August 20, 1953
Britain Is Cautious on Revolt in Iran
By PETER D. WHITNEY
ONDON, Aug. 19 -- British sources indicated today a mixed optimism about the probable effect of the coup in Iran on Teheran's relations with the Western powers.
In essence the informed view appeared to be that the news was excellent in so far as it affected Iran's chances of staying out of the Soviet orbit but only promising in the direction of improving Iranian liaison with the West.
As for the first point, these authorities said the motivation for the Royalist coup appeared to have been largely the increased complaisance of the deposed Premier, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, toward the pro-Communist Tudeh party and that the tribal religious and economic groups that had rallied to the new regime were the historically anti-Communist elements in Iran.
These apparently include groups of the Army and the police, the influential and fanatic Moslem religious leader, Ayatollah Sayed Abolghassem Kashani, the Kurds and Azerbaijani in the north and the important Bakhtiari and Ghashghai tribes in the south.
But as to the second point--the chances of settling Iran's outstanding differences with Britain and the West--the informed view here is that the new regime is likely to be only a little less intractably nationalist than the old.
The outstanding issue is that of the expropriated oil concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
It is only a little less than a year since the last positive move was made in that matter. That was the joint Churchill-Truman offer to recognize the nationalization of the company's property in Iran if the question of compensation for the Anglo-Iranian company were submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, the Netherlands.
That offer was summarily rejected by Dr. Mossadegh the day it was made.
Of the groups combined in the Royalist coup only the Shah himself and the warlike Kurds of the northwest can be called pro-Western, sources here say.
Fazollah Zahedi, the new Premier, is almost unknown here except for the fact that the British had to arrest him during World War II because of his suspected intention to participate in a coup on behalf of the Nazi armies.
Slaying of Razmara Recalled
Recalled here was the anti-Western fanaticism of Ayatollah Kashani, whose followers were responsible for the March, 1951, murder of Dr. Mossadegh's predecessor as Premier, Gen. Ali Razmara, for having negotiated with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company an agreement that would have increased Iran's royalties considerably.
But the accession of a new government in Teheran that is as nationalist as that of Dr. Mossadegh and also firmly anti-Communist belatedly confirms one British prediction and seemingly contradicts one made by United States officials.
During last year's discussions on the oil dispute United States State Department experts maintained that, like him or not, Dr. Mossadegh was the only alternative to communism in Iran. British and Anglo-Iranian officials contended that some day Dr. Mossadegh would be deposed and the alternative would not be the Tudeh party.
It was this conviction that led to the company's rejection of all Dr. Mossadegh's proposals and the British Government's refusal to abandon the compensation claims.
Comments in London on the effect of the coup on the oil trade were guarded. Middle East oil production has soared recently even without a ton of crude from Iran.
A new Petroleum Information Bureau report said Middle East production for the first half of 1953 tied that of Latin America at 59,000,000 tons, second only to that of the United States.
On the London Stock Exchange Anglo-Iranian shares rose sharply on the news of the coup.
U. S. Awaits More Information
By THE NEW YORK TIMES
ASHINGTON, Aug. 19 -- High Government officials here made it plain today they would be unable to evaluate accurately the effects of the uprising in Iran until the whereabouts and physical condition of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh had been definitely established.
In the meantime the State Department assumed throughout the day a strictly neutral, hands-off policy and recognized officially the uprising only by making public wirelessed reports from Loy W. Henderson, United States Ambassador in Teheran.
Henderson left little doubt in his reports that the pro-Shah forces were increasing their hold on the Government. These forces either were ignoring or showing a friendly attitude to the obviously foreign passersby, he added.
Despite the Ambassador's reports, however, and news reports by agencies in Teheran also indicating early pro-Shah victories, United States officials continued to decline to say which side, in their opinion, was winning.
While officials remained non-committal there was not much secrecy about the prevailing feeling that the United States would prefer to see the Shah's forces emerge with the Government under their control. Repeated reports of growing friendliness between Dr. Mossadegh and Tudeh, the outlawed Communist party in Iran, have been a matter of increasing concern here for several weeks.
The Iranian Embassy here remained scrupulously non-committal through the day as to the progress of the uprising. Ambassador Allah-Yar Saleh said in a prepared statement, however, that he would refuse to cooperate in any action against Dr. Mossadegh.
"I believe Dr. Mossadegh represents the will of the people of Iran," he said. "Any movement against him will be opposed by all true Iranians. I shall not, therefore, cooperate in any action against Dr. Mossadegh."