Complications Hindering the Completion of the California High-Speed Rail

Andrew Sleugh
December 17, 2022

Submitted as coursework for PH240, Stanford University, Fall 2022

Introduction

Fig. 1: Diagram showing the current construction plan for the HSR; goes through the Central Valley with additional 'Phase 2' segments branching to San Diego and Sacramento. [4] (Courtesy of the California HSR Authority)

The California High-Speed Rail Project (HSR) is a mostly theoretical passenger train connecting the major northern and southern hubs of the state, San Francisco and Los Angeles. It was first approved for construction in 2008 when the estimated cost was only (!) 33 billion dollars for the first phase and 50 billion for the entire project with a completion date set in 2020. [1] The completed project is estimated to reduce vehicle miles by 200 million annually. [2] Using an average fuel efficiency of 20 miles per gallon (in 2020 most passenger cars averaged around 25, but trucks, utility vehicles, etc. drag down the mean), this represents 10 million gallons fewer gallons burned. [3] Given that about 9 kilograms of CO2 are emitted for every gallon of gasoline (3.7 CO2/carbon ratio × 2.5 kg of carbon in a gallon of gasoline), this would result in about 90 million fewer kilograms of CO2 entering the atmosphere each year. This would be a rather significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions if the project were to actually be completed and constructed efficiently enough to not counteract its own positive effects. Fast forward to present times; the current estimated cost is over $110 billion, construction is dragging and there is no completion date to speak of. [2] Where did it all go wrong?

Analysis

The primary cause of the construction delays and ballooning costs is naturally politics. It was never explicitly agreed upon what the main goal of the project was: to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles in the most direct path possible or to meander through the Golden State to reach as large a population as possible. The former is likely closest to the project's original vision and would manifest in the form of a rail line following the I-5 highway along the length of the state. This original idea has been co-opted by the latter goal to reach the more rural populations in the state's Farm Belt, making the path much more convoluted, construction more complicated as the rail traverses difficult and mountainous terrain, and the trip time much longer than anticipated. [4]

Lobbyists all along the route have argued that it is imperative that the rail passes through or stops in their city in order to promote economic development and connect people with more jobs and lower housing. While these outcomes are desirable, the pursuit to please everybody has essentially left the HSR at a standstill; construction on a 171-mile interim section from Merced to Bakersfield is optimistically projected to be completed in 2030 (a decade after the entire line was initially slated for completion). [4] This lethargic pace of construction has left many politicians (and the general public) skeptical of the feasibility of the project in general, which is in turn leading them to divest funds initially earmarked for the HSR to other, more reasonable projects. In addition to funding problems, difficulties acquiring the land and required permits have also led to major delays that have left the projects future in a nebulous state.

Conclusion

The California High-Speed Rail has had its project timeline extended indefinitely, with costs tripling from the original estimate. Many experts and politicians do not believe the project can be completed at all, so accepting the sunk cost and pivoting towards other solutions that could reduce the emissions from the transportation industry in a simpler way could be the way forward. For example, making affordable electric vehicles a top priority as well as programs for trading in old cars for more modern and sustainable options could potentially have the same CO2 reduction without a $113 billion price tag.

© Andrew Sleugh. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.

References

[1] W. Cox and J. Vranich, "The California High Speed Rail Proposal: A Due Diligence Report," Reason Foundation, September 2008.

[2] R. Vartabedian, "Costs of California's Troubled Bullet Train Rise Again, by an Estimated $5 Billion," Los Angeles Times, 8 Feb 22.

[3] "Greenhouse Gas Emissions From a Typical Passenger Vehicle," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-420-F-18-008, March 2018.

[4] R. Vartabedian, " How California's Bullet Train Went off the Rails," New York Times, 9 Oct 22.