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| Fig. 1: Germany Nuclear Energy Consumption in Exajoules (2009-2019). [4] (Image Source: M. Madrian). |
March 11, 2011, was the day many nations began questioning nuclear energy globally. Why? Fukushima, the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl in 1986, shocked people worldwide. While every European country continued to support nuclear energy, it marked a significant turning point for Germany. As a direct consequence of Fukushima, the German Parliament approved the gradual shutdown of all German nuclear power plants by 2022 and an immediate discontinuation of Germany's 7 oldest nuclear power plants. [1] This was a surprising decision as Germany's Reactor Safety Commission concluded in May 2011 that all reactors could operate safely. Also, just before Fukushima, the German government had just agreed to prolong the operational lifetime of its 17 nuclear reactors by 8 years for the ones built before 1980 and 14 years for the ones built after, thereby postponing the 2021 termination date. [2]
This report will shed light on Germany's abrupt shift from nuclear energy post-Fukushima and highlight alternative energy sources that will power the EU's industrial powerhouse in the years to come.
Fig. 1 represents Germany's Nuclear energy consumption between 2009-2019. Before the Fukushima disaster in 2010, Germany had its highest nuclear consumption during this period at 1.32 Exajoules, accounting for approximately 9.62% of Germany's overall energy consumption mix. [3] Following the disastrous event, nuclear consumption dropped by 23.48% from 1.32 Exajoules in 2010 to 1.01 Exajoules in 2011 as a direct consequence of immediate phase-out actions by the former German government. [3]
This significant drop is reflected in Chancellor Merkel's decision to unwind the extension of Germany's 17 nuclear power stations and instead to immediately shut down seven of its oldest nuclear power plants. [1] From 2012 onwards, there was a steady decline in nuclear consumption, dropping to 49.24% by 2019 from its peak in 2010. [3]
This abrupt decline in nuclear consumption showcases one of the most significant changes in Germany's energy landscape. In 2009, nuclear power accounted for 9.67% of Germany's energy consumption, which declined to 5.1% by 2019. [3] While these changes may seem minor, they significantly affected the countrys industrial sector. Moving away from a reliable and affordable energy source has created a need for alternative energy solutions to be found both in the short and long term.
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| Fig. 2: Germany Energy Consumption Mix in Percentages (2009-2019). [3] (Image Source: M. Madrian). |
Fig. 2 depicts Germany's energy consumption for each energy source, represented as a percentage of the total energy consumption between 2009-2019.
Renewable consumption significantly stepped in for nuclear power, partially covering the gap created by its faster phase-out. Germany's renewable adoption also aligns with its ambitious environmental targets to produce 80% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030. [4] This further explains why Germany's renewable consumption sustainably trended upward from 8.41% in 2011 to 16.13% in 2019, showcasing the effectiveness of the Energiewende policies from 2000. [3]
While the consumption of renewables has increased, there is a critical issue with the full-scale adoption of renewables. Compared to nuclear energy, renewable energy is not considered a continuously reliable baseload energy source, given its weather dependency. Consequently, more renewable power is needed, particularly for large industrial customers primarily consuming baseload power. Given the ongoing baseload requirements for industrial customers, along with the substantial time needed for renewable capacity buildout to handle the accelerated nuclear phaseout, another energy source was needed to meet the immediate power requirements of Germany's energy system: coal.
As Fig. 2 indicates, the coal-based power supply immediately increased from 23.54% in 2010 to 24.85% in 2011 and further rose to 25.3% in 2014. [3] From that point forward, it gradually decreased to 17.5% in 2019. [3] This suggests that coal initially stepped in to fill the void created by the accelerated shift away from nuclear power, but it only lasted temporarily. The temporary nature of the step-up in coal can be explained by an increase in hard and lignite coal usage. This increase directly opposed the Climate Protection Law, which requires Germany to lower its carbon footprint by 65% by 2030 and to achieve net zero emissions by 2045. [4,5] To tackle this, Germany decided to increase its natural gas imports, lowering its carbon footprint on a relative basis while also providing its industrial sector with stable baseload power.
As Fig. 2 also indicates, natural gas consumption negatively correlates with coal consumption. From 2014, natural gas increased from 20.21% to 24.28% in 2019, while coal consumption started to decline and continued its downward trajectory. [2] From an environmental perspective, gas consumption is much more environmentally friendly, given its lower CO2 emissions compared to coal.
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| Fig. 3: Natural gas volume transported through Nord Stream 1 (2012-2021). [7-11] (Image Source: M. Madrian) |
The increase in gas imports to Germany was primarily sourced from Russia and transported via the Baltic Sea directly to Germany through Nord Stream 1, which started operating in 2012. With a capacity of 55 bcm/year (billion cubic meters/year), it could compensate for the requirements of a reliable and cost-effective baseload resource for Germany's industry. [6]
Fig. 3 shows the natural gas volume transported through Nord Stream 1 between the years 2012 to 2021. It indicates that Nord Stream 1 steadily increased its capacity from 11.5 bcm in 2012 to 58.8 bcm in 2018, from where it continuously operated even slightly beyond its maximum annual capacity. Correspondingly, its capacity factor increased from 20.91% in 2012 to 106.91% in 2018. [7,8]
To meet the high demand for Russian gas, feasibility studies of Nord Stream 2 began, which had an identical capacity to Nord Stream 1. Construction concluded in September 2021, leading to a combined transportation capacity of 110 bcm/year. Natural gas was effectively used as a cost-effective bridge technology in Germany's energy transition, filling the gap created by the nuclear and coal phase-outs, and fulfilling the 80 integration of renewable capacity by 2030. [4] Despite all its supposed benefits, Germany's dependence on Russian gas imports substantially increased, with the proportion of Germany's total gas consumption rising to a staggering 65% in 2021. [6]
Leveraging Russia's relationship as a gas supplier may have been the most economical from a short-term perspective, but it also reveals strategic and political shortsightedness. Germany resisted building alternative gas import facilities, like LNG terminals, to reduce its strategic gas dependence on Russia. After all, Germany built three LNG terminals in record time, substituting Russian gas with more expensive Norwegian, Dutch, and US gas and LNG imports, which all came at the expense of Germany's population and industrial base.
In conclusion, it begs the question of whether Germany's swift nuclear phaseout should have been more thoroughly evaluated rather than being primarily influenced by the limited emotional support from the German public in 2011. Given Germany's ability to operate its cost- effective nuclear plants safely and securely, a more careful evaluation of its dependence on Russian gas and the long-term economic consequences for German industry should have been conducted.
© Max Madrian. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] D. Crossland, "Germany Cripples Itself With Nuclear Angst," Spiegel International, March 2011.
[2] "German Nuclear Phase-Out: Implications For the EU ETS," CDC Climat Research, July 2011.
[3] "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020," British Petroleum, June 2020, pp. 24-55.
[4] R. Dickel, "Achieving Net Zero Plus Reliable Energy Supply in Germany by 2045: The Essential Role of CO2 Sequestration," Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, OIES Paper ET13, June 2022.
[5] "Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetzes," Bundesgesetzblatt, BGBl 2024 I. Nr. 235 vom 16.07.2024.
[6] "Ausgewählte statistische Daten zum Nord Stream-Projekt," Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste, WD 5-3000-067/24, May 2024.
[7] "Press Release: A Record Volume of 58.8 Billion Cubic Metres of Natural Gas Has Been Transported through The Nord Stream Pipeline in 2018," Nord Stream, January 2019.
[8] "Press Release: Nord Stream Reaches Average Utilisation of 93% in 2017 51 bcm Delivered to the European Union," Nord Stream, January 2018.
[9] "Press Release: The Nord Stream Pipeline Transported a Volume of 59.2 Billion Cubic Metres of Natural Gas in 2020," Nord Stream, January 2021.
[10] "Press Release: A Volume of 58.5 Billion Cubic Metres of Natural Gas Was Transported Through the Nord Stream Pipeline in 2019," Nord Stream, January 2020.
[11] "Pressemitteilung: Die Nord Stream-Pipeline transportierte 59,2 Milliarden Kubikmeter Erdgas im Jahr 2021," Nord Stream, February 2022.