|
|
| Fig. 1: Hydropower output comparison showing Kakhovka's 2.1 TWh relative to Ukraine's 2021 and 2023 hydro generation. [4] (Image source: N. Oliinyk) |
The Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) was a major component of the Dnipro Cascade in southern Ukraine. [1] On 6 June 2023, the dam and powerhouse were destroyed during the ongoing Russian invasion, causing catastrophic flooding and the complete loss of generating capacity. [2] Here we quantify the energy deficit created by the destruction of Kakhovka HPP and evaluate the carbon implications of replacing its lost hydropower with natural gas generation.
Before its destruction, Kakhovka HPP operated six Francis turbines with a combined installed capacity of 570 megawatts. [3] With an average annual capacity factor of approximately 42%, typical for Ukrainian run-of-river hydropower, the plant produced about 2.1 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity per year. This corresponds to roughly 7.6 × 1015 joules of electrical energy annually. Kakhovka accounted for around 7% of Ukraine's pre-war hydropower generation and also provided important peak regulation and irrigation services. Fig. 1 compares Kakhovka's output to total hydropower production in 2021 and 2023. [4]
If Ukraine were to replace Kakhovka's 2.1 TWh of annual hydropower output with modern combined-cycle gas turbines operating at 52% efficiency, the required fuel input would be 1.46 × 1016 joules per year. Natural gas has an energy density of approximately 5.5 × 107 joules per cubic meter. [5] Therefore, full replacement would require about 2.65 × 108 cubic meters of gas annually (265 million m3).
Combusting this quantity of gas would emit roughly 5.2 × 105 tonnes of CO2 per year, using the IPCC emission factor of 56.1 kg CO2 per gigajoule. [5] For perspective, this is comparable to the annual footprint of approximately 110,000 passenger vehicles. The loss of low-carbon hydropower therefore carries both energy security and climate consequences if replaced with fossil generation.
Key operational and replacement parameters for Kakhovka HPP are summarized in Table 1.
Ukraine has not restored Kakhovka's lost capacity. Instead, the power system has adapted through a combination of increased nuclear generation, additional thermal output, and emergency electricity imports from European partners. [4] Ukrenergo reported a sharp reduction in flexible hydropower reserves and ramping capability in the southern grid following the dams destruction. [6] The loss of the Kakhovka reservoir also disrupted irrigation systems serving hundreds of thousands of hectares of farmland, creating an indirect energy burden through higher diesel use for pumping.
Rebuilding the Kakhovka reservoir would require multi-year reconstruction and stable security conditions. Until then, Ukraine must rely more heavily on thermal plants and cross-border interconnections to balance peak demand with higher operational and environmental costs.
|
||||||||||||
| Table 1: Kakhovka HPP Energy Parameters. [3,5] |
The destruction of Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant removed 2.1 TWh of clean electricity annually and weakened Ukraine's grid flexibility. Replacing this output with natural gas would require around 265 million cubic meters of fuel per year and generate over half a million tonnes of CO2. While Ukraine has partially compensated through increased nuclear and thermal output, the hydropower systems lost storage and fast-ramping capacity remain irreplaceable. The resulting energy deficit illustrates the vulnerability of critical waterenergy infrastructure during wartime.
© Nazar Oliinyk. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] "Ukraine Dam: What We Know About Kakhovka," BBC, 8 Jun 23.
[2] "Ukraine - Destruction of Kakhova Dam - Flash Update #8," United Nations Office For the Coordinataion of Humanitarian Affairs, 22 Jun 23.
[3] Yu. I. Kasikov, "Increasing the Reliability of Turbines at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Plant," Hydrotech. Constr. 10, 1198 (1976).
[4] "Country Analysis Brief: Ukraine," U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 2025.
[5] T. Forsyth, International Investment and Climate Change: Energy Technologies for Developing Countries (Routledge, 2017).
[6] "Post-Disaster Needs Assessment - 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine," United Nations, October 2023.