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| Fig. 1: The Yongbyon 5 MWe Reactor. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) |
With North Korea in isolation, the Obama Administration pursued a policy of strategic patience. This decision rested on using more intense sanctions in hopes that North Korea will return to negotiations. Yet, North Korea continued to test and improve its short-, medium- and long-range missiles. [1] The last year of the Obama Administration marked the greatest number of instances of North Korean missile tests and launches. [2]
President Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2017 signaled a shift in US policy, and his first year in office marked a series of volatile exchanges. [1] Tensions between North Korea and the western world peaked in September 2017 when Kim Jong Uns government tested its most powerful nuclear weapon, which it described as a miniaturized hydrogen bomb, as well as released its first ever intercontinental ballistic missiles. These missiles are able to strike the United States. [2] As a result, the Trump administration labeled North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in November of that year, and pledged to fully dismantle North Koreas nuclear program while Kim is still in power. [1,2]
By 2018, however, everything suddenly changed. Kim conducted his last nuclear test and missile launch September-October 2017. And Trump, who initially ridiculed the dictator, suddenly fell in love with the ruler. [2] Kim became more open to holding a number of diplomatic summits in 2018 with Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Moon Jae-in after years of isolation. [3] More importantly, the months of 2018 surprisingly lacked any missile or nuclear tests by North Korea, leading some (especially the President himself) to claim that this was due to the Trump Administrations new approach to policy. In June, his summit with Kim seemed to have reduced some of the tensions from the Obama era and seemed to welcome future hopes for diplomacy between the US and North Korea. However, experts claims that while we have not seen any obvious displays of nuclear power, Kim Jong Un continues to develop more subtle parts of his weapons program while the world remains focused on the public negotiations. [2]
In particular, questions are being raised as to whether Kim's promise to shut down operations at the Yongbyon 5 MWe Reactor has been upheld (Fig. 1). An assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in April 2018 of the site showed signs of construction and activity around the water discharge portion of the secondary cooling system, as well as the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR). This part of the reactor is responsible for producing plutonium to be used in nuclear weapons. [4] This is done through a process called neutron capture. An atom of Uranium-238 (U-238) is bombarded by a neutron, which it absorbs and transforms into U-239, a highly reactive isotope. This isotope undergoes β-decay and produces Np-239, i.e. neptunium. However, neptunium is also unstable, so it undergoes β decay to produce Pu-239, or plutonium. Upon extraction, this isotope of plutonium is able to undergo fission, and is therefore able to be used in energy production, as well as nuclear bombs. [5] If these parts of the reactors are still operational today, there is a large enough risk that Kim has moved his nuclear program operations underground.
It seems that 2019 will be equally packed with talks between the four politicians. [3] Most experts believe that North Korea will never give up its nuclear arsenal, especially since Kims regime is convinced his missiles are the best insurance policy against invasion. More realistic, short term goals, such as cooperation in other ways could yield more results. Moon, despite his commitment to the ultimate denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, has been committed to intermediate steps, such as inter-Korean cooperation. [2] This was evident in his third summit with Kim in September 2018, where the two Korean leaders signed a joint declaration to reduce tensions, improve inter-Korean exchanges and take steps towards eventual denuclearization. [1]
That being said, some do concede that Trump should receive some credit for bringing Kim out of isolation and to the negotiating table. Unlike his predecessors, Trump was much more willing to tolerate what could potentially be a horrific, devastating war. But, more importantly, he was the first president to meet the North Korean dictator in-person. In an ironic twist of events, he was willing to risk a complete an utter catastrophe in order to achieve a much more tepid atmosphere that we are currently seeing. [2] Yet, given the somewhat vague agreements that Trump and Kim have so far achieved, 2019 will raise more concerns about how committed Pyongyang is to denuclearization and how willing the Trump administration is to take the necessary steps needed to sign a peace treaty. [3]
© Alexandra Hellman. The author warrants that the work is the author's own and that Stanford University provided no input other than typesetting and referencing guidelines. The author grants permission to copy, distribute and display this work in unaltered form, with attribution to the author, for noncommercial purposes only. All other rights, including commercial rights, are reserved to the author.
[1] M. Sampathkumar, "The U.S. and North Korea On The Brink: A Timeline," The Independent, 24 May 18.
[2] A. Smith, "North Korea Launched No Missiles in 2018. But That Isn't Necessarily Due to Trump,," NBC News, 27 Dec 18.
[3] W. Ripley, "Trump Sends Letter to North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un," CNN, 15 Jan 19.
[4] D. Albright and S. Burkhard, "Continued Monitoring of the Yongbyon Nuclear Site," Institute for Science and International Security, 18 Apr 18.
[5] J. C. Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium," Sci. Global Security 4, 113 (1993).
