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| Fig. 1: Portions of the Nord Stream II pipeline in Germany during construction. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) |
The February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine placed a spotlight on the German Energy landscape. Over the past two decades Germany has all but culminated a phase out of nuclear energy in favor of natural gas imports in the immediate term and renewable energy sources in the long term. In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the international community has deployed an extensive set of sanctions, including banning Russia from the international SWIFT payment transfer system, in order to exert economic pressure on Russia. As of writing, a glaring hole in these sanctions include those that target Russia's energy exports which provided 36% of the national budget last year. [1] Germany's reliance on Russia for approximately 34% of its oil demand and 65% of its gas demand has at least initially precluded Germany, and the EU more broadly, from targeting Russia's most lucrative energy industry. [1]
The history of nuclear power in Germany has had a number of pivotal moments, notably the introduction of Chancellor Schöder's energy policy to phase out nuclear power and the acceleration of this phase-out in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster. These have led to the situation in 2022 of a diminished role of nuclear energy and heavy dependence on Russian natural gas imports.
Germany's foray into nuclear energy came after World War II, with material developments beginning to emerge in both West and East Germany in the late 1950s by way of small experimental reactors. In West Germany the establishment of the Ministry of Atomic Affairs (later, the Ministry of Research and Technology) created a government partner for pro-nuclear developments. [2] In conjunction the Atomic Energy Act, drafted into power in January of 1960, provided favorable regulation for nuclear exploration. [2] The first experimental nuclear power plant emerged in Kahl in 1961. [2] In the late 1960s and early 1970s ten orders for light water reactors (split between boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors) were placed by German utilities. [2] The construction and maintenance of the plants was contracted to modern day Siemens and AEG, although the first reactors were supplied by US-based Westinghouse Electric and General Electric. [2] Domestically produced reactors followed the joint formation, by Siemens and AEG, of the Kraftwerk Union, eventually absorbed by Siemens. [2] Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Germany continued to build nuclear power plants with light water reactors, amassing a peak of 23 active reactors, 14 with outputs above 1,000 MW. [2]
The proliferation nuclear energy in the early 1970s also precipitated Germany's first anti-nuclear movement. Famously, citizens in Wyhl protested the proposal to build a new nuclear plant, which had been granted in February 1975. [3] In retaliation, hundreds of protestors occupied the site. When police dispersed the first wave of protestors it galvanized 30,000 citizens to re-occupy the site leading to the site losing its build permit. [3] Over the following decade similar protests spread across Germany. Some of which (including the Wyhl incident) are discussed by Urban. [3] Growing anti-nuclear sentiment led to the emergence of the Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (Federal Association of Citizens' Initiatives for Environmental Protection - BBU) which had a membership of 1.5 million in 1978. This enabled it to have a political presence. Further anti-nuclear influence in the development of the Green Party is discussed by Lee. [4]
Despite a growing anti-nuclear movement throughout the late 20th century, strengthened by the Chernobyl reactor meltdown in 1986, it wasn't until two pivotal events in 2000 and 2011 caused a formal turnaround of Germany's nuclear energy ambition to a policy of phase-out. In 1998 Gerhard Schröder became Chancellor of Germany as the head of the social democratic green coalition (SPD-Green). He formally developed a timeline for the phasing out of nuclear power and the acceleration of renewable energy adoption. The timeline required the phase out of all 19 of Germany's nuclear power plants by 2022, beginning with the decommissioning of the least economical reactors at the plants in Stade and Obrigheim in 2003 and 2005 respectively. [3]
In 2005, Angela Merkel became the Chancellor of Germany. The chancellor and the Christian Democratic Union held more favorable views toward nuclear energy. While bans on new reactor constructions remained in place, in 2010 a 12 year delay on the phase out of the 17 operating nuclear plants was instituted. [4] It has been speculated that this extension was in part due to the 2007 energy dispute between Belarus and Russia, in which Gazprom, the largest gas company in the world, cut off gas flows to Belarus over a payment increase dispute. In March 2011 the Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Okuma Japan, causing significant nuclear fallout in the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. Following the disaster came a resurgence of anti-nuclear protests across Germany, touched upon by Urban. [3] In response to the sentiments in May 2011, a mere 3 months after the Fukushima disaster, Angel Merkel and the conservative-liberal government, reneged on the previous nuclear phase-out delay and committed to phasing out nuclear energy completely by 2022. [3,4] The abrupt policy change was widely viewed as a way to appease voters - who had recently participated in a nuclear plebiscite - before the upcoming election. [4]
As of this writing in March 2022, Germany has three remaining nuclear power plants set for complete phase-out by December 31, 2022: Emsland (1329 MW), Isar (1410 MW), and Neckarwestheim (1310 MW). [5] This represents an 80% decrease from peak nuclear power production of 171.3 TWh (1.70 Exajoule = 1.70 × 1018 J) consumption) in 2001 and less than 2.4% of Germany's 2020 power generation. [6] During a similar period, Germany's coal consumption has been reduced from 3.58 Exajoules in 2001 to 1.58 Exajoules in 2021. [6] In contrast, natural gas consumption has remained a bedrock of the Germany energy landscape, with consumption of 3.15 Exajoules in 2001 and 3.12 Exajoules in 2020. [6] Natural gas imports from Germany have remained relatively constant and in 2020 Germany imported 56.3 billion cubic meters (2.25 Exajoules) of natural gas via pipeline from Russia. [6] The newly completed (but not in commercial operation) Nord Stream II pipeline runs from Germany to Russia and has a total capacity of 55 billion cubic meters per year (2.2 Exajoules). [7] Fig. 1 depicts pieces of the Nord Stream II pipeline in Germany during construction. These numbers suggest that even if Germany had kept nuclear power at peak levels, the country's reliance on natural gas would have at most been cut in half. As of writing, Germany lacks the liquified natural gas terminals required to receive liquified natural gas imports narrowing the field of possible providers, and making it likely Germany would need to continue using pipeline dominated imports.
The implementation of sanctions on Russian energy exports has been floated as an effective way to paralyze the budget of the Russian government and thereby incentivize a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. [1] As a first step the German government has halted the start of natural gas imports on the Nord Stream II pipeline which was completed in September, 2021. [7] The German ministries of Economy and Energy have recently vetoed calls to extend the lifetime of existing nuclear energy plants, arguing that benefits would be minimal. [8] They instead opted to extend renewable deployment and accelerate construction of liquified natural gas terminals set to be complete in 2024 which would provide Germany more flexibility in gas imports. From a practical standpoint, operators of two of Germany's remaining nuclear plants have suggested that the continual decommissioning of nuclear plants has led to insufficient staff and fuel rods to keep the reactors running beyond 2022. [9]
It is inappropriate to speculate whether Germany will re-embrace nuclear energy in an attempt to minimize energy dependence on Russia. The numbers show that even if Germany were able to quickly bring back its peak nuclear capacity dependence on Russia, gas imports could only be decreased, but not eliminated entirely. Given the most recent communications from the ruling party, it is likely Germany will remain committed to full nuclear phase-out by 2022.
© Alexander Conklin. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] C. Nugent, "Why Sanctions on Russia Aren't Targeting Oil and Gas," Time, 25 Feb 22.
[2] O. Renn and J.P. Marshall, "Coal, Nuclear and Renewable Energy Policies in Germany: From the 1950s to the Energiewende"," Energy Policy 99, 224 (2016).
[3] O. Urban, "Nuclear Energy in Germany, " Physics 241, Stanford University, Winter 2016.
[4] X. M. Lee, "Germany's Change of Mind," Physics 241, Stanford University, Winter 2015.
[5] F. Jordans, "Germany Shuts Down Half of its 6 Remaining Nuclear Plants," ABC News, 3 Jan 22.
[6] "BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021," British Petroleum, June 2021.
[7] T. Jacobs, "Germany Halts Russia's Nord Stream 2 in Response To Moves Against Ukraine," Journal of Petroleum Technology, 22 Feb 22.
[8] "Germany Vetoes Nuclear Power Extension, Aims for LNG Terminal in 2024," Reuters, 8 Mar 22.
[9] C. Steitz and M. Wacket, "Explainer: Could Germany Keep Its Nuclear Plants Running?," Reuters, 28 Feb 22.
