Afghanistan, we have already taken measures to guard it from aggression. I have already said that we have sent corresponding messages to the president of Pakistan, [Irish religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini, and the prime minister of Iran.

N.M. TARAKI. Must I tell the members of our Politburo that the Soviet Union will give the DRA only political support and other aid?

A.N. KOSYGIN. Yes, both political support and extensive assistance in the line of military and other shipments. This is the decision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev will tell you about this during the meeting with you, which will start in 10 minutes. I think that you will return to Afghanist cantid for our support, confident of your own actions.

21.III.79.
AK-786ss
30 copies
21.III.79.

x) This record has not been seen by the participants.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 26.)

Taraki is then ushered into Brezhnev’s Kremlin office. The Soviet leader uses the occasion not only to reaffirm the decision against dispatching troops—a decision, he stresses, that should be kept strictly secret—but to preach to Taraki the importance of widening the base of the government’s support among the Afghan people through political and economic means, and of taking a more moderate attitude toward the military, the clergy, and others in order to lessen fears of persecution. He also expresses mystification at the “abnormal” situation of open borders between Afghanistan and its neighbors given the infiltration of armed rebels. Taraki’s response—essentially defending his present approach—could not have satisfied his Moscow interlocutors.

Subject to return to CC CPSU
(General Office, 1st sector)
No. P486

Distributed to the members
and candidate members
of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF CONVERSATION
of L.I. Brezhnev with N.M. Taraki

20 March 1979

Also present: comrade A.N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov and B. N. Ponomarev.

L.I. BREZHNEV. Over the last few days we have been watching with alarm the development of events in Afghanistan. From what you said in conversation with our comrades, it seems the Afghan friends are gravely alarmed as well.

We must take steps to correct the situation that has developed and eliminate the threat to the new order in the DRA. And not only eliminate the threat, but also work to strengthen the gains of the April revolution.

As we see it, it is very important to widen the base which supports the leadership of the party and the country. First of all, of great importance here is the unity of your party, mutual trust, and ideological-political solidarity throughout its ranks from top to bottom.

It is worth thinking about creating a single national front under the aegis of the People’s democratic party of Afghanistan as the recognized leader of the people. Such a front could include already existing socio-political organizations and be supported by groups of workers, peasants, petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and students, youth, and progressive women. Its purpose would be to consolidate anti-imperialist and national patriotic forces against domestic and foreign reactionaries. It could also serve in the political upbringing of the population.

In rural areas it would be expedient to organize poverty committees consisting of propertyless and petty peasants and metayers [sharecroppers] to repel feudalists and capitalist landowners.

And, of course, everything must be done so that the army is staunchly on the side of the people’s revolutionary government.

It is important that the commanding ranks in the army feel assured of the stability of their positions. One cannot expect much from an army when commanding cadres are frequently replaced. This is even more true if the cadre changes are accompanied by arrests. Many commanders, seeing their colleagues arrested and disappearing, begin to feel unsure of their own future.

All of this does not mean that repressive measures should not be taken with regard to those who have serious evidence of untrustworthiness to the revolutionary government. But this weapon is very sharp and must be used with the utmost caution.

As for the events in Herat, the normalization of the situation in this city would have a positive influence on the situation of the country as a whole and would have a chilling effect on circles ill disposed towards the revolutionary government.

It seems that the work carried out by the various types of enemies of the new order, including the reactionary clergy, to undermine the new order is much more active and on a greater scale
than the political work of the government representatives in the area. This point is of exceptional importance not only in Herat, but in the rest of the country as well.

Appropriate work must be done with the clergy in order to split their ranks; this could well be achieved by getting at least apart of the clergy, if not to actually support the government openly, then to at least not speak out against it. This could be best of all achieved by showing that the new government is not trying to persecute the leaders and representatives of the clergy, but only those who speak out against the revolutionary government.

And now for the question of the possibility of deploying Soviet military forces in Afghanistan. We examined this question from every angle, weighed it carefully, and, I will tell you frankly: this should not be done. This would only play into the hands of the enemies—yours and ours. You already had a more detailed discussion of this question with our comrades.

Obviously, to announce publicly—either for us or for you—that we are not intent on doing this is, for understandable reasons, not advisable.

We will give you all necessary political support. Already, we are addressing Pakistan and Iran with strong warnings not to interfere in the internal matters of Afghanistan.

It would be well if Soviet economic aid, especially things like the delivery of 100 thou. tons of wheat and the increase in the price of natural gas supplied [exported] by Afghanistan, were made known to the Afghan people in the necessary manner, using the means of mass information. This is of foremost importance in strengthening the position of the Afghan government.

The arms and military technology that we are additionally supplying you with will increase the strength of the Afghan army. However, this will only be true if the arms are placed in trustworthy hands and not in the hands of the enemy.

As you have asked, we have sent you numerous advisers and specialists both in military and other matters. You have working for you 500 generals and officers. If necessary, we can send an additional number of party workers, as well as 150-200 officers.

One more question: how do you explain the fact that, despite the complications in the situation and the deployment of a thousand armed people from Iran and Pakistan, your borders with these countries were, in effect, open, and it seems even now are not closed? This is an abnormal situation, and, in our opinion, it should be fixed.

Finally, I would like to emphasize once more that in the current situation the most important factor will be the ability to draw greater circles of the population to your side through political and economic means. It is important to also re-examine the arsenal of methods utilized and eliminate those that may cause legitimate alarm in people and give them a desire to protest.

N.M. TARAKI. With regard to creating a single national front in Afghanistan, I would like to say that it essentially exists in the shape of party, komsomol, trade unions and other mass public organizations, which function under the leadership of the People’s democratic party of Afghanistan. However, it cannot yet firmly establish itself in the socio-political life of Afghanistan because of its economic backwardness and as yet insufficient level of political development in a certain part of the population.

However, under the current situation the leadership of the country cannot avoid the use of extreme measures when dealing with accomplices of international imperialism and reactionism. The repressive measures taken against ranks of representatives of the clergy, Maoists, and other persons partaking in open combat against the new people’s government are completely in accordance with the law and no one turns to persecution without lawfully establishing the guilt of the accused.

The Afghan people do not want war with Iran and Pakistan, but if war does break out, then it will not be to their advantage—the Pashtuns and Baluchis would be on the side of Afghanistan. I would like to point out that the present government of Pakistan, and not without the help of China, is trying to play an important role in the incitement of anti-Afghani elements, including Afghans showing up in Pakistan. Our party and government are trying to react calmly to these aspirations on the part of Pakistan and not worsen the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The question of closing our borders with Iran and Pakistan is rather difficult. We are unable to do this because of the absence of the necessary means. Besides, the closing of the Afghan-Pakistan border would create discontent among Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluchis who maintain close family ties, and in the final result would significantly damage the prestige of the current government in Afghanistan.

30 copies.
21.III.79. [21 March 1979]

x) This record has not been seen by the participants.
(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 25.)

Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the Afghan leadership and its handling of events and concern with its lack of support among the Afghan people was evident in a 1 April 1979 special report for the Politburo prepared after Taraki’s visit by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev and reprinted in the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 3, pp. 67-69). That report reaffirmed the correctness of the Soviet refusal to send military forces to repress the “counter-revolution.” But despite the repression of the Herat rebellion the anti-government activity persisted and so did Kabul’s desire for direct Soviet military support. Shortly after his return to Kabul, Taraki was replaced as prime minister by his Khalq deputy, Hafizullah Amin. In April, Amin reiterated the now familiar appeal to Moscow for Soviet helicopter pilots for use against rebel forces, eliciting the following Politburo response, together with the instructions sent to the chief Soviet military adviser in Kabul for transmission to Amin. 

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

Subject to return in the course of 3 days to CC CPSU (General office, 1st sector) Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FILE
P150/93

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Smirnyakov.

Extract from protocol #150 of the CC CPSU Politburo session from 21 April 1979

On the inexpediency of the participation of Soviet military helicopter crews in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the proposal on this question submitted in the memorandum by the Ministry of Defense on 18 April 1979, #318/3/0430.
2. To ratify the draft of instructions to the chief military adviser in the DRA (attached).

SECRETARY of CC

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE
KABUL

TO CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER

Inform the Prime-Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan H. Amin that the request to send 15-20 military helicopters with Soviet crews has been delivered to the Soviet government.

Tell him that the Afghan government has already been given explanations on the inexpediency of direct participation of Soviet military sub-units in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the DRA, as such actions would be used by the enemies of the Afghan revolution and foreign hostile forces in order to falsify Soviet international aid to Afghanistan and to carry out anti-governmental and anti-soviet propaganda among the Afghan population.

Emphasize that during March–April of this year, the DRA has already been sent 25 military helicopters which are equipped with 5-10 complete sets of combat ammunition.

Convince H. Amin that existing combat helicopters with Afghan crews are capable, along with subdivisions of land-based forces and combat aircraft, of solving the problems of suppressing counter-revolutionary actions.

Work out for the Afghan command the necessary recommendations pertaining to this question.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 28.)

Yet between May and December 1979, the situation continued to deteriorate, and for reasons that are still not entirely clear, Moscow changed its mind about sending troops. Why the turnabout? Several potential explanations exist. One factor was undoubtedly the grave internal situation in Afghanistan, which Moscow viewed with growing concern, receiving reports from a parade of special emissaries sent to urge Kabul to modify and moderate its course. While blaming outside countries (Iran, Pakistan, China, the United States) for exacerbating the situation, Soviet leaders recognized deep problems with the Afghan leadership itself, and rumors arose that Moscow was angling to replace the Khalqi Taraki-Amin regime with one headed by Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction. Mutinies and rebel attacks continued, and Moscow began to increase its security presence in the country, though still short of sending military forces. In September-October 1979, tensions between Taraki and Amin and their supporters exploded into open warfare, ending with Amin in control and Taraki dead—a result clearly contrary to the Kremlin’s wishes. Surface cooperation between Kabul and Moscow continued, with Amin even requesting the dispatch of Soviet troops. But Soviet leaders were privately convinced of Amin’s “insincerity and duplicity” (the quotation is from a report for a Politburo meeting of 31 October 1979, cited in Trud (Moscow), 23 June 1992, and Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, rev. ed., 1011) and his inability to successfully contain the rebel insurgency, and may well have begun plotting to remove him—although much remains unclear about this period, as it is for the few months immediately preceding the intervention that the fewest internal Soviet documents have so far become available. Still, even the likely defeat of the clearly unpopular government would not alter the reasons why Moscow had rejected intervention the previous spring—so what else had changed? One possibility concerns the continuing growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and most importantly the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, which had deposed the Shah after a quarter-century in power and installed in his place a theocracy dominated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In their 1 April 1979 report to the Politburo, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev had pointed to the “situation in Iran and the spark of religious fanaticism all around the Muslim East” as the “underlying cause” of the anti-Kabul agitation. Moscow may well have also feared the spread of religious zeal into the mostly-Moslem Central Asian republics of the USSR itself—a latent threat that would not become evident to the rest of the world for another decade to come. Since the spring, the fundamentalist tide had only become stronger, with Islamic radicals taking firmer control of the Iranian revolution (and seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November), sparking unrest in Saudi Arabia, and calling for a jihad against other Arab regimes and against both superpowers. These developments related to the larger question of the changed international context since the spring’s decision against non-intervention. Although Brezhnev and Carter had met in Vienna in June 1979 to sign a SALT II treaty, US-Soviet ties had been sinking ever since, with acrimony stirred by the “Cuban brigade” brouhaha later that summer—the flap, regarded by Moscow as a provocation, over the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba that U.S. intelligence had lost track of—and by the failure of the Senate to ratify, or even vote on the ratification of, the SALT II treaty. The concerns Gromyko had expressed in March about the negative international repercussions of a Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan were, in fact, no less valid, but he and other Soviet leaders may have come to feel that there was less to be lost in that sphere anyway—that détente was already effectively dead. Finally, still to be resolved is the argument advanced by some analysts that U.S. irresolution in responding to the Iranian Revolution and the capture of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 emboldened Moscow to advance toward its purported goal of a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf. If anything, however, the weight of the evidence in the documents that have become available suggest that Moscow’s considerations were more influenced by fear of losing Afghanistan to Islamic radicalism than by hopes of using the country as a military springboard to dominate the region.

Still, it must be emphasized that the archival documents that have become available so far do not permit a clear reconstruction of Soviet decision-making in late 1979. Further evidence, particularly Politburo transcripts, may reside in the Russian Presidential Archives. But the closest document to a “smoking gun” for the intervention that has emerged is a memorandum dated 12 December 1979, apparently in Chernenko’s handwriting. Six days earlier, the Politburo had approved sending a 500-man “Spetsnaz” (military intelligence special unit) force to Afghanistan. And now, the Politburo subgroup of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko (Ponomarev was absent), together with Chernenko, obtained Brezhnev’s signed consent to implement the agreed-upon measures leading to the deployment of 50-75,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan later that month, and (using the “Spetsnaz” force mentioned above) to the killing of Amin and his replacement by Babrak Karmal as Afghan leader and head of the PDPA. That a full CPSU CC Politburo meeting was not held to approve the invasion until it had taken place, and that the memorandum was hand-written to avoid informing typists, phrased euphemistically to avoid explicit reference to troops, or even to Afghanistan (“A”), reflect the secrecy with which the fateful step ultimately came about. More Russian documents on the Afghan events will appear in future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin.
VII. Excerpts from Politburo Minutes, 1983-86

The following excerpts from transcripts of meetings of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo between 1983 and 1986 shed light on perceptions, motives, and decision-making processes at the highest level of Soviet leadership, and illuminate the crucial transition period from old order to new in the Soviet Union. In the two-and-a-half years following Brezhnev’s death in November 1982, the energetic but short-lived rule of the former KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, gave way briefly to the feeble apparatchik Konstantin Chernenko, who in turn was succeeded by the man who would turn out to be the last head of the CPSU and USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. This period was also one of the final turning points in the Cold War itself, as the renewed hostility, confrontation, and military build-up that characterized U.S.-Soviet ties in the early 1980s, during the first term of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, shifted way briefly to the feeble apparatchik former KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, gave way briefly to the feeble apparatchik Konstantin Chernenko, who in turn was succeeded by the man who would turn out to be the last head of the CPSU and USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. This period was also one of the final turning points in the Cold War itself, as the renewed hostility, confrontation, and military build-up that characterized U.S.-Soviet ties in the early 1980s, during the first term of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, shifted to a recharged, albeit at times testy, search for negotiated agreements to reverse the nuclear arms race and establish a friendlier basis for superpower relations.

The first Politburo excerpt below records a meeting on 31 May 1983 presided over by Andropov, who had taken over from Brezhnev six months earlier and was at the height of his leadership before health problems curtailed his powers months before his death in February 1984. The meeting also came at a time of heightened acrimony between Moscow and Washington. Reagan, already anathema to Soviet leaders as an inverteate anticomunist who had labelled the USSR an “evil empire,” had, just two months earlier, on 23 March 1983, laid down a new gauntlet to Moscow by calling for the development of a defensive shield against nuclear attack. Despite Reagan’s protestations that his Strategic Defense Initiative was only a defensive measure, Soviet leaders had instantly denounced SDI, known more popularly as “Star Wars,” as a diabolical U.S. plot to regain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, as the herald of a nuclear arms race in space, and as an abandonment of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This new twist came against the backdrop of a looming showdown between Moscow and the NATO alliance over the impending U.S. deployment in Western Europe, planned for the fall of 1983, of Pershing-2 and ground-launched cruise medium-range nuclear missiles capable of striking Moscow and the western Soviet Union. Despite Western arguments that the deployment was necessitated by Soviet installation of comparable missiles in the late 1970s, the NATO plan had aroused protests in West Germany and other West European capitals, and Moscow had threatened to break off arms negotiations in Geneva over intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and strategic nuclear arms (START) in Geneva should the missiles actually be sent in (they were, and Moscow did walk out, but only temporarily). Superpower tensions had also risen in the Middle East over the aftermath of the 1982 war in Lebanon—which had included a brief but violent clash between Israel and Syria, backed by opposed superpower patrons—and over what Washington saw as the efforts of Syria, a Soviet client, to torpedo the U.S.-brokered pact between Israel and Lebanon that had been concluded on May 17. Washington and Moscow also clashed via proxies in Third World conflicts, especially Afghanistan and Nicaragua; over human rights issues; concerning relations with China, which Moscow increasingly saw as a hostile U.S. ally; and on other issues.

As the Politburo met, the Western allies had just concluded a summit meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, which, despite being ostensibly devoted to economic issues, had also produced a unanimous endorsement for the missile deployment (in the absence of a “balanced” INF agreement) from Reagan and the leaders of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada, and even Japan, whose leader, Yasahuro Nakasone, had more firmly than ever aligned his country with NATO’s European strategy. The Williamsburg declaration came despite an explicit warning in Pravda on the eve of the
summit that the deployment would provoke the Soviets to deploy additional missiles of their own targeted not only on Europe but on the United States itself.

The anger of Andropov and his cohorts at this latest development shows clearly in the transcript, as does their determination to act “very decisively” to develop a political counter-offensive to swing international, and especially U.S. and West European, public opinion against Reagan’s “aggressive” and “militaristic” programs. One finds Andropov and the Soviet leaders particularly alarmed by Japan’s solidarity with NATO, and searching for ways to weaken that bond, perhaps through a territorial compromise. They also show concern about the need to consolidate the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe—not only the maverick Romanians, but other Warsaw Pact leaders had, in Andropov’s terms, failed to show “strong unity” and were “buried in their national problems,” and should therefore be called to Moscow for a summit conference to reinvigorate Socialist bloc unity and strategy.

Despite obvious irritation with Western actions, the Soviet leaders also display a degree of restraint, or at least caution. Regarding the situation in the Middle East and Central America, Andropov remarks that Moscow should warn the Syrians, as he said he had told the Cubans, to avoid instigating a confrontation, since the USSR would not be dragged into a war on their behalf. And there is discussion of Andropov sending a personal letter to Reagan on nuclear arms control issues—presaging the letter he in fact sent Reagan on 4 July 1983, initiating a short-lived yet promising private dialogue that was aborted less than two months later following the Soviet downing of a Korean Air Lines 747 on September 1, triggering renewed U.S.-Soviet hostility.

All of the excerpts below were declassified by Russian authorities as possible evidence for use in the Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992—and perhaps for potential use in discrediting Mikhail Gorbachev and other rivals of Boris Yeltsin— and subsequently deposited in Fond 89. They were provided to CWIHP by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and introduced by CWIHP director Jim Hershberg; Lena Milman translated the following transcript:

SESSION OF POLITBURO OF CC CPSU
31 May 1983

Chairman comm. ANDROPOV Yu. V.

In the beginning of the session comrade Andropov expressed words of deep sadness about the death of comrade Arveed Yanovich Pelshe. Comrade Andropov informed that the funeral of comrade Pelshe, according to the decision of the CC is going to be held at 11 o’clock on the Red square by the Kremlin wall. The members of the funeral commission will come to the Dom Soyuzov at the time of carrying out the body; the rest of the members of Politburo, candidates to members of Politburo and the secretaries will come at 11 o’clock straight to the Mausoleum.

[ANDROPOV.] Now I would like to address the issue, which in my opinion deserves the exchange of opinions and suggestions.

Today I’ve talked with a number of members of the Politburo about our government’s announcement of the response connected with the deployment of American missiles “Pershing-2” and cruise missiles in the countries of Western Europe; and also concerning the resolution adopted by the countries of “Big Seven” in Williamsburg. It’s important that we discuss this matter, exchange opinions, and express the suggestions that should be developed.

If you look at the events that are taking place in the Western countries, you can say that an anti-soviet coalition is being formed out there. Of course, that’s not accidental, and its highly dangerous. At the session of the NATO countries, that’s going on in Williamsburg, very aggressive speeches are given; and the very resolution adopted by the “Big Seven” is non-constructive, but aggressive.

If you analyze the reaction of the countries of the West on our declaration, then the reaction has two sides. From one side, our declaration had impressed them very much. There are indications, seen through some of the speeches of some of the western politicians that give hope to normal and productive high level talks about the decrease of the arms race and disarmament, especially of the nuclear weapons. On the other side there are indications of absolute fulfillment of the so-called double decision of NATO, which is the placement of nuclear missiles in the countries of West-
nuclear missiles. Maybe we should all think about that idea and make it an official proposal—join the talks about the nuclear missiles in Europe with the talks about the limitation on all the strategic nuclear weapons. We also should think when and where to bring up this proposal. I think that MFA and the Ministry of Defense will decide on that problem.

We have to open up a wider network to win public opinion, to mobilize public opinion of the Western countries of Europe and America against the location of the nuclear weapons in Europe and against a new arms race, that’s being forced by the American administration. The behavior of Japan, and especially of the president [Yasuhiro] Nakasone worries me. He completely took the side of the more aggressive part of the Western countries, and he completely supports Reagan’s actions. Because of that we should consider some sort of compromise in our relations with Japan. For example: we could think about joint exploitation of several small islands, that have no strategic importance. Maybe there will be other suggestions. I, personally, think that Japan could initiate more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

The next point concerns China. I think that the Chinese aren’t going to move any further on their positions. But all our data shows that they could increase their trade with USSR. They did offer us a trade agreement for this year, that substantially increases our goods exchange[compared to] the previous years of trading with China. Because of that we might have to send comrade [First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V.] Arkhipov to China to conduct a series of talks and to “feel the ground.” And if we succeed in improving our economic ties with China through cultural, sports, and other organizations, it could be considered a big step ahead.

Now about the Middle East. To say that the events in the Middle East don’t bother us would be wrong. The fact is that we have very good relations with Syria. But Syria argues against the agreement that was made between Israel and Lebanon, Syria has no friendly relations with Iraq. Recently Syria has been facing minor problems with PLO, and in particular with [PLO Chairman Yasser] Arafat. In one word—here is a problem we have to think about.

If you look at our propaganda, you can come to a conclusion that it’s quite calm when it comes to strategic preparations of NATO. That’s true, we shouldn’t scare people with war. But in our propaganda we should show more brightly and fully the military actions of the Reagan administration and the supporting countries of Western Europe, which in other words means disclosing in full scale the aggressive character of the enemy. We need that, so we could use facts to mobilize the soviet people for the fulfillment of social and economic plans for development of the country. We can’t, comrades, forget that in this situation defense sufficiency of our country. These topics should be constant in our media. You remember comrade L. Y. Brezhnev at the XXVI session of CPSU [23 February - 3 March 1981] said, that military threat is coming and because of that we should lead a struggle against the influence of military revanchist ideas of the West.

That’s what it came to: Reagan calls up the senators if they support the ideas of the Soviet Union, and charges them with treason. Why don’t we use press to speak against the lazy bums, those who miss work [progulshikov], bad workers? I ask the comrades to express their opinions about the questions brought up and maybe comrades have other suggestions. Who would like to take the stand?

GROMYKO. I completely approve of the suggestions that were expressed by Yu. V. Andropov. First of all about the call of the meeting of the leaders of socialist countries, countries of the Warsaw Pact. That kind of meeting, to my opinion, we should gather. [Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, I think, we should invite to the meeting. I would say, it’s beneficial for us. ANDROPOV. Right now they are asking for a consultation.

GROMYKO. Particularly they were asking us for that. The meeting of the leaders of the countries of the Warsaw Pact will show the unity of our Pact and prove our principal positions in the questions of nuclear weapons and reduction of arms race. I think that we should adopt at the meeting a document, as rightly mentioned before Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov]. This document should sound very clearly. Along declaration shouldn’t be made, but it should be sharp and concrete. This would be our collective action of the countries of Warsaw Pact. It is needed.

What to do with the talks? I fully support the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich about uniting the talks on nuclear armament in Europe and strategic armament in whole. As you know, Reagan has got a goal, whatever it takes him, to place the nuclear missiles “Pershing-2” and the cruise missiles in the European countries. A question comes up, what should we do, whether we should continue the talks? As it’s known, the United States, as it’s known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think, that they without enough reason wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles. Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and Western Germany. This we also have to use skillfully in our propaganda and in our practical interests.

Regarding Japan, I have an idea: why don’t we use our suggestion regarding the islands of Habamabi [sic-Habamai—ed.], Kunashir, and other small islands, that really are very little spots, and draw the border, I mean make an adjustment of the border. It would be then the most prestigious suggestion.

ANDROPOV. When I talked about Japan, I didn’t mean that suggestion. I talked about joint exploitation of several little islands.

GROMYKO. We could do both at the same time. These same islands are small dots in the ocean and they don’t have such a grand strategic importance.

About China. The People’s Republic of China expresses wishes to broaden our economic ties. Even in practice it is starting something in that sphere, for example the increase of goods exchange.

ANDROPOV. This should be checked out, as I said.

GROMYKO. I think, that the Chinese aren’t going to go for anything else. One of the terms for normalization of our relations is the withdrawal of our troops from Chinese borders. It seems to me that we could think about that. But then the Chinese began to push for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

ANDROPOV. I suggest we don’t bring up that question.

GROMYKO. Regarding Mongolia. Maybe we should withdraw part of the army away from the border. There is a danger in the Middle East...
that Israel will strike against Syria. If Syria ruins Reagan’s plans, Americans will go bankrupt.

ANDROPOV. I would suggest we turn to Syria to advise it not to pull itself into this conflict. If the events start happening, we should warn Syrian leaders beforehand to work out a corresponding plan.

GROMYKO. Syria sends tanks to Lebanon. Our task is to advise Syrian leaders to withhold from any participation in the events of the war.

ANDROPOV. May be we should write a letter about that to [Syrian leader Hafez] Assad?

USTINOV. All that we do regarding defense we should continue doing. All the missiles, that we planned to install, should be installed. All the airplanes should be stationed at the spots we agreed upon. Reading the resolution that was adopted by the “Big Seven,” I should say, it was very cunning and strict. But it has its weak points and we should figure out how to use them. But everything happens in life, so “they” may be installing the missiles in England, FRG, and other countries.

I consider the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich absolutely correct that we should carry out active work, to counteract against the imperialistic actions of our enemies.

Regarding Mongolia I should say, that if we move the Soviet army, that’s now located there back to our territory then we will lose a very good post. Everything is already equipped there. That’s why we have nowhere to move on the Soviet border.

Regarding Cambodia and Vietnam, we already talked about it not once. I figure that we shouldn’t lose positions won in battles, but we should retain them. The sanctions which were discussed earlier by Yuri Vladimirovich, should be supported. We will look at it very carefully and think about our actions. We also have to think about talks in Vienna and Geneva, in regards to nuclear weapons as well as strategic. In fact I consider very rightful the suggestion to combine both of these talks. Maybe, Y.V. Andropov will consider it rational to speak out with that suggestion, and maybe give another suggestion, let’s say, about decrease of nuclear weapons by 50 percent, including French and English nuclear weapons.

TIKHONOV. England and France will never agree to that.

USTINOV. If they don’t agree, than our proposal will sound all over the world. The middle-range missiles, Western countries wouldn’t refuse against their location in Europe.

GROMYKO. But what then to reduce?

USTINOV. We can reduce all the rockets.

GROMYKO. We proposed that.

USTINOV. Yes, we already proposed, but we should offer again. About Japan I would like to say that we can look only at very small islands, but the big island Kunashir—we have quite settled there. For example, from the Japanese sea we can only access through the strait of La Pérouse, and, I should say, here we would substantially cut our maneuvering space.

About the meeting with governments of socialist countries. I completely agree with Yuri Vladimirovich. We should expose the Western countries, their offensive speeches and military tone. Maybe Yu.V. Andropov should say something on that topic, too.

GROMYKO. I will have a speech at the session. In that speech, it seems to me, I should spell out a number of suggestions.

USTINOV. Maybe I should give an interview? In one word, we activate the work, gather socialist parties and agree with them on this subject.

CHERNENKO. Even if Romania doesn’t sign, we could adopt a resolution without the signature of Romania.

USTINOV. Japan hadn’t joined the military alliance of the Western countries, yet. That’s why we should act not only upon Japan, but the other countries, also, so that not only we openly spoke out against militaristic intentions of Reagan administration, English, Japanese and others, but the socialist countries did it, too, and the leaders of the socialist countries could have spoken out, too. By the way, in those situation they have kept silent. We have, comrades, to build, strengthen the socialist bloc, but very skillfully. To my regret, the relations between Vietnam and China are very strained. I absolutely agree with the decision of Yuri Vladimirovich about enforcing anti-war propaganda, targeted at the arms race, wrong suggestions of the Western countries and especially at the American administration. It looks like the Americans thought about installing a space command. In a word, I would like to say, that we should more widely speak out about our suggestions and expose the militaristic intentions of the Western countries.

ANDROPOV. Of course, we aren’t going to change Reagan’s behavior, but we will expose his antisoviet, militaristic intentions very decisively.

TIKHONOV. Reagan doesn’t react any more to our suggestions. Regarding the uniting of the talks, this is one more of our important suggestions, and we should bring it in. Missiles, of course, they will be in Western Europe. But [we] should explain it broadly and clearly to our people and all other nations of other countries. The resolution of the Soviet government is a very important document. We now have only to develop propaganda, expose the actions of the West and have a strong influence over people. I think that meeting that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about is vitally important to be held. And with that we should somehow hint to socialist countries that they alone and each one of them, let’s say GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary give a speech. Let’s say a speech for Nuclear-free Zone in Europe and on the other topics. [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov, for example, can give a speech about Nuclear-free Zone in the Balkans. Now about China. All the initiatives about the increase in goods exchange between USSR and China come from China. This is very important. That’s why we should feel the ground about broadening our economic relations with China and send to China comrade Arkhipov for the talks.

Regarding removal of the troops from the Chinese border, to me it seems like an unrealistic act.

Regarding Syria, as comrades have talked about it, everything is correct. If Syria gets involved in a conflict, then we can lose everything we have in the Middle East. And we have to keep Syria in our orbit. That’s why we should conduct more work with the Syrian government. We have to find such a method in our propaganda, such forms and methods of conducting it so as to tell our people the truth about the nuclear war, but not to scare them, as Yuri Vladimirovich correctly pointed out.

CHERNENKO. It’s absolutely correct, that Yuri Vladimirovich gathered us today, and the suggestion is right about a meeting with the leaders of all the members of the Warsaw Pact. If you look attentively at our friends—Czechs, GDR, Hungarians, Bulgarians, you get an impression, that the leaders of these countries don’t worry about the current situation. That’s why the very fact of calling a meeting will mean a lot. I think that we should call a meeting in a near future, as said Yuri Vladimirovich.

VOICEs. Support the suggestion about the calling of a meeting.

CHERNENKO. At that meeting we can talk about China, about the Middle East and about other important questions of the international situation. I think that all the questions that Yuri Vladimirovich stated in his speech were very correct. There gathered a “big Seven” of Western aggressive states, but we are also a “big Seven,” and we should meet, but this would be now a meeting of “big Seven,” fighting against nuclear arms and for peace.

About working out the suggestions, that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about, I think, that, including our interests, we should prepare them well and introduce [them] to [the] CC.

GRISHIN. I completely support what Yuri Vladimirovich suggested. The situation is dangerous. The resolution of the “Big Seven” that they will put the missiles in Europe, has an offensive character. Actually, there is being formed a bloc based on an anti-soviet platform. Western countries try to outweigh the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the nuclear weapons. The meeting should be held before the meeting of NATO.

GROMYKO. It could be held even after NATO’s meeting. Then we could find out their point of view on several questions.
GRISHIN. On our meeting we should call socialist countries to active counteraction toward imperialist countries. About the invitation of Romania, I am for it, though there’s no guarantee they will sign the resolution. They behave very badly. Not long ago, as it was known, Ceausescu hosted [conservative West German politician, Bavarian state premier Franz Josef] Strauss and during the talks he spoke very badly. I think that we should prepare a good, short, but sharp document, that will be adopted there.

I am completely for opening of wide range of propaganda in our press and among our oral propagandists, which was mentioned before by Yuri Vladimirovich.

ANDROPOV. In that sphere we so far don’t do a whole lot.

GRISHIN. I think that with Japan we should look for the way to soften the relations. With China we could develop economic relations on higher levels. Of course, China won’t give up on Cambodia, and on that issue we will never come to an agreement. I think, that we should keep Synds from unnecessary actions, so that they don’t get pulled into military confrontation.

ANDROPOV. At one point, remember I told the Cubans that we won’t fight them for it and won’t send any troops to Cuba. And it worked all right, the Cubans accepted it. We should tell the same thing to Syrians. I think such a saying will prevent them from confrontation.

GORBACHEV. You said it right, Yuri Vladimirovich, that the time now is calling us to increase actions, taking necessary steps to develop a broad program of counter-measures against the aggressive plans of the Western countries. And in the inside plan we have certain serious tasks. We can take some action towards the countries of CMEA [Council on Mutual Economic Assistance], countries of Warsaw Pact, and separate socialist countries. I completely support the suggestions about holding a meeting and other actions, that were suggested here, including the military line.

The United States is moving to Europe. Here we can’t wait. We have to act.

ALIEV. I support all the suggestions of Yuri Vladimirovich. This complex of actions is vital to be carried out. Our external politics has an offensive character, but the character of a peace offensive. The imperialists are irritated by our suggestions. All that you said here, Yuri Vladimirovich, regarding a meeting of the socialist countries, improving relations with China, about the Middle East, especially about starting a wide propaganda—all this deserves special attention and should be adopted.

DEMICHIEV. Why don’t we write a letter to Reagan from the name of comrade Andropov?

ANDROPOV. I would modernize a bit the suggestion of P. N. Demichev and write a letter to the participants of the meeting of the “Big Seven,” and then, maybe later, to Reagan.

PONOMAREV. In response to the actions of the “Big Seven” we should work out our suggestions. Maybe, after the meeting of the leaders of the socialist countries we should hold party activities, and meetings in the country.

USTINOV. This is all correct, but what if we scare the people?

PONOMAREV. On 20 June, for example, there’s going to be an Assembly of Peace in Prague, we should use it for propaganda of our peaceful propositions.

ZIMYANIN. I completely agree with what Yuri Vladimirovich said. I would ask a permission to begin realization of this ideas starting tomorrow. In particular, gather the editors of the leading newspapers, information agencies and tell them about these ideas, especially point the sharp end of our propaganda at Reagan and his aggressive suggestions.

KUZNETSOV. I think, we should activate also the work in parliamentary relations, especially about sending our parliamentary delegations to France, USA, and the other countries. Obviously, on the session in A.A.Gromyko’s speech he should mention these questions.

ANDROPOV. Now I would like to tell you, comrades, the most important [item], what I would like to inform you of, I am talking about improvement of our work inside the country, and about the increase of our, leaders’ responsibility of the assigned tasks. It doesn’t only concern me—Andropov, or Gromyko, Ustinov, we all are personally responsible for the departments that we lead. Comrade Tikhonov has to keep a tight grip on Food industry. Comrade Gorbachev has to use fewer weather excuses, but organize a fight for the crops, mobilize people so that they don’t talk about bad weather, but work more, so they use every good day, every minute for gathering more crops, do all we can to increase wheat crops and other grain and meat and dairy. Comrade Aliev has an important task—improvement of the public transportation system. Comrade Kapitonov has to increase the common goods production, more should be done in that field. Comrade Demichev should be stricter with the repertoire of the theaters, we have too many negative sides, and the other questions in the development of our culture demand more attention. You, Petr Nlyovich [Demichev] are the one to be asked from in this sector. I wouldn’t talk about the other comrades, they all know their departments and their goals. I think that you should gather all your employees and tell them about the ideas and tasks that we talked about today. You can gather all of them or you can gather them in according to groups, whatever is better.

USTINOV. Maybe I should gather with comrade Smirnov all those in defense and we’ll talk about our defense.

TIKHONOV. I will gather all the ministers and their VPs and talk to them about these subjects.

RUSAKOV. We have to, obviously, check everything that’s going on in the socialist countries in these areas and then let them know our suggestions and give them friendly advice.

ANDROPOV. All this, comrades, can be done and I think that you will take these tasks actively. There is a suggestion to give to comrades Gromyko and Zimyanin a task to summarize all that we talked about on our session, and prepare a suggestion about the counteractions towards the actions of the imperialist states, targeted at worsening of the international situation. Don’t be long with the preparation of those suggestions and entering them in the CC. Agreed?

EVERYONE. Agreed.

ANDROPOV. On this permit me to end our meeting.


The intense, neo-Brezhnevite and almost neo-Stalinist conservatism of the brief Chernenko interregnum (Feb. 1984-March 1985) pervades this July 1984 Politburo excerpt. The transcript also illuminates the relationship between fluctuations in CPSU leadership and reassessments of past party history. On this occasion, the Politburo’s consideration of requests for rehabilitation from several one-time rivals of Nikita S. Khrushchev who had been ousted from the party in intra-leadership struggles in the 1950s prompts a vigorous bout of Khrushchev-bashing. (The three erstwhile party stalwarts who had petitioned the Politburo—Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the long-time USSR foreign minister; Georgii M. Malenkov, for a time considered Stalin’s likely successor; and Lazar M. Kaganovich, one of Stalin’s key henchmen and First Deputy Premier after Stalin’s death—were all expelled from the party leadership in 1957 as members of the “Anti-Party Group” that had allegedly plotted to overthrow Khrushchev. Also seeking additional privileges was Alexander Shelepin, once KGB chief under Khrushchev but now denouncing him.) Sympathetically considering the requests of the “Anti-Party Group” to be restored to honored party positions, one Politburo member after another—especially Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Ministry Gromyko, KGB chairman Viktor M.
MEETING OF POLITBUREO OF CPSU  
12 July 1984

Chair: Com. CHERNENKO K.U.  

[...]

CHERNENKO: Departing from today’s agenda, I would like to inform you about a few letters I have received.

As you know, we have made a decision concerning one of the letters. This was the request of V.M. Molotov about his restoration to the ranks of the CPSU. I received V.M. Molotov, had a talk with him. We heard our decision with great happiness and almost started crying. Molotov said the decision was like being born again. Molotov is now 93, but he looks hearty enough and speaks firmly. He declared that the Politburo CC CPSU has preserved and continued that work, which the party persistently conducted. The only bad thing is that you work like we used to, until midnight. Molotov talked about how he is interested in the press, reads periodical journals. He declared: you are doing things right, and for this you have the people’s support.

USTINOV: That is an important evaluation.

CHERNENKO: Molotov said that he does not understand people who hold a grudge and remain in the opposition. He declared that he recognized his mistakes and made the necessary conclusions. After our conversation Victor Vasil’evich Grishin in the city committee of the party presented him with his party card.

TIKHONOV: In general we did the right thing in restoring him to the party.

CHERNENKO: And right after this the CC CPSU received letters from Malenkov and Kaganovich, and also a letter from [former KGB chairman Alexandr] Shelepin, in which he declares that he once was against Khrushchev and includes a list of requests.

Allow me to read Kaganovich’s letter. (Reads the letter).

A letter with analogous contents, with a confession of his mistakes was sent by Malenkov.

USTINOV: Maybe for now we shouldn’t do anything with these letters?

CHERNENKO: For now we can do nothing, but let’s agree to examine them after the XXVII Congress of our party.

USTINOV: But in my opinion, Malenkov and Kaganovich should be reaccepted into the party. They were active figures, leaders. I will say frankly, that if not for Khrushchev, then the decision to expel these people from the party would not have been taken. And in general those scandalous disgraces which Khrushchev committed in relation to Stalin would never have occurred. Stalin, no matter what is said, is our history. No one enemy brought us so much harm occurred. Stalin, no matter what is said, is our history. No one enemy brought us so much harm as Khrushchev did in his policy towards the past of our party and our state, and towards Stalin.

GROMYKO: In my opinion, we need to restore these two to the party. They were part of the party leadership and government, and for many years led specific parts of work. I doubt that these were unworthy people. For Khrushchev the most important task was to decide questions of cadres and not to expose mistakes made by certain people.

USTINOV: Maybe we should return to this question at the end of this year or at the beginning of next year?

CHEBRIKOV: I would like to inform you that Western radio stations have been transmitting news about the restoration of Molotov into the party for a long time now. And they are saying that to this moment the workers of our country and the party do not know anything about this. Maybe we should include an announcement in the Informational Bulletin of the CC CPSU about the restoration of Molotov to the party?

Concerning the question about the restoration of Malenkov and Kaganovich into the party, I would request a little time in order to prepare a summary of those resolutions which these individuals wrote on the lists of repressed people.

Indeed, in the case of their restoration to the party, one can expect a large stream of letters from those who were rehabilitated during the 1950s, who, of course, will be against restoring their party membership, especially Kaganovich. We need to be ready for this. I think that such a summary should be viewed by the Politburo of the CC before making a final decision.

TIKHONOV: Yes, if not for Khrushchev, they would never have been expelled from the party. He soiled and stained us and our policies in the eyes of the whole world.

CHEBRIKOV: Besides that, a whole list of individuals were illegally rehabilitated. As a matter of fact they were rightly punished. Take, for example, Solzhenitsyn.

GORBACHEV: I think that we could go without publicizing the restoration of Molotov in the party in the Informational Bulletin of the CC CPSU. The department of organizational and party work could communicate this in an operational manner to the regional and district committees of the party.

Concerning Malenkov and Kaganovich, I would also support their restoration in the party. And we wouldn’t need to connect their restoration with the upcoming party congress.

ROMANOV: Yes, these people are already elderly and could die.

USTINOV: I will stand by my evaluation of Khrushchev’s activity, as they say, until I die. He did us a lot of damage. Think about what he did to our history, to Stalin.

GROMYKO: He rendered an irreversible blow to the positive image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the outside world.

USTINOV: It’s not a secret that the westerners never loved us. But Khrushchev gave them such arguments, such material, that we have been discredited for many years.

GROMYKO: Basically thanks to him the so-called “Eurocommunism” was born.

TIKHONOV: And what he did to our economy! I myself have had to work in a Sovnarkhoz [Soviet regional economic organ].

GORBACHEV: And to the party, breaking it into industrial and agricultural party organizations!

USTINOV: We were always against sovznarkhozy. And many members of the CC Politburo, as you remember, stated such an opinion.

In connection with the fortieth anniversary of the Victory over fascism [May 1985] I would propose discussing one more question. Shouldn’t we restore the name Stalingrad to Volgograd? Millions of people would support this. But this, as they say, is information for thought.

GORBACHEV: This proposal has positive and negative sides.

TIKHONOV: Recently a very good documentary film was released called “Marshall Zhukov,” in which Stalin is portrayed rather
fully and positively.

CHERNENKO: I watched it. This is a good film.

USTINOV: I really should see it.

CHERNENKO: Concerning Shelepin’s letter, it, at the end, requests support on the level of former Politburo members.

USTINOV: In my opinion, what he received upon retiring is quite enough. He raised this question in vain.

CHERNENKO: I think that in terms of these questions we should limit ourselves to exchanging opinions. But as you understand, we will have to return to them.

TIKHONOV: We wish you, Konstantin Ustinovich, a good rest during the recess.

CHERNENKO: Thank you.

* * * * *

Having taken over the leadership of the CPSU and USSR from Chernenko in March 1985, Gorbachev moved only gradually to dismantle the legacy of his more conservative and dogmatic predecessors. This excerpt, from August 1985, finds him dealing with a nettlesome legacy from the past, the case of Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel laureate dissident scientist who had been exiled to the city of Gorky in January 1980 following his criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and his equally outspoken wife, Yelena Bonner. The particular question at issue here was whether to permit Bonner to visit the United States to receive medical treatment and visit relatives, a decision complicated by concern about the potential risk of an embarrassing uproar if her request was denied barely two months before Gorbachev’s planned summit meeting in Geneva with Reagan. This danger was more than hypothetical; not only was Sakharov’s treatment the subject of persistent demonstrations abroad, but the physicist had in May 1984 and April 1985 already twice conducted hunger strikes to demand that his wife be allowed to travel, prompting the KGB to hospitalize him against his will and to force-feed him intravenously. (In briefing Gorbachev, Chebrikov alludes euphemistically to “various situations [which] have arisen” and “[a]ppropriate measures,” all allegedly legal, taken by the KGB in response.)

On 29 July 1985, a month before the meeting, Sakharov had written Gorbachev and Gromyko pleading for a favorable response to his wife’s request, and promising in return to “discontinue my public activities apart from exceptional circumstances,” and acknowledging the state’s right to restrict his own foreign travel because of his past atomic weapons work. To underline his message, he had also launched another hunger strike, and by August 13 his normal weight of 175 pounds had fallen to 138 pounds. (See Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1990), 599-601.) (Again, Chebrikov avoids explicit mention of a hunger strike, referring only to Sakharov’s “poor health” and weight loss.)

Of course, Gorbachev would in December 1986 permit Sakharov’s return to Moscow, restore his rights to travel, speak and engage in political activity (culminating in his election to the Congress of People’s Deputies), and just combatively with him over the direction of Soviet society until his death three tumultuous years later. But this transcript shows how much disdain and scorn Gorbachev—“Now there’s real Zionism.” Even with Chebrikov grudgingly acknowledging that Bonner should be allowed to leave for three months, and Prime Minister Ryzhkov supporting that action as “a humanitarian step,” Gorbachev seems eager to show his colleagues, most of whom had been elevated to the Politburo by previous leaders, that his decisions are based purely on hard-boiled realpolitik considerations: “What will hurt us more—to allow Bonner to go abroad or to forbid it?” But at the same time, he moved gingerly to moderate the contrast between the mood of society and the leadership, and how Gorbachev appeared to fall in with this attitude, as evidenced by his reported crack about the alleged influence of Bonner, a Jew, over Sakharov:—“Now there’s real Zionism.”

But many more struggles lay ahead. Translation by Loren Utkin.

* * * * *

MEETING OF POLITBURO OF CPSU
29 August 1985

Chair: Com. GORBACHEV. M.S.


I. Concerning the results of the meeting in the CC CPSU on the question of formulating State plans of economic and social development of the USSR in 1986 and the Twelfth Five-Year Plan

GORBACHEV: I won’t touch on all the issues that were discussed at the conference in such detail, because the majority of the comrades were there. Now it is clear that we acted correctly by having such a conference. At the April Plenum of the Central Committee and the June meeting of the CC CPSU the party developed a conception of acceleration of the social-economic development of the country and marked out the principle path of its realization. The people fully supported the party’s course. The tension and vitality of party life has increased, as has all social life of the country. In such a case we have the right to calculate that the results of the work to accelerate economic and social development will be reflected in the first year of the Five-Year Plan. It was emphasized that the views of some ministries and departments in developing the plans for next year and the Twelfth Five-Year Plan have aroused concern in the Central Committee. We are asking our comrades to leave their department’s trenches and approach the development of plans from an all-union position.

SHEVARDNADZE: One observes a huge contrast between the mood of society and the actions of the U.S. administration.

GORBACHEV: As a whole the discussion was heated, but constructive.

Now a few works on another subject. At the end of July I received a letter from the not unfamiliar Sakharov. He is requesting that his wife, Bonner, be allowed to go abroad to undergo treatment and visit relatives.

CHEBRIKOV: This is an old story. It has been going on for 20 years. During this time various situations have arisen. Appropriate measures were employed in relation to Sakharov and Bonner. But no actions were permitted which would have violated the law. This is very important and should be emphasized.

Sakharov is now 65 and Bonner is 63. Sakharov is in poor health. He’s undergoing oncological tests because he has been losing weight.
Sakharov as a political figure has basically lost his image of late and has been saying nothing new. Bonner should probably be allowed to go abroad for three months. According to the law, it is possible to interrupt the exile for a short period of time (Bonner, as you know, is in exile). Of course in the West, she could make a statement and receive some award, etc. We cannot exclude the possibility that from Italy, where she’s going to obtain treatment, she could go to the U.S. Allowing Bonner to go abroad would have the appearance of a humanitarian step.

Two variants of her future behavior are possible. First, she returns to Gorky. Second, she refuses to come back and begins to raise the question of reunification of the family, which means giving Sakharov permission to leave. In this case, appeals from Western officials and even some representatives of the communist party could follow. But we cannot let Sakharov go abroad. Minsredmas [Ministry of Middle Machine-Building] is against this because Sakharov knows in detail the entire path of development of our atomic weapons.

According to specialists, Sakharov could continue to work in military research if he would be given a laboratory. Bonner has a strong influence on Sakharov’s behavior.

GORBACHEV: Now there’s real Zionism.

CHEBRIKOV: Bonner has a 100 percent influence over him. We believe that without her his behavior will change. He has two daughters and a son from his first marriage. They behave well and can influence their father.

GORBACHEV: Is it possible to do things in such a way that Sakharov would state in his letter that he understands that he cannot go abroad? Is it possible to convince him to make such a statement?

CHEBRIKOV: We must resolve this question right now. If we make this decision prior to or even right after your meetings with Mitterrand and Reagan, if we allow Bonner to go abroad before this, then in the West a loud anti-Soviet campaign will be raised. So it would most likely be better to do this after the visits.

KAPITONOV: If we let Bonner out, then the story will drag out. She will have a case to unify with her family.

GORBACHEV: Maybe we will do this: confirm that we have received the letter, and say, that we have attended to the matter and given the appropriate assignments. We have to let it be known, say, that we can meet him halfway on his request to allow Bonner to leave, but everything depends on how Sakharov will behave himself and on how Bonner will act abroad. For now it is advisable to limit ourselves to this.

(Signed) A. Lukianov.

* * * * *

Gorbachev continued to move gradually toward a relaxation in persecution of political dissidents. In this September 1986 excerpt, he receives a report from KGB chief Chebrikov that he had requested on “what kinds of people are serving sentences for crimes, which Western propaganda calls political.” Obviously following Gorbachev’s lead, Chebrikov proposes to alleviate the prison sentences of two-thirds of the 240 persons he lists under this category; but, in response to a question from Gromyko, he notes two cases where the guilty parties had already received a sentence that could not be reduced—execution for espionage. Of the two cases Chebrikov mentioned, one, transliterated from the Russian as Polischuk, is not further identified; the other refers to Adolf G. Tolkachev, a Soviet electronics expert arrested in June 1985, allegedly after being fingered as an American spy by ex-CIA officer Edward L. Howard, who had been recruited by the KGB and successfully escaped to the USSR in September 1985. (See David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away (New York: Random House, 1988), 19, 68, 159, 196, 207-8, 234-5, 248-9, 261-2.) Translation by Loren Utkin.

* * * * *

MEETING OF POLITBURO OF CPSU
25 September 1986

Chair: Com. GORBACHEV. M.S.


[...]

GORBACHEV: I asked Victor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] to tell us what kinds of people are serving their sentence for crimes, which western propaganda calls political.

CHEBRIKOV: According to our laws these crimes are especially dangerous state crimes. A total of 240 people have been brought to bear responsibility and are serving sentences for committing the aforementioned crimes. These individuals are convicted of espionage, violating state borders, circulating hostile leaflets, hard currency counterfeiting, etc. Many of these individuals made statements about their refusal to continue their hostile activity. They connect their statements with the political changes following the April Plenum of the CC CPSU and the XXVII Party Conference [on 25 February-6 March 1986].

It seems that we could, for a start, free one-third from prison and later one-half of these individuals. In this case, only those persons who maintain hostile positions towards our state would continue to serve their sentences.

GORBACHEV: It seems that one could support such a proposal.

CHEBRIKOV: We will do this rationally. In order to assure that the aforementioned individuals cease their hostile activity, they will be watched.

SCHERBITSKY: How does one explain that relatively few individuals have borne criminal responsibility for committing especially dangerous state crimes? Perestroika?

CHEBRIKOV: It can be explained by the
preventative measures taken by organs of the KGB. Many individuals are noticed, so to speak, as they approach that line beyond which lies criminally punishable activity. The organs of the KGB and society are used in order to influence them.

GROMYKO: Which crimes are the most dangerous and what kind of punishment is meted out with them?

CHEBRIKOV: Espionage. Punishment is either execution or 15 years in prison. Polishchuk has been shot for espionage. Yesterday Tolkachev’s sentence was implemented.

GORBACHEV: American intelligence was very generous with him. They found 2 million rubles on him.

CHEBRIKOV: This agent gave very important military-technical secrets to the enemy.

GORBACHEV: Let’s come to an understanding that we agree with Comrade Chebrikov’s ideas. Let the KGB draw up proposals in the established manner.

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: We agree.

(signed) A. Lukianov.

* * * * *

The following Politburo excerpt reveals the undercurrent of bitterness and mutual recrimination in U.S.-Soviet relations following the failure of the high-stakes, high-drama Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11-12 October 1986. Although the two leaders had come close—shockingly close, to many—to achieving a stunning breakthrough toward massive cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, or even a pact to abolish nuclear weapons altogether, the deal fell apart due to Reagan’s insistence on preserving the right to continue the development of his “Star Wars,” program, which the Soviets considered a blatant violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The collapse of the agreement over such a narrow point, though disappointing and frustrating, was not in itself enough to inspire the anger which animated the Politburo discussion below—indeed, in retrospect it laid the basis for considerable progress in the years which followed.

But at the time, the failure to come to terms at Hofdi House was accompanied by a series of additional events which further soured the atmosphere of superpower relations. The weeks immediately prior to the Iceland meeting had seen tit-for-tat sting operations leading to arrests on espionage charges in New York City and Moscow of, respectively, Soviet diplomat Gennadi Zakharov and American journalist Nicholas Daniloff; the standoff threatened plans for a planned Gorbachev visit to the United States, and required intense high-level negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to find a face-saving resolution involving the release from prison and immediate expulsion of both men, as well as the release of imprisoned Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov. While this hurdle had been overcome, allowing the hastily-arranged Reykjavik rendezvous to take place, the summit’s aftermath had seen a re-escalation of the espionage and propaganda battle: in addition to 25 Soviets affiliated with the USSR UN Mission in New York who had been deported from the country on September 17, provoking Moscow to expel five U.S. diplomats, in mid-October Washington kicked out more than 50 Soviet diplomats.

Such actions angered Gorbachev—and at this meeting, on October 22, he ordered in retaliation the removal of 250 Soviets working in service positions at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow—but so too did he deeply resent what he viewed as the Reagan Administration’s adamant refusal to acknowledge the great concessions that the Soviet Union had already made at Reykjavik, or to advance any constructive arms control proposals of their own. Some of Washington’s conduct could be written off to the Reagan Administration’s desire to blame the U.S. administration. In this extremely complex situation we need to win some propaganda points, to continue to carry out offensive explanatory work oriented towards American and all international society. Washington politicians are afraid of this. For three days materials featuring my speech at the Reykjavik press conference and appearances on Soviet television have been delayed at customs.

YAKOVLEV: Comrade Bugaev called me and said that this material is still held up at American customs.

GORBACHEV: We need to continue to put pressure on the American administration, explaining our positions to the population and showing that the American side is responsible for the breakdown in the agreement over the questions of reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons.

Lately, Reagan and his staff haven’t found anything better to do than commit another hostile act — deport 55 Soviet diplomats. Five of our officials have been declared persona non-grata, as they explain in Washington, in response to our deportation of 5 American diplomats, and 50 are being removed under the guise of establishing equal numbers of American and Soviet diplomatic representatives.

We cannot let this hostile action go unanswered. We should not exclude the most decisive
measures. Americans are making threats and claiming that if we take retaliatory measures, then they will take further steps towards our diplomatic personnel in the United States. Well, I think that given the limited character of Soviet-American relations, our embassy in the USA will be able to handle its assignments.

It is essential to come up with serious proposals. What specifically should we do? We should remove our people who work as service personnel in the American Embassy. Furthermore, the number of American representatives visiting the USA Embassy Moscow on business should be limited. Annually about 500 American citizens come here via this channel. Finally, the number of guests visiting the American ambassador in Moscow, which reaches up to 200 persons annually, should be determined on the basis of equality. Our people rarely take business trips or visit our ambassador. It is essential that such trips take place on an equal basis in the future.

In general, this confirmed what I said to the President of the United States in Reykjavik, that the normalization of Soviet-American relations is the business of future generations.

SHEVARDNADZE: Our personnel in the embassy in the United States numbers 43, while the consulate in San Francisco has 25 workers. There are 229 people in the USA Embassy in Moscow and 25 in the Leningrad Consulate. Besides that, the Americans have over 250 of our citizens working in service positions. We can have them removed. This will surely hinder the activity of the American representatives. In terms of business travel, about 500 people make business trips to the American Embassy annually. We, in contrast, hardly ever make use of these types of trips to the USA. Therefore, a principle of reciprocity should be imposed. The Americans will lose more than we will. We also do not make use of private invitations from the ambassador. Up to 180 people visit the American ambassador every year.

DOBRYNIN: And the ambassador doesn’t even know many of these “guests” personally.

SHEVARDNADZE: There are 14 people from Finland working in the American Embassy in Moscow as service personnel. We have to demand their departure as well as the 8 American diplomats suspected of illegal activity. We also have to take adequate measures against the American military attaché. The result is that we will end up with an equal number of employees—251 in the embassies and 25 in the consulates.

The fact that the quota for our officials was 320 people reveals the provocative character of actions of the American administration. We have never filled our quota.

GORBACHEV: All this should be written down with appropriate arguments and prepared in a powerful political document.

SHEVARDNADZE: The USA administration needed a new aggressive action prior to the elections. It should be emphasized in our document that if the Americans will take retaliatory measures in response to our actions, we will do the same.

GORBACHEV: Do my comrades have any doubts about these proposals?

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: No.

DOBRYNIN: It would be advisable to apply these measures to the consulates in Kiev and New York.

GROMYKO: Perhaps their opening should not be rushed in this situation. There is no reason to do it now.

GORBACHEV: This question should be definitely decided. In terms of our overall stance, we have to act calmly but decisively. This is important not only from the point of view of Soviet-American Relations, but international relations as well. If they are talking with the Soviet Union in such a manner, one can imagine how they will act with other countries.

I had a conversation with Nikolai Ivanovich [Ryzhkov]. We should refrain from purchasing corn from the Americans for now.

GROMYKO: Perhaps we shouldn’t announce this outright, but realize it de facto.

SOLOMENTSEV: The statistics Comrade Shevardnadze was talking about should be included in our document.

DOBRYNIN: The American actions toward our military attaché are unprecedented.

GORBACHEV: We should deport all American military personnel.

CHEBRIKOV: We have another possible course of action which can be employed if necessary. As I already reported to the Politburo, we discovered many eavesdropping devices in our offices in the USA. This fact should be made public in order to expose American espionage, and a press conference should be called with a demonstration of American espionage’s eavesdropping devices.

GROMYKO: How many eavesdropping devices were found in their offices?

CHEBRIKOV: One. The numbers are in our favor—1 to 150.

GORBACHEV: This should be emphasized.

SHEVARDNADZE: When should our announcement be promulgated?

GORBACHEV: As soon as it is ready. After we look it over, it should be transmitted over the radio and television and published in the press.

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: We agree.

GORBACHEV: I was intending to have a press conference and show where the Americans are leading things after Reykjavik. To expose their lies and underhanded actions. But, now is an inappropriate time. It would probably be better to appear on television and communicate these facts to our people, rather than at a press conference.

RYZHKOV: Correct.

GORBACHEV: No new suggestions will appear in the speech. Therefore it is unnecessary to circulate the text of the speech. In the frame of the position which was formulated it should be shown that the USA administration bears full responsibility for the failure of the agreement at Reykjavik and engages in underhanded activity in order to misrepresent facts and mislead society.

It could be said that the development of events after Reykjavik shows the inability of Reagan to handle his gang.

GROMYKO: This could be said, but in a form which does not fence off Reagan himself.

GORBACHEV: Yes. Reagan appears as a liar. The appropriate formulation should be found. Do you comrades have any other suggestions?

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: No. The resolution is accepted.

2. Concerning activities in connection with the death of [samaro]. Machel, President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique.

GORBACHEV: We need to make a decision about measures in connection with the death of Machel. Comrade Aliyev will fly to Mozambique tomorrow. The last report of our pilot was: “We have been shot down.”

ALIEV: He [the pilot] is now in the South African Republic.

GROMYKO: All measures should be taken to rescue him and to find his fate through the Red Cross.

CWIHP CONFERENCE continued from page 49


Recent CWIHP working papers have featured Norman Naimark’s report on the creation of the Stasi #10) and Christian Ostermann’s analysis of U.S.-East German interactions following the June 1953 GDR uprising (#11). More findings from the East German archives will appear in future CWIHP Bulletins and Working Papers.
RUSSIAN ARCHIVES REVIEW
by Jim Hershberg

Scholars conducting research in Russian archives dealing with the Cold War over the past year (since late 1993) continued to report a mixture of positive and negative experiences, with signs of progress mingled with many persistent frustrations. While individual accounts ranged from exhilaration to exasperation, and often encompassed both emotions, reports from Cold War historians visiting Moscow archives in the spring and autumn of 1994 sounded slightly more upbeat, notwithstanding continuing woes over photocopying, fees, access to documents and finding aids, and declassification delays. Although grave financial troubles stemming from inflation and reduced state budgets continue to plague all archives, their dealings with researchers may be growing more connected to laws and regulations rather than to shifts in personalities or political trends. In particular, time seems to have thawed the chill that descended in early 1993 after a controversy erupted over the discovery of a document in the former CPSU CC archives suggesting that North Vietnam held hundreds more U.S. POWs in 1972 than it then acknowledged.1 In conversations with the author during a trip to Moscow in September 1994, neither Russian archivists nor scholars mentioned the controversy—which led to a temporary clampdown on research in the former CPSU CC archives—for the first time in over a year of repeated visits.

Major complaints persist, however, over access to documents in the so-called Presidential or Kremlin Archive, the collection of sensitive materials known officially as the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF). This archive passed from Mikhail Gorbachev's personal control to Boris Yeltsin's after the USSR's collapse in 1991. Since then, Russian archival officials have repeatedly vowed to transfer APRF historical materials to more accessible repositories under the authority of the Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), such as the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), which holds post-1952 CPSU CC records, but, as only very limited transfers have taken place, the process has been too slow to satisfy archivists and researchers.

Instead, documents have emerged sporadically from the APRF via ad hoc arrangements with particular journals or scholars, and in state-to-state gestures to enhance Russian foreign policy. Recent examples of these practices included the new Lenin biography by Dmitri Volkogonov, head of a presidential commission on the declassification of Russian archives, who cited extensively from APRF materials to which other scholars have not yet had access:2 and presentations of APRF documents by Russian officials to Hungary and Czechoslovakia (about the Soviet invasions of those countries in 1956 and 1968, respectively), Poland (about Soviet policy on the 1980-81 crisis), and South Korea (about Moscow's role in the Korean War and the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007).3 These actions have undoubtedly contributed to the historical record, but have also drawn allegations of politicization and favoritism. The dispute was long mostly limited to scholarly circles, but burst into public view in July 1994 when an Izvestia article criticized APRF practices.4 Citing the examples of new journals which had published APRF materials without appropriate citations, journalist Ella Maksimova complained that despite promised reforms, "the Presidential Archive (the former Politburo Archive) works according to the same super-secret regime, inaccessible to the mass of researchers [and] even its very existence...is not advertised."

Maksimova wrote that in 1992 Roskomarkhiv (now Rosarkhiv) chairman R. G. Pikhoia, head of the Presidential Administration S.A. Filatov, Volkogonov, and APRF director A. V. Korotkov appealed to Yeltsin to transfer state archives 12,000 of the rumored 100-150,000 files in the APRF, "thus removing grounds for political speculation connected with the preservation of historical materials in archives which are closed to researchers." Yeltsin reportedly responded: "I agree. Please carry out the necessary work." If the President had limited himself to this resolution, it would have been possible to hope that everything, little by little, would gradually be returned to society. However, on the list of "fondy" alongside No. 1 (Party Congresses, 1947-1986) and No. 2 (Plenums of the CC VPK (b) and the CC CPSU 1941-1990) a decisive "No" was printed in that same presidential hand.

Rather than blaming Yeltsin, Maksimova surmised that someone had stood at his "elbow whispering that 'it's dangerous, it's not worth it.'" Maksimova said access to the APRF currently depends on users' "presence in the President's room, at an international advisory group meeting with MID officials Igor V. Lebedev and Igor V. Bukharkin in Cortona, Italy, on 22 September 1994. According to reports from participants, technical, not security, concerns are now the main obstacle to releasing deciphered telegrams from before and after the 1940s, and a mechanism was agreed upon to begin to make opishi available.
to researchers, who until now have had to make requests to archive staff who then consulted internal finding aids. Some possible progress was also reported on the question of photocopying fees and procedures, about which some scholars have complained. Despite such apparently positive steps, however, it was uncertain whether the results to date were sufficient to enable the international advisory group to raise additional funds.

Several AVP RF staff members have created an organization to assist researchers and support the archive's work. The International Diplomatic Archives Association, headed by Bukharkin, was organized in 1993 to help researchers, on a contractual basis, locate and submit for declassification desired archival materials related to the history of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy. (It should be stressed that it is not necessary to be a member of the association to conduct research at the archive.) The association also aids publication projects of MID materials, modernizing archive facilities, and involving retired diplomats to expedite declassification.


A more problematic situation persists regarding access to Cold War-era Soviet military documents, although in March 1994 Russian Defense Ministry officials participated in a Pentagon-sponsored conference on declassifying NATO and Warsaw Pact Cold War records, and some Soviet General Staff files on the Korean War, Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, and other Cold War events have been declassified in conjunction with specific conferences or projects. The files of the former KGB remain tightly controlled as well, with limited exceptions for families of victims of repression and an agreement with Crown Books to publish a series of books based on selected KGB documents.

Several recent U.S. initiatives to enhance ties with Russian archives should also be noted. In November 1994, CWIHP brought three Russian archival leaders to the United States for meetings with scholars and archivists. The three were Igor V. Lebedev, Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; Sergei V. Mironenko, Director, State Archive of the Russian Federation; and Natalia G. Tomilina, Director, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation. Their program in Washington, D.C., included meetings at the Wilson Center and its Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies; Library of Congress; National Archives I & II; National Security Archive; historical offices of the CIA, State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Holocaust Museum, and National Air & Space Museum; and the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX). CWIHP then brought them to the 26th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) in Philadelphia, where the project organized a roundtable on "Researching the Cold War in Moscow: A Dialogue with Russian Archival Leaders." In Philadelphia, the archivists met with a new AAASS/American Historical Association Task Force on the Russian and East European Archives. Its members are Norman Naimark (Stanford U., AAASS coordinator); William G. Rosenberg (Univ. of Michigan, AHA coordinator); William Taubman (Amherst C.); Kathryn Weathersby (Florida State U.); Donald J. Raleigh (U. of North Carolina); Gregory Freeze (Brandeis U.); and David Ransel (Indiana U.). The group prepared a draft report on the situation of the Russian and East European archives, examining the possibility of a "general statement of policies on ... the appropriate use of and access to archives," exploring ways AAASS and AHA might assist archives in the area; and considering ways to improve coordination among various relevant projects, scholars, and institutions.

Meanwhile, Russian and East-bloc archives and archival materials on Cold War topics were discussed at various other conferences held over the past year, including:

- a conference on "Archives and Research in Russia and Eastern Europe," in Aero, Denmark, on 3-6 December 1993; organized by a research network based at Odense University and the University of Copenhagen, the meeting heard reports by Russian and East European archive administrators and scholarly users;
- a "Conference on Cold War Military Records and History" for representatives of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, held on 21-26 March 1994 near Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Army Center of Military History, which organized the conference in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, intends to publish conference reports and to create a newsletter;
- a seminar on Soviet-Finnish Relations, 1944-48, was held in Helsinki on 21-25 March 1994 organized by the Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, in cooperation with the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow;
- on 29-31 March 1994, a conference on "The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1945-1950: A Reassessment" was held in Moscow, sponsored by the Institute of Slavonic & Balkan Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; the American Council of Learned Societies; the Social Science Research Council; and IREX;
- a conference on "Czechoslovakia and the World, 1968: The New Archival Evidence" was held in Prague, 18-20 April 1994, co-sponsored by the Prague Spring 1968 Foundation, the National Security Archive, and CWIHP;
- on 6-9 May 1994, Brown University's Center for Foreign Policy Development held a conference involving ex-officials of the Brezhnev and Carter administrations at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, one of a series of planned meetings on the collapse of détente in the late 1970s (the Carter-Brezhnev project is working with MID and TsKhSD, as well as U.S. government agencies, to expedite declassification of relevant U.S. and Soviet documents); on 23-24, in Cortona, Italy, a conference on "The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War (1943-1953)" took place, sponsored by the Institute of Universal History, Moscow, the Feltrinelli Foundation in Milan, and the Gramsci Foundation Institute in Rome;
- on 27-29 September 1994, a conference on "The Caribbean Crisis in the Documents in the Archival Fonds of Russia, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba: Analysis, Outcomes, Lessons" was organized in Moscow by Rosarkhiv and the U.S. Naval Academy;
- on 26-30 September 1994, a seminar on archival issues was held in Moscow at the Historical Archives Institute, Russian Humanities University, with visiting archivists from the Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan and support from IREX; CWIHP organized a session on declassifying Cold War materials.

Other noteworthy developments concerning Cold War-related Russian archives included:
1. See Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1-38. 2. Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: Free Press, 1994). A longer Russian version was published. The U.S. edition includes a statement (p. xxv) by editor Harold Shukman that, "Subject to the rules and regulations of the Russian Archive Commission (Rosarkhiv), all the documents cited in this book can be seen at the various locations indicated. Documents from the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) have been transferred from the Kremlin to the archives of the former Central Committee (RTS KhIDND1 and TsKhSD).

3. The CWHP Bulletin plans to include reports on some of these materials in its next issue.

4. Ella Maksimova, "Merchants of Sensations from the Archives of the President," Izvestia 131 (13 July 1994). Quotations in this article are from an unofficial translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.

5. See letters from Volkogonov and Stephen Cohen (Princeton Univ.) in Izvestia, July 19, August 17, 1994. 6. Organizers of the international advisory group are O. A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.) and S. G. Holmstark (Norwegian Inst. for Defense Studies); members include W. Taubman (Amherst C.), J. Haslam (Cambridge U.); G. N. G. Sevast'yanov (Russian Academy of Sciences); and G. W. E. Tait (Duke Institute for Russian, Eastern European, and International Studies, Cologne).


8. Dr. Lebedev announced at the AAASS meeting in Philadelphia in November 1994 that MID hopes to publish an extensive guide to the archives within two years; meanwhile, researchers may consult a list of fondy in the MID reading room, and, under the Cortona agreement, may pay 50 cents per page to copy finding aids, which will then be generally available in the reading room, to specific collections.

9. For further information contact Igor V. Bukharkin, Deputy Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation; 16 Gogolievsky bul., Moscow 121019, Russia; tel: (095) 241-49-31; (095) 925-26-67; fax: (095) 244-51-06; Bank Account: 0000070265 / 0017037048, Inkombank, Moscow, branch "Triumphal"; (S.W.I.F.T. BIC: INCOMRUM) via Account/ 890-0056-096 with Bank of New York, USA N 890-0056-096.

10. Contact: Russian Publications Project; Center for Russian & East European Studies--4G12 FQ/University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; fax: 412/648-2199; tel: 412/648-74037.

11. Profs. W. Taubman (Amherst C.) and K. Weathersby (Florida State U.) also participated in the roundtable. CWHP also organized the following sessions at the 1993 annual AAASS meeting:


12. See the announcement printed in the October 1994 AHA Newsletter (Perspectives), p. 27.

13. Conference papers were published by The Research Network: Change and Continuity in Russia, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, Dept. of Slavonic Studies, Odense U.: Campusvej 55; DK-5230 Odense M; Denmark; tel: +45 66 158600, ext. 3388/3416; fax: +44 66 157892; e-mail: kul@hist.odu.dk; or: Inst. of East European Studies, U. of Copenhagen, Næsbakke 78, 3; 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark; tel: +45 328 52021; fax: +45 328 5322. Contact Prof. Bent Jensen, Odense U.


15. A conference volume containing English-language versions of the papers, many of them based on Russian archival sources, has been published: Jakka Nevakivi, ed., Finnish-Soviet Relations 1944-1948 (Helsinki: Department of Political History, Univ. of Helsinki, 1994); copies from: Department of Political History, PL 54 (Sennomilankatu 14A); 00014 Univ. of Helsinki, Finland; fax: 358-0-191 8942.

16. Contact Dr. Leonid Gogolesvskiy, Inst. of Slavonic & Baltic Studies, Moscow, fax: (7-095) 938-2288; or Prof. Norman Naimark, History Dept., Stanford U., Stanford, CA 94305-2024.


19. Contact Prof. Francesca Gori, Fondazione Feltrinelli, Via Romagnosi 3, Milano, Italy 20121, fax: 39/2/ 86461855; or Academician O.C. Chubarian, Inst. for Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia, fax: (7-095) 938-2288.

20. Contact Rosarkhiv or Prof. Robert W. Love, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, fax: (410) 267-2256.

21. Contact: Chadwick-Healey Ltd.; The Quorum; Barnwell Road; Cambridge CB5 8SW; UK; tel: 0223 215512; fax: 0223215514; in USA/Canada: Chadwick-Healey Inc.; 1101 King Street; Alexandria, VA 22314; tel: 703 683-4890, 800 752 0515; fax: 703 683-7589.

22. Two volumes are planned for 1995: Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fredrik I. Gerichovf, eds., The Secret World of American Communism, and Lars T. Lih and Oleg V. Naumov, eds., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936; subjects of future projected volumes include the Katyn Massacre, Georgi Dimitrov’s letters to Stalin (1934-45) and diary (1933-49), the GULAG (1920-89), and Anti-Government Opposition under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Contact: Yale University Press; PO Box 200040, New Haven, CT 06520-9040; tel: 1-800-YUP-READ; fax: 203/432-0948.

23. Contact: IDC bv P.O. Box 11205, 2301 EE Leiden; The Netherlands; fax: 31-71-13 17 21; bankers: ABN AMRO, Leiden, The Netherlands, account no. 566 314 967/SWIFT no. ABN ANL. 2A. IDC also markets a microfiche set of finding aids to archives and manuscript collections in Russia, Baltic Republics, Ukraine, Belorusia, and Moldova, edited by Dr. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, a microfiche documentary collection on Antisemitism and Nationalism at the end of the Soviet Era, prepared by the Institute of Humanitarian Political Research and “Memorial” (Moscow), and the Second World Center and International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam); and other microfiche collections of Soviet-bloc materials.


25. Contact Open Media Research Inst.; Motokov Building; Na Strzi 63; 14062 Prague 4; Czech Republic.
Yeltsin's Directive on Declassification
Translated and Introduced by Mark Kramer

This directive ("rasporyazhenie"), issued by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 22 September 1994, was published in Rossiskaya Gazeta, 27 September 1994, p. 4. The language in the directive is unusually turgid and awkward, even by the standards of government decrees. Hence, the translation is necessarily cumbersome as well. For the sake of clarity, abbreviations used in the directive other than "Rosarkhiv" have been provided in full.

The directive is intended to expedite the declassification of Soviet-era documents up through 1963. Although Points 1 and 2, which establish a declassification commission, pertain only to "documents created by the CPSU," Points 3 and 4 make clear that the directive is also supposed to cover documents created by Soviet state organs, including items preserved in the Russian Foreign Ministry (MID) archives, the military archives, and the former KGB archives. (The KGB has now been split up and renamed: The Foreign Intelligence Service handles foreign intelligence, formerly the province of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB; and the Federal Counterintelligence Service handles most of the old KGB's domestic functions.)

Point 4 has two potentially important features: First, it provides for departmental documents (i.e., documents produced by MID, the KGB, etc.) to be transferred to archives under Rosarkhiv's direct jurisdiction once the storage period of those documents has expired. It remains to be seen how this will work out in practice, but it could eventually facilitate access to materials that have been off-limits up to now. Second, Point 4 raises the question of giving the directors of archives under Rosarkhiv's immediate jurisdiction the power to declassify documents stored on their premises. Presently, the declassification of documents is permissible only if consent is obtained from all agencies involved in the original preparation of the documents. This extremely cumbersome process has all but halted attempts to declassify certain materials. The procedure could be greatly expedited if directors of Rosarkhiv-controlled archives could make declassification decisions on their own.

Perhaps the most important element in the directive is Point 5, which requires a phased transfer of original documents from the Presidential Archive (APRF) to archives under the jurisdiction of the State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv) by the end of 1995. This sort of transfer had been promised since late 1991, but scant progress had been achieved as of mid-1994, sparking complaints in a lengthy article by Ella Maksimova on 13 July 1994 in Izvestiya. The establishment of a set timeframe for the transfer is a decided step forward, but several qualifications should be noted:

1) the transfer applies only to "documents from the former archive of the CPSU CC Politburo," implying that key non-Politburo documents in the APRF, including the personal files of top Soviet officials, will not be turned over to Rosarkhiv. If so, these documents will not be subject to the provisions of the 22 September directive, which apply only to "state archives," "document storage centers," and "departmental archives." The APRF has its own special status under the Russian President's direct control.

2) the transfer applies only to documents created "in or before 1963." This implies that documents dating from 1964 and later, aside from those declassified for political reasons, will be released in the future only if there is another Presidential directive. It is unfortunate that the 30-year rule, itself a relic of the Cold War that deserves to be reexamined and pared back, has been so firmly enshrined (both here and elsewhere) in Russian archival policy.

3) the directive does not promise that records transferred from the APRF to Rosarkhiv will be any more accessible than at present. Although the directive implies that transferred files will be subject to expedited declassification, that is not spelled out explicitly.

The composition of the new Declassification Commission is encouraging, because it includes the director and deputy director of Rosarkhiv and the heads of the APRF, of both of the former KGB's main archives, and of the MID and military archives. Somewhat less desirable is the inclusion of several prominent political figures, whose presence may mean that archival procedures will be even more vulnerable to shifts in the political wind. At the same time, the participation of these officials may be the only way to ensure that archival matters and questions of declassification will be able to command high-level attention in the future.

On balance, then, the directive provides some basis for guarded optimism.

DIRECTIVE
of the President of the Russian Federation

Taking account of the demands of the public, in the aim of speeding up work to remove unwarranted restrictive classifications from archival documents in the state and departmental archives as well as in the document storage centers, and also to promote the declassification of archival documents stored there whose period of secrecy has expired, in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation:

1. A Commission on the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU, which will be an integral sub-division of the Interdepartmental Commission on the Protection of State Secrets, is to be formed.

2. The appended composition of the Commission on the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU is affirmed.

3. The Federal Service of Counterintelligence of Russia, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, and the State Archival Service of Russia are assigned the task of working out procedures for the declassification of documents in closed collections of the state archives, the document storage centers, and departmental archives, and for the extension of the periods of their secret storage.

4. The federal organs of state authority, whose directors are empowered to render information as state secrets are to:

   organize in a prescribed manner the prompt transfer of documents, after their period of departmental storage has expired, to the state archives and the document storage centers and
to examine the question about delegating powers to the directors of state archives and the directors of document storage centers to declassify documents located in the storage areas and closed fonds of these archives and centers.

5. In the course of 1994-1995, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, together with Rosarkhiv, is to organize a stage-by-stage transfer—from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation to archival institutions under the auspices of Rosarkhiv—of original documents from the former archive of the CPSU CC Politburo created through 1963 inclusively.

6. The Commission on Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU is to present a quarterly report to the President of the Russian Federation on the work it has carried out.

President of the Russian Federation
B. Yeltsin

22 September 1994
No. 489-rp

Composition of the Commission on the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU

Krasanenko, S. N.—First Deputy Director of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (chairman of the Commission); Yakovlev, A. N.—Director of the Federal Service of Russia for Television and Radio Broadcasting (deputy chairman of the Commission); Pikhoya, R. G.—Director of Rosarkhiv and Chief State Archivist of the Russian Federation (deputy chairman of the Commission); Krivova, N. A.—Assistant to the Director of Rosarkhiv (senior secretary of the Commission); Abramov, E. A.—Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation; Belozerov, A. P.—Chief of a Directorate of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia; Volkogonov, D. A.—Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly; Zolotukhin, B. A.—Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly; Kozlov, V. P.—Deputy Director of the
The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist bloc. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP to relevant citations.

Abbreviations:
- DA = Deutschland Archiv
- FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- NYT = New York Times
- RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
- VfZ = Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte
- WP = Washington Post
- ZfG = Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft

**Russia/Former Soviet Union**


Russian archives, particularly Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History, offer insights into history Soviet ties to CPUSA; article focuses on Comintern files on Minnesota Communists. (John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, “Researching Minnesotan files on Minnesota Communists. (John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, “Researching Minnesota History in Moscow,” History in Minnesota: The Quarterly of the Minnesota Historical Society 54/1 (Spring 1994), 2-15.)


Ministry of Defense document on Wallenberg’s arrest in 1945 located. (Ella Maksimova, “Wallenberg is Dead; Unfortunately, the Proof is Sufficient,” Izvestia, 6/3/93.)


Jukka Nevakivi, ed., Finnish-Soviet Relations 1944-1948 (Helsinki: Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, 1994), contains papers, many based on Russian archival sources, prepared for a seminar in Helsinki on 21-25 March 1994 organized by the Department of Political History, University of Helsinki, in cooperation with the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Copies from: Dept. of Political History, PL 54 (Snellmaninkatu 14A); 00014 University of Helsinki; Finland; fax: 358-0-191 8942


Author discusses origins of Soviet nuclear project and whether Moscow’s bomb was invented or stolen. (Valerii N. Soifer, “Myths about The Theft of the Century: Who Profits by Accusing Soviet Physicists?” Izvestia 193 (10/9/94), 5.)

Discussion of Stalin’s tactics in 1948 in response to Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreement and suicide of Albanian official Spiru Niku. (V. Tarlinski, “The Fate of the Federation,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12/17/93.)


Archival documents from Stalin’s death to Beria’s arrest (March-June 1953) suggest seriousness of Beria’s proposed reforms. (B. Starkov, “Something Brand-New on Beria,” Argumenty i Fakty 46 (Nov. 1993).)


Court reviewing effects of fall-out from top-secret 1954 nuclear tests in southern Urals. (S. Mustovshchikov, “How a Nuclear Victory was Forged in 1954,” Izvestia, 12/17/93.)

Remains of U.S. servicemen recovered from plane shot down by Soviets on 7 October 1952. (“Flier’s Bones Found,” WP, 9/15/94.)


Records of Moscow State University party committee show extent of surveillance. (E. Taranov, “We’re Shaking Lenin Hills!: From a History of Subversive Thought at MGU, 1955-56,” Svobodnaya Mysl’ 3 (1993), 52-61.)


Review of KAL 007 investigation, findings (including Black Box transcripts), journalist’s role in exposing cover-up. (Murray Sayle, “A Reporter at Large: Closing the File on Flight 007,” The New Yorker 69:42 (12/13/93), 90-101.)

CPSU archival documents contradict Japanese Communist Party claims it operated independently of Moscow. (V. Tsvetov, “A Snake in the Communist Party claims it operated indepen-
dently of Moscow. (V. Tsvetov, “A Snake in the

CPSU documents implicate party, KGB in subservient activities in Italy, report says; editors blast archivists for denying access to key documents under pretext of state secrecy. (Press conference by editors of Stoliza Magazine on “Itali-an Trial of the CPSU’s Money,” Official Krem-lin International News Broadcasts, 9/20/93.)

Russian Procurator’s Office considers fate of investigation into CPSU finances and attempts to recover funds abroad. (V. Rudnev, “The Case of Party Finances,” Izvestia, 11/19/93.)

Alexander Agentov, ex-adviser to CPSU General Secretaries from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, interviewed. (I. Zamyatin, “An Interview with a Man who was Silent for a Long Time,” Arguments and Facts, 5/20/93, 6.)

Documents from mid-1980s on state surveillance of religious activities in USSR from Council of Ministers. (N. Krivova, et.al., “Religion and the Church in the USSR,” Historical Archives 1 (1993), 137-44.)

Transcript of talks between Gorbachev and Italian Communist Party chief A.G. Occhetto in Moscow on 28 February 1989; continuation of series of publications from Gorbachev Archives. (“Gorbachev-Occhetto,” Svobodnaya Misl [Free Thought] 4 (1993).)


Politburo records from 5-6 March 1990 on discussion of “urgent measures” on Lithuania’s plans to leave USSR. (A. Chernovin, “How They Opposed Lithuania’s Seccession from the USSR,” Historical Archives 1 (1993), 3-5.)


Ex-KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov says he participated in August 1991 coup attempt because KGB had reports that US and NATO planned to dismember the Soviet Union and Gorbachev failed to respond adequately to this information. (RFE/RL News Briefs 2:49 (29 Nov-3 Dec 1993), 3.)


Espionage/Intelligence Issues


Article recounts KGB’s role in Soviet policy on Germany in the 1980s and contends that spy service maintains its network in eastern Germany. (Y. Bovkin, “The KGB in the Bright Kingdom of Capitalism,” Izvestia, 9/22/93.)


Ex-KGB Major Viktor Sheimov describes escape from USSR with CIA aid in 1980. (D.
controversy erupts over charge by former soviet intelligence official Pavel Sudoplatov that leading western scientists, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard, knowingly passed secret atomic data to Oppenheimer, Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard, willingly passed secret atomic data to Wernher von Braun, 1945. (M. Kornyei, “Wernher von Braun: German Rocket Scientist,” May 1993.)


archives developments

Survey of Russian state archives, including guide to regional records centers. (“the system of archives of the federal government and centers of document storage/preservation,” Historical Archives 1 (1993), 222-23.

internal documents inform account of crucial years in the journal Historical Archives’ history. (V. Esakov, “The Fate of a Journal: Historical Archives in 1955-62,” Historical Archives 1 (1992), 194-211.

hoover institution transfers 4,640 microfilm reels of documents to state Archives of Russian federation as part of 1992 agreement to exchange archival materials. (A. krylovich, “American Institute Gives Documents to Russian Archives,” TASS, 21 May 1993.)

author notes pitfalls of research in military archives, says no more than 15 percent of materials opened. (E. Moskal, “Military History: Problems and Perspectives of its Study,” New and Newest History 5 (1993), 249-51.

Russian archives head debates impact of new research conditions in Moscow. (“Hinter sieben Siegeln. Nach wie vor kein Zugang zu den Archiven des KGB. Interview mit dem russischen Historiker Dmitri Jurassow” (“Behind Seven Seals: Like before, no Entrance to the KGB Archives: An Interview with Russian Historian Dmitri Jurassow”), DA 7 (July 1993), 868-72.

despite new law, bureaucratic and financial obstacles could hamper access to archives. (V. Rudnev, “Law on Archives Removes Barriers to Researchers,” Izvestia, 7/14/93, 5.)


six scholars express concern that access might be cut off to newly created center for CPSU party archives. (“When they struggle with the Archives, Society Suffers,” Izvestia, 9/9/93.)

Russian archival head Pikoiba rebuts charges of selling original documents abroad. (“Russian Archive Report Denies Selling Documents Abroad,” Mayak Radio, Moscow, 10/17/93.)


Yeltsin orders creation of commission to be chaired by Dmitrii Volkogonov to investigate cases of foreigners and Russian who disappeared within Soviet union’s borders during the cold War. (V. Rudnev, “Russia Continues to Search,” Izvestia, 10/28/93.)

Volkogonov says US-Russian commission on POWs/MIAs has determined that no Americans were detained in Russia today; says Russian security Ministry was opening relevant files, but acknowledges mid-level officials treat the commission negatively. (“Volkogonov: No U.S. MIAs Forced to Stay,” Interfax, Moscow, 12/8/93.)
Malcolm Toon, co-chair of commission, reports that Soviet pilots in Korean War tried to down U.S. F-86 fighter jets safely and two were captured and brought to Moscow; question remains whether more important data awaits discovery in Russian archives. (R. Boudreaux, “U.S. Gets New Leads in Search for MIAs,” Los Angeles Times, 12/9/93, A4.)

US-Russian commission chair Volkogonov removed, then reinstated, as head of commission as well as presidential adviser. (RFE/RL News Briefs 3:5 (24-28 Jan 1994), 6, citing Itar-Tass, 1/25/94 and Interfax, 1/28/94.)

In 11/12/93 classified cable, Russian officials are quoted as saying State Department discouraged them from releasing full data about Vietnam-era US POWs because of possible harm to Russo-US ties; State Department denies report. (Steven Greenhouse, “New Doubts Cast On nam-era US POWs because of possible harm to aged them from releasing full data about Vietnam-era US POWs,” Los Angeles Times, 12/9/93, A4.)


Archives head Pikhoia announces pact requiring Moscow to return to France over 20 tons of documents seized at the end of World War II. (Moscow returns to Paris Six and One-Half Kilometers of Secret Archives,” Izvestia, 2/4/94.)

Interview with senior Russian archival official V. Kolozvoyim. (E. Maksimova, “The Treasures of Russia are Being Scattered all over the World,” Izvestia, 2/16/94.)

Despite legal complications, scientist-dissident Andrei Sakharov’s archives near public opening. (M. Lebedeva, “The Sakharov Archives are Opening,” Izvestia, 5/21/94.)

Complaints voiced about preferential treatment given some persons for access to materials in Russian Presidential Archives. (Ella Maksimova, “Merchants of Sensations from the Presidential Archives,” Izvestia 131 (7/13/94); letters in response from D. Volkogonov and S. Cohen, Izvestia, 7/19/94, 8/17/94.)

Azerbaijan

Interview with Atakan Musayev, head of the Main Archive Administration of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers. (Aghagulu Nifalijew, “Without Archives, There Is No History,” Khalk Gazeti (Baku), 10/13/93, in FBIS Report: Central Eurasia, 1/27/94.)

Belarus

Author assesses KGB’s role in Byelorussia in 1990-91. (A. Starikevich, “Belarus: Back in the USSR,” Izvestia, 2/24/94.)

Latvia


Lithuania

Politiuburo records from 5-6 March 1990 on discussion of “urgent measures” on Lithuania’s plans to leave USSR. (A. Chernovin, “How they Opposed Lithuania’s Secession from the USSR,” Historical Archives (Moscow) 1 (1992), 3-5.)


Ukraine

Internal documents from CPSU archives, including memos of Central Committee of Ukrainian Communist Party, on Soviet leadership’s treatment of Crimean Tartars. (O.V. Volobuyev, “The Crimean-Tartar Issue According to CPSU Documents (From the Late 1950s to the Mid-1980s),” Otechestvennaya Istoriia (Moscow), Jan.-Feb. 1994, 157-69.)

Bulgaria

Look at secret services examines reasons for “sketchy” accounts of past activities, charges of involvement in attacks on Pope John Paul II, dissidents. (Kjell Engelbrekt, “Reinventing the Bulgarian Secret Services,” RFE/RL Research Report 2:47 (11/26/93), 41-49.)


Former Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic/Slovakia


Reassessment of Prague Spring after a quarter-century. (Milos Barta, “The 1968 Reform Move-


Russian archival head R. Pikhoya gave Czech President Havel a second batch of Soviet documents pertaining to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, including the transcript of an 8/13/68 telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubcek. (“Brezhnev warned Dubcek,” The European, 4/22/94, 2.)

Story of Pavel Minarizh, accused of spying undercover for the Czechoslovak secret police against Radio Free Europe from April 1970-June 1975 and involvement in plots to blow up the Munich station. (O. Dimitrieva, “He Laid the Mine Under the ‘Free Europe,’” Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 12/15/93.)


Slovakian Interior Minister complains about difficulties obtaining archives of former Czechoslovakian secret police (SIB). (Ladislav Pittner’s Dissatisfaction, or Who Has the Archives of the Former SIB?, Narodna Obroda (Bratislava), 3/18/94, in FBIS-EEU-94-055 (3/22/94), 16.)

**Germany/Former East Germany**


Prague court sentences two former police officers to terms of 3 and 3.5 years for beating students in 11/17/89 protest that sparked revolution against communist rule. (RFERL News Briefs 3:9 (21-25 Feb 1994), 19.)

**Report on concentration camp system in Soviet-occupied Germany, using Russian archival data, as part of joint project of Institute for History and Biography at Fern University at Hagen, Historical Institute at University of Jena, and Buchenwald Memorial.** (Bodo Ritscher, “Zur Herausbildung und Organisation des Systems von Speziallagern des NKVD der UdSSR in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschland im Jahre 1945” [“On the Evolution and Organization of the System of Special Camps of the NKVD of the USSR in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany in 1945”], DA 6 (June 1994), 723-35.)


SED archival documents disclose details of policies on German POWs held by USSR, 1949-55. (Beate Ihme-Tuchel, “Die SED und die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion zwischen 1949 und 1955” [“The SED and the German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1955”], DA 5 (May 1994), 490-503.)

Rise of student self-government at one of the most influential East German universities after World War II. (Ilko-sascha Kowalczuk, “Die studentische Selbstverwaltung an der Berliner Universitaet nach 1945” [“Student Self-Government at the Berlin University after 1945”], DA 8 (Aug. 1993), 915-27.)


Using SED. Stasi records, historian recounts case of ex-SED Central Committee member Paul...


SED archives inform reassessment of 1953 East German refugee crisis, contrasting GDR, FRG, and U.S. perceptions. (Valur Ingimundarson, “Cold War Misperceptions: The Communist and Western Responses to the East German Refugee Crisis in 1953,” Journal of Contemporary History 29:3 (July 1994), 463-81.)


Scientists’ part in GDR brain-drain of ‘50s re-counted. (John Connelly, “Zur ‘Republikflucht’ an alleged Western spy in the 1950s; SED perse-

Notes found in GDR archive of 10-11 Nov. 1986 socialist bloc conference in which Gorbachev privately broke from Brezhnev doctrine, affirming “independence of the party in each country, their right to make sovereign decisions, their own responsibility toward their own people,” and stating that the USSR would not intervene to keep socialist leaders in power. (Reprinted with commentary by Daniel Kuechmeister and Gerd-Ruediger Stephan, ZIG 8 (Aug. 1994), 713-21.)

Analysis of Gorbachev’s policies on German unification, using transcripts and correspondence from SED archives to illuminate his contacts with Honecker. (Hannes Adomeit, “‘Midwife of History’ or ‘Sorcerer’s Apprentice’? Gorbachev, German Unification and the Collapse of Empire” (forthcoming in Post-Soviet Affairs.).

German translation of two documents from CPSU CC archives dealing with Soviet relations with the PDS, hand-over of SED archives to Bundestag, authored by Valentin Falin (10/18/90) and Nikolai Portagolov (3/13/91). (Vera Ammer, trans., “Steng geheim!” [“Top Secret!”], DA 2 (Feb. 1994), 222-4.)


Berlin Administrative Court issues mixed decision in suit by Brandenburg Minister President Stolpe seeking to bar head of government agency investigating Stasi from “making public value judgments” about persons suspected of past Stasi ties. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 6/4/93, 4, in FBIS-WEU-93-113 (6/15/93), 40-41.)

Chancellor Helmut Kohl says he favors destruction of Stasi files. (AFP dispatch, 11/15/93.)

Joachim Gauk, head of commission on Stasi archives, discusses arrangements for making files available. (Der Spiegel 52 (12/27/93).)


Investigators in Stasi files buried by an “avalanche” of discoveries of treason, minister in parliamentary inquiry says; more than 2,000 leads being followed, many prosecutions expected; extent of spying estimated. (“A Suspected People,” Der Spiegel, 4/18/94, 92-97, in FBIS-WEU-94-075 (4/19/94), 8-12.)

Interview with Klaus-Dietmar Henke, head, Education and Research Department subordinated to the federal commissioner for the Archives of the Stasi in suit by Brandenburg Minister President Stolpe seeking to bar head of government agency investigating Stasi from “making public value judgments” about persons suspected of past Stasi ties. (Die Welt, 9/12/92, in FBIS-WEU-92-179 (9/15/92), 16.)


Archives Developments:

Deutschland Archiv and Arbeitsbereich DDR-Geschichte, Center for European Social Research, Mannheim University, to publish “Aktuelles aus der DDR-Forschung,” to inform scholars and research institutions of historical research on the former GDR. For information, to receive a newsletter, and to “register” research projects, contact: Herr Ulrich Maehlert, Arbeitsbereich DDR-Geschichte, Mannheimer Zentrum fuer Europaische Sozialforschung der Universitat Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (tel.: (0621) 292-8472; fax: (0621) 292-8435; e-mail: maehlert@mxs.sowi.uni-mannheim.de. Also see DA 7 (July 1994), 671-2.

Survey of conditions for research in various former GDR archives, and comments on situation for research in Moscow. (Hermann Weber, “Die Aktuelle Situation in den Archiven fuer die Erforschung der DDR-Geschichte”["The Actual Situation of the Archives for Research on East German History"], DA 7 (July 1994), 690-99.)


Ex-GDR officials form “Society for Legal and Humanitarian Support” to aid those allegedly persecuted because of past SED activity. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 5/24/93, 5, in FBIS-WEU-93-110 (6/10/93), 21-22.)

Hungary

On 22-23 Oct 1993, gatherings are held across the country to the mark the 37th anniversary of the 1956 revolt; justice minister calls for trial of communists guilty of repression. (RFE/RL News Briefs 2:44 (25-29 Oct 1993), 9-10.) Justice Ministry official tells press conference on 22 Nov 1993 that more than 1,000 people were killed during 1956 revolution between 10/23/56 and 12/28/56 when special units fired into unarmed pro-
**UPDATE**


**Government declassifies significant proportion of Council of Ministers’ documents from 1944-60 period; some documents to remain secret on foreign policy, national security, or privacy grounds.** (MTI (Budapest), 5/26/94, in FBIS-EEU-94-103-A (5/27/94), 13.)

**Poland**


**Newly-declassified Soviet documents on 1980-81 Polish crisis (Suslov Commission documents) are published, including Poliburo minutes and Brezhnev-Jaruzelski telephone transcript.** (Cited in *RFE/RL News Briefs* 2:48 (22-26 Nov 1993), 13.)

**People’s Republic of China**


New evidence indicates far higher death toll than previously believed in Mao’s Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76). (Daniel Southerland, “Repression’s Higher Toll,” WP, 7/17/94, and “A Nightmare Leaves Scars, Questions,” WP, 7/18/94.)


**Society for Study of Chinese History of the People’s Republic of China founded to “adhere to the party’s basic line and systematically study the history” of the PRC “under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s theory on building socialism with Chinese characteristics.”** (Guangming Ribao (Beijing), 12/11/92, in JPRS-CAR-93-011 (2/11/93), 9.)

The following free publications are available from the Center for Pacific Asia Studies; Stockholm University; S-106 91; Stockholm, Sweden; tel.: +46 8-16 28 97; fax: +46 8-16 88 10; Michael Schoenhals, CCP Central Documents from the Cultural Revolution: Index to an Incomplete Data Base (Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Working Paper 32, August 1993); “W. Woody” (ed. and trans. by Michael Schoenhals), *The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia: Extracts from an Unpublished History* (Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Occasional Paper 20, December 1993)

Prof. Schoenhals also informs:

* An edited English-language translation of the unpublished memoirs of former CCP Politiburo ghost-writer Wang Li—who participated in drafting the Chinese “polemics”
against the CPSU in the early 1960s—will be published with an introduction in a forthcoming issue of the journal Chinese Law and Government, published by M.E. Sharpe Inc., Armonk, NY.


North Korea/Korean War


History offers clues to Kim II Sung’s handling of nuclear crisis. (Michael Shapiro, “Annals of Authoritarianism: Kim’s Ransom,” The New Yorker 69:48 (1/31/94), 32-41.)


North Korea Institute of International Affairs says Japan was “directly involved” in the war against Korea in the 1950s, including germ warfare. (Pyongyang KCNA in English, 0403 GMT 6/24/94, in FBIS-EAS-94-122 (6/24/94), 18.)


Soviet leaders learned as early as 1985 that North Korea was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, causing Moscow to withdraw most advisers, according to Vladimir Kumachev, adviser to director of Russia’s Institute of National Security and Strategic Research. (AFP, 2/14/94, in RFE/RL News Briefs 3:8 (14-18 Feb 1994), 2.)

KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov secretly reported to Soviet leaders in 1990 that North Korea had successfully developed a nuclear device but had not tested it “in order to conceal from the world public and international monitoring organizations.” (Izvestia, 6/24/94, 4, in FBIS-SOV-94-122 (6/24/94), 11-12; also Yonghap, 6/24/94, citing Sankei Shim bun quoting Izvestia, in FBIS-EAS-94-122 (6/24/94), 31.)


Cuba


YELTSIN DIRECTIVE

continued from page 89

Rosarkhiv; Korotkov, A. V.—Director of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation; Krayushkin, A. A.—Chief of a Directorate of the Federal Service of Counterintelligence of Russia; Lebedev, I. V.—Chief of the Historical Documentation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Rauschenbakh, B. V.—Head of the Faculty of Theoretical Mechanics at the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, and Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Sevost’yanov, G. N.—Deputy Academic Secretary for the Division of History, Russian Academy of Sciences; Semin, Yu. N.—Chief of the Historical-Archival and Military-Memorial Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; and Surkov, A. P.—Assistant to the Director of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst C.) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (U. of Maryland/Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio U./Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington U.). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters, and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies available free on request.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issue 4 (Fall 1994)
Woodrow Wilson Center 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20560
Tel.: (202) 357-2967; Fax: (202) 357-4439

Editor: James G. Hershberg
Associate Editors: P.J. Simmons, Bonnie Terrell, Stephen Connors
Researchers: Daniel Rozas, Amanda Bichsel, Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, Lena Milman, Mark Doctoroff, Michelle King