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| Fig. 1: Price of natural gas over time at the Title Transfer Facility (TTF), a virtual trading point for natural gas based in the Netherlands [8] (Source: Wikimedia Commons) |
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine tipped the European Union into a major energy crisis. [1] EU sanctions against Russia and Russia's response of cutting energy supplies led to skyrocketing gas and electricity prices across Europe (Fig. 1), prompting the EU to reevaluate its energy security. [2] REPowerEU, the European Commission's post-invasion energy strategic plan, outlined a three-pronged approach to improving the EU's energy resilience: (1) save energy, (2), diversify energy supplies, and (3) accelerate the clean energy transition. [3] Here we discuss how the EU energy market has evolved in response to the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The EU has largely been dependent on imports to fulfill its energy needs. Historically, Russia has been a major supplier of fossil fuels: in 2021, it accounted for 44% of natural gas, 25.3% of crude oil and liquid natural gas, and 52.5% of hard coal imports to the EU as a whole. With fossil fuels accounting for 67.9% of the EU's energy supplies, Russia had an outsized influence on the EU's energy security. In comparison, domestic supplies of renewables and biofuels only accounted for 17.7% of energy consumption. [4]
Energy consumption across the EU does appear to be on a downwards trend. Prior to the invasion, EU member states consumed 1313.1 Mtoe (5.50 × 1019 J) of primary energy in 2021. In 2023, that value was reduced to 1208.5 Mtoe (5.06 × 1019 J). During that same time period, final energy consumption was reduced by 5.6%, down to 893.7 Mtoe (3.74 × 1019 J). [5]
In the fossil fuel sector, the EU has dramatically reduced its reliance on Russian imports. In 2023, Russia accounted for 11.5% of natural gas, less than 5% of crude oil and liquid natural gas, and less than 2% of hard coal imports, a sharp reduction from its pre-invasion dominance of the market. [5] In compensation, supplies from other countries have grown, with Norway and the United States now each taking a major share. [5] The result is that fossil fuels still make up the vast share of the EU's energy usage, accounting for 66.5% of its consumption in 2023. [5] In fact, in the initial stages of the 2022 energy crisis, EU imports of liquid natural gas spiked as much as 60%, while a glut of subsidies were implemented to address soaring gas and electricity prices; analysts have predicted that these policies will likely disincentivize the transition to cleaner energy supplies as long as fossil fuel prices are kept artificially low. [6] These realities are at odds with the REPowerEU commitment to lower EU gas consumption by 30% by 2030. [3]
Though renewable energy has been on the rise in the EU for the past fifteen years, the invasion of Ukraine has increased the growth of the sector. As part of REPowerEU, the European Commission increased its target of renewable energy usage to 45% by 2030. [3] As of 2023, renewable energy and biofuels account for 20.1% of the EUs energy usage, up 2.4% from 2021. [5] In that same time, solar and wind energy capacity in the EU has increased by 30%, with a cumulative capacity now of over 466,00 MW (1.68e14 J). [5] This surge in renewables is not without its own issues. In particular, the renewables supply chains are dominated by non-EU countries; notably, 95.6% of solar energy imports in 2022 were from China. [7] Which begs the question: is the EU simply trading one geopolitically unstable linchpin for another?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has kick-started an important transition in the EU's energy landscape, one that will continue to evolve as Europe tries to balance its ongoing energy needs with the rise of renewable energies and the influence of geopolitical tensions.
© Abby Pan. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] M. Misik & A. Nosko, "Post-Pandemic Lessons For EU Energy and Climate Policy After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Introduction to a Special Issue on EU Green Recovery in the Post-Covid-19 Period," Energy Policy 177, 113546 (2023).
[2] Md. Umar, Y. Riaz, and I. Yoursaf, "Impact of Russian-Ukraine War on Clean Energy, Conventional Energy, and Metal Markets: Evidence From Event Study Approach," Resour. Policy 79, 102966 (2022).
[3] "REPowerEU Plan," European Commission, COM 2022, 230, May 2022.
[4] "EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2023," European Commission, September 2023.
[5] "EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2025," European Commission, August 2025.
[6] S. Dekeyrel, "The European Energy Crisis: Shock Therapy for the EU's Clean Energy Transition," European Policy Center, 11 Jan 24.
[7] A. O. Westerber and J. Lindahl, "Dominant PV Trade Flows In Europe 2022," European Solar Manufacturing Council, 2022.
[8] P. Heather, "European Traded Gas Hubs: TTF Now a Global Gas Benchmark," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, OIES Paper NG 198, June 2025.
