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Klaus Fuchs and the Humanist Task of Science

Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski

From 1941 to 1949, my uncle Klaus Fuchs, a naturalized British citizen who had come to Britain as an anti-Nazi German refugee in 1933, was a leading theoretical physicist in nuclear research. On 21 December 1949, British intelligence confronted him with the accusation that he had been passing secret information to the Soviet Union. Fuchs initially denied any wrongdoing, but in January 1950, he admitted having done so, and subsequently dictated a confession giving the background for his action. In March 1950, he was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment, the maximum sentence allowable under British law for espionage not involving a wartime enemy, and stripped of his British citizenship. In June 1959, after nine years in prison, Fuchs was released early for good behavior, and flew from London to Schönefeld Airport in East Berlin.

Appointed deputy head of the Central Institute for Nuclear Research of the Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Rossendorf and professor at Dresden Technical University, he immediately resumed extensive research and also worked to promote junior members of his staff.

At the conference “Ethics in the Sciences: Responsibility of the Scientist—In Honor of Klaus Fuchs,” held in Berlin on 14 November 2003, organized jointly by the Leibniz Society and


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the German Society for Cybernetics, Günter Flach, as head of the Central Institute for Nuclear Research, reported on these activities of Fuchs (2003). One of the highlights of the conference was the statement of Russian physicist German Goncharov that Fuchs made an important contribution to the development of the hydrogen bomb, as documented by a patent he shared with mathematician John von Neumann (2003). This contribution of Fuchs, not widely known in Germany, was quite a sensational revelation by a physicist who had worked with the Tamm-Sakharov team on Soviet hydrogen bomb development. Even the biographer of von Neumann, the centennial of whose birth was just commemorated at Humboldt University, did not seem to know of this decisive patent.

Further contributions at the Berlin conference stressing Fuchs’s outstanding scientific achievements, were made by Manfred Bonitz and Friedrich-Martin Balzer. A sciometric analyses by Bonitz showed that an early work by Klaus Fuchs in 1938, “The Conductivity of Thin Metallic Film According to the Electron Theory of Metals,” in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society,* that laid the foundation for the development of microelectronics is now more often cited than the basic work of Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann on the discovery of nuclear fission (Bonitz 2003).

Balzer presented the letters exchanged between Emil Fuchs and his son Klaus Fuchs while the latter was imprisoned in England between 1950 and 1959. They impressively revealed the warm-hearted relationship between the two, based on mutual respect and love. For the first time, they unveiled some of the philosophical and political thinking of Klaus Fuchs during his nine years of imprisonment. (Balzer 2003).

My task here is to present not a tribute to the personality of Klaus Fuchs, but some notes by his father, supplemented by my own personal memories of my uncle. Emil Fuchs called these notes on the arrest of his son—prepared as a draft for the (unpublished) third volume of his autobiography—“New Personal Fates” (reproduced in Reiprich et al. 2000, 165–87).

This phrase “personal fates” was consciously selected to express how suddenly, without any warning, my grandfather
learned about his son’s arrest. The serious charge of treason immediately made him fear that his son would receive the death penalty.

In order to appreciate Klaus Fuchs’s greatness, warm-heartedness, and willingness to make sacrifices, as well as his political clarity and decisiveness, it is necessary to examine his confession quite carefully (K. Fuchs 1987). At the beginning, he writes about his father’s insistence that the children must follow their own consciences, even when these led to actions with which Emil Fuchs disagreed.

In family discussions of this fundamental principle of child rearing, Fuchs usually added, smilingly: “But we always ended up doing what he wanted anyway.” This addendum does not appear in the confession, but in my opinion one should always include it, because the important decisions in Fuchs’s life are inconceivable without the spiritual and ethical background provided by his father and, as his sister Christel would emphasize, his mother.

Emil Fuchs wonders in his notes if his family, and especially his son Klaus, had not been through enough already. What is only rarely reported is that, in effect, Klaus spent his entire life being persecuted or imprisoned in some way until he finally settled down in the GDR. The first incident was his headmaster’s refusal to present a high-school diploma publicly to the son of a Social Democrat—this in the Weimar Republic! The start of his studies of mathematics in Leipzig (1930–31) was also the beginning of his struggles with Nazi students.

As chairman of the Social Democratic student organization in Leipzig, he was also a member of the Social Democratic Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, a paramilitary group formed to protect the republic. As mentioned later in his confession, he consciously acted against his father’s principles in this, since his father was a staunch lifelong pacifist. I consider as especially important that part of his confession in which he gives his reasons for deciding on organized military resistance. He states:

Not one party has resisted the Enabling Act which gave special powers to Hitler, and there was hardly anybody in
the universities to stand up for those who were removed for political or racist reasons, and then one found that people who one considered honourable under normal circumstances did not have the inner strength left to stand up for their own ideals and moral principles. (1987, 198)

Klaus Fuchs joined the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) after the Social Democratic Party (SPD) adopted a capitulating attitude toward the coup d’état by Chancellor Franz von Pappen in July 1932. During his studies in Kiel (1931–33), Fuchs was sentenced to death by Nazi students in a “lynching trial.” They formed a posse that was supposed to throw him into the Förde River. At this time he fled to Berlin and hid himself there. In 1933 he enrolled in the University of Berlin—something he could later barely remember. Documents at Humboldt University show that he was expelled, together with his brother Gerhard Fuchs and other members of the “Red Students.” After the burning of the Reichstag and the persecution of Communists, Social Democrats, trade unionists, and all who resisted the new regime, the Party sent him into emigration.

First he went to France, where he met his future wife, Grete Keilson. She used to say later that one of Fuchs’s attributes was that he was stingy with words, to the extent that to her husband at that time, the painter Max Keilson, she laughingly compared him to a “word automaton” that would only spit out a few words now and then after one had put sufficient words into it first.

Poverty-stricken in France, he made his way to England, where he was able to continue his studies from 1933 to 1937 at Bristol University under Nobel laureate Sir Nevill Mott. Graduating in 1937, he worked as assistant lecturer for Nobel laureate Max Born in Edinburgh. But at the beginning of the war, he was interned and sent to Canada. Fuchs said the worst part of this experience was that interned Nazis were in command of the camp. There he met Hermann Duncker, the great Marxist teacher of the workers’ movement. Fuchs was released because of the need for physicists and mathematicians in wartime Britain. He was sent back to work in Edinburgh until 1941.
Whether as a member of the “Red Students” and Free Socialist Youth in Kiel and Berlin, or an emigrant in Paris, or in the internment camp in Canada, Fuchs was always in the middle of political struggle or flight, except for the short time of his studies that led to a Ph.D. under Nevill Mott in Bristol and his work as assistant lecturer for Max Born.

In the short time with Born, he produced such important work that Born considered Fuchs together with Werner Heisenberg as two of his most important students. In 1935, at the age of twenty-three, Fuchs published his first work in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* under the title: “A Quantum Mechanical Investigation of Cohesive Forces of Metallic Copper.” By 1942, he had published five more papers in the field of electron theory of metals. Fourteen more papers, some co-authored with Born, dealt with statistical mechanics, the theory of relativity, quantum field theory, and nuclear theory.

Fuchs’s 1938 paper on the electron theory of metals was not only his most-cited work, but it made him the most frequently cited scientist in the GDR. Günter Flach, as director of the Central Institute for Nuclear Research (Rossendorf, GDR), in a memorial speech at the Academic Colloquium of Physics on 19 January 1989, emphasized that “it has left the deepest tracks in the world of science” (1990, 5–10). He added, “I am very sorry that those results became known only a short time ago and that Klaus Fuchs was not aware of the success of his now fifty years ‘young’ pioneering work during his lifetime.”

In 1941 Fuchs went to work with German-Jewish refugee physicist Rudolf Peierls and Austrian-Jewish refugee physicist Otto Frisch at Birmingham University, where he stayed until 1943. In his private list of his publications, he refers to papers written during this period as secret publications of the MS-series of the Birmingham group (K. Fuchs 1996). The work on the theoretical basis for an atomic bomb had already begun in Britain, independently of the United States.

In the wake of the German annexation of Austria in 1938, Otto Frisch’s aunt, the physicist Lise Meitner, had to flee Vienna to Sweden to avoid arrest by the Gestapo. In December 1938,
University of Berlin nuclear chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman, with whom she had been collaborating, consulted her for an interpretation of their observation of the element barium after uranium had been bombarded with neutrons. Meitner, in turn consulted with her nephew, who was then visiting her in Stockholm from Copenhagen, where he had been working under Niels Bohr. Together, Meitner and Frisch concluded that the barium Hahn and Strassman had observed was the result of the splitting of the uranium nucleus in a process that they subsequently called fission when they published their interpretation of Hahn and Strassman’s discovery in 1939. Hahn and Strassman had discovered the enormous power contained in the atomic nucleus.

From Copenhagen, Otto Frisch went to Birmingham University to continue his research in collaboration with Peierls. In spring 1940, Frisch and Peierls submitted two secret memoranda to the British government outlining the potential of using uranium 235 to produce an atomic bomb. They warned of the urgency of proceeding with research on the bomb because of the possibility that German scientists would be engaging in such an effort.

Upon receipt of the secret memoranda, the British government created the Maud Committee to consider the feasibility of constructing an atomic bomb, and Frisch and Peierls were put in charge of a small team to investigate the chain-reaction process that could lead to an atomic bomb.

Max Born’s comments on Fuchs’s move from Edinburgh to Birmingham are not only interesting but very characteristic of him:

Though my recollections of these discussions with Fuchs are dim, I believe I had a strong feeling that an atomic super-bomb would be a devilish invention and I wanted nothing to do with it. For though I hated Hitler and the Nazis more than I can express, and though I despised the German people because they had brought him to power and fought for him like lunatics, I could never bring myself to consent to actions by which not only Nazis and Hitler’s soldiers were killed but also innocent children and people who shared my feelings. But Fuchs thought otherwise. He hated Hitler and his gang so violently that he was willing to use any weapon
to destroy them and to prevent the world from getting into their grip. So he accepted Peierls’s offer and disappeared. (Born 1975, 287)

It should be mentioned that Born’s wife was a Quaker, and he was close to the Society of Friends, as is clear from his remarks. Fuchs stated in his confession that he had not known what was going on when Peierls invited him to work on military projects.

I doubt whether it would have made any difference to my subsequent actions if I had known the nature of the work beforehand. When I learned the purpose of the work I decided to inform Russia and I established contact through another member of the Communist Party [of Germany]. Since that time I have had continuous contact with persons who were completely unknown to me, except that I knew that they would hand whatever information I gave them to the Russian authorities.

Klaus Fuchs continues:

At this time I had a complete confidence in Russian policy and I believed that the Western Allies deliberately allowed Russia and Germany to fight each other to the death. I had, therefore, no hesitation in giving all the information I had, even though occasionally I tried to concentrate mainly on giving information about the results of my own work. (1987, 199–200)

As a convinced Communist, he decided to help the country of the October Revolution in its dire need, especially since the opening of a second front was long in coming, and it seemed that the Allies were waiting to see who would be bled dry first. But in my opinion, Fuchs’s actions also were the response of a scientist to the question of personal responsibility when participating in the development of such terrible destructive power, especially in view of the temporarily hidden competition between two different world systems. Moreover, under the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, the two countries had agreed to share secret information on military weapons and technology (Williams 1987, 132).
One often reads that scientists lost their innocence with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and ever since have been discussing their responsibility. Those physicists who first confronted the prospect of the possible violation of the humanistic mission of science as a consequence of their research must have agonized even more.

The only written record on this by Fuchs known to me states:

The exciting discovery was made in the winter of 1938/39, when World War II sent its menacing shadows ahead. And overnight, all illusions about a “neutral” or “value free” science were scattered in the face of the fateful question that demanded a personal decision from me, as well, when I was invited to participate in the English atomic bomb project in 1941: Will the power of the atom be used for good or ill? How great is the danger of Hitler fascism? How great are the dangers of this sinister weapon in a divided world?

Nobody had any doubt that Otto Hahn would refuse to work on an atomic bomb. But how would Heisenberg, Weizsäcker, and other well-known nuclear scientists react? One cannot find the answers in the German physics journals of the time. (1976)

Today we know that the Blitzkrieg ideology denied Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and the other nuclear physicists in Germany the necessary research support for the construction of the bomb. They may well have been glad that, in spite of intense research in the field, as reported by the English secret service and especially by Paul Rosbaud, the editor of the Physikalischen Blätter (Kramish 1986, 129), they were unable to create the bomb.

It is often said erroneously that the German atomic bomb was not developed because the physicists did not wish to do so. In this way, German researchers put themselves on a moral pedestal as compared to the English and American ones, who were feverishly working on the development of an atomic bomb, driven by the fear the fascist Axis powers would get this weapon first. In reality, the German financial and economic resources were insufficient.
In 1943, Fuchs went to the United States as part of the British team to work on the Manhattan Project. Mentioned in his list of “secret” publications are: “Works in the MSNY series of the English team in New York on problems of fluctuations in enrichment, especially considering regulatory problems of the diffusion separation installation” (1996). From 1944 to 1946 he worked in Los Alamos, where he concerned himself with projects that he described as “Works in the LA series of Los Alamos on the following issues: The occurrence of instabilities in an implosion, especially of ‘jets,’ problems of detonation by a neutron source, problems of the spreading and form of the explosive wave, e.g., in variable air pressures, problems of denatured fission material, neutron impulses of an impulse reactor, motion integral in hydrodynamics.”

Fuchs returned to England in 1946 and became the director of the theory department at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment in Harwell. There he worked on problems of reactor theory and radiation protection, and headed the Fast Reactors commission. Under the “secret” heading, he lists works on problems of reactor design, especially perspectives on the development of performance reactors, fast reactors, and tolerance for radioactive substances. Fuchs worked at Harwell up to the time of his arrest in 1950. In the same year, he published another paper, on interference theory, in the Proceedings of the Physical Society of London.

Under the title “Comments on the History of the H-Bomb,” Hans Bethe, Nobel laureate and leader of the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos 1943–45, published an article that, according to Stanislaw Ulam, made Edward Teller “go pale with fury” (Broad 1982). In this article, written in 1954 but first published in slightly revised form in 1982, Bethe corrected the erroneously reported history of the hydrogen bomb, showing decisively that the development of the superbomb was not obstructed by the political opposition of Robert Oppenheimer, but by mistakes in calculations by Edward Teller. While stressing Teller’s creative contributions to the development project during and after the war, Bethe stated that he had to agree to Teller’s wish to detach himself from further
work on the atomic bomb project during the war because Teller did not want to carry out detailed calculations that were needed for the atomic bomb project. “Partly for this reason,” wrote Bethe, “some members of the British Atomic Energy team, already working in the U.S. on other aspects of the Manhattan District Project, were brought to Los Alamos and asked to help with this problem. The leader of the British theoretical group was Rudolf Peierls, and another very hardworking member was Klaus Fuchs” (1982, 44).

On 14 February 1950, shortly after Fuchs’s arrest, Bethe told the FBI that Fuchs was “extremely brilliant, one of the top men in the world of atomic energy.”

The high esteem expressed in several published interviews and documentary films that Rudolf Peierls and other colleagues had for Fuchs as a scientist and human being, even after his arrest and conviction and the personal disappointment that they experienced, shows the importance of Fuchs’s scientific achievements that we had not been able to speak about, since no mention of his work during World War II was permitted in the GDR (on this prohibition, see also Laitko 2003).

It is therefore very important for a correct history of science that it was possible to invite German A. Goncharov to Berlin to participate in the recent conference on ethics in science and the responsibility of the scientist, in honor of Klaus Fuchs. From 1952 to 1965, Goncharov worked as a senior scientist in the theoretical division of the Soviet hydrogen bomb project under the leadership of Igor Tamm and Andrei Sakharov. He also had access to the secret documents in the Presidential Archives in Moscow. With this background, he has written extensively on the development of the Soviet atomic and hydrogen bomb programs. It was thus possible to establish a proper appreciation for Fuchs’s achievements by drawing a step-by-step picture Fuchs’s contributions to Los Alamos projects.

Today we also know through the recent material provided by Goncharov that the British research team in the United States not only made important contributions to the development of the atomic bomb, but also to the development of the thermonuclear bomb. Recent examinations of the secret archives—the details of a joint U.S. patent by Fuchs with the mathematician John von Neumann
in 1946—led the historian of science Gennady Gorelik to state, “The ‘technically sweet’ in Oppenheimer’s words, idea was born apparently in the head of Fuchs, and he could be named a grandfather of the three national H-bombs he worked for—American, Soviet and British” (2002).

This estimate that Fuchs contributed a fundamental independent idea to the realization of the hydrogen bomb is based on the fact that both hydrogen bomb groups—Teller/Ulam in the United States and Zel’dovich/Sakharov in the USSR—had to get out of the blind alley in which they found themselves in regard to the method for igniting the thermonuclear explosion. For the solution, Teller consciously resorted to Fuchs’s 1946 discovery, while Sakharov solved the problem independently. But he was probably also stimulated by the ideas of the patent of Fuchs and Neumann.

According to Goncharov, Soviet scientists developed a solution analogous to the Teller-Ulam concept on their own. It seems, however, probable, and can by no means be excluded, that the decisive step leading Soviet scientists to the discovery of the Soviet equivalent was based in early spring 1954 on the repeated study of the document delivered by Fuchs in 1948. This document, according to Goncharov, contained the scheme and extensive description of how the “Classic Super” worked together with the two-stage system of initiation based on the principle of radiation implosion. This is, as Goncharov pointed out, very similar to the situation when the development of the Teller-Ulam concept in the United States was stimulated by the Fuchs-Neumann patent (Goncharov 2003). Both the patent with regard to the physics in the United States and Fuchs’s contribution to Soviet physics underline the extremely great importance of Klaus Fuchs as a scientist, an importance that has long been unknown, because it was overshadowed by the Cold War.

The history of the fundamental research on this world-changing and terrible weapon has to be rewritten. Fuchs’s now-recognized ideas did not originally get recognition on either side, either by the Soviet physicist Zel’dovich, who had access to the information conveyed by Fuchs, or by Teller and his colleagues at Los Alamos, who invited Fuchs, before his departure in April 1946, to a conference organized to discuss the superbomb.
In his then-classified response to Bethe’s 1952 “Memorandum on the History of the Thermonuclear Program,” Teller wrote:

It appears to me that the idea of the [deleted (the Teller-Ulam design?)] was a relatively slight modification of ideas generally known in 1946. Essentially only two elements had to be added: to implode a larger volume, and to achieve greater compression by keeping the imploded material cool as long as possible. . . . The main principle of radiation implosion was developed in connection with the thermonuclear program and was stated at a conference on the thermonuclear bomb, in the spring of 1946. Dr. Bethe did not attend this conference, but Dr. Fuchs did.11

A really tense situation. Bethe emphasizes strongly Teller’s achievements. He speaks of a brilliant discovery, an idea of genius. Teller contradicts the evaluation by saying that he only slightly changed what was known before. “And now, a half a century later, the thing that at that time concerned the difference of opinion comes to light, released as a piece of evidence from the secret archives of the Soviet Union” (Gorlik 2000, 165–84).

Fuchs’s design, with “a relatively slight modification,” turned out to be the basic arrangement for modern thermonuclear weapons. The scheme in the patent of Fuchs and Neumann was the trigger for the ignition, and in its further development was unlike what was had been envisaged in the “classical super”—the original plan for the hydrogen bomb.

Fuchs’s design, the first physical scheme to use the radiation implosion principle, was a prototype for the future Teller-Ulam configuration. Fuchs’s proposal, truly remarkable in the wealth of ideas that it embodied, was far ahead of its time. Indeed, mathematical modeling of the physical processes involved was not yet advanced enough to further develop Fuchs’s idea. It would take another five years in the US for the enormous conceptual potential of the proposal to be fully substantiated. (Goncharov 1996b, 46)

Fuchs never spoke to me about the patent that stood behind that brilliant discovery. He mentioned the name of John von Neumann
in an entirely different context. I had mentioned, to him that I am not able to stem the euphoria toward machines that credits them with creative achievements. I am only partially able to express my thesis that the machine is only a conveyor of information, as opposed to the creative, active person who creates new information. In response to my remarks on the subject, Fuchs said almost irritatively, “Then say to your friends that I have worked in Los Alamos on the first machine with John von Neumann and then one should at least believe me that we had to deal with highly specialized complete idiots. With all that efficiency, they are in no way creative. The human being is the only creative productive force.”

For Klaus Fuchs the question was from the beginning that of participation of all partners in the anti-Hitler coalition. Participation in the arms race and the scientific efforts involved were only justified by the threat from Nazi Germany. After the anti-Hitler coalition broke up, Fuchs began to doubt Soviet policies:

In the postwar period I began again to have my doubts about Russian policy. It is impossible to give definite incidents because now the control mechanism acted against me, also keeping away from me facts which I could not look in the face, but they did penetrate and eventually I came to a point when I knew I disapproved of a great many actions of the Russian Government and of the Communist Party, but I still believed that they would build a new world and that one day I would take part in it and that on that day I would also have to stand up and say to them that there are things which they are doing wrong. (1987, 200)

Shortly after his arrival in the GDR in 1959, I was impressed to learn that he was really doing this. Grete Keilson and I had picked him up from Schönefeld Airport, and in a bizarre journey, with hordes of reporters chasing us, took him to his father’s weekend cottage by Wandlitzsee. I had to take my motorbike back to Leipzig the same afternoon because I had exams in political economy the next day. When I told him there were intense discussions going on in the Institute of Philosophy and one student was in trouble for not agreeing with the official thesis that “peaceful coexistence” applied on an international level, but not in the
relation between the two German states, Klaus Fuchs looked at me and said: “That is devoid of any logic, because what applies in general also applies in specific cases.” An article later appeared in Neues Deutschland by Gerhard Kegel, a GDR diplomat, that countered this wrong and dangerous thesis, which had been officially promoted for a long time.

For my part, I was impressed from the first day by Fuchs’s scientific way of thinking, even on political questions. Especially in those early days, he was involved repeatedly in philosophical discussion, as much as it was possible for me to bring it to him. When he realized that an article prepared by my group of students for Zeitschrift für Philosophie (Böhnisch et al. 1961) was too compromising toward Lysenko (in spite of our attempt not to promote his positions), he sent me a sharply worded letter and asked how we could justify failure to distance ourselves unambiguously from assumptions that had been clearly refuted by science. When I was already working in the Department for Philosophical Problems of the Natural Sciences and we had begun to look at the problem of determinism in physics and biology, he criticized us for not truly grasping the real liberating achievement of modern physics, the real existence of probability (which went against Hegel as well as Marx and Engels, who, in accordance with the status of science in their time, had seen probability only as the manifestation of necessity). Indeed, development toward socialism was only a possibility; another possibility was nuclear war; and therefore we were required to do whatever we could to ban nuclear bombs and promote peaceful development. I do not know if he had also included the actual event of implosion of the socialist countries in his realm of possibilities. Although this is not likely, it is certain that the overcoming of the mechanistic worldview and the openness for future developments, where humans are not merely a cog in a predetermined world history but will and must influence events, is at the core of his anti-dogmatic position, oriented towards scientific-technological and social progress.

Obviously, one of the ways he tried to act upon his vision of critical and constructive work in socialism was that after his
arrival in the GDR he engaged himself not only in nuclear energy and nuclear technology but also with also philosophical issues (1965) and scientific-organizational structures.

Since I had little contact with Fuchs because of his workload and our different fields, I cannot write in detail about his work in Rossendorf as acting director of the Central Institute for Nuclear Research (1959–1973), or at the Academy of Sciences of the GDR as leader of the field of physics, nuclear, and industrial material science and committee membership in the Academy, or as member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). But it is appropriate to refer to the multitude of publications he now produced without the “secret” designation. It would go beyond the scope of this article to list them all.

In his documents, Fuchs emphatically refers to his many years of publishing materials against the misuse of nuclear energy for imperialist purposes, and in favor of nuclear disarmament.

Fuchs’s contribution to a volume marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of Planck’s discovery of the quantum of energy has fundamental significance for my work in informatics, especially in the field of formation of information systems in organizations, the development of a methodology for a complex and practical formation of information systems, and software development. He wrote:

One of the most robust children of quantum theory—solid state physics—provides both knowledge and means to solve the problems related to the development of comprehensive control, operation, and information systems for increasingly complicated technological processes. With the ongoing development of such an extensive system, the role of human beings in the process of production will be fundamentally changed, especially that of the operator. We can summarize this human-machine problem with this comparison: is the human being an element of the control system—an unfortunately unavoidable, capricious, breakdown-prone element that requires a special branch of science, “human engineering,” as supplement to “control-engineering”—or is the human in the production process the master of this system? (K. Fuchs 1977)
This relatively small segment of his explanation is based on fundamental considerations and bears witness to the high-ranking humanistic concerns also found in his later scientific and scientific-organizational work. Analysis of the Three-Mile Island reactor accident\textsuperscript{15} made it clear to him that the cause of the accident was over-automation, and that for this reason more attention needed to be paid to the place of the human in highly complex information technological systems, that humans cannot be treated as elements in this system, but must retain ultimate decision-making power.

In another work that he made available to me, he says even more clearly:

In the United States there are different viewpoints on the lessons of the reactor accident on Three Mile Island. The results of the presidential fact-finding committee allow only one conclusion: a small, easy-to-fix fault developed into a serious accident because conditions inside the reactor had been completely misjudged. The following quote from the American journal *Control Engineering* [Sublett 1980, 62] illustrates the progressive attitude of many engineers toward the role of human being in automated production: “The more demanding and automated the equipment, the more critical is the role of man, the more costly are mistakes. . . . Man is the central reason for the design.” (1983, 63)

In view of the widespread technological euphoria and the accompanying ideal of full automation and gradual reduction of the workforce in the production process, and in view of the dominant technocratic thinking that too easily and too often combines with partisan dogmatism, these conclusions and talks with him served as a beacon for me. Without them the fruitfulness of the 1986 (Dochertty et al. 1987) and 1989 (Besselar et al. 1991) Berlin conferences of Technical Committee 9 of the International Federation of Information Processing: Relationship between Computers and Society, for which I shared organizational and content responsibility, would have been doubtful.

Many information technologists are promoting these findings—for example, in connection with a plane crash in
Warsaw and other disasters—but in those days they still had to be fought for.

Whenever he criticized something, Fuchs always used scientific language. When we younger ones would have liked to have had stronger criticism from a person in his position, he did not find it easy to do so under the conditions of the Cold War, especially as one in the generation that has been through so much struggle and suffering. Fuchs had great inner discipline, in accordance with his principle that those who have become conscious of their humanity are not ruled by external influences. Their inner selves—their human consciousness—guide their decisions.

His words on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of his mentor Max Born underline his fierce belief in the humanist mission of science. He wrote, “He welcomed the overcoming of the cold, dead worldview that had ruled physics since Newton’s time. In the dispute between Newton and Goethe, he recognized long before the formulation of the principle of complementarity the contradictory and mutually complementing opposites in knowledge, because he saw and loved the whole person in his or her lively, contradictory, and creative work (1962).

In his confession, Klaus Fuchs also mentions the talk with his father about the latter’s move to the then Soviet-occupied zone in 1949 and admits:

At that time my own mind was closer to his than it had ever been before, because he also believed that they are at least trying to build a new world. He disapproved of many things and he had always done so, but he knew that when he went there he would say so and he thought that in doing so he might help to make them realize that you cannot build a new world if you destroy some fundamental decencies in personal behaviour. I could not bring myself to stop my father from going there. However, it made me face at last some of the facts about myself. I felt that my father’s going to the Eastern Zone, that his letters, would touch me somewhere and that I was not sure whether I would not go back. (1987, 201)
Apparently Klaus Fuchs decided during the talks with his father to leave the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell.

Comparison of this part of the confession with the words of Max Born strengthens this impression. Born writes about a visit to Harwell when Fuchs showed him around laboratories there. When he heard that Emil Fuchs was in Oxford, he invited father and son for dinner:

I remember very little of our talk, but one thing has stuck. Klaus complained that the routine work on nuclear technology—construction of reactors and such things—was rather dull. So I asked him why he remained there and did not return to academic work, and I offered him my help in getting a good job at a university. His reply was: “Thank you, but it is too late.” That struck me as strange; I could not understand what he might mean, for he was still a young fellow. (1975, 288)

Robert Williams notes, however, that in June 1948, Professor Peierls wrote the director of the Harwell Atomic Energy Research Establishment, John Cockcroft praising Fuchs’s talent: “Peierls wrote Cockcroft that Klaus Fuchs was probably the ‘strongest candidate’ for a university chair in mathematical physics should one become vacant in England, for he was ‘one of the few men well-suited to build up a strong school of theoretical physics.’ A few months later he proposed Fuchs for membership in the Royal Society, a proposal that was seconded by Cockcroft” (Williams 1987, 98). So what was “too late” at this time?

Fuchs was hesitant to leave because he did not want to cause upset to his work and especially to that of his friends. Decisive for him was his wish to avert as much damage as possible at Harwell and to maintain as many friendships with colleagues and others as possible. He also did not want to betray any of the agents whom he knew only by sight, but for whom he would have given his life and who were putting their lives on the line for him. The last time he passed on information was in February or March of 1949.

My grandfather and I visited Fuchs in the summer of 1949 in Harwell on our way back from the United States to Germany. But my grandfather wanted to go to Leipzig by himself, as he
was not sure what to expect in the Soviet Occupied Zone. So he had the idea that I could stay with my uncle in England and go to an English boarding school, rather than return to Odenwaldschule near Heppenheim. We actually did tour several boarding schools, but they all seemed too strict to me. Finally my grandfather said: “After being at one of the best and most informal schools in the United States, Shady Hill in Cambridge, this would really be too much for him.” When he uttered this conclusion, I was sitting behind my uncle in the car and could tell his palpable relief from his body language. Apparently he had said once in a conversation with his Soviet handler Alexander Feklisov that he did not want to establish a family in England to avoid putting them in danger (Feklisov 2001, 224). So what was he supposed to do with me? Feklisov writes that Fuchs also talked about his future plans. “I’d like to help the Soviet Union until it is able to test its atomic bomb. Then I want to go home to East Germany where I have friends. There I can get married and work in peace and quiet. That’s my dream” (225).

William Skardon from Scotland Yard appeared at Klaus Fuchs’s office on 21 December 1949, one week before Fuchs’s thirty-eighth birthday. He found a man who was already internally prepared for the events, even though he hesitated slightly and suspiciously, when he was asked about any Soviet contacts he had in New York: “I don’t think so,” was his reply (Moss 1987, 135). It was not this that caused him to confess, but, as he tells it, he betrayed himself when his colleague Skinner came to him and said: “If you tell us that the accusations are false we will stand behind you as one man” (classified videotaped interview mentioned in note 24). Here, he says, it was impossible for me to continue lying to my friends. On 27 January 1950 he went to London, where Skardon was waiting for him at the railroad station, and made his confession at the War Office.

Fuchs’s Soviet handler Feklisov writes that when Fuchs was first confronted with the charges that he passed on information to the Soviet Union about his work, he denied them. According to the present official record, British intelligence had been informed by the FBI that a British physicist, subsequently
identified as Fuchs, had passed information to the Soviet Union. This information is said to be based on a decrypted cable from the Soviet Consulate General in New York to Moscow reporting a secret meeting between Harry Gold and Fuchs in the apartment of Fuchs’s sister, Christel Fuchs-Heinemann, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in February 1945 (not January, as Feklisov mistakenly states). Feklisov asserts that this cable was an FBI forgery to protect its real source, Harry Gold, who, according to Feklisov, was turned by the FBI well before the arrest of Fuchs. Further evidence presented by the FBI consisted of a map of Santa Fe (which Feklisov suggests was found in Gold’s apartment during an earlier search and not after Fuchs’s arrest) with demarcations of meeting places and pictures of Gold. Fuchs continued to deny everything. During the interrogations he continued his work in Harwell, where he saw his friends and colleagues on a daily basis. This psychological pressure was apparently intentional. When asked directly by a friend, Herbert Skinner, who was deputy director at Harwell, he finally admitted his cooperation with the Soviet Union. According to Feklisov, Fuchs also drew the conclusion during the interrogations that Harry Gold had betrayed him (Feklisov 2001, 240–41, 275–77). If so, it would appear that Fuchs provided no significant information to his interrogators that they had not already known.16

In my opinion, Klaus Fuchs’s confession is not a great success for Scotland Yard, as has been claimed, but a victory of humanity, of genuine friendly feelings not toward his friends, but also toward the country that had given him refuge. A spy cannot afford these kinds of emotions. His conversation with his father and his feelings after that raise the question of whether he really wanted to continue or if honesty toward his friends had already taken on greater importance for him.

He stated to the judge:

I have committed certain crimes for which I am charged, and I expect sentence. I have also committed some other crimes which are not crimes in eyes of the law—crimes against my friends and when I asked my counsel to put certain facts before you, I did not do it because I wanted to
lighten my sentence. I did it in order to atone for those other crimes. (Moss 1987, 163)

He retained international respect and many friendships because of his scientific achievements, his engagement for the preservation of world peace (even though this was certainly not approved by all and he suffered imprisonment for it), and especially for his attitude toward his friends. I do not know of any book or film where the leading physicists who worked with Fuchs do not speak with great respect of him, even if they condemn his deed.17

The arrest of Klaus Fuchs gave new buoyancy to the anti-Communist witch hunt in the United States. The atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation had already been spreading when Franklin D. Roosevelt’s close associates were pushed out of office. The hysteria and persecution that came to be named after the infamous Senator Joseph McCarthy flourished in the United States for many years with wide application of snooping with the help of bugging devices and other forms of surveillance, lie detectors, and blacklisting. My aunt Christel Fuchs-Heinemann and her children suffered greatly. I was at Odenwaldschule at the time and the principal, Minna Specht, who had herself been an emigrant in England, showed great understanding. My teacher in the United States, Miss Thorp, great-granddaughter of the famous American poet Longfellow, wrote a kindly letter almost every day at first, then every week. So not every American became a victim of witch-hunt fever and saw Klaus Fuchs as the most infamous traitor of the century.

Klaus Fuchs was ready to receive the death penalty, but British law provided for this only during war, not in peacetime. In reality, Fuchs should have been viewed not as passing on secrets to an enemy, but to an ally.18 As contemporary U.S. documentary films show, members of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s circle and also Robert Oppenheimer19 spoke about passing on the results of atomic weapons research to their allies, in the interest of a stable postwar order. Fuchs’s position was therefore not all that strange; rather it reflected the position of a good portion of the researchers in Los Alamos. Niels Bohr as well had brought such ideas forward to Churchill and Roosevelt.20 Fuchs was merely the most
consistent, who did what many others were only thinking, which made him guilty in the eyes of the law, but, as Emil Fuchs says, he probably did more for the English people and the world than if he had not done it.

Colonel Rudolf Petershagen, who handed the city of Greifswald over to the Allies was acting against prevailing law and military orders, but by following his conscience he saved the city and many lives.\textsuperscript{21} There are situations when a decision has to be based on personal determination, in order to avoid tragedy in face of the lack of understanding of the potential dangers. \textquote{Pity the country that needs heroes,} says Brecht in \textit{Galileo}.

I was able to visit him and his father briefly in Harwell both on my way to the United States in the fall of 1948 and again on my way back in the summer of 1949. He told us enthusiastically that they were now working on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a child, I was most impressed by the fact that my uncle and his colleagues were constantly working on calculations; even on a family outing to the forest and the Thames River they would not stop. It is questionable how much they noticed of the nature around them.\textsuperscript{22}

From these few weeks, I clearly remember a conversation between father and son. Emil Fuchs asked his son if he would get into difficulties if he, Emil, went to Leipzig. Klaus replied that he did not know, but he would ask his security representative the next day. The next evening he reported there was no reason to fear any difficulties for his position in Harwell because of his father’s move to the East. In several books, this talk with the security representative is described as the event that triggered the investigation and later arrest of Klaus Fuchs. Of course, the father felt burdened by the thought that the security man was only trying to calm Klaus down while he started the machinations against him. It is likely that the security man approached the British security apparatus, which was in a state of alarm after the Soviet atomic bomb test.

Emil Fuchs writes in the manuscripts for the second and third part of his autobiography about the attempts to get him a chair for theology in Berlin or Leipzig, even before his trip to the United States. The correspondence with Dresden had continued during his stay in the United States. So the secret services, especially
the FBI, were directly informed. And more! The house of his sister, Christel Fuchs-Heinemann in Cambridge, Massachusetts, was under constant FBI surveillance. At the premiere of Joachim Hellwig’s film about Klaus Fuchs, Väter der Tausend Sonnen, produced by the GDR film studio DEFA, William A. Reuben presented me with his book The Atom Spy Hoax (1955) and a number of transcripts of bugging operations from my time in Cambridge. He posed a question I have not been able to answer even today: If the FBI was so well informed that they practically had only to pull his or his sister’s file to find out about their Communist past, why did they wait until 1950?

In his autobiography, Max Born writes about his last meeting with Klaus Fuchs:

I met Fuchs once more at a meeting on elementary particles held in Edinburgh during 14–16 November 1949. I have a photo of the members grouped in front of the portico in the court of the natural philosophy building. It shows many of my colleagues and friends, such as Darwin, Peierls, Feather, Fröhlich, Powell, Proca, Bopp, Möller, Rosenfeld, Kemmer and Pryce. In the front row Klaus Fuchs can be seen, sitting beside Janossy, who was and is a communist (now in Budapest) and, just two rows above, Pontecorvo, who a short time later was also found to have given away secrets to the Soviets and vanished to Moscow. I wonder whether this grouping was accidental. (1975, 288)

I was deeply moved on reading these lines (unfortunately I found a copy only recently in Klaus Fuchs’s estate). Only the answer to this question would make a film about Fuchs possible. The Hellwig film was introduced with the statement that the Politburo member Kurt Hager had prohibited the making of a film about Klaus Fuchs. That is not the entire truth. Fuchs did not want a film about his life. When he was dying in hospital, the filmmakers asked me to approach him with the request to allow a film about him. It was literally the last day of his life, 28 January 1988, in Berlin. His response was: “I don’t want a movie about myself, if such a film should be made it should be about all.” I
took this as an expression of his well-known modesty and did not want to bother him any more. But since then I have been wondering: whom did he mean by “all”? It was certainly his wish to keep good relations with all his colleagues with whom he had worked together in Los Alamos and in Harwell.

Even after publication of the book *Perseus: Spionage in Los Alamos* (Tschikow and Kern 1996), which reveals much, there are still unanswered questions, largely because after the distortions of the Cold War era it is difficult to present a complete and accurate picture of events.23

Although there were realistic estimates that the Soviet Union would have caught up to the United States within four to five years, some claimed that the Soviets would not have been able to do it alone. During a visit with Emil Fuchs at the theological faculty in Leipzig, Frederic Joliot Curie, president of the World Peace Council and main initiator of the “Stockholm Appeal,” expressed his opinion that he would have shared Klaus Fuchs’s fate if he had not withdrawn in time from nuclear research, since the Cold War propaganda needed a case like Klaus Fuchs to blame everything on espionage.

In the segment “New Personal Fates,” Emil Fuchs writes especially about the shameless press campaign “that affected me as well; an unimportant matter that needed to be dealt with but did not touch the reality of big events.” This campaign was fanned again and again, primarily to sharpen the conditions of the Cold War. Emil Fuchs saved the articles that were particularly malicious, together with anonymous hate mail and a death threat from “Fighters against Inhumanity” in a special folder under the title *Kuriosa*, in his own typical way of dealing with the “unimportant” matter of character assassination. Of course, he appreciated friendly correspondence even more because of this. Aside from those mentioned by him, there were the comments by the poet Johannes R. Becher, a letter from cathedral dean Karl Kleinschmidt, and a very kind and understanding letter from the church president Pastor Martin Niemöller (Balzer 2002, 35–53). The espionage case was blown out of proportion to further anti-Communist incitement of the people. To counter this, others
have been trying to downplay it as much as possible, even to undo it.

For example, William A. Reuben has a startling answer to the issue of treason in *The Atom Spy Hoax* (1955). He claims the crime of treason did not happen, that there was no evidence for this charge. The press accounts, as well as the verdict, were based solely on Fuchs’s confession. The United States needed this case during the Cold War, especially for the anti-Communist witch hunt during the McCarthy era. Startled by this, I asked Reuben, upon being contacted by him, why Klaus would make such a confession if he was not guilty. Reuben’s response was that Fuchs was trying to protect his sister. She needed protection because she could have been drawn into the Rosenberg case and become subject to severe punishment under U.S. law. Reuben asked me if Fuchs had ever said what information had supposedly been passed on. Everybody he had asked had looked astonished and replied in the negative.

I never talked to Fuchs about the matter. His colleagues in Rossendorf, as well as his wife, always said that he did not want to talk about it. So one did not ask.24

Contemporary publications prove that the view that there was no transfer of secret information is simply wrong.25 Regardless of exact details, the information about the right direction for the bomb projects was of incalculable value to the Soviet Union.

Fuchs was asked about this many times at public appearances. He always maintained with great modesty that the Soviet scientists would have been able to achieve their aim without his help, and that they basically had done it by their own efforts, because the difficulties were not of a theoretical but of a practical nature, and a required a large industrial complex that had to be created independently from the information that was passed on. His part in this would be cleared up one day by history.

Emil Fuchs described how, at the beginning of the trial, we were visited in Leipzig by a secretary from the Soviet embassy, who explained that the Soviet Union would make no statement on the Fuchs case, since it would not be of any help to him. At the time, this seemed perfectly clear to us. Later on, I was less understanding when I was asked to erase the following sentence from
my school CV: “My uncle was sentenced to jail in 1950 for spying for the Soviet Union.” The reason for this request was that supposedly the Soviet Union did not engage in espionage. I refused repeatedly and stated my entire family was proud of his actions and this would be the last thing I would erase from my CV. When I added that the Rosenbergs would likely still be alive if my uncle had been extradited to the United States, since he would have been executed to set an example, the commission had enough. They had never experienced such arrogance—that somebody would put his uncle above the Rosenbergs. Things only calmed down when my grandfather himself met with the school administration. Although this episode might be dismissed as a Cold War aberration, I am mentioning it here for a number of reasons.26

First, when I told the story to an American friend many years later, she answered rather vehemently, “Why are you standing up so much for the GDR? Can’t you see they don’t even want you there?” I answered that because of all the sacrifices that had been made, it was important to protect that state on German soil where at least a man like Hans Globke [co-author of the official Nazi commentary on the racist Nuremberg Laws–Ed] could not become Secretary of State.

Second, a few weeks after writing this, we had a visit from a Moscow TV team. The director asked if I could imagine that, if Klaus Fuchs had returned to the East directly from Los Alamos or during the fifties, he would have been put on trial either for helping the Americans build their bomb or because of his confession. I rejected this question as speculative and refused to answer. But in the face of the fate of many prisoners of war and forced laborers who were accused of having worked for Germany, the question is not without justification.

The fact is that neither the Soviet Union nor Russia today have ever taken a stand regarding the case. When I asked my cousin in the United States, Steven, for a possible reason for that, he responded convincingly, “Because he wasn’t one of them!” It was true! He did not belong to the secret service apparatus. He never took money. He mainly passed on what he himself was working on. He had acted solely on his conscience and his beliefs.
When I visited the representative of the resistance in St. Gallenkirch, with whom we had much contact during the last years of the war, he proudly showed me an article that he had written to refute somebody’s claim that Fuchs had received a lot of money. This man, a shoemaker named Spannring, had, of course, no evidence to the contrary. He had simply concluded that anyone who had come to know Emil Fuchs would know that his son would not take money; but had acted only to preserve world peace.

When people ask me why the Soviet Union has never honored or even acknowledged Klaus Fuchs’s commitment, his sacrifice of a promising career for a country he did not even know, I have only one explanation (aside from the above-mentioned incitement by the other side): nationalism and personal egoism that would not allow the admission that decorated Soviet researchers had help. But I cannot understand why the Minister for Research of the GDR did not mention Klaus Fuchs’s jail time in his eulogy at his funeral, but simply stated that he was in Los Alamos and then came to the GDR. It takes me back to my time at the Arbeiter und Bauern Fakultät [Workers’ and Farmers’ University], when no criticism of the Soviet Union was permitted. Surely this pretension was one of the reasons for the downfall of the Soviet Union, which Fuchs had tried to prevent with his sacrifices during the war.

The basic conflict for Fuchs was that between allegiance to his country and allegiance toward humanity. This conflict can arise in different forms. He definitely decided on the side of humanity, the interest of all humankind. In this decisive point, father and son always agreed. Emil Fuchs had become a religious socialist and staunch pacifist out of his deeply religious belief, following the call of the Sermon on the Mount. The son did not follow Emil Fuchs in this basic ideology. He was not religious, but based his ideology on science. He was no pacifist, but on the contrary he put his brilliant talent into the service of the Allies’ armament program because of his understanding that Nazi Germany had to be beaten militarily by common efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition.

But father and son were always closely united through their humanist ideals. Both felt bound by their responsibility to the
people of the world; the ideals of Christianity and the humanist ideals of socialism are not opposites, so they could understand and support each other. It was thus no joke, when Klaus Fuchs said that despite their father’s advice always to follow their conscience, he and his siblings “always did what he wanted.”

For this reason, I think it is more difficult, but also more important, to grasp the basic beliefs of his father and mother, than to produce yet another book or film about Klaus Fuchs. Johannes R. Becher wrote in his diary Auf andere Art so grosse Hoffnung (1951) that the history of the Fuchs family would be an appropriate task for him as a modern Buddenbrooks [a novel by Thomas Mann], but as far as I know he never began such a work.²⁸

Reports about the need to be in constant hiding, and the reality of being at the mercy of the Nazis, are rare. I was almost more impressed by those than by the later arrest for revealing secrets. Klaus Fuchs experienced discrimination as a student in the Weimar Republic; political struggles and persecution in Leipzig, Kiel, and Berlin; and detention in Canada. After all this, the secret activities in Los Alamos and the suffering of jail until 1959 appear to be a continuation of a life of suffering. His father seems to have seen it in this way.

Anybody looking at Klaus Fuchs’s fate and especially his betrayal of secrets has to ask what he accomplished in the end.

The Soviet intelligence agent Alexander Feklisov, who was in contact with him in England and visited his widow in Dresden, reports that Margarete Fuchs greeted him with the words: “Why have you come so late? . . . Klaus waited to see you for some thirty years. Lately he was saying that no Soviet comrade who had known him was probably still alive” (2001, 263). In his book, Feklisov lists a number of consequences of the early knowledge of Soviet nuclear scientists about the developments in Los Alamos. He emphasizes the significant savings, so important for the cash-strapped country, because they could take the most successful route, making it possible to boost research in the field. He also emphasizes the importance of the resulting international stability. The term “balance of terror” graphically describes the situation. It was not a normal situation, but it prevented even worse,
unimaginable horror. This is clearly verifiable for the Korean War, in which it is likely that the United States would have used the atomic bomb again if the Soviet Union had not had it as well. Probably millions of people owe their lives to Klaus Fuchs. This alone is such a remarkable achievement that it deserves a place of honor in the history of humankind.

Karl Kleinschmidt, religious-socialist comrade and lifelong friend, wrote in a letter to Emil Fuchs on 13 March 1950 about being “extraordinarily impressed” by “the actions of your London son”:

The recklessness with which he has engaged his person, his freedom, and his future for the preservation of peace shows human greatness and capacity for self-sacrifice that has become sadly lacking in the world. I know how much you will feel burdened by your boy’s fate. But if ever anybody had reason to bear his pain with his head held high it is the father of such a man. He has thrown his existence into an abyss, and, like that ancient Roman, he has closed that abyss that would otherwise have swallowed millions. His name will shine among the names of those who we will say have saved the world from a third world war.29

Many books have been written on the great spy of the twentieth century. It is now time to honor one of the world’s most outstanding scientists, who followed his conscience based on political and moral convictions acquired in the age of extremes.

Leibniz Society
Berlin

Translated from the German by Hanne Gidora
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NOTES

1. See the declaration by Emil Fuchs in “Good-bye to Comrade Eckert,” which appeared in the official organ of the Religiösen Sozialisten [religious
socialists] on the occasion of the latter’s joining the Communist Party of Germany (KPD): “I adhere to the principle of nonviolence in the spirit of Ragaz, the radical, revolutionary, nonviolence that is not influenced by the bourgeoisie and its ideology” (Balzer 1993, 202–3).

2. Although the Social Democrats under Otto Wells rejected the Enabling Act of 25 March 1933, which was passed with the agreement of all bourgeois parties, they were silent on the persecution of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and its members that was in full swing at the time, and they agreed on the “peace resolution” of 17 May 1933, which was used to hide the military ambitions and preparations of German fascism.

3. In order to create jobs for his son Gerhard and son-in-law Gustav Kittowski (my father), Emil Fuchs used funds from the sale of IG Farben shares inherited from his father-in-law to purchase a number of cars for a car-rental business. Until Gerhard’s emigration and my father’s arrest in 1936, these were used to help victims of political and racist persecution to flee the country, as well as to conduct courier services for the reestablishment of Rote Hilfe [Red Aid] in Eckernförde and elsewhere. My father’s uncle, Hermann Ivers, was arrested and executed in a concentration camp for this (Geheime Staatspolizei, Nachrichtenübermittlung, Kiel, 29 May 1936).

4. Christel, sister of Klaus Fuchs, strongly disagrees with this perception and emphasizes her observation that Klaus, as far as she knew him at home, was not only kind and loving, but also lively and talkative.

5. In the same year that Werner Heisenberg received the Nobel Prize for Physics, Hitler came to power and Heisenberg’s great teacher Max Born, who had provided the mathematical basis that made Heisenberg’s development of quantum theory possible, had to flee Germany. Born was deeply hurt by the conduct of his students who had coauthored the classic works of modern atomic theory since 1925. Pascual Jordan became a member of the Nazi Party; Werner Heisenberg’s conduct towards Born is reported to have been less than decent, as told by Arnold Kramish in his book The Griffin (1986, 44).

6. Personal memo from Manfred Bonitz, noted by Günter Flach (1990). It is the result of Bonitz’s work on the Science Citation Index that this work of Fuchs has been acknowledged, albeit after his death.

7. They were unaware that Leo Szilard had drafted a letter to be submitted to President Roosevelt over the signature of Albert Einstein in 1939 with a similar proposal and that a similar committee was thereupon established in the United States.

8. Robert Jungk reports in Brighter Than a Thousand Suns that Heisenberg and Weisszäcker failed to inform the Danish physicist Niels Bohr that they did not want to work on the bomb. As we know today, Niels Bohr interpreted their talk differently. The now-accessible protocols of the Farm Hall recordings of conversations among the German physicists held there by the British at the end of the war show a very different picture of the conduct of the German nuclear researchers. On the basis of a letter from Max von Laue (one of the scientists held at Farm Hall), Paul Rosbaud disputes the commonly published German scientists’
version, “We knew how to build an atom bomb but of course we wouldn’t tell the Nazis” (Kramisch 1986, 245–48).

9. On the history of nuclear fission, nuclear energy, Blitzkrieg, National Socialism, “German physics” and the myth of the German bomb, see Walker 1995.


12. This article was one of the first in the GDR dealing with questions of cybernetics in biology. Its main purpose was to intervene in a positive way in the debate on cybernetics. The question of the significance of information flow in biology, the development of cybernetics (from cybernetics of the first order to cybernetics of the second order in the sense of Heinz von Förster) is still relevant today. See Fuchs-Kittowski and Rosenthal 1999.

13. Professor Jakob Segal, director of the Institute for General Biology at Humboldt University in Berlin, had paid several visits to our seminar group on philosophical questions in physics and biology, led by Docent Rochhausen. At that time as well as later he denied the existence of genes. But we were also visited by Dr. Helmut Böhne from the Institute for Research on Cultivated Plants under the leadership of Professor Hans Stubbe. They were among the most decisive opponents of the official Soviet Lysenko ideology of genetics (Böhme 1999). Caught between a rock and a hard place, we had indeed been trying to find a compromise between two extremes and had to learn step-by-step that it was not a question of compromising between extreme theories, but that science had clearly decided between correct and false assumptions. Messenger RNA and with it proof of transportation of information in one direction (and not vice versa, the central dogma of molecular biology) had only been postulated, discovered, and isolated in 1960/61. As a graduate student under Hermann Ley and Samuel M. Rapoport, I had a chance to work in detail with the Jacob-Monod model of genetic regulation—especially since my U.S. cousin Steven was able to get me the CIBA Foundation Symposium on the Regulation of Cell Metabolism (1959) (see Fuchs-Kittowski 1998).

14. In the group for philosophical problems of the natural sciences of the Institute of Philosophy at Humboldt University led by Hermann Ley, a profound philosophical discussion around these questions developed. It led to a clear distinction between different types of probability as well as laws of dynamics, statics, and probability. See, for example, Hörz 1977 and Fuchs-Kittowski 1969.

15. In the framework of an organizational report to the investigation commission, Charles Perrow analyzed the reactor accident in Harrisburg, as well as other accidents such as Chernobyl and shipping and airplane catastrophes.
his book *Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies* (1984), Perrow draws appropriate and far-reaching conclusions regarding the use of information technology in institutions.

16. After the defection in September 1945 of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Fuchs’s sister Christel Fuchs-Heinemann, living in Cambridge, Massachusetts, was subject to FBI investigation. The FBI determined that in 1945 she was visited three times by an American, the Soviet agent “Raymond” (Williams 1987, 163–64). In 1947, when there was no connection between “Raymond” and Fuchs, another Soviet agent testified that Gold was a “Moscow spy.” Gold was acquitted for lack of evidence, but was still under surveillance. According to Feklisov, after the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, the FBI drew the conclusion that Christel Fuchs-Heinemann’s visitor was Harry Gold and interrogated him about his visits to Christel and his knowledge about her brother. The FBI searched his apartment and found a map of Santa Fe, although he had denied ever being in Santa Fe. Faced with this evidence, Gold confessed his work for Soviet intelligence and his meetings with Klaus Fuchs in New York and Santa Fe and with Julius Rosenberg’s brother-in-law David Greenglass in Albuquerque. Gold could have been pardoned after ten years in jail, but he chose to stay in jail out of fear of vengeance for his betrayal (Feklisov 2001, 335–36).

17. Peierls condemned the actions, as did others, including Max Born, who, nevertheless, maintained contact with him.

18. Britain, in fact, had been violating its wartime agreement with the Soviet Union to share weapons information.

19. It is well known that Robert Oppenheimer, the “father of the atom bomb,” had refused to participate in the development of the hydrogen bomb, and that Edward Teller, motivated in part by his strong anti-Communist ideology, was the driving force behind it. This is another example of how differently leading nuclear physicists dealt with their responsibility. Today not everybody may understand the great respect Fuchs’s former colleagues held for him. Many might ask, in the spirit of the current day, how he could have wanted to help the Soviet Union. The historical situation at that time must be understood. For example, the well-known writer Rolf Hochhuth felt compelled to thank Marcel Reich-Ranicki for giving thanks to the Red Army for rescue from Auschwitz. He writes:

> We are living in a country whose leaders want to get rid of Russian war monuments on German soil, just like the Führer got rid of the names of 12,000 Jews who had died for Kaiser and the Reich, not to mention the Austrian ones; they were scraped off the war monuments . . . even Piscator asked me before the premiere [of *The Deputy*] if he could replace the words “Red Army” with “Russian soldiers”: . . . “the last prisoners were liberated by Russian soldiers.” I thank you for boldly standing up for the truth. Stalin says sadly to Churchill: “Losses of the Red Army: 10,000 men per day!” We owe our freedom to the Russian dead!

Your Hochhuth
Regardless of the current political beliefs of the individual German citizen, the historical contribution of the Soviet Union in the fight against fascism must be held in high esteem. Those who cannot understand that should read Marcel Reich-Ranicki’s autobiography (2001), where he maintains, in spite of later conflicts, that he and his wife owe their lives and freedom to the Red Army. Those who grew up in the Cold War should carefully read the differentiation in Emil Fuchs’s autobiography in his October 1959 letter to Kurt Schumacher (1957–59, 2:306–10). One does not have to accept every point, but one gains a very differentiated picture that clarifies the decisions by such personalities as Klaus Fuchs. Fascist ideology is aimed at the destruction of reason and humanism. Its supporters demand the elimination of the Jews, of so-called inferior life. Those who want to understand at least this should read these autobiographies.

20. Niels Bohr sent several memoranda to leading politicians in England and the United States, as well as a letter to the United Nations in which he cites his memorandum of 24 March 1945: He specifically rejected the naïve belief that careful guarding of “nuclear secrets” could secure a monopoly on nuclear weapons. Bohr demanded openness and free international exchange of information as the means for effective international control and preservation of trust among the different peoples (Alexander 1995).

21. In violation of his orders to continue military action, Colonel Rudolf Petershagen, commandant of Greifshagen, to spare the city from destruction and the population from suffering, negotiated the peaceful surrender of the city to the Red Army on 30 April 1945.

22. See the photos in Moss 1987.

23. There is an impression that more perpetrators were invented to diminish the deeds of the actual participants. For example, Markus Wolf writes that Moscow had never acknowledged the value of his information, but had pretended for decades to have other atom spies besides Fuchs (1977a, 230). Only many years after the death of Igor Kurchatov, the father of the Soviet bomb, did it become known in the USSR that, thanks to Klaus Fuchs, the Soviets were able to avoid lengthy experiments and concentrate on procedures that had already been successfully carried out in Los Alamos.

24. Markus Wolf notes in his book Man without a Face that in the GDR Klaus Fuchs indeed never spoke about his secret activity, except in one classified videotaped interview. During the interview, Fuchs said:

I never considered myself as a spy. I could not see why it was in the West’s interest not to share the bomb with Moscow. Something with this unimaginable destructive potential simply had to be held in common by the great powers. It was abhorrent to me that one side should be able to threaten the other with such great force. That would be like a giant treading on Lilliputians. I never thought that I was doing something culpable by passing the secrets to Moscow. It would have seemed an evil negligence for me not to have done it. (1997a, 229)

25. Alexander Feklisov writes that Klaus Fuchs was always aware of the great danger he incurred to himself by meeting with him. But he wanted to enable
the Soviet Union to save time and resources; first, as Max Born clearly states, because he hated fascism, later out of fear that the Americans would use their nuclear monopoly for blackmail and possibly war against other countries, especially the Soviet Union. He emphasizes his courage and his prudence. Feklisov gives a detailed description of how the Soviets got written information from its informants in the 1940s until May 1949. The detonation of the Soviet plutonium bomb on 29 August 1949 shook the world; it was indeed the end of the American nuclear monopoly. As already noted, Academician Igor V. Kurchatov, director of the development and testing of the first Soviet bomb, acknowledged the importance of information received from abroad. As Yuli Khariton, one of his closest collaborators, pointed out on the occasion of ninetieth anniversary of Kurchatov’s birth, the material from Klaus Fuchs was the most important (Khariton and Smirnov 1993).

26. Especially since the denial of Fuch’s actions became more and more part of GDR history; for example, Percy Stulz writes in his book on atomic weapons, “German nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs was arrested on 27 January 1950 for allegedly spying for the Soviet Union” (1973, 250). If not an expression of nationalist thinking, it is at least personal egotism, coupled with neglect and insensitivity. Feklisov writes that he was trying to get Klaus Fuchs’s achievements honored: When then president of the Academy M. V. Kel’dysh learned about his effort, he said, “This is not advisable; it would lower the image of our own scientists in the creation of the atomic weapon” (2001, 261). The Soviet public learned about Fuchs for the first time in 1988 when the TV documentary Risk 2 was aired. Here was the first public acknowledgement that scientists had voluntarily passed on information about the American atom bomb. Even at that time, Soviet scientists responded reluctantly to questions by the press, e.g., how could the bomb be developed in only three years, a much shorter time than for the American bomb? Feklisov refers to an article by Academician Juli Khariton, 8 December 1992, which gave the first public admission of facts that should have been come out much sooner: the first Soviet atom bomb was developed after the American model with the help of information, especially that received from Klaus Fuchs (1994).

27. Markus Wolf writes: “My only explanation for the lack of Soviet acknowledgement is that they were initially suspicious of him, that he did not keep his mouth shut or initiated the chain of betrayal. Once they knew better, they were too embarrassed to admit their misjudgment and to apologize to Fuchs” (1997b, 421). But this suspicion could not have arisen, since, as Feklisov indicated, they knew about others who betrayed them.

28. It is open to interpretation what parallel Becher saw between the Buddenbrook and the Fuchs families. Emil Fuchs thought he was not talking about a direct parallel, but about the tragedy of a large family, because Becher was also talking about my mother, who came from an intellectual family, joined the workers’ movement for the same motives as her brother, married a worker, rescued him from a concentration camp by risking her own life, but was broken by the experience. The publication of the weekly reports written by Erwin Eckert and Emil Fuchs after the establishment of the presidential dictatorship from 1930 to 1933 show explicitly both the moral and analytical abilities of the authors (see
Eckert, Fuchs, et al. 2002. At this point I should like to thank the discoverer and editor of these sources, Friedrich-Martin Balzer, for his kind support in the drafting of this article.

29. Letter from Karl Kleinschmidt in the private archives of Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski.

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Preventing shutdown

Resistance

On a website devoted to nonviolent civil disobedience, an editorial appeared in 2002 listing twenty-three types of official actions taken to shut down legitimate dissent. These actions range from levying excessive fines to imprisonment, and they are ominous harbingers of an American style of fascism.

Patricia Nell Warren, a journalist, writes, “Quietly, when Americans weren’t looking, law enforcement and legislators have slapped a high markup on the penal price of protest.” She observes that “the powers that be” now believe public protests border on “domestic terrorism.” Court decisions have created outrageous sanctions for what are essentially minor violations of law. Protesters are being confronted with high bail, huge fines, multiple counts, and months or years in prison. Warren reports a university student who joined a demonstration “for a lark.” He found himself faced with felony charges, the first of “three strikes, you’re out.” The charges failed to stick only
because his parents were able to retain forceful (and expensive) lawyers.

Americans are trying to curb these attacks on civil liberties. During the preposterous congressional debate on Ashcroft’s anti-terrorism bill, for instance, the American Civil Liberties Union organized a “Coalition in Defense of Freedom in Time of National Crisis.” The coalition reflects a wide range of political standpoints, including Center for Constitutional Rights, Free Congress Foundation, American Friends Service Committee, Gun Owners of America, NAACP Board of Directors, Rutherford Institute, and Amnesty International USA.

Since the Patriot Act was passed, organizations have been taking additional steps and trying to restrict the law. An extended version of this act circulated among high-level officials was entitled the “Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,” but it has also been labeled “Ashcroft’s new fascist bill,” because it is designed to give the government even more repressive powers than the Patriot Act.

Also, independent media correspondents are paying special attention to the presence of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force observers at demonstrations. A Special Forces photographer was seen (and photographed!) at the 19 September 2002 demonstration against the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Military observers have also been spotted at other demonstrations. While many believe the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the military from engaging in domestic police functions, is still in force, Gore Vidal points out that because the law was nullified by “anti-terrorism” legislation passed under the Clinton administration, Ashcroft now has the power to use the armed services against civilians.

Unsurprisingly, the Homeland Security department’s core staff members will occupy a building at the U.S. Naval Security Station in Washington DC.

Many are justifiably indignant about the use of military resources for domestic control. The high-profile Pentagon domestic surveillance program—the Total Information Awareness Project (TIA), for instance, has sparked a firestorm of criticism. Concerned about the potential for violating civil liberties, Senator
Charles Grassley requested “detailed information” from Ashcroft about the disclosure of interagency contacts, aimed at developing a working relationship between the TIA, FBI, and the Department of Justice (DoJ). In addition, Senator Russell Feingold called for a suspension of the project until Congress has conducted a thorough review. Additional demands for an end to TIA and mass surveillance programs have been made by such politically diverse organizations as the ACLU, American Conservative Union, Americans for Tax Reform, Center for Democracy and Technology, Center for National Security Studies, Eagle Forum, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, and Free Congress Foundation.

Suddenly, while alternative news sites and Internet privacy organizations assailed the TIA, the House-Senate Conference panel negotiating the spending bill voted to block funding for the program until the Pentagon explained the program and assessed its impact on civil liberties. In addition, a group of senators led by Ron Wyden introduced limits that prevent TIA from targeting U.S. citizens without prior congressional approval. (Still, the Pentagon is going ahead and ensuring the completion of the project; hence, if Congress ever supports targeting citizens, the software developed by TIA could be employed for this purpose overnight.)

Finally, the TIA logo, with an “all-seeing” eye on top of a pyramid (shown at the head of Part 1 of this article in NST, vol.16, no. 1), was quietly dropped by the Defense Department after a storm of criticism.

Demonstrators are fighting in courts to dismiss unjust charges and make the government pay wherever possible for its acts of repression. For example, before Sept. 11, sixty-four activists protesting the Republican National Convention were arrested at a warehouse where they were constructing puppets and floats. Because the puppeteers had a sensational impact during the protests, the police raided the warehouse in an alleged search for weapons, and, after systematically destroying both puppets and puppeteer equipment, arrested all the puppeteers and set bail starting at $15,000 apiece. Each puppeteer was handcuffed and kept on a hot bus for five hours. Eventually, the court dismissed all
charges against them. In addition, the prosecutors were forced to withdraw for lack of evidence as many as fourteen misdemeanor charges against Ruckus Society head John Sellers, who had also participated in the Philadelphia demonstrations. Sellers had been charged with “possession of an instrument of a crime, his cell phone” and, incredibly, the prosecution had asked for his imprisonment on one million dollars bail.

In “The Crackdown on Dissent,” Abby Scher, a sociologist, provides another example, the mistreatment of Rob Fish, a member of the Student Environmental Action Coalition, by DC police in April 2001. During the protests against the IMF and World Bank, Fish was “beaten bloody and bandaged after an attack by an enraged plainclothes officer who also tried to destroy Fish’s camera.” (Fish was documenting police harassment.) The ACLU, National Lawyers Guild, and other organizations filed a class-action suit, including Fish, against the DC police and the Feds. That suit to our knowledge has not been settled.

There are further examples, such as the class-action suits against the department policy of the New York police that mandated—for people arrested at political demonstrations—overnight jail, fingerprinting, photographing, etc., on charges that would ordinarily draw only a few hours detention and a desk-appearance ticket. Ironically, imprisoning demonstrators overnight and legal suits made this policy so costly that the police department finally rescinded it.

Abused demonstrators have also sued the Feds for their involvement in these atrocities. FBI seminars, based on lessons derived from the Seattle demonstrations, actually instructed the police to mistreat the protesters in DC, Philadelphia, and other cities. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) set up by the attorney general have been cited because they provided the identities of leading activists, information that enabled the local police to single out, beat, and arrest these protest leaders.

The Red Squads are another consideration. Despite limited success, coalitions that struggled against these squads during the 1970s and 1980s are being revived. Campaigns by organizations like the ACLU and American Friends Service Committee forced
several major cities to enact laws restricting political-intelligence files in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, even though many cities successfully employed the “terrorist card” to get around these restrictions, some resisted. San Francisco’s mayor and citizens in 1997 refused to abandon democratic control and public accountability. They prohibited their police from joining a newly created Joint Terrorism Task Force. They did not capitulate to Big Brother even though officials in other cities did. Although the FBI maintained the right to conduct illegal investigations, other law-enforcement agencies did not violate the law.

Brian Glick, a major authority on COINTELPRO, the FBI counterintelligence program,83 reports that the program was revived in the 1980s under the Reagan administration.84 Early in the following decade, the FBI maintained, despite restrictions, files on patently noncriminal groups such as the AIDS activist group Act Up; see Part 1 of this article (NST, vol.16, no. 1, 101, note 19). On the other hand, some states have mandated audits of police intelligence files to uncover unlawful police activity, and some municipal laws have also called for files to be purged when it was clear that no crime had been committed. If these kinds of controls are effective, they should be revitalized. If they are not, they should be replaced by tougher requirements.

Indeed, since the violations of the law perpetrated by the FBI and Red Squads continue, policing the police should be given top priority. Although Congress has whitewashed most attempts, oversight committees have, on rare occasions, exposed law-enforcement abuse. When public hearings expose abuse, the corporate media declares, “The system is working!” But the system is not working. No system of constitutionally mandated checks and balances has actually kept intelligence agencies in check for long.

Congress should appoint a national commission, whose members would be selected from American Bar Association recommendations, with a permanent staff that periodically samples and audits criminal intelligence databases.85 Officials who are themselves responsible for these databases should be accountable to independent observers.
Since openness would mean more democracy, civil libertarians should do everything possible to fight the administration’s attempts to restrict the Freedom of Information Act. Such attempts must be anticipated. The FBI, for instance, refused to disclose surveillance of John Lennon until ordered to do so by the federal courts in 1997. A fascist police chief and mayor, Frank Rizzo, sheltered an army of undercover agents who infiltrated radical organizations, college campuses, and the Black community in Philadelphia. Ashcroft has told his agencies to resist doggedly Freedom of Information Act requests. And, as we have seen, the “war on terrorism” is enabling him to legitimate secrecy by putting local law-enforcement units under federal control.

Legislation sharply restricting penalties for civil disobedience is another technique available to curb mass repression. A California bill entitled “Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Protection” restricts penalties proposed by the prosecution. It was approved by the California legislature. Although Governor Gray Davis caved in to law-enforcement pressure on 29 September 2002 and vetoed it, surely this is not the last time a governor of California will see such a proposal.

Another battle is going on against the federal government’s policy of harassing dissidents by restricting their freedom to travel. Alia Kate, a sixteen-year-old Milwaukee high school student, wanted to go to Washington DC on 19 April 2002 to join protests against the School of the Americas (appropriately known as the School for Torturers) run by the U.S. military. She was pulled from the line at the airport. Twenty members of the Peace Action Milwaukee group were forced to miss the same flight. They had to leave the next day after they were pulled aside by Milwaukee County sheriff’s deputies. Their names were on the “No Fly Watch List” supplied by the Feds to the airlines. This list purports to identify potential terrorists who must be searched carefully and interrogated before being allowed to travel. On 7 August, two more peace activists found themselves on the list and were detained by police at the San Francisco airport.

Two months later, the editors of CounterPunch reported seeing stories two or three times a week on the Web about people detained and prevented from flying. Racially profiled travelers
were especially targeted. (For this reason, in November 2002, Canada issued a travel advisory to Canadians with Middle Eastern backgrounds to avoid traveling by air in the United States.)

The case of Doug Stuber, chairman of the North Carolina Green Party, represents another type of harassment. As Stuber was trying to fly to Prague from Raleigh, North Carolina, an Officer Stanley accosted him in the airport and said he could not fly because of the DC sniper attacks. He was further informed that no Greens were allowed to fly that day. The next day, he was forced to buy a $2,600 “same day” round-trip ticket even though he had originally purchased a $650 ticket for the previous day’s flight. Just before he boarded, Stanley appeared again, accompanied by two federal agents who took photographs, and prevented Stuber from boarding, asked about his family, where he lived, whom he knew, what the Greens were up to, etc. Turning on his interviewers, Stuber asked if they believed the Greens were the equivalent of Al-Qaida. They showed him a document from the DoJ that actually identified the Greens as likely terrorists.

Stuber missed his morning flight that second day, but the two agents helped him get a ticket for a later flight. He said, “I was relieved that the SS hadn’t stopped me from flying.” But he was wrong. When he tried to board that plane, he was stopped a third time and advised to go Greensboro, for still another flight. He complied, only to be denied, at Greensboro, permission to board either domestic or overseas flights. In spite of having gone forty hours without sleep, he drove to the Charlotte airport, an hour and a half away—again to no avail. Not only had Stuber been grounded and driven to exhaustion, but the agents had forced him to pay for tickets he could not use. They had acted criminally: they had lied with malice, leading him to believe he could fly if he followed their directions.

Obviously, the No Fly List is being used to harass and neutralize dissidents. The names of political dissidents should be deleted from this list and legislative restrictions with penal sanctions ought to be imposed on the Justice Department and its agents to ensure freedom to travel. Stuber’s equation of the federal agents with the Nazi SS has considerable justification; the No Fly List
does indeed resemble the fascist technique of singling out, with no pretense of proof, a particular group for denial of rights.

Communication over the Internet has had an extraordinary impact on the expansion of antiwar movements around the world. It has enabled activists and organizations to provide millions with alternative sources of news. It has proved particularly useful for catalyzing coalitions and mobilizing mass support rapidly. Growing numbers of websites monitor government policies toward the Internet and energetically oppose censorship. Nevertheless, insufficient attention has been directed toward developing “fail-safe” mechanisms to compensate for e-mail censorship and blocked websites. Developing such strategies should obviously have high priority.

Criminalize repression

Donner’s final book about Red Squads and police repression was published in 1990. The opening paragraph terms police “the protective arm of the economic and political interests of the capitalist system.” Since repression increases when the system is threatened, Red Squads vastly proliferated in the early sixties, a period of rising protest, when almost 300,000 men were assigned to these squads to pursue “subversive” Americans.92

Donner reports in his final chapter successful barriers against full-scale surveillance. He maintains that civil libertarians, courts, and legislative committees, from the 1970s on, made cities and police leery of lawsuits, judicial restraints, control of police targets, and missions. The legacies of accomplishments by the civil liberties and antiwar movements also curb repression. Police surveillance of demonstrations against U.S. foreign policy has been revealed and protested without delay.

However, he also summarizes running battles during the 1980s in city after city with law-enforcement policies that had been condemned in the 1970s. After noting the uncertain outcomes of these battles, and the right-wing backlash during the Reagan administration, Donner turns to broader factors triggering a possible revival of these policies. What would happen if the nation were suddenly convulsed with protests and fears of economic downturn, racial disturbances, growth in nuclear weapons,
and terrorism and military intervention abroad? If the authorities were to misrepresent and exaggerate these threats, we might, “once again . . . entrust the police [with] the very powers now denied them,” Donner concludes.93

These words were prophetic. In 2001, the events of September 11 occurred, and by 2003, the government openly entrusted to the police many powers previously denied them—temporarily.

Civil libertarians and dissidents are now fighting aggressively this full-scale revival of repression. But more can be done. For instance, today’s strategies were developed in the 1970s and 1980s. What modifications would increase their impact? What else could be done to rein in the revival of repression? Organizations such as the ACLU, Lawyers Guild, and Center for Constitutional Rights should encourage conferences and symposia that scrutinize and evaluate current antirepression strategies and propose new ones.

New proposals should take advantage of the contradictory character of the American criminal-justice system. Facing two ways, like Janus, that system paradoxically supports and at the same time threatens democratic institutions. America has highly competitive and relatively autonomous law-enforcement jurisdictions. If political repression itself is criminalized, would crime-fighting policies encourage some jurisdictions and police officers to support the Constitution rather than subvert it?

The case for taking this strategic crime-fighting option into consideration rests upon two pillars: First, criminalization is justified by the magnitude of harm political repression freely inflicts upon the public. Second and more importantly, it is justified by the degree to which this repression violates elementary rules of democratic life.

Let us spell this out. Recall that the FBI, CIA, IRS, and military agencies have repressed individuals’ political dissent in the past with slander, forgeries, burglary, illegal wiretapping, instigating loss of employment, breaking up families, police brutality, false arrests, and unwarranted IRS audits. Government agents have harassed, burglarized, and spied upon hundreds of lawful organizations.94 They have even promoted assassinations.

Anyone reading Donner’s studies should be appalled at the extent to which government officials have committed crimes with
impunity. To cite just one example, no agent, officer, or informant who shared the responsibility for murdering Black Panther leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark has ever been brought to trial.95

Furthermore, FBI documents irrefutably show that a covert war on left-wing political organizations is an enduring feature of U.S. politics.96 These documents have exposed the ruthless use of force and fraud, by all levels of government, to repress political activity supposedly protected by the Constitution. Not only have they uncovered the violence, infiltration, legal harassment, and psychological warfare employed against political dissidents, but they have also shown that the FBI and CIA did all they could to brainwash the American public by generating propaganda and disinformation to be disseminated by the mass media as the product of their own correspondents.

From 1960 to 1974, FBI agents conducted more than half a million investigations of so-called “subversives” who, in their collective imagination, might have been planning to overthrow the government by force. And what did they find? Not a single individual or group was prosecuted under the laws prohibiting planning or advocating action to overthrow the government. Political dissidents were nevertheless imprisoned on unrelated or fraudulent charges in order to destroy their political influence.97

The attempts to subvert progressive movements and left-wing political parties have been so extensive that nothing comparable has taken place in recent decades among Western industrial democracies. Moreover, this repression has been, on the whole, successful. Mass political parties on the Left, for instance, exist in virtually every European democracy, but not in the United States. Here, political repression by the government has not permitted any mass social democratic, socialist, or Communist party—or even a mass Green party—to emerge.

At present, resistance strategies customarily employed to counter illegal surveillance, police brutality, “preemptive” arrests, “no fly lists,” indefinite detention, etc., have little deterrence value. They rely chiefly on civil rather than criminal law, and even when victims win in civil court, government officials usually dip into public revenues to make restitution. In most cases, the public
pays—not the wrongdoers themselves. As a result, the officers who raided the Puppetistas’ warehouse, conducted “preemptive arrests,” and destroyed the puppeteers’ property really had nothing to fear. Pursuing justice in the criminal courts, as in the case of the enraged plainclothes officer who bloodied Fish and tried to smash his camera, would clearly be futile.

In addition, civil libertarians who do demand criminal prosecutions routinely rely on conventional criminal codes, which do not take a fundamental characteristic of crimes of repression into account. They overlook the fact that political repression is especially harmful because it subverts the elementary rules of democratic life.

Because these rules are conserved by the U.S. Constitution, Congressman Don Edwards noted in 1975:

Regardless of the unattractiveness or noisy militancy of some private citizens or organizations, the Constitution does not permit federal interference with their activities except through the criminal justice system, armed with its ancient safeguards. There are no exceptions. No federal agency, the CIA, the IRS, or the FBI, can be at the same time policeman, prosecutor, judge and jury. That is what constitutionally guaranteed due process is all about. It may sometimes be disorderly and unsatisfactory to some, but it is the essence of freedom. . . . I suggest that the philosophy supporting COINTELPRO is the subversive notion that any public official, the President or a policeman, possesses a kind of inherent power to set aside the Constitution whenever he thinks the public interest, or “national security” warrants it. That notion is postulate of tyranny.

How do we distinguish ordinary crimes from crimes against democratic life? Judging violations of the elementary rules requires thinking about the conditions that distinguish them from conventional crimes and that call for different sanctions. For instance, when investigating FBI abuses, the committee headed by Senator Frank Church found that forty percent of 290 COINTELPRO actions from 1968 to 1971 aimed at keeping activists from speaking, writing, and publishing. Since these actions were certainly
violations of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, the committee declared, “The American people need to be reassured that never again will an agency of the government be permitted to conduct a secret war against those citizens it considers threats to the established order.”

Yet this Senate committee failed to recommend policies that would actually disarm the government’s weapons of mass repression and enable political dissidents to fight back. Furthermore, as indicated, no oversight committee has rectified this failure. Consequently, civil libertarians need to develop an aggressive long-term deterrence strategy on their own. They should create coalitions fighting for the passage of crime-fighting legislation at every level of government—federal, state, and local—that penalizes the individuals responsible for political repression. By “penalize,” we mean actually criminalizing the use of information technology and law-enforcement practices to repress political dissent and subvert the Constitution.\textsuperscript{100}

For example, police should be incarcerated when they abuse protesters exercising their rights to free speech and assembly. The Washington DC police chief and every officer who followed his directives at this peaceful demonstration were guilty of felonies that would net any civilian a long sentence. The police have no right to echo Adolph Eichmann, the head of the Gestapo’s Jewish Section, who justified his crimes by saying he had to “follow orders” from above.

Furthermore, since Chief Ramsey’s police “training exercise” subverted the Constitution, political dissidents ought to demand additional legislation—akin to the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of the 1960s—authorizing federal intervention to defend demonstrators from police brutality. Sounds crazy? It certainly does. Anyone who believes Bush and Ashcroft would protect anti-war and antiglobalization demonstrators must also believe them to be Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy in human disguise.

But wait. Let the 60s speak and tell how important federal intervention was in protecting the Freedom Riders in Montgomery, Alabama, after mobs beat them and firebombed their buses at the Anniston, Birmingham, and Montgomery Trailways terminals.
In 1961, Federal marshals were sent in to protect the Riders.\textsuperscript{101} In 1963, U.S. marshals defending a group of Freedom Riders (including Martin Luther King) were greatly outnumbered by a mob when Alabama Governor John Patterson did not provide the protection he promised. Attorney General Robert Kennedy “federalized” state troopers and the National Guard to reinforce the marshals.\textsuperscript{102} Later, in Mississippi, 160 marshals supported the struggle against segregation, fighting a racist mob the night before an African American student, James H. Meredith, enrolled at “Ole Miss,” the state university. Finally, in 1965, after pitiless beatings and gassing by police, Martin Luther King Jr. led civil rights demonstrators from Selma, Alabama, under the protection of a federalized National Guard, to Montgomery, the state capital. They were greeted by a rally of 50,000 people.

We know that federal marshals, national guardsmen, and state troopers have victimized political dissenters. Guardsmen killed Black students at Jackson State and white students at Kent State. But despite Ashcroft, the American criminal-justice system is not a monolithic entity. Activists should explore strategies that will make enforcement agencies uphold the Constitution even if it means providing security for demonstrators against the police.

Demanding federal (or state) enforcement of the people’s right to assemble, to protest, and to have legal representation and freedom from torture and extortion may seem impractical when the Inspectors General of Capitalism are running the show. But, for now, such a demand would at least begin to raise public awareness of the grave threat to democracy posed by the current leadership in Washington DC. Without the right to protest government policies, democracy becomes a sham.

Such a demand would also provide the opportunity to educate the public about police brutality. Legislative campaigns, rallies, teach-ins, demonstrations, and photo ops could also be used. They could feature “police crime” tribunals, puppets, plays, speakers, and placards that call this brutality by its right name.

Demonstrators should also demand that police training and seminars run by the Feds be reconstituted so that they discourage police brutality. After all, this brutality occurs with amazing
regularity despite citizen review boards and civil litigation. Police officers should be told they will be prosecuted if they follow orders that violate the law. The Washington DC police became kidnappers, extortionists, and torturers when they followed Chief Ramsey’s orders. The political prisoners who were forced to sit for hours with hands cuffed to ankles ought to advertise Ramsey’s crimes by sending a Wanted Poster with his mug shot worldwide on the Internet.

Police brutality has a long history in this country. The inescapable truth is that the police were primarily responsible during the Vietnam War for the violence occurring at demonstrations throughout the nation. Take, for example, police actions in October 1967 during “Stop the Draft Week” demonstrations. On the first day, 6,000 students had protested the war at a rally on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley. On the next day, “bloody Tuesday,” 3,000 students joined 1,000 demonstrators in civil disobedience to shut down the Oakland Induction Center. Suddenly, 200 police officers in rapidly advancing wedge formation kicked, clubbed, and beat the unarmed and nonviolent demonstrators blocking the center. A policeman on the scene said the demonstrators “weren’t allowed enough time to get away.” Most of the crowd tried to back off as the wedge advanced, but could not move fast enough without trampling each other. “They handcuffed this guy,” one demonstrator reported. “He started to move and they knocked him down. Then four policemen got on him and beat him unconscious.”

Police commissioners at that time denounced police violence and found it escalated rather than contained political protests. Consequently, it was no surprise to find that more than 10,000 demonstrators responded to “bloody Tuesday,” defying the police. The media defined the civil disobedience that prevented inductees from entering the Oakland center as a crime. Journalists said the students, in particular, broke windows, overturned automobiles, and punctured tires to block busloads of inductees.

Seven activists who helped organize the weeklong demonstrations were arrested and tried. The jury included a retired U.S. Marines colonel. The head of the jury had top security clearance at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, where nuclear weapons
were being designed. And the judge later indicated that, in the beginning, he believed the defendants had violated the law. But Charles Garry, the famous civil liberties and labor lawyer, called an impressive array of character witnesses to testify to the defendants’ intentions and conduct. He convinced the jury that the First Amendment protected activists who helped organize the thousands of people who shut down the induction center. Civil disobedience was recognized as a hallowed tradition in the United States.

Another lawyer, Jeff Segal, was a student activist in the 60s. His first-hand report refutes the media’s attempt to discredit the students. He recalls,

After taking two days to regroup and fight off those who wanted to cancel the rest of the week, the students showed up [on Friday] at the Induction Center. Several demonstrators brought clunker cars to the action. Otherwise no cars were overturned, and, besides these clunkers the only other vehicles that were used were with the permission of the owners or drivers. I clearly remember a guy on Friday driving, I think a Coke truck, into the middle of one of the intersections. He got out and shouted, “I guess I lost my keys.” When the students roared with laughter in response, he threw his keys into the crowd and left.

The media also emphasized the inconvenience to people who drove by the area. But Segal indicates that a large number of the people driving cars were spoken to, and most were willing to have the traffic blocked and wait, given the purpose of the demonstration. He also recalls,

While it is true that park benches and trashcans were used to block traffic the demonstrators did not take innocent peoples’ property. On Tuesday, we were quite careful about not drawing the cops into the Oakland ghetto. However, by Friday, as the perimeter of the action grew into the ghetto, the residents, of their own volition, came out of their houses and brought out old furniture, etc. to help build barricades.

The significant political purpose of the demonstration was, unlike “The Resistance,” which pushed kids to turn
in their draft cards; this was an effort in collective support. That there were many poor and working-class kids caught up in the war machine, and it was important to show them that we were willing to do something about it, by shutting down, if only temporarily, the system that was turning them into cannon fodder. In fact, during the week, many of the inductees, either as the buses came to the center or as they got out, flashed “V” signs.

Segal does not believe that this and many other demonstrations gave police an opportunity to discredit the antiwar movement or enable the Feds and local police to use agents provocateurs. The FBI and cops were already using such agents, and, press attacks had already taken place. What it did, however, was to demonstrate that the students were willing to stand up to the war machine.

The students who showed up on Friday justifiably defended themselves against the police. They demonstrated that there are some Americans who will not lie down and take a beating.

Today, government officials and media commentators are devoted to conditioning the public to acquiesce in squelching political dissent. Yesterday, applying words like communist, nuclear holocaust, and national security to dissent provided the smoke and mirrors, harnessing popular sentiments to imperial aims. Such words as terrorist and weapons of mass destruction have merely updated the justifications. Now, after amplifying public hysteria with interminable alerts, nonstop patriotic speeches, and arrests that would never stand up in court, the administration has persuaded more than a third of the electorate (according to some studies) that national security requires abandoning the Bill of Rights. This electorate apparently stands behind the administration when it charges dissenters with sabotaging the “war against terrorism.”

What measures might be appropriate for dealing with government censorship and sabotage? First, to forestall an executive pretext for war, the websites that support free speech and assembly might encourage discussions about uncovering political hoaxes, spotting disinformation, detecting spyware, filtering viruses, and unearthing plans to assemble weapons of mass repression—these discussions to be hosted by experts in these areas. Discovering
these is not enough. Extraordinary measures should be taken to publicize evidence of these repressive efforts. Second, these discussions might also help people differentiate between appropriate police files on political terrorists and inappropriate files on political dissidents. After all, progressives favor protecting Americans from terrorism but they oppose squandering billions on racial dragnets, repressive bureaucracies, and a bloated military, whose aggression endangers Americans by exploiting terrorism to further Bush’s political agenda.

But Ashcroft knows that his incipient fascism will be resisted; this resistance may eventually provide him with the pretext for instituting a state of emergency that forcibly shuts down the anti-war and antiglobalization movements. These movements have not yet formed a national organization akin to Mobilization against the War in the 1960s, but they are marching together. Progressives agree that the slaughter on Sept. 11, 2001, was a heinous crime and that the perpetrators must be captured and punished; protesters will nevertheless undoubtedly be targeted by the administration. When they find themselves targeted, they will do well to remember Vietnam. American dissidents helped end that war and if their counterparts do not fight back now, Bush’s “endless war against terrorism” may outlast Hitler’s short-circuited “thousand-year Reich.”

A great
democracy is coming,
perhaps helped by a flicker of
Reichstag fire, hint of Battleship Maine,
whiff of Lusitania, scent of
Gulf of Tonkin? Yes.
o yes a great democracy where
tongues will be
cut out,
fingernails pulled out
and fingers chopped
and rapes in dank
barracks.
All who love democracy will be

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NOTES


69. The scope of these items emphasizes the need for protective legislation for demonstrators. The abuses include: excessive fines; exorbitant bail; keeping peaceful protesters in prison; felony charges; permits for legitimate protests denied; trespass and other false charges; adults prosecuted for bringing minor children to protests; “zero tolerance” rules that expel students who participate in nonviolent protests; court orders to stifle future legitimate protests; long sentences under inhumane conditions; seizure of bank accounts; arrest without charge; use of racial and other biases in arrest and prosecution; unjustified force; demonization of protesters as “anarchists,” “hoodlums,” and “domestic terrorists”; unlawful surveillance, infiltration, and investigations to identify, arrest, and detain nonviolent protesters prior to protest; police entrapment used to fabricate grounds for arrest; “national security” violations invoked arbitrarily against protesters; and nonviolent protesters barred from talking about their causes or motives during trial.


71. The most outrageous example of this escalation involves people protesting the “School for Torturers” maintained by U.S. armed forces. Dorothy Pagosa reports that seventy-one people have served a total of over forty years in prison for engaging in nonviolent resistance in a broad-based campaign to close the school. See Pagosa, “School of the Americas Protesters Lock Gate to Fort Benning after 37 Activists Sentenced” (13 July 2002), *School of the Americas Watch*, commondreams.org.

72. It was preposterous because many representatives had not been given time to read the bill.

73. Many organizations already have links to each other’s websites in order to cover legislative proposals and *Congressional Record* entries aimed
at preventing censorship and jamming on the Internet, for instance. The ACLU website also contains the Wyden and Kyl speech on cybernetic security entered in the Congressional Record, 10 October 2002 (Senate) Page S10361–S10388.

74. It is also being called “Patriot Act II.”

75. The Posse Comitatus Act was breached in the infamous assault on the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco. Military personnel and equipment were used at Waco to train domestic agents, fly choppers, supervise the use of equipment, and review the plans for the assault. ATF agents trained by Special Forces were at Waco during the siege.


77. Vidal declares:

Six years ago, in response to the Oklahoma City bombing (which, if indeed perpetrated by a lone nut armed only with a rental van and fertilizer, begs the question of why sweeping new legislation was necessary), Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, “antiterrorism” legislation which not only gives the attorney general the power to use the armed services against the civilian population. (“The New War on Freedom” [18 July 2002], reproduced online at AlterNet, http://www.alternet.org)

He also notes that this legislation selectively suspended habeas corpus, “the heart of Anglo-American liberty.”


79. Chris Carley writes:

The bus was extremely hot. We were kept on it for a total of FIVE HOURS, without access to toilets or drinking water. Three people suffered immensely from the handcuffs—their hands turned blue and became numb. We all demanded that their handcuffs be changed. The driver of our bus ignored our pleas, calling one of the victims a “crybaby.” Luckily, after hours of protest and agitation, we got the attention of officers outside the bus who did change the handcuffs of those who were suffering. There was also an asthmatic on the bus who was having trouble breathing. His inhaler had been confiscated, and he was denied medical attention. (“A Report from the Philadelphia Protests,” X-Ray Net, [2000], http://xraynet.editthispage.com/PhillyArrests)

80. Unfortunately, lawsuits take a lot of time and money. Furthermore, they can be followed by harassment and vicious retribution by the authorities. Shaffer describes the litigation between the Puppetistas and the harassment caused by a high-powered legal firm defending the city government as well as harm caused by the city’s retribution. See Gwen Shaffer, “Bully Puppet,” Philadelphia City Paper, an online newspaper (8 August 2002), http://www.citypaper.net/articles/2002-08-15/cover.shtml.
81. Nation (19 January 2001). According to Sher, Fish was profiled in a Sierra magazine cover story on the new generation of environmentalists.

82. Other lawsuits filed in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Seattle have also exposed the brutal disruption of demonstrations. “In L.A., apparently they decided instead of arresting people and setting high bail like they did in Philadelphia, they’ll just open fire,” said Dan Takadji, an ACLU lawyer. Police shot painful rubber bullets at people outside the Democratic party convention center. Takadji reported that a few people were throwing garbage over the fence, but instead of dealing with these people or allowing demonstrators to exit through a small opening lined with police, “the police swept in and fired on a crowd with rubber bullets.”

83. Brian Glick, War at Home: Covert Action against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do about It (Boston: South End Press, 1989).


85. At this point, it is clear that local police review boards are usually not independent, especially when city officials determine their compositions.

86. Federal authorities apparently have no difficulty getting information from the public. In New Hampshire, for instance, even the military has legislative permission to request the names, addresses, phone numbers, and student records of every junior and senior high school student—ostensibly for recruitment purposes. In Connecticut, where state law prohibits schools from providing this information, the federal “No Child Left Behind” Act has a little-known section 9258 entitled “Armed Forces Recruiter Access to Students” that nonetheless forces schools to comply with the military request. For an account, see Jennifer Van Bergen, truthout, 22 September 2002 (http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/09.23Bb.jvb.child.htm).

87. Both incidents are reported in the Progressive (27 April and 16 October 2001).


89. This advisory was issued after Canada discovered that the United States had jailed a Canadian citizen and secretly deported him to his birthplace, Syria. This Canadian was merely in transit, with no intention of actually entering the United States.


91. Stuber points out that national Green Party cochair Nancy Oden had also been previously denied a flight from Maine to Chicago.


94. Aside from a common interest in social reform and social justice, these organizations were diverse and included the ACLU, Institute for Policy Studies, Ford Foundation, Lawyers Guild, etc.

95. Regarding FBI and police complicity in the murder of Black Panther leaders, see Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System (New York: Knopf, 1980).
96. These documents are collected and reproduced in such publications as the South End Press trilogy on domestic covert action. See, for example, Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars against Dissent in the United States*, and also their *Agents of Repression: The FBI’s Secret Wars against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement*—both by Boston: South End Press, 1990. Many of the confidential documents in these books were removed from an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, in 1971; others were released through requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

97. This information can be found on a website devoted to COINTELPRO: http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm.


100. Civil libertarians cannot rely on legislative oversight committees to initiate this process. As Donner and Glick point out, these committees have repeatedly turned a blind eye or whitewashed the repressive policies of government intelligence agencies. Donner also makes this point and adds that Hoover collected information about the private lives of subjects—sexual activities, drinking habits, gambling proclivities, and the like—and traded this information for increased budget appropriations and protection from oversight committees.

101. Southern police also killed three Freedom Riders.

102. The Riders left safely on the next route in defiance of the segregated public transportation system but they were arrested in Jackson, Mississippi.


105. William Mandel, whose son was one of the defendants, provides an admirable discussion of the eleven-week trial. In his view, the “Stop the Draft Week” trial marked a high point in a jury’s understanding of the real meaning of the First Amendment (“Stop the Draft Week,” http://lists.village.virginia.edu/lists_archive/sixties-l/1300.html).
Our culture is a scientific one, defining what is natural and what is rational. Its values can be seen in what are sought out as facts and made as artefacts, what are designed as processes and products, and what are forged as weapons and filmed as wonders. In our daily experience, power is exercised through expertise, for example in science, technology and medicine. Science as Culture explores how all these shape the values which contend for influence over the wider society.

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Spinoza, Marx, and the Terror of Racism

E. San Juan Jr.

_If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation._

——Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*

_Well, my view is very prejudiced and personal, I’m afraid. I’ve no religion. I was born a Jew, but I’m an atheist. I believe we are totally responsible for ourselves._

——Nadine Gordimer, responding to question about “clash of religion” behind the Sept. 11 attack

Public exchanges after September 11, 2001, somehow police themselves with the obligatory gesture of condemning the fanatical atrocity of those who feel victimized by Western civilization (a.k.a. U.S. national interest). Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University ruminated over the right of the U.S. nation-state to defend its “civic order and democratic liberties” against “the lower depths” (2001, 11). Falk moralized over the war as a justified, measured response of the state acting on behalf of a threatened Western global hegemony. We are now conscripted into a “just” war waged against terrorism—the new “ism” that subsumes the

old enemy, “communism”—wherever the Bush administration thinks it may be found, even as far as the remote jungles of the island of Basilan in the Philippines, where a bandit group of less than a hundred is holed up. The Abu Sayyaf group is actually a local problem of social neglect, military delinquency, and political corruption; but its usefulness as a pretext for projecting U.S. military power into that Southeast Asian region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) rich in oil and abundant natural resources has nevertheless converted this U.S. neocolony into the next battleground after Afghanistan. A refurbished replay of the war against the communist “evil empire,” this defense of civilization against an international Other—Islamic fundamentalism—ocludes its real intent: to maintain the racial polity subsisting on class inequality, gender subordination, and ethnic inferiorization.

War in the name of Western civilization claims to be an affirmation of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property (Huntington 1996). Woe to the barbarians who dare inflict harm on innocent civilians. What needs to be acknowledged is that such ubiquitous moralism, understandable within the hegemonic framework, forgets that its presumption is questionable. It presumes the legitimacy of the world status quo instead of viewing the attacks as a continuation and escalation of the war for the colonial subjugation of the Middle East as well as the South that continues the Cold War in another form (Chitty 2002). The equation of global capital with Americanization, as some cosmopolitanizing intellectuals tend to argue, forgets that global capitalism remains, in the words of Susan Buck-Morss, “an indefensible system of brutal exploitation of human labour and nature’s labour” (2002, 9). United States “low-intensity warfare,” as Chomsky, Samir Amin, and others remind us, has been going on for decades, especially in Nicaragua and elsewhere; what is needed is a united front against international and social injustice to make useless “such desperate acts by victims of the system” (Amin 2001, 22).

*Harbinger of fascism*

I wish to call attention here to the new reality of what the *Nation* (17 December 2001) calls the new “National Security
State,” especially after the passage of the Patriot Act. This omnibus law “imposes guilt by association on immigrants, rendering them deportable for wholly innocent nonviolent associational activity on behalf of any organization” labeled as terrorist by the secretary of state. More than 1,200 aliens have been detained on mere suspicion, without any hearing or the usual safeguards to insure “due process.” For the sake of protecting the “homeland,” racial profiling is acceptable as one legitimate weapon. This policy has targeted immigrants from the Middle East, citizens in Arab American communities, and South Asians who seem to fit the profile. I don’t have to remind you of the rash of violent acts, harassment, and killing of South Asians suspected of being Arabs that occurred in the few weeks after Sept. 11, perhaps a testimony to the need for more multiculturalist educational programs?

The undeclared state of war has resurrected not only the nation-state that postcolonialists taught us was obsolescent if not defunct; it has revived the coercive Leviathan in its current military emergency posture, with all the legal apparatus of McCarthyist surveillance, military tribunals, and new, secret ground rules of inclusion and exclusion for defining national subjection—the American national character and national identity. Who still dares to pontificate that the nation-state is dead?

What is more, the dreaded metanarratives seem to have awakened in “the night of the living dead,” as it were, a primal scenario returning to haunt us, the inheritors of the tainted legacy of the Enlightenment. We cannot presume the legitimacy of the liberal democratic status quo, with citizens of color living under duress. The postmodernists, including postsocialists espousing “radical democracy,” now confront the fact that the United States maintains a racial polity of “white supremacy . . . as a political system in itself.” In the history of the United States, racial exclusion is, as Charles Mills argues, “normative, central to the system,” with racism as “the ideological correlate of a fundamental organizing principle of the “modern Euro-implanted social order” (1999, 25), and the liberal state as the prime defender of Western civilization threatened by dark-skinned terrorists and non-Christian rogue states.
In my view, any discussion on the nature of racism, identity politics, ethnic studies, and the multiculturalist problematic should immediately engage with this theme of the racial polity. The arguments on the fraught issues of pluralism, “common culture,” individual liberties, civic consensus, and republicanism hinge on the confrontation between these two positions: one that claims that the United States is a democratic polity where a “common culture” will eliminate through incremental reforms the problem of racism as individual prejudice, and one that holds that one major support of the class-divided polity is what DuBois called “the wages of whiteness” (1935, 700), whiteness as property, differential entitlement—as Derrick Bell (1992), Cheryl Harris (1995), David Roediger (1999), and others have called it. The first celebrates cultural pluralism—figured as the “melting pot” and the “Americanization” of differences, as envisaged by Michael Walzer (1994). The ideal of cultural pluralism implies that there is a normative standard—call it the American Way of Life, the “common culture,” the Great Books, the canon, civic or republican nationalism—compared to which the other ways (not real alternatives) are alien, weird, menacing. The second position critiques a racial polity founded on the “possessive investment in whiteness.” Whichever position one aligns oneself with—and I am afraid a middle ground cannot be negotiated—that position will determine one’s stance on the numerous versions of multiculturalist pedagogy, postcolonial discourse, ethnic identity, and citizenship.

Some time ago, Ronald Takaki (1994) countered Nathan Glazer’s thesis of the “American ethnic pattern” with his theory of “racial patterns.” Racial inequality persists despite legislation prohibiting discrimination based on color, race, or ethnic origins. Takaki observes: “Due to racially exclusionist forces and developments in American history, racial inequality and occupational stratification have come to coexist in a mutually reinforcing and dynamic structural relationship that continues to operate more powerfully than direct forms of racial prejudice and discrimination” (34). It might be instructive here to rehearse briefly the historical contours of this racial pattern.
A review of the geopolitical formation of the United States demonstrates a clear racial, not simply ethnic, pattern of constituting the national identity and the commonality it invokes. As oppositional historians have shown, the U.S. racial order sprang from a politics of exploitation and containment encompassing *inter alia* colonialism, apartheid, racial segregation, xenophobia, exploitation, marginalization, and genocide. It evolved from four key conjunctures that mark the genealogy of the social field of power and its logic of division: first, the suppression of the aboriginal inhabitants (Native Americans) for the exploitation of land and natural resources; second, the institutionalization of slavery and the post–Civil War segregation; third, the conquest of territory from the Mexicans, Spaniards (Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, Guam), and Hawaiians, together with the colonization of Mexicans, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans; and, fourth, the subordination of Asian labor (Kolko 1976; Goldfield 1997). This racial genealogy of the empire followed the logic of capital accumulation by expanding the market for industrial goods and securing sources of raw materials and, in particular, the prime commodity for exchange and maximizing of surplus value: cheap labor power. This confirms the enduring relevance of Oliver Cromwell Cox’s proposition that “racial exploitation is merely one aspect of the problem of the proletarianization of labor, regardless of the color of the laborer. Hence racial antagonism is essentially political-class conflict” (1948, 485).

With the end of the Cold War and the globalization of a “free-market” regime, a new phase of the “culture wars” has begun. This is an ideological-political conflict symptomatic of the organic crisis of capitalism as a historical stage of sociality and human development. One manifestation of this debate is Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” the replacement of class/national struggles with the putative rivalry between the Islamic/Confucian axis and a monolithic Western dispensation.

In the context of economic recession and aggravated urban problems after 1989 (for example, insurrections in Los Angeles and Cincinnati), the problem of cultural ethos has become the major site
of racial categorization and conflict. In scholastic circles, we observe the confrontation of two irreconcilable positions: one that claims the priority of a “common culture,” call it liberal or civic nationalism, as the foundation for the solidarity of citizens; and another that regards racism or a racializing logic as inherent in the sociopolitical constitution of the United States, a historical episteme undercutting the universalizing rhetoric of its proclaimed democratic ideals and principles (Perea 1998). Attempts to mediate the dispute, whether through the artifice of a “multicultural nationalism” or a postethnic cosmopolitanism (Hollinger 1995) have only muddled the precise distinctions laid out by the various protagonists.

Multiculturalism, inflected in terms of cultural literacy, canon revision, the debate between Eurocentrism versus Afrocentrism, and corollary antagonisms, has become the major site of philosophical contestation. It has become a field of forces in which the exercise of symbolic violence preempts the functioning of communicative rationality and supplements the coercive surveillance of citizen-subjects. In clarifying why cultural identity has suddenly become salient in the terrain of multiple social antagonisms, however, it would be useful to invoke here again Gramsci’s ideas about ideological disputes functioning as synecdoches for deeper, protracted systemic conflicts.

Hegemony revisited

Hegemony is the key concept that unlocks the political ambiguity of multiculturalism within the analytic framework of mapping the relations of social forces in any given conjuncture. Gramsci (1971) postulated that hegemony (political and intellectual leadership) in most societies is realized through a combination of peaceful incremental reforms (voluntary consent from the majority) and violent struggles (coercive domination). Hegemony incorporates the working of symbolic violence shown in the “transfiguration of relations of domination and subordination into affective relations, the transformation of power into charisma” (Bourdieu 1998, 102; San Juan 1992).

Culture wars are thus engagements for ideological-moral positions that at some point will generate qualitative changes in
the terms of engagement and thus alter the balance of political-economic power in favor of one social bloc against another. In modern industrial formations, the struggle is not just to occupy City Hall, as it were, but also (from a dialectical, strategic point of view) to mobilize the masses in order to transform the relations of power, their bases and modality, on both material and symbolic levels.

With the demise of the welfare state and the end of the Cold War, the Self/Other binary persists as the integrating paradigm that underpins token programs of multiculturalism with all their infinite permutations. I recently read the colorful polycentric multiculturalism that Robert Stam has proposed that “calls for a kind of diasporization of desire, the multiplication, the cross-fertilization, and the mutual relativization of social energies” (1997, 200). Wonderful! Could a multiculturalist strategy of peacefully managing differences have prevented the 1992 Los Angeles riot if it had been deployed earlier? Is the question of ethnic difference, the politics of identity, reducible to the celebration of cultural diversity? How does a group claim to be distinctive and different? Can the expression of cultural difference be tolerated as long as it pays deference to the prior claims of civic nationalism? Does the notion of citizenship—the abstract owner of property—premised on the universalizing discourse of individualism resolve inequalities of class, gender, and race? If ethnicity is not primordial but a strategic choice, will reforms of the now-obsolescent “welfare state” curtail institutional racism and racist violence? With the demise of liberal programs of amelioration and safety nets, will “ethnicity” still function as before by legitimizing stratification and inequality as a result of disparate cultural norms and folkways? Is multiculturalism a reformist tactic for carrying out those highly touted neoliberal goals of stabilization, deregulation, and privatization that have caused untold misery for millions?

Multiculturalism is celebrated today as the antiphony to the fall of the “Evil Empire” and the triumph of the free market, the performative self as model consumer and exemplary shopper. Ishmael Reed (1998), among the multiliterati, has trumpeted the virtues of “America: The Multinational Society.” The rubric
“multinational” is meant to vindicate the thought of DuBois, the proponents of La Raza Unida, and the theories of internal colonialism. Ironically, however, Reed declares somewhat naively that “the United States is unique in the world: The world is here” in New York City, Los Angeles, and so on. Reed, I suspect, does not mean that the problems of the underdeveloped subaltern formations have come in to plague American cities. With this figure of subsumption or synecdochic linkage, the imperial center reasserts a privileged role in the world—all the margins, the absent Others, are redeemed in a hygienic uniform space where cultural differences dissolve or are sorted out into their proper niches in the ranking of national values and priorities. Multicultural USA then becomes the ultimate prophylaxis for the loss of global economic superiority and endemic social decay.

We are now supposed to accept a fait accompli: plural cultures or ethnicities coexisting peacefully, without serious contestation, in a free play of monads in “the best of all possible worlds.” No longer a melting pot but a salad bowl, a smorgasbord of cultures, our society subsists on the mass consumption of variegated and heterogeneous lifestyles. There is of course a majoritarian subject-position—tune in to the six o’clock news—to which we add any number of fragments of particularisms, thus proving that our principle of sophisticated tolerance can accommodate those formerly excluded or ignored. Even recusant denizens can be invited to the Mall of America. Why not? It’s a bazaar for anyone who can buy, though it may turn out that your particular goods are not as valuable or significant as mine. Assorted postality (i.e., postrevolutionary, given the triumph of global capitalism over Soviet communism) sages are accessories to this fashionable cosmopolitanism.

On closer scrutiny, this bureaucratic mechanism of inclusion—what Herbert Marcuse once called “repressive desublimation” (1968)—is a mode of appropriation that fetishizes and commodifies others. The self-arrogating universal swallows the unsuspecting particulars in a grand hegemonic compromise. Indeed, retrograde versions of multiculturalism celebrate in order to fossilize differences and thus assimilate “others” into a fictive gathering that flattens contradictions pivoting around the axis of class. Questions
of identity (racial, gender, sexual, etc.) must be framed within the totality of social relations articulated with determinate modes of production. Other versions grant cultural autonomy but hide or ignore structural inequalities under the umbrella of a refurbished humanist cosmopolitanism—a totality that homogenizes all the atoms contained in its space. And so the noisy border-crossers like Guillermo Gomez Pena or Coco Fusco, our most provocative agitprop artists, are constantly reminded that to gain full citizenship, unambiguous rules must be obeyed: proficiency in English is mandatory, and assimilation of certain procedures and mores is assumed.

Panopticon of the transnational market

Cultural pluralism first broached in the twenties by Horace Kallen has been refurbished for the imperatives and exigencies of the “New World Order.” What the current Establishment multiculturalism elides, however, is the history of the struggles of people of color—both within the metropolis and in the far-flung outposts of finance capital. While the political armies of racial supremacy were defeated in World War II, the practices of the capitalist nation-states continue to reproduce the domination and subordination of racialized populations in covert and subtle ways. The citizen-subject, with citizenship as self-ownership with the right to buy and sell (that is, to alienate own’s own labor-power), demonstrates the universalizing virtue of the liberal nation-state. Citizenship remains defined by the categories that govern the public sphere of exchange and the marketplace, categories denoting race, geopolitical location, gender, nationality, sexuality, and so on (Peller 1995). While globalization may render national boundaries porous, the U.S. nation-state continues to institutionalize social differences in national structures of enfranchisement, property law, and therefore of exploitation. This transpires amid profound social crisis that has undermined emancipatory projects and the autonomy of collective agencies. As Stephen Steinberg has tirelessly argued, “the essence of racial oppression [in the United States]—our grand apartheid—is a racial division of labor, a system of occupational segregation” (2000, 64). The racial polity
is a thoroughly nationalized machine for reproducing racialized class hierarchy that sustains and informs the political economy of capital accumulation.

Multiculturalism in its diverse modalities has indeed become the official policy designed to solve racism and ethnic conflicts in the North. Contextualized in the history of transnational capitalism, however, multiculturalism tends to occlude if not cancel out the material conditions of racist practices and institutions. It conceals not only the problematic of domination and subordination but reconstitutes this social relation in a political economy of difference where privatized sensibilities and sensoriums become the chief organs of consumerist experience. The performative self fragments the public sphere into self-replicating monadic entities equipped with customized survival kits. In short, neoliberal multiculturalism idealizes individualist pluralism as the ideology of the “free market” and its competitive utilitarian ethos.

A historical-materialist frame of interpretation may enable us to appreciate what is involved in the struggle over classification and delimitation of social space and the fields of symbolic power. In a polity (such as the United States) configured by a long history of class divisions articulated with gender, race, nationality, and locality, the claim that there is a single moral consensus, “habits of the heart,” or communitas can only be a claim for the ascendancy of a particular ruling group. And it is around the moral-intellectual leadership of a social bloc, which translates into effective hegemony, that hierarchy and stratification, along with the norms and rules that constitute canons and disciplinary regimes, become legitimized. This is also the locus of struggle over who defines the nation, authorizes the criteria of citizenship, and sanctions violence.

Liberal pluralism and its variants obfuscate this hegemonic process conducted via wars of position and maneuver (to use Gramsci’s terminology). Establishment pluralism exalts diversity, multiple identities, as “a condition of human existence rather than as the effect of an enunciation of difference that constitutes hierarchies and asymmetries of power” (Scott 1992, 14). From this pluralist perspective, group differences and discrete ethnic identities are cognized in a static categorizing grid; that is to say, they are
not examined relationally or dialectically as related systems constructed through various processes of discursive and practical enunciation of differences. Hazel Carby warns us that “because the politics of difference work with concepts of diversity rather than structures of dominance, race is a marginalized concept” (1990, 85) replaced by ethnic diversity. Instead of revealing the structures of power at work in the racialization of a social order, “a social formation structured in dominance by the politics of race,” academic multiculturalism fosters ethnic separatisms among the oppressed in the guise of celebrating the virtues of every ethnic group and culture. Premised on the pluralistic notion of compatibility, multiculturalism respects the Other’s specificity in order to assert its own universal superiority. Slavoj Zizek reminds us that

the problematic of multiculturalism—the hybrid coexistence of diverse cultural life-worlds—is the form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of capitalism as universal world system. (1997, 44)

Similarly, Colette Guillaumin has elucidated the axiomatic presence of hierarchy underneath or behind the egalitarian articulation of difference in democratic regimes. What exactly is the ideological significance of this paradox? Guillaumin explains:

To speak of “difference” is to articulate a rule, a law, a norm—briefly, an absolute which would be the measure, the origin, the fixed point of a relationship, by which the ‘rest’ would be defined. . . . It is quite simply the statement of the effects of a power relationship. . . . [Difference presupposes] a source of evaluation, a point of reference, an origin of the definition. . . . The definition is seen for what it is: a fact of dependence and a fact of domination. (1995, 250–51)

The defining authority is, of course, the sacred principle of private property, “civilization” as Huntington, Bush, Rumsfeld, and others conceive it in their deadly crusade against the heterogeneous multitudes out there. Multiculturalism thus legitimizes pluralist stratification, exploitation, and oppression in the process of capital accumulation around the planet (Appelbaum 1996), in “the best
of all possible worlds.” It apologizes for and reinforces the status quo of differential power based on asymmetrical positioning in social space and on unequal property relations.

**Specter of us-versus-them**

Viewed from this angle, the “common culture” interpellates individuals and articulates them in a commonality of monadic identities. Instead of a composite identity overdetermined by manifold lines of interests and affiliations, one acquires an identity defined by this shared heritage with its naturalized closure and its exclusivist fiat. Implicit here is the constitutive role of the market, specifically the buying and selling of labor as commodity, which guarantees and is predicated on individual rights, the foundation of bourgeois civil law and procedural liberty. Thus, if the “common culture” of Hirsch, Schlesinger, and others is affirmed by the status quo in mainstream education, workplace, family, and other institutional matrices of subjectivity, then there will be no room for encountering, much less recognizing, the dignity and integrity of un-common texts, expressive practices, and deviant expressions of people of color within and outside the North American continent. To paraphrase George Lipsitz’s thesis, the racial polity’s ruinous pathology in the “possessive investment in whiteness” perpetuates the absence of mutuality, responsibility, and justice (1998). We should then disabuse ourselves of the notion that there are equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences in a racial polity sustained by an unjust political economy. No doubt, culture wars (both of position and maneuver) will continue until the present hegemonic order is transformed and ethnic antagonisms sublated to another level where a more genuinely egalitarian resolution can be realized.

We need to be cautious about the possible cooptative and compromising effect of the liberal brand of “multiculturalism” commodified by the globalized marketplace. Its answer to inequalities of power and privilege is to add and relativize Others’ modalities of interaction without altering the underlying hierarchy of status
This pragmatic species of hegemonic pluralism, color-blind and gender-blind, elides the actual differences in systemic power relations immanent in the lived experiences of communities, peoples, and nations. In fact it sanitizes the institutionalized racism, sexism, heterosexism, and overall class exploitation that prevail, sanctioned by the instrumentalities of government and the Realpolitik of international agencies.

Given the time-space coordinates of cultures conceived as “designs for living” or signifying practices that produce meaning and value for groups, it is untenable to posit a homogeneous culture as the definitive index of a complex society. Instead of fixing on the abstract and large cultural configuration at play in any society, we should conceive of historically specific cultures that stand to one another in relations of domination and subordination, in struggle with one another. One might recall that Raymond Williams once suggested that we construe any social formation as comprised of stratified layers of dominant, residual, and emergent cultures in varying degrees of tension with one another (1977). The Birmingham School of Cultural Studies proposed an analogous approach: “We must move at once to the determining relationships of domination and subordination in which these configurations stand; to the processes of incorporation and resistance that define the cultural dialectic between them; and to the institutions that transmit and reproduce ‘the culture’ (i.e. the dominant culture) in its dominant or hegemonic form” (Hall and Johnson 1976, 12–13).

One can of course discriminate among varieties of “multiculturalisms”—from conservative to liberal, left-liberal, critical, or resistance multiculturalism (see Goldberg 1994). It is not the best polemical strategy to reduce the wide spectrum of positions to the usual binary or Manichaean formula. Nor is it judicious, I think, to multiply positions in a permanent state of deferment, flux, or “suspension of disbelief.” Nonetheless, the “politics of difference” and identity underwriting such positions as Nancy Fraser and other well-intentioned social democrats, reduce class to a “mode of social differentiation” (Fraser 1997, 17), an index of identity, as equally functional for this purpose as race, gender, sexuality, etc. That is a serious and recurrent mistake. In the spirit of Weberian sociologism,
they tend to reify “superstructural” differences into almost intractable social and political disjunctions, rendering dialogue and communication among groups impossible—and this, despite their desire to combine both the politics of recognition and of redistribution in a gradualist evolutionary scheme of reforming the polity without fundamentally altering the market and commodity exchange—that is, the basic contradiction between capital and labor.

Confronting this quandary, we need to return to our point of departure: the historicity of the racial polity and the strategy of ascertaining which of the projects of social transformation will lay the groundwork for abolishing the racializing patterns of cultural interpretation and evaluation. I believe that is the socialist struggle to dissolve the iniquitous social relations of production, the labor-capital contradiction, which I submit is key to beginning the project of unraveling the antinomies and dilemmas of reification—the racial polity. But is there another alternative mode of subverting the logic and paradigm of liberal pluralism that can afford opportunities for mass intervention?

Spinoza’s intervention

This is where Spinoza’s political theory interrupts the postmodernist narrative with its seductive deployment of contingency and difference. Why Spinoza? The quite surprising fascination, at least in academic circles, with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s treatise, *Empire,* may have reinforced the suspicion that Spinoza is behind (to appropriate Negri’s phrase) this not-so-savage “anomaly.” Mistakenly idolized as a mystic, arch heretic, and atheist of his time, Spinoza himself continues to be a provocative enigma.

*Empire*’s invocation of Spinoza’s philosophy for the goal of cosmopolitical liberation runs through this manifesto of postrevolutionary anarchism. Hardt and Negri ascribe to Spinoza’s intransigent naturalism, its horizon of immanence, the discovery of the omnipresent “creative and prophetic power of the multitude” (2000, 65). This power of singularity realized by “the democracy of the multitude as the absolute form of politics” requires, for Hardt and Negri, no external mediation by any organization or party; the multitude’s constituent power will actualize desire in
action in a possible form of democracy as the absolute form of
government. Spinoza’s critique of modern sovereignty, accord-
ing to Empire, originates from this primary goal: “the ontologi-
ical development of the unity of true knowledge and the powerful
body along with the absolute construction of singular and collec-
tive immanence” (2000, 186). While Spinoza repudiated all teleo-
logical speculation, he affirmed the identity of reason and virtue,
virtue and blessedness, as the path to freedom.

The recent revival of interest in Spinoza was sparked by
French thinkers like Althusser and Balibar who inspired Negri and
some American academics—even though several generations of
Soviet thinkers led by A. M. Deborin have celebrated Spinoza as
one of the precursors of dialectical materialism (Kline 1952). This
“new Spinoza” deviates from the traditional pantheist of European
romanticism (idealized by Goethe) and from the complaisant saintly
thinker of Bertrand Russell and Lewis Feuer. Feuer’s book Spinoza
and the Rise of Liberalism (1958) reconfirmed the traditional por-
trait of Spinoza as the torchbearer of the European enlightenment,
the apostle of classic liberalism, albeit disturbing for certain propo-
sitions about the barbaric masses. We don’t need to recapitulate
this well-trodden path. My interest in Spinoza is, for this occasion,
limited to what ideas about citizenship and the politics of race/
etnic difference we can extrapolate from his philosophy. Racial
supremacy, it seems, has nothing to fear from secularism, material-
ism, immanence, nor from the multitude who are its chief support.
Does Spinoza have anything to say to people of color besieged
by the resurgence of neoconservative nationalism, by the rise of a
racializing program of free-market civilization?

Given Spinoza’s reputation as a radical democrat, even an
incorrigible freethinker, I am particularly intrigued by the way he
has been recast as a proponent of conformity to the hegemonic
“common culture.” I have in mind Steven B. Smith’s book Spinoza,

Smith enrolls Spinoza in the ranks of the defenders of the status
quo based on the erasure of differential particularisms. He imputes
to Spinoza the ideology of a “civic ethos” premised on what a later
scholar calls “the possessive investment in whiteness.”
Spinoza’s solution to the theologico-political problem can be summarized in a single word: assimilation. The assimilation he has in mind does not mean conversion to Christianity or any of the revealed faiths but assimilation to a secular society that is, formally, neither Christian nor Jewish but liberal. The idea of the fides universalis, the common civil faith, seems to embody the liberal idea of the “melting pot,” where all the old religious and ethnic particularities of a people are refined in order to produce a new universal human identity. This new identity can trace its beginnings back to the early modern wars of religion and the need to put an end to the continual conflict between the contending sects of Christian Europe. Thus it was not uncommon to find the framers of liberal democracy arguing that allegiance to a common creed was necessary to both ensure civil peace and guarantee religious freedom. The purpose of such a creed was to find a common ground for a shared civic identity while still allowing ample room within which individual and group differences could be given free expression. Inevitably, the kind of culture that came to dominate took on a largely Protestant hue. America may not have been a Christian nation, but it was a nation composed overwhelmingly of Christians, as has been noted by the most astute observer of our civil creed. The image of the melting pot, though in principle open to all, was far from neutral. An amalgam of liberal political institutions and cultural Protestantism virtually defined the uniquely American version of this civic ethos well into this century. (Smith 1997, 200)

Based on this rather oversimplified reading of Spinoza, Smith recruits the excommunicated Marrano into the fold of those who condemn “identity politics” for imposing “narrow orthodoxies and conformity.” Rejecting the “tyranny of group differences,” which allegedly destroys “the values of individual freedom and intellectual independence,” Smith ascribes to Spinoza the espousal of “the universalistic norms and principles of the liberal state,” more precisely, a civic republicanism that rejects cultural pluralism. Is this plausible?
While it is true that during Spinoza’s time, the believer had been transformed into a creditor, it strains credulity to imagine Spinoza insisting on rational-choice theory, or the methodological individualism of Rawls and Rorty. We need to reestablish our historical bearings. This doctrine of a late-capitalist dispensation in crisis cannot surely be ascribed to the bourgeoisie in the stage of primitive accumulation. Let us review Spinoza’s fundamental principles of political philosophy to ascertain his true position on the question of identity, power, and representation.

**Right equals power**

One of the most scandalous propositions to have been invented by Spinoza is the equivalence or co-extensiveness of right (jus) and power (potentia). Spinoza conflates right with power:

> Every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned. Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each individual should endeavor to preserve itself as it is . . . ; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural conditions . . . . Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, hereafter TTP, 1951, 200–201)

Moreover, each individual who is “conditioned by nature, so as to live and act in a given way,” possesses natural rights as part of nature; nature’s rights “is co-extensive with her power.”

Under the laws of nature, only such things that no one desires and no one can attain are prohibited; otherwise, strife, hatred, anger, deceit, and the other effects of passion/desire prevail. Nature is clearly not bounded by human reason that still fails to comprehend “the order and interdependence of nature as a whole.” But for the sake of preserving life, and avoiding the misery brought about by fear, hatred, enmity, anger, and deceit, humans have judged it best to use reason and resort to mutual aid
“if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals.” Hence the social compact or covenant whereby the force and desire of individuals are displaced by “the power and will of the whole body,” of the state, *civitas, imperium*. This replaces the multiplicity of desires and its anarchic operation with the dictates of reason so as to prevent “any desire which is injurious to a man’s fellows,” and insure that people “defend their neighbour’s rights as their own” (Spinoza 1951, *TTP*, 1).

Humans enter into a social compact for its utility, as dictated by reason: the good for each is promoted by the preservation of the commonwealth. By uniting, humans “have jointly more power and consequently more right over nature than each of them separately.” Therefore, “the more there be that join in alliance, the more right they will collectively possess” (Spinoza 1951, *Political Treatise*, hereafter *PT*, 1).

Mutual aid tempers narrow private egoism. Spinoza’s naturalism entails a realistic view that not all are guided by reason, so people can act deceitfully and break promises and agreements unless “restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.” When humans transfer their natural rights (right of self-defense) to the state, their powers are also ceded—but not entirely (in contrast to Hobbes’s well-known version of the social contract, or those of Grotius and Rousseau. Rousseau, together with Hobbes and Locke, located the legitimacy and force of political obligation in bourgeois society as residing in a social compact or contractual promise, whether express, implied, or hypothetical. Experience shows that “men have never surrendered their right and transferred their power to others so completely that they ceased to be feared by the very rulers who received their right and power, and, although deprived of their natural right, became less dangerous to the state as citizens than its external enemies.” (This may explain why John Walker Lindh, as an example to citizens, is more fearsome than the hundreds of Taliban prisoners in Guantanamo.) The right to rebel against tyrannical and oppressive government can never be outlawed. Whether the individual’s right produces an effect or is of no consequence depends on the balance of power in a condition of precarious and unstable equilibrium (Curley 1996, 318–22).
In a democratic polity, Spinoza argues, the aim is to bring all under the control of reason to insure peace and harmony. Obedience to rational commands does not make individuals into slaves if the object of the action is the welfare of the whole people, the common interest; they are made into subjects. In a democratic polity, which Spinoza considers “the most natural and the most consonant with individual liberty,” “no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in a state of nature, equals” (1951. PT, 206–7). An effective government exists when the state exercises absolute authority over its citizens, that is, when its right extends as far as its power. In this case, the state enjoys obedience from its subjects who seek to preserve their lives and pursue their personal advantage under the law, which is the rational thing to do; only within this law-governed space can justice or injustice make sense. But no matter how absolute the sovereign, the individual’s natural right remains intact: “In a free state, everyone is permitted to think what he wishes and to say what he thinks” (Spinoza 1951, TTP, 265).

Spinoza elaborates on the theme that the right of every subject extends as far as its power does; right is coextensive with power, both subserving the conatus of every individual to seek its own good. “No one will promise to give up the right he has to all things,” and “no one will stand by his promises unless he fears a greater evil or hopes for a greater good” (1951, TTP, 204). Assimilation may be one of the greater good, or lesser evil, if the state adopts a policy that everyone should give up her/his cultural particularities in order to be full-fledged citizens. But a democratic state that relies on civic unity would not demand such a sacrifice, so long as the ethnic subject follows just and fair laws—laws that would neither discriminate, nor apply exclusiveness and selectivity. Spinoza considered the Netherlands his “homeland” without ceasing to be identified as a “Jew” and to some extent an alien, as Yovel observes (1989, 173).

Empire of reason

Spinoza’s teaching thus affirms the inviolable singularity of each person within the domain of a civil society ordered according
to rational principles. In this setup, right translates into power and
the right to self-preservation is made concrete or determinate in
“an organized community” or polity. Notions of wrong and right
are conceivable only within the polity. Laws need to enable the
practice of justice—giving every person his/her lawful due—and
charity; those administering the laws “are bound to show no
respect of persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend
every man’s right equally, neither envying the rich nor despising
the poor.” Spinoza adds that for those who follow desire, not
reason, and who live by sovereign natural right outside the poli-
ity, are still enjoined to practice “love of one’s neighbor, and not
do injury to anyone, since all are equally bound to the “Divine”
command—“divine” here being a shorthand for natural necessity
(1951, TTP, 187).

Seven years after the anonymous publication of the TTP in
1670, and the killing of Spinoza’s patron, Johan de Witt, by a
politically motivated mob, Spinoza reaffirms his equation of pow-
er with right: “every natural thing has by nature as much right, as
it has power to exist and operate.” What is notable at this point in
Spinoza’s life is his recognition of the power of the masses, the
multitude, which determines the general right called “Dominion”
or sovereignty. Earlier Spinoza stressed the value of mutual help
to establish the conditions for the cultivation of the mind and exer-
cise of reason. Now, in the Political Treatise, he envisages “gen-
eral rights” of the community “to defend the possession of the
lands they inhabit and cultivate, to protect themselves, to repel
all violence, and to live according to the general judgment of all”
(297). In the Ethics he writes: “The greatest good of those who
seek virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally”

Rights thus prove their efficacy through rational collective
activities. According to Deleuze, the thrust of Spinozan politics
inheres in the “art of organizing encounters” leading to useful
and composable relationships or assemblages (Hardt 1993, 110).
These assemblages are mediated through “common notions”
(Deleuze 1988, 54–58). The “common notions” or general ideas
that Spinoza associates with the interactions of bodies (humans as
finite modes) are effective because of the historical conditions that define civil society and its articulation with the state, precisely an articulation that gives rise to the contradictions in a market-centered system: “Now to achieve these things the powers of each man would hardly be sufficient if men did not help one another. But money has provided a convenient instrument for acquiring all these aids. That is why its image usually occupies the mind of the multitude more than anything else. For they can imagine hardly any species of joy without the accompanying idea of money as its cause” (*Ethics* IV, Appendix 28, in Spinoza 1994, 243). What an insight! Spinoza discerned the cash-nexus as the cause of reification and alienated labor long before Marx and Engels anatomized that mysterious object, the commodity.

Collectivities endowed with general rights, not individuals, are the real actors in the ever-mutable field of political forces envisaged by Spinoza. They are composed by the interaction and encounter of singular individuals; from this conjuncture springs assemblages of individuals who have been constituted by past experiences and customary dispositions. Warren Montag points to the historical concreteness of groups: “The conjunctural agreement of complex elements that defines the specific ‘character’ or complexion of an individual (Spinoza emphasizes the Latin term *ingenium*) is found on a larger scale in the collective forms of human existence: couples, masses, nations all have a specific *ingenium* that makes them what they are and no other” (1999, 69). What defines the character of a people (*ingenio gentis*) are those specific historical features that distinguish them relative to others: language, religion, customs, etc. Nature comprehends this variety of embodied rights/powers.

Sovereignty, or the power/right of the state to command, is measured by the power not of each individual but of the multitude in its various forms, among them, ethnic groups, racialized peoples, etc. These groups cannot be simply dissolved or liquidated in the “melting pot” of liberal pluralism, as official or Establishment multiculturalism would have it, without risks of dissension and revolt. If the chief purpose of the state is freedom—principally, freedom of thought and its expression—which enables the
formulation of a common will and the definition of the common good among citizens, then every group—while ceding its natural right (that is, power) to the state—needs to be recognized and treated as a distinct entity with its peculiar customs, rituals, traditions, aspirations, and so on.

Without the heterogeneity of singular subjects in constant exchange and communication, as the Ethics urges, the ideal of freedom as augmented power of the mind and body cannot be achieved: “Whatever so disposes the human body that it can be affected in a great many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in a great many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the body capable of being affected in a great many ways, or of affecting other bodies, the more useful it is; on the other hand, what renders the body less capable of these things is harmful” (Spinoza 1994, 221). The richer these exchanges and contacts, the greater the power of the mind to comprehend the order of nature—the third kind of knowledge Spinoza calls “intellectual love of God” (deus sive natura).

Politics of recognition

A good example of how the Jewish community—mainly exiles and refugees from Portugal—interacted with the Dutch may be cited here. In the beginning, each group regarded each other with suspicion: the European hosts did not formally recognize the Jews as a religious community until 1615 when the States General of the United Provinces allowed residents to practice their religion. Amsterdam forbade public worship. In 1616, the municipal authorities ordered the Jews to avoid criticizing Christianity, refrain from converting Christians to Judaism, and stop having sexual relations with Christian women. Clearly the local Calvinists placed a limit on tolerance. In 1619, however, the city council officially granted the Jews the right to practice their religion, though various restrictions on economic and political rights continued (Nadler 1999, 10–12). Only in 1657, fifty-seven years after Spinoza’s family arrived in Amsterdam and two years after Spinoza himself was banished from the Jewish community, did the Dutch republic grant citizenship to the Jews. They ceased
to be foreigners when the sovereignty of the Dutch republic was
finally recognized by Spain, the former colonizer, at the Treaty of
Munster in 1648.

But there was no assimilation or hybridization. Though eco-
nomically prosperous, they remained insecure. No doubt, the
behavior of this recently “naturalized” community cannot be
understood without taking into account the ascendency of the con-
servative faction of the Dutch Reformed Church. The religious
leaders had to constantly reassure their Dutch rulers that they
were able to safeguard their community and maintain orthodoxy
by internal disciplinary measures. Spinoza’s excommunication
was thus meant to prove to the Dutch authorities that the Jews,
in conformity with the conditions of their settlement, “tolerated
no breaches in proper Jewish conduct or doctrine” (Nadler 1999,
150). The lesson Spinoza derived here was clearly not the virtues
of liberalism, nor was it the evils of “groupthink” and communal
solidarity that Smith condemns.

Over and above geopolitical origin or location, religious belief
and practice defined the ethnic particularity of the Jewish commu-
nity. Spinoza’s family belonged to the group of Marranos who
fled religious persecution from Spain and Portugal and joined the
Sephardim community in Amsterdam who thrived as merchants
and brokers in the flourishing foreign commerce from Portugal,
Spain, and Brazil. They became relatively wealthy; although
restricted from the retail trade and craft guilds, they could engage
in diamond cutting and polishing, tobacco spinning, silk weaving,
and clandestine refining of sugar. Although Jewish merchants
could purchase nontransferable citizenship, that did not entitle
them to burgher rights. An Amsterdam ordinance of 1632 stipulat-
ed that “Jews be granted citizenship for the sake of trade.” In gen-
eral, the Jewish community was not isolated in a ghetto, so that in
less than three decades after arrival, they succeeded in recreating
on the banks of the Amstel “the rich, cosmopolitan but distinctly
Jewish culture” they had left 140 years earlier (Nadler 1999, 26).

It was the influx of Jews from Poland, Sweden, Russia, and
Germany, survivors of pogroms, that precipitated Spinoza’s
rigorous affirmation of “common claims” against eccentric
particularisms. The “racial discrimination” against these “children of Jacob” not only for their inferior lineage but more precisely for their menial occupations may have reinforced an equivocation: aliens not welcome to a hitherto foreign enclave. The latest biographer of Spinoza, Margaret Gullan-Whur, describes a complex realignment of collectivities that, assuming that “mind is the idea of the body” as the Ethics asserts, may have registered in Spinoza’s thinking:

The work ethic of Jews was well-known: neither “Portuguese” nor “German” had proved criminal or wanted Dutch charity. . . . But their strictures over ritual upset social harmony by inflaming Gentile imaginations. . . . As early as 1616 a rabbi had warned that “each may freely follow his own beliefs but may not openly show that he is of a different faith from the inhabitants of the city.” . . . While Spinoza’s later writing poignantly addresses the question of racial oppression, it also sternly upholds, on grounds of logical necessity, the Dutch precept that racial and religious differences must not be paraded. Any religious or racial concept that applied only to one section of society could not, by definition, he said, be universally true. (1998, 45)

In TTP, Spinoza emphasized the historical specificity of Mosaic law and its value for defining Jewish nationality as an imaginary construct. But that level of social cohesion based on obedience to rational precept derived from Old Testament revelation should not be confused with a polity or civitas founded on philosophical reason. Reason urges tolerance where pietas or devotion is manifested through deeds rather than profession of dogmas which, if allowed to dictate government policy, only foments religious conflicts and persecution (Hampshire 1961, 198–209). Hence Spinoza conceives of a rational state as one concerned with freedom, where “every man may think what he likes, and say what he thinks.” The purpose of the state is “to enable men to exercise their mental and physical powers in safety, and to use their reason freely, and to prevent them from fighting and quarreling through hatred, anger, bad faith, and mutual malice” (1951, PT, 314). Consequently, “the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state, seek to
curtail the liberty of judgment which they are unable to tyrannize over” (*TTP*, chap. 20). We are reminded of Spinoza’s expulsion from the fold, his friendship with dissidents like the Collegiants, Van den Enden, and other liberal republicans, as well as the fate of the radical thinker Adriaan Koerbagh, arrested by the city authorities for blasphemy at the instigation of the Calvinist consistory and killed (Nadler 1999, 170).

If Spinoza upholds the rationality of the state as coinciding with its devotion to freedom, does this freedom to think and speak arise from consensus, from adherence to a “common culture”? In short, does the giving up of one’s rights—not all—preclude the recognition of one’s identity as different? Is the government or state justified in using its power to make everyone conform to a monolithic standard of values, a majoritarian ideology? Den Uyl argues that Spinoza does not use the language of individual rights when he expounds on the political value of reason, for what is involved in the establishment of a free state is a desirable communal order, norms of community action, that would prove useful in promoting peace and security for everyone. And so can the ethnic and racialized minority exercise free speech and free rational judgment? I think that for Spinoza, such freedoms are guaranteed; what is problematic are actions or deeds that destroy the precarious equilibrium of political-social forces subtending the peace and safety of citizens in the commonwealth. Right (*jus*) is contingent on utility (*utile*), but this utility depends on who is in command, who formulates and implements rational corporate decisions. For Spinoza, a subject of a mercantile polity founded on capitalist principles of accumulation, private ownership of the means of production, and the sale of “free” labor-power, the disjunction between the ethical (private, personal) and the political (public) realms serves as the condition of possibility for the equivocation about natural rights and the shifting boundary between the prescriptive/normative and the descriptive modes of elucidating power relations (Den Uyl 1983). What rights the ethnic group or cultural minority may enjoy in private, they do not have as individual citizens in the public realm—liberalism mixed with totalitarian or authoritarian attitudes. This explains
the enigmatic duplicity over the role of the multitude in Spinoza’s political discourse.

This enigma cannot be resolved by an anarchist reading (Hardt and Negri) or a conformist liberal interpretation (Smith). Yovel convincingly argued that Spinoza was the first secular Jew (1989). The enigma can only be resolved by a dialectical and historical-materialist optic that can illuminate the paradox of citizenship, assimilation, model minority myth, and pluralist democracy as the framework of white supremacy or racial polity. Marx’s critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* provides the most cogent historical framework in which to situate the freedom/authority dialectic in Spinoza. But Marx’s preliminary study entitled “On the Jewish Question” (written in the same year he published his critique of Hegel) is more relevant. We need to recall that Marx admired Spinoza, copying verbatim the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* with his signature on it.

**Marx’s interpolation**

Let us take a short detour here. In “On the Jewish Question,” Marx showed the contradiction between dualistic and mechanical thinking about individual and society, minority and majority interests, the ethnic group and the nation-state. The antithesis between “political society” as a spiritual or heavenly commonwealth and “civil society” as a fragmented domain of private interests and egoistic drives warring against each other is the locus of the problem. In a free state, Marx argues, citizens live a double life: the real life of isolated, private persons in civil society, and the imaginary life of the citizen in a political sphere (state; *civitas*). Civil society is characterized by the pursuit of money and self-interest, the real world of everyday affairs, where humans function as means, “a plaything of alien powers”; while in the state, individuals are integrated and unified as citizens. Thus political emancipation in terms of citizenship does not coincide with real, human emancipation—which is not a religious but a secular question. As Marx emphasizes: “The state can be a free state without man being a free man” (1975, 152). This is because freedom involves the species-life of humans (the subject as citizen) as opposed to the material, egoistic life of the bourgeois individual. In the state,
however, when religion, language, and other particularistic cultural properties have been confined to the sphere of private law, the individual remains “an imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, filled with unreal universality”—the free rational subject in Spinoza’s *Ethics*.

The bourgeois revolution (instanced by the French one and translated into jurisprudence and political principles in the American version), according to Marx, demonstrates a dialectic of opposites. The idealism of the state coincides with the materialism of civil society, with “egoistic man” in the latter as the foundation or presupposition of the former. In history, the bourgeois state emerged from the dissolution of feudal society into independent individuals, the world of atoms, in the theories of Locke, Mill, Rawls, Rorty, and assorted postmodernists inspired by Kant and Foucault. I would like to quote this extended passage from Marx’s 1843 essay for its bearing on the topic of rights:

*The droits de l’homme* [rights of man (with the triumph of the bourgeoisie)] appear as *droits naturels*, because *conscious activity* is concentrated on the *political act*. Egoistic man is the passive result of the dissolved society, a result that is simply *found in existence*, an object of *immediate certainty*, therefore a *natural object*. The *political revolution* dissolves civil life into its component parts without *revolutionising* these components themselves or subjecting them to criticism. It regards civil society, the world of needs, labour, private interests, civil law, as the *basis of its existence*, as a *precondition* not requiring further substantiation, and therefore as its *natural basis*. Finally, man as a member of civil society is held to be man *in the proper sense*, *homme* as distinct from *citoyen*, because he is man in his sensuous, individual, *immediate* existence, whereas *political* man is only abstract, artificial man, man as an *allegorical, juridical* person. The real man is recognised only in the shape of the *egoistic* individual and *true* man is recognised only in the shape of the abstract *citoyen*. . . .

Political emancipation is a reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an *egoistic*,
independent individual, and on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person.

Only when real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognised and organised his “forces propres” [own powers] as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished. (1975, 167–68)

The current debate over citizenship as the site of transcendence—the point where the formal or abstract dimension of citizenship is supposedly fleshed by the social and cultural dimensions (Glenn 2000; Rosaldo 1999)—may have missed the crucial interface or reciprocity of the private and public aspects.

To recapitulate Marx’s thesis: in the world of alienated labor and commodity exchange where competing private interests dominate, the general interest embodied in the civitas or commonwealth can only be realized in a formal way, via abstraction. Thus the basis and substance of the political organism we call state, sovereignty, or commonwealth remains civil society with its class divisions and internecine warfare. In fact, the unified state sanctions and legitimizes the unequal economic relations and other differences that constitute civil society. In order to overcome those actual differences, like religion, the hypostatized idealized state—the modern representative democracy with its liberal, tolerant ethos—has to acknowledge the limitations of the profane world, reinstate and confirm the crass materialism of bourgeois civil society. Estrangement and unsociability inform the very nature of the polity, the state; hence, uncritical idealism or spiritualism coexists with uncritical positivism and crude, vulgar materialism.

**Citizenship guarantee?**

Citizenship in a liberal democratic order is necessarily premised on difference. The citizen is an abstraction, a formal product of a “thoroughgoing transubstantiation” of all the particular
qualities, elements, and processes that are synthesized in the constitution of the modern liberal state. But this constitution is nothing else but the exaltation of private property, in short, the sanctification and legitimization of the basis of disunity and disintegration of the state. Everything is turned upside down: the ideal of equality is praised in order to defend the cause of inequality, private property, as fundamental and absolute. And so, it is not the separate but consonant categories of normative and descriptive languages in Spinoza that explain the ambiguous co-presence of liberal and authoritarian tendencies; rather, it is the essence of the contradictions in the development of the capitalist mode of production and its ideological-political forms of reproduction. We find in Spinoza’s thought a mediating expression and symbol of “the most systematically commercialized economy” in seventeenth-century Europe, together with the civic virtues, intelligence, and enterprise that the bourgeoisie were “ideally capable of” (Muller 1963, 225).

Caute—be careful or take care—was the emblem on Spinoza’s ring. The scholar Yirmihayu Yovel contends that Spinoza’s dual language was his response to the existential realities of Marrano life in seventeenth-century Netherlands: the ever-present danger of the Inquisition, Spinoza’s status as a dissenter within the Jewish community, and (after his excommunication) as a freethinker and reputed atheist in Calvinist Holland. In addition, two other factors shed light on the ambivalence in Spinoza’s discourse: his belief that the vulgus or multitude cannot liberate itself from the bondage of the sad passions and the lure of the imagination, and only a few can attain the grade of the scientia intuitiva, the third kind of knowledge, without which freedom and personal salvation is meaningless. Nonetheless, the apparatus of the liberal state and rationalized or universal religion may help convert “the activity of the imagination into an external imitation of reason, using the power of authority and obedience” (Yovel 1989, 32), mobilizing the masses to cooperate in the constitutional state’s task of implementing a program of justice and charity.

Smith’s portrait of Spinoza as the consummate liberal will not survive the evidence of Spinoza’s inclination toward a more
interventionist state (Smith 1997). Perhaps this is peculiar to Spinoza’s reaction to the Jewish condition. Michael Walzer recounts how the French revolutionaries debated the issue of the emancipation of the Jews in 1790-91. One centrist deputy then declared: “One must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation, and give everything to the Jews as individuals. . . . It would be repugnant to have . . . a nation within a nation” (Walzer 2000, 192). And so Jews as individuals with rights were recognized; they could be regenerated by becoming citizens in political society (as Marx discussed) while sustaining their corporate existence in civil society. Thus, “the price of emancipation was assimilation” (Walzer 2000, 193). Smith would go along with that process. In which case we are reminded of what Jean-Paul Sartre cautioned us some time ago, in his memorable essay Anti-Semite and Jew, about the democrat who is the only friend of the Jews, who tirelessly dialogues with the anti-Semite with whom he shares the penchant for resolving “all collectivities into individual elements and making an individual the incarnation of universal human nature (1965, 55). Here, the utopian kernel of Spinoza’s view of an inalienable right disappears into the “melting pot” of consumption and laissez-faire negotiation. Meanwhile, racism and ethnic exclusion acquire new life in the “New World Order” of transnational and globalized capital.

The terror of U.S. nationalism

What advice then can Spinoza give to Asians Americans who are today beleaguered, even besieged, by law-enforcement agencies implementing the Patriot Act in the war against worldwide terrorism? We have read of the hate backlash after September 11, 2001—incidents like these: Balbir Singh Sodhi, 49, an Indian-American immigrant in Mesa, Arizona, murdered; Saad Saad, 35, of Scottsdale, Arizona, shot by Frank Roque, who shouted as he was handcuffed, “I stand for America all the way.” In Arcadia, California, Adel Karas, 48, an Egyptian American mistaken for a Muslim, was shot to death point-blank at the International Market, a store he owned. The list is long. Nameless hundreds, maybe thousands—the Justice Department and attorney general are keeping
it secret—are now detained on mere suspicion, and others will undergo secret trials before a military tribunal. The early incidents featuring Vincent Chin, or the killing of the postal worker Joseph Ileto by a white supremacist in 1999, pale in comparison with recent outrages. The latest is the firing of tenured professor Sami Al-Arian from the University of South Florida (Walsh 2002). We can no longer speak of toleration, fairness, charity, or justice. War against what the hegemonic power elite considers “terrorism” is said to justify these extreme measures, which some call a “just” and measured response, to defend U.S. sovereignty.

In the last two decades, the myth of the model minority has seduced most Asian Americans into believing that they have finally lived through the period when the country needed an “indispensable enemy” (to use the historian Alexander Saxton’s epithet). They believe that almost everyone has made it. In fact, testimonies like Eric Liu’s The Accidental Asian (1998), or more recently, Helen Zia’s Asian American Dreams (2000)—a vulgarized rendition of Ronald Takaki’s Strangers from a Different Shore)—are symptomatic of what Spinoza diagnosed as the state’s power to encroach into the psyche. The state not only rules by coercion or by fear, but employs all means “since it is not the motive for obedience which makes a man a subject, but the will to obey.” Spinoza contends that “obedience is less a matter of the outward action than of the mind’s inner activity, so that the man who wholeheartedly decides to obey all the commands of another is most completely under his rule; and in consequence he who rules in the hearts of the subjects holds sovereignty as much as possible” (TTP, chap. 20). It is certainly not amor dei intellectualis that motivates Helen Zia to extol Asian American dynamism (personified by her extended family) as the distinctive quality of this heterogeneous assemblage of “American people.” Zia concludes that Asian Americans, by pulling their bootstraps, have already become fully acculturated or melted; what is lacking is their acceptance by the larger society. The pathos of this anxiety evokes the sad passions in Spinoza’s Ethics, an affect of mimicry determined by external forces, the appetite of the “model minority.”

“Turning American” for Zia means moving away from stereotypes, from tales of campaign donations and espionage, to reciting
the litany of “model” successes in politics, business, mass media, and so on. Meanwhile, Wen Ho Lee, the Chinese-American scientist formerly employed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and recently acquitted of the charge of espionage, has just published his account of his arrest and trial, My Country Versus Me. The title ominously captures the prudential strategy Spinoza deployed in his work. Lee reflects during his 278 days of solitary confinement without benefit of trial: “I sometimes felt like I must have made a mistake and should not have come to America in 1964 for my Ph.D. I must have done something terrible to have ended up like this. As I sat in jail, I had to conclude that no matter how smart you are, no matter how hard you work, a Chinese person, an Asian person like me, will never be accepted. We always will be foreigners” (2002, 37). Too late a discovery, it seems.

And so we will witness more media scandals of secret campaign contributions, espionage, human rights violations, and so on. It is probably because of the re-invention of the “indispensable enemy” to serve ongoing national identity formation, not so much because of the Los Angeles riots, that the genre of the initiation-cum-spy thriller novel, exemplified by Chang Lee’s Native Speaker (1996) will be the most appropriate vehicle to register our current predicament. All talk of postcolonial hybridity, “double consciousness” performed by transnationals or transmigrants, globalized knowledge-production, deconstruction of binary epistemologies, essentialist discourses, and so on that we read in anthologies like Orientations (Chuh and Shimakawa 2001), becomes complicit with “cynical reason” if it does not confront the racial polity and its ideological state apparatuses operating in the international arena. This exceeds the objective of the disciplinary Kulturkritik of Establishment cultural studies and the cosmopolitan populism of high-salaried public intellectuals (Mulhern 2000).

The “inscrutable” enemy

The reporter from Newsweek who interviewed Lee describes this Chinese-American intellectual as clueless, and despite Lee’s acquittal not entirely blameless for his predicament. Who is responsible for such cruel procedures? “Washington politics and
government overreaching,” the Feds’ “over-the-top tactics,” say the pundits; the “unfair manner” of the executive branch, according to the judge who acquitted Lee. Citizenship rights seem otiose, irrelevant here, even though Lee claims he is innocent. In medias res, Lee subsists in a condition of duality, suspended on that divide between naïve, obedient citizen and a suspect, recalling his life before he was “branded a spy and an enemy agent—a disloyal, lying traitor, one of the most base and awful labels imaginable” (2002, 37). Terror beyond belief.

We can conjecture that Lee not only practiced a cunning ratio but also carefully tried, in his memoir, to devise a method of reaching the “third kind of knowledge,” the knowledge of necessity, even though mediated by a journalistic narrative. This knowledge concerns not so much the causal order of the universe but the logical operations of the government to which he has sworn loyalty, its Realpolitik, its pragmatic modus operandi in enforcing its commands. He has not surrendered his right to pursue his own advantage, to demand that the social contract be properly carried out; however, his knowledge is inadequate because it assumes that the national-security state plays fair and only commits minor errors. His understanding is inadequate because it does not examine the nature of the racial polity of what is now called “homeland,” its long and substantial record of inferiorizing and subordinating the historically differentiated Other, and its mode of idealizing or abstracting those differences and alterities in order to claim moral ascendancy and spiritual superiority.

Despite these reservations, it is clear that insight of acute significance has been registered by the break between Lee’s past life as Federal employee and his present effort to vindicate his honor. What Lee’s case has dramatized most poignantly is the problematic articulation of pact and law, the tension between what Balibar calls “the physics of individual conatus or powers and the metajuridical form of the social contract” (1997, 171). For Lee, unwittingly perhaps, has proved Spinoza’s thesis that “no one transfers his natural right to another so completely that he is never consulted again, but each transfers it to a majority of the entire society of which he has a member. In this way all remain equal, as they were
before in the state of nature” (*TTP*, chap. 17). It is this freedom that guarantees the strength and security of the state: “Peace is not freedom from war but a virtue, which springs from strength of mind” (Jaspers 1966, 72).

What cannot be elided over, despite such ruses and subtle legalisms, is the truth that exploitation and oppression thrive on those very same principles of liberal democracy, individual liberties tied to property, and market-determined civilization on which Western hegemony continues to ride roughshod over all of nature and humanity—a paradox and aporia that Spinoza tried to unravel and demystify. As noted earlier, Marx succeeded in casting light on the interdependency of bourgeois liberty and private property. Cultural pluralism thrives on inequity. Multiculturalism is the cultural logic of globalized neoliberal capitalism. So it is quite possible that the terror of racism that Spinoza envisaged will continue to haunt us in this new millennium as long as the conditions that produce and reproduce class relations, in effect the material-ideological armature of the U.S. racial polity, remain the *sine qua non* for the reproduction and legitimation of the dominant social structures and institutional practices of everyday life.

Social contradictions persist everywhere. Given the recalcitrance of citizens in the racial polity, the right of the state—even what claims to be an *imperium democraticum*—is not identical, nor co-extensive, with its power in the case of the unruly, oppositional subaltern. Spinoza argued that such states are irrational and deserve to be overthrown. So long as the power of the individual, in this case the conatus (conceived in two senses, human power as part of the infinite power of nature, which Spinoza also identifies with “god,” and also human appetite, the capacity of being affected) immanent in natural right, remains his own within the *respublica*, it subverts the “society effect,” the production of obedience that validates the effective unity or sovereignty of the *imperium*. One can counterpose to this protofascist legality and military tribunals the Enlightenment solidarity of “progressive humanism” (Palumbo Liu 2002), but such humanism, I fear, has already been thoroughly incorporated into the constitution of the racial polity.

Social justice, the recognition and validation of people’s singular identities and worth, remains the goal of popular
mobilization. Not everything is foreclosed. For despite the liberal state’s pragmatic politics of incorporation, and its power to command and enforce its commands, the collective subjects of this racial polity continue to exercise their right to dissent, protest, and rebel not just out of self-interest (“self” here understood as a “common notion”), but precisely for the sake of affirming self-determination, rational autonomy, and dignity. The survival of the planet, which is ultimately at stake here, inheres in the conatus of every living creature. As Ethics IV proposes: “Every individual has a sovereign right to everything which is in his power” (1994, 218). The permanent resourcefulness of Spinoza’s political teaching for people of color in this period of antiterrorism lies, I submit, in reminding us of this inalienable right of resistance.

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REFERENCE LIST


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The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is the largest Communist Party among all the developed capitalist countries. In the following pages we present the text of the JCP program as revised at its Twenty-Third Congress in January 2004 to reflect the changes that have taken place domestically and internationally since the program was last revised in 1994 (the text of which appeared in Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 7, no. 3 [1994]:343–67). An explanation of some new theoretical approaches on which the revised program is based was presented at the congress by Tetsuzo Fuwa, chair of the JCP Central Committee. The text of his report will appear in Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 16, no. 3.
Revised Program of the Japanese Communist Party

(Adopted on 17 January 2004 at the Twenty-Third Congress of the Japanese Communist Party)

I. Prewar Japanese Society and the JCP

(1) The Japanese Communist Party was founded on July 15, 1922, in the midst of the popular liberation struggle surging in Japan and the world, as a party with scientific socialism as its theoretical basis following the Japanese history of the struggle for social progress and change.

Japan at the time was one of the world’s major monopoly capitalist countries, but the country was under the rule of the emperor’s despotism (absolute emperor system). Under the regime, the people were deprived of civil rights and liberties; the semifeudal landlord system that squeezed tenant peasants into paying heavy rents prevailed in rural areas; and under monopoly capitalism, workers without basic rights were harshly exploited. This was the regime that drove Japan as Asia’s only imperialist country to embark on the path of a war of aggression against the region’s countries.

The JCP’s activities were directed to fulfilling the immediate task of putting an end to these conditions and achieving a democratic revolution aimed at building a peaceful and democratic Japan, to be followed by a socialist revolution.

(2) The JCP fought to end the autocratic rule of the emperor system which deprived the Japanese people of civil rights, and...
The JCP fought to abolish the semifeudal landlord system and free the land for the peasants.

The JCP fought for fundamental improvement of living conditions of the working class, which was suffering from harsh exploitation, and for the betterment of the rights and living standards of all working people, intellectuals, women and youth.

The JCP fought for the creation and dissemination of progressive, democratic, and revolutionary culture.

The JCP opposed Japanese imperialism’s interventionist wars aimed at crushing the Russian revolution and the Chinese revolution, fought against its war of aggression against China, and called for peace throughout the world as well as in Asia.

The JCP supported the liberation of Korea and Taiwan, which were at the time colonies of Japanese imperialism, and fought for the complete independence of Asia’s colonial and semicolonial nations.

(3) Japanese imperialism in 1931 began a war of aggression in the Northeast of China and in 1937 started a total war of aggression against China, thus becoming the first aggressor nation to pave the way for World War II. In 1940, Japanese imperialism entered into a military alliance with the European fascist states, Italy and Germany, and in 1941 expanded its war of aggression beyond China into the whole of Asia and the Pacific, thus becoming a driving force for World War II.

The imperialist war and the tyranny by the power of the emperor system forced the people to endure hardships. JCP activities faced major difficulties and failures, but many JCP members, undaunted by persecution and imprisonment, fought against various kinds of betrayal and held fast to the banner of the JCP. A number of JCP members were killed in the repression.

At a time when all the other political parties together supported the war of aggression and political reaction, the JCP’s dauntless struggle for peace and democracy was of great significance, which is imperishable in the cause of peace and democracy in Japan.

The war of aggression killed more than 20,000,000 people in other Asian countries as well as more than 3,000,000 Japanese
people. In this war, Okinawa underwent a ground battle, and air raids throughout the country reduced many regions into ashes. In August 1945, U.S. forces dropped the world’s first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 200,000 people (by the end of that year). The Japanese people became a people with tragic history of the nuclear attack engraved in their memory.

With the alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan, which represented fascism and militarism, suffering setbacks throughout the world, Japanese imperialism in August 1945 was defeated and accepted the Potsdam Declaration. This was a declaration by the antifascist Allied Powers calling for militarism to be eliminated and for democracy to be established. It showed that the only way out for the Japanese people was to establish a peaceful and democratic Japan. This proved that the course followed undauntedly by the JCP had been basically appropriate.

II. Characteristics of postwar Japanese society

(4) After the end of World War II, Japan underwent several major changes.

First, Japan lost its independence and became a de facto dependency of the United States.

Defeated in the war, Japan was occupied by the U.S. forces ostensibly on behalf of the antifascist Allied Powers. The United States later replaced this occupation with its one-country rule. In 1951, it concluded with Japan the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty to continue to occupy Okinawa and maintain the main part of U.S. military bases built in many parts of mainland Japan during the occupation period. With this, the United States forced Japan to play the role of a semipermanent forward deployment base serving U.S. global strategy. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised in 1960. But the revision did not decrease Japan’s subordination to the United States; it not only changed the treaty to one of land-leasing for U.S. military bases but incorporated provisions for joint Japan-U.S. operations in the event of emergencies and bilateral economic cooperation as the treaty’s new pillars. Thus, the treaty was adversely revised and strengthened into a military alliance treaty that binds Japan as a subordinate ally that would be forced to participate in U.S. wars.
Second was the change in Japan’s political system, marking an end of the despotism that had given the emperor absolute power and the beginning of democracy based on the principle that sovereign power resides with the people. This change had its expression in the present Constitution of Japan which came into effect in 1947. The Constitution established people’s sovereignty, renunciation of war, fundamental human rights, the Diet as the supreme state organ, local autonomy, and a series of other democratic and peaceful provisions that serve as pillars of democracy. Although the constitutional provisions that allowed the emperor system to continue under the new definition had weaknesses going against the consolidation of democracy, they included a restrictive provision that the emperor “shall not have powers related to government.”

This change made it possible to set out for institutional preparations for Japan to carry out social progress and transformation through parliament based on the wishes of the majority of the people, the first in Japan’s political history.

Third, an agrarian reform basically dissolved the semifeudal landlord system, which, along with the despotism of the emperor system, had been the root cause of the semifeudal character of Japanese society. This gave Japanese monopoly capitalism modern conditions for its development and served as one of the factors in promoting fast economic growth in the postwar period.

These are circumstances in which Japan, as one of the world’s monopoly capitalist countries, achieved major economic development. However, despite its high rate of economic growth, the basic structure of Japan’s relationship with the United States remained an alliance in which Japan was bound as a subordinate U.S. ally.

(5) Although Japan is a highly developed capitalist country, it is a de facto dependent country, with its land, military, and other key areas controlled by the United States.

The greater part of U.S. military bases constructed during the total occupation period following the end of WWII continue to exist throughout Japan even after half a century. In particular, Okinawa, which was put under U.S. military occupation separate from mainland Japan following Japan’s defeat in WWII and was
bound by the San Francisco Treaty providing for its continued occupation, is used as the largest military base in Asia. A nationwide popular struggle led by Okinawans in 1972 won the reversion to Japan of the administrative rights over Okinawa, but the state of U.S. military bases [remained] basically unchanged and Okinawans are still forced to live in the middle of U.S. bases. United States forces are flagrantly violating Japan’s territorial air space and territorial waters, and even imposing on Japan “secret agreements” on the possible bringing in of nuclear weapons to Japan, which three times fell victim to the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and again at Bikini Atoll.

The Japanese Self-Defense Forces, which are virtually under U.S. control and command, are forced to assist in U.S. world strategy.

The United States still retains significant power over Japan’s military and diplomatic affairs, and constantly uses its enormous power to interfere in Japan’s economic affairs. In the United Nations and in other international forums, Japanese government representatives often play the role of spokespersons for the U.S. government.

The Japan-U.S. relationship is not one of an equal rights alliance. The present state of Japan is marked by its state subordination to the United States, which is extraordinary not only among the developed capitalist countries but in international relations of the present-day world, in which colonization is history. The U.S. domination of Japan clearly has an imperialistic character because it tramples on Japan’s sovereignty and independence in the interests of U.S. world strategy and U.S. monopoly capitalism.

(6) In the conditions that emerged after the end of WWII, Japanese monopoly capitalism took the path of development as state monopoly capitalism subordinate to the United States. Already in the early part of the postwar period, it overtook all European countries to occupy the position second only to the United States in gross national product. A tiny number of large corporations, which are at the center of Japanese monopoly capital, has taken possession of the greater part of wealth and pursued a path to become gigantic and multinational. They have also kept
the Japanese government under their strong influence and used the state structure as much as they can to secure their class interests. Domestically, large corporations and business circles, connected with the U.S. policy of domination of Japan, constitute the main forces that dominate Japan and its people.

Under the tyrannical rule of large corporations and business circles, in most fields related to the people’s living conditions and basic rights, rules that are common sense in Europe are not established in Japan. This is a major weakness of Japanese society. Workers are afflicted by long hours of work and excessively heavy workloads that could result in *karoshi* (death from overwork) as well as by unstable jobs that are discriminatory, and “forced overtime work,” an illegal method of exploitation, is prevalent at many enterprises. In the area of job security, there are no laws, as there are in Europe, to regulate dismissals.

Discrimination against women persists in various sections of social life as a backward reality that contravenes the international convention and is under international criticism. Suppression of basic human rights, including their violations by public authority, remains a serious problem in many sections.

Small- and medium-sized enterprises carry significant weight in Japan’s industries and trades, and are the essential players in the Japanese economy. But their business performance is constantly worsening as a result of their being forced to endure inequity, and discriminatory and oppressive treatment in their transactions with large corporations as well as in loans, taxation, and administrative measures. Agriculture, without the security necessary for its independent development, is exposed to a storm of “free trade,” and Japan’s self-sufficiency in food is lower than any other developed capitalist country, but the country is unable to find a way to rebuild its agriculture.

Concerning the issue of the environment, which has critical bearings on the life and health of the people, the development policy primarily serving large corporations’ quest of profits is responsible for the nationwide destruction of nature and living conditions.

The Japanese government, on behalf of large corporations and business circles, has maintained its economic and fiscal policy that
gives priority to securing the interests of large corporations. The larger part of Japan’s expenditure has been directed at large-scale public works projects and other items mainly in the interests of large corporations as well as military buildup. Public spending on social security and other social services remains the smallest among the developed capitalist countries. This “upside-down” approach is a typical manifestation of the Japanese government’s economic and fiscal policy.

What underlies this upside-down policy is the corrupt triangle of reactionary politicians, privileged bureaucrats, and some large corporations. Endless graft, bribery, and corruption scandals represent the unfathomable depths of Japanese monopoly capitalism and political reaction.

United States interference in the Japanese economy has often led the Japanese government’s economic policy in wrong directions and has been a major cause of the crises and contradictions in the Japanese economy. The U.S. attempts to impose its business models or economic models on Japan in the name of “globalization” turn out to be increasingly harmful and dangerous to the future of Japan’s economy.

Due to all these factors, Japan’s economic bases are particularly left vulnerable, and Japanese monopoly capital will have to face particularly sharpening contradictions and crises in the tumultuous situation relating to world capitalism in the twenty-first century.

Japan’s monopoly capital and government are playing the active role of a subordinate ally of the United States in military, diplomatic, and economic aspects in order to broaden the scope of their activities abroad using Japan’s closer attachment to U.S. global strategy.

Militarily, the Japanese government, taking part in U.S. war plans, is broadening the scope and raising the level of the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces, thus making the dispatch a fait accompli and using it as leverage to accelerate the moves toward reviving militarism, including the war-contingency legislation, the exercising of the right of collective self-defense, and an adverse revision of the Constitution. These policies and actions toward the
revival of militarism, which are being developed in conjunction with the U.S. preemptive attack strategy, are causing rifts with other Asian peoples and making Japan one of Asia’s seismic centers of military tension along with its role as a U.S. forward deployment base.

This system, which is characterized by Japan’s subordination to the United States and the tyrannical rule by large corporations and the business sector, has many unsolvable contradictions with the fundamental interests of the Japanese people. These contradictions are growing deeper and more serious in the twenty-first century.

III. The world situation: From the twentieth century to the twenty-first century

(7) The twentieth century began with monopoly capitalism and imperialism dominating the world. During the twentieth century, humanity underwent worldwide ravages of two world wars, fascism and militarism, and a series of wars of aggression. But these calamities were overcome through efforts and bitter struggles by peoples, paving the way for enormous historic changes to take place.

The colonial system, which chained many nations, collapsed completely, and the right of nations to self-determination became a universally accepted principle, and more than one hundred countries achieved political independence to become sovereign countries. These countries are the main components of the meetings of nonaligned countries as an important driving force in international politics for a world that is peaceful and based on self-determination of nations.

Democracy with popular sovereignty now forms a current accepted as a political principle by the majority of the world's countries, thus becoming the main trend of world politics.

With the founding of the United Nations, the illegalization of war was set as the historical course of development, and the building of an international order of peace that will prevent war was set forth as the world’s objective. In the light of what the world experienced in the twentieth century, in particular the wars of aggression and opposition to attempts to carry out such wars,
the increasingly pressing task is for the peoples of the world to establish an international order of peace.

(8) The era of capitalism as the only system dominating the world ended with Russia’s October Socialist Revolution that broke out in 1917. After World War II, a number of countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America embarked on the path of breaking away from capitalism.

In its early stages under the leadership of Lenin, the Soviet Union, the first country to begin taking a road to socialism, registered a series of positive efforts in spite of the social and economic backwardness it faced at the start as well as the trial and error it had to go through. However, after Lenin’s death, Stalin and other successive Soviet leaders discarded the principles of socialism. Internationally, it took the path of hegemony through invasion and oppression of other nationalities and domestically imposed bureaucratism and despotism that deprived the people of freedom and democratic rights and repressed the working people. All the more because these were committed under the name of “socialism,” these errors had particularly adverse effects on the movement for world peace and social progress.

A party of sovereign independence in defense of scientific socialism, the JCP firmly opposed the interference by Soviet hegemony in the Japanese movement for peace and social progress, and the armed Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

The breakdown of the ruling system that occurred between 1989 and 1991 in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern European countries that were subordinate to the former was not due to a failure of socialism; it was a failure of hegemonism, bureaucratism, and despotism that departed from the cause of socialism. At the outset, revolutions in these countries called for socialism as their objective, but due to the errors committed by their leaderships, these societies grew so repressive that they had nothing in common with socialism and as such came to an end.

The downfall of the historic and colossal evil of Soviet hegemony, in the long run, was significant in that it paved the way for new possibilities leading to the sound development of the world’s revolutionary movement.
It is important to note that today, several countries that broke away from capitalism are beginning a new quest for socialism, including the effort to “achieve socialism through a market economy,” although they still have political and economic problems to solve. This constitutes a historically significant current in the twenty-first century as an effort that covers vast regions with a total population of more than 1.3 billion.

(9) The disintegration of the Soviet Union and other countries did not serve to prove that capitalism is superior. Capitalism’s contradiction arising from its inability to regulate the enormously developed productive power has its expression in the largest scale and sharpest form ever in the worsening living conditions of the broad strata of the people, the widening gap between rich and poor, repeated economic recession and massive unemployment, rampant speculative financial investment beyond national borders, the global destruction of environmental conditions, the heavy burden of the negative legacy of colonialism, and the exacerbating poverty, or the North-South problem, in many countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

The danger of nuclear war continues to threaten the mother earth and humankind. Enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which were accumulated during the U.S.-Soviet arms race, continue to be a great threat to the survival of humankind. To get rid of the threat of nuclear war, nothing but the abolition of nuclear weapons can be the alternative. The call for “No More Hiroshimas! No More Nagasakis!,” which grew out of the World Conference against A & H Bombs, is now heard everywhere throughout the world. In international politics, the call for nuclear weapons to be abolished is continuously increasing, but the forces that refuse to give up nuclear weapons are persistent in continuing to buttress their monopoly over nuclear weapons as a means of pursuing their world strategy.

Attempts in many regions of the world to strengthen military blocs and adopt military-first approaches toward settling international disputes are the cause of increasing tension and threatening peace.

It is particularly grave that the United States, putting its national interests above the interests of world peace and orderly
international relations, carries out its preemptive attack strategy against other countries in disregard of the United Nations and tries to impose a new form of colonialism. The United States proclaims to be “the world’s policeman” in order to justify its sinister design to impose a U.S.-led international order and dominate the world. This is nothing less than a blatant expression of the aggressive inclination of imperialism, which is peculiar to monopoly capitalism, under conditions in which the United States stands aloof from the rest of the world as the sole remaining superpower as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. These are blatant policies and actions of hegemony and imperialism, which are incompatible with the principle of national independence and freedom or with the principles established in the U.N. Charter.

United States imperialism is now the greatest threat to world peace and security as well as to the sovereign rights and independence of nations.

The U.S. quest for hegemony and its imperialist policies and actions are even causing contradictions and rifts with other monopoly capitalist countries. The pursuit of economic hegemony aimed at forcing the rest of the world into a U.S.-led economic order in the name of economic “globalization” is also bringing disorder to the world economy.

(10) The above-stated situation makes it more important than ever to develop the struggle against any form of hegemony and for a peaceful international order in defense of a peaceful international order, the struggle for the abolition of nuclear weapons, the struggle against military blocs, the struggle to have the right to national self-determination respected and defended from violation, and the struggle to establish a democratic international economic order based on respect for national economic sovereignty.

It is important for the forces working for peace and social progress to make efforts to achieve their advances and solidarity in appropriate forms both nationally and internationally.

The Japanese Communist Party supports the struggle for the progress of humanity in solidarity with the world’s working class and all people who are fighting for the cause of national independence, peace, democracy, and social progress.
It is particularly important to note that the major question today is that the world must choose between two international orders: one of peace based on the U.N. Charter and the other plagued with intervention, aggression, war, and oppression giving the United States freedom to be tyrannical. The JCP will do all it can to build up international solidarity to help stop U.S. hegemony from dominating the world, establish an international order of peace, and achieve a world without nuclear weapons or military alliances.

In the context of these developments the world entered the twenty-first century. Although there may be numerous ups and downs, twists and turns, as well as temporary or long-term retrogressive movements in the course of history, it will be inevitable in the long run for social development to be achieved through overcoming imperialism and capitalism and advancing toward socialism.

**IV. Democratic revolution and democratic coalition government**

(11) A change Japanese society needs at present is a democratic revolution instead of a socialist revolution. It is a revolution that puts an end to Japan’s extraordinary subordination to the United States and the tyrannical rule of large corporation and business circles, a revolution that secures Japan’s genuine independence and carries out democratic changes in politics, the economy, and society. Although these are democratic changes realizable within the framework of capitalism, their full-fledged achievement can be made possible through a transfer of state power to the forces that represent the fundamental interests of the Japanese people from those representing Japan’s monopoly capitalism and subordination to the United States. Success in achieving this democratic change will help solve problems that cause the people to suffer and pave the way for building an independent, democratic, and peaceful Japan that safeguards the fundamental interests of the majority of the people.

(12) The following is a list of democratic changes Japanese society needs at present:

*National independence, security, and foreign relations*

1. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be abrogated in accordance with Article 10 providing that Japan can notify the U.S.
government of its intention to terminate the treaty, and the U.S. forces and military bases will be withdrawn from Japan. Japan will conclude a friendship treaty with the United States on an equal footing.

Unjustifiable U.S. intervention will be rejected also in economic affairs, so as to establish independence in all fields, including finance, foreign exchange, and trade.

2. Japan, after recovering sovereignty, will follow the path of peace, neutrality, and nonalignment to establish friendship with all countries, instead of entering into any military alliances, and participate in the meetings of the nonaligned countries.

3. With regard to the Self-Defense Forces, the law allowing the SDF dispatch abroad will be repealed, and disarmament steps will be taken. In view of new developments that will follow the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, steps should be taken toward the complete implementation of Article 9 of the Constitution (dissolution of the SDF) based on national consensus.

4. A new Japan will develop peace diplomacy in line with the following basic points:

   —Attach importance to promoting friendship and exchanges with Asian countries on the premise that Japan expresses remorse for its war of aggression and colonization in the past.

   —Champion the international order of peace as defined by the U.N. Charter and oppose any hegemonic attempts to violate or destroy it.

   —Strive to prevent nuclear war and abolish nuclear weapons as a vital task for the survival of humankind, defend the right of nations to self-determination, achieve general disarmament, dissolve all military blocs, and get all foreign military bases dismantled.

   —Oppose both indiscriminate terrorist attacks that victimize the general public and retaliatory war, and work to heighten international calls and increase common action for eradicating terrorism.

   —Seek to achieve the return to Japan of the Chishima Islands as well as the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, which are historically part of Japan.

   —Control irresponsible activities of multinational corporations, protect the global environment, check economic hegemony
by great powers, and seek to establish a democratic international economic order based on respect for economic sovereignty for every nation with equitable relations.

—Take active part in international activities by nonmilitary means to help the peaceful resolution of international disputes and deal with humanitarian problems, including disasters, refugees, poverty, and hunger.

—Exert efforts to establish peaceful coexistence and dialogue among countries with different social systems as well as relations of coexistence among various cultures with different values.

Constitution and democracy

1. Defend all the provisions of the Constitution, including the preamble, and in particular strive to have provisions of peace and democracy fully implemented.

2. Maintain the system of parliamentary democracy in which the Diet is the supreme state organ in both name and deed, the multiparty system that guarantees the existence of opposition parties, the system of political power change that allows a political party or a group of political parties in the parliamentary majority to be in charge.

3. Give all Japanese citizens who are eighteen years of age or older the right to vote. Carry out reforms of the election systems, administrative organizations, and the judiciary system to realize the constitutional principle of people’s sovereignty and peace.

4. Put the “residents-first” principle into practice in local government and establish local autonomy that gives top priority to serving the residents’ interests.

5. Preclude every attempt to restrict or suppress fundamental human rights and work to improve human rights protection in accordance with the changing social and economic conditions; protect basic labor rights fully; eliminate discrimination based on ideology and belief in all fields of social life, including within companies.

6. Defend and guarantee equality of rights between men and women in all fields; respect women’s independent personality;
raise women’s social and legal status; and remove obstacles to women’s social participation and contribution.

7. Carry out reforms of the education system as well as educational administration using the constitutional ideas of peace and democracy as the guide, and make efforts to improve educational conditions and contents of education at all educational levels.

8. Follow useful traditions of culture in various fields and seek to achieve the diverse development of science, technology, culture, arts, and sports; and defend the freedom of academic, research, and cultural activities.

9. Defend the freedom of religious belief and put into practice fully the principle of separation of religion and politics.

10. Prohibit political donations by companies and other organizations in order to root out graft, corruption, and concession hunting.

11. Call for the constitutional provisions restricting the role of the emperor (Tenno) to be strictly implemented, including the one that the emperor “shall not have powers related to government,” and correct deviations from constitutional provisions and spirit, including the political use of the emperor.

The JCP maintains that the present hereditary system allowing an individual to be the symbol of “the unity of the people” contradicts democracy and the principle that all people are equal, and that the consistent implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty calls for a political system to be established under a democratic republic. The emperor system is a system provided for by the Constitution, and its continuation or discontinuation should be decided by the will of the majority of the people in the future, when the time is ripe to do so.

Economic democracy

1. Overcome the present state of “capitalism without rules” and, taking into account what has been achieved in major capitalist countries in Europe and through international conventions, build an “economy governed by rules” that defends the people’s living standards and rights, including regulations regarding long working hours and arbitrary dismissals of workers.
2. Control large corporations’ economic tyranny with democratic regulation as the main means; require large corporations to fulfill their social responsibility for protecting workers, consumers, small- and medium-sized businesses, regional economies, and the environment, with a view to promoting the establishment of rules for defending the people’s living standards and rights and promoting balanced economic development; oppose environmental destruction, including pollution, caused by economic activities and military bases, and strengthen regulatory measures for the conservation of nature and the protection of the environment.

3. Fundamentally change Japan’s policy for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries as well as its energy policy that gives importance to efforts to increase the self-sufficiency of food, establish safety-first energy supply systems and raise the self-sufficiency in energy with a view to securing the safety of people’s living conditions and the effective use of domestic resources; and promote agriculture as a key industry of the nation.

4. Improve and establish a comprehensive social security system as the basic system that supports the living conditions of people of all strata; attach importance to establishing social facilities and programs to help maintain children’s health and well-being and bring up children; and have Japanese society make efforts to reverse the falling birth rate.

5. End the spending practice that gives budget priorities to wasteful large-scale public works projects, assistance to large corporations and major banks, and arms buildup in order to establish a fiscal and economic policy that puts emphasis on safeguarding the people’s living conditions and providing social services; end the present regressive tax system favoring large corporations and the wealthy and establish progressive taxation and social security systems based on the principle of shouldering burdens according to ability to pay.

6. Promote mutually beneficial economic relations on an equal footing with all foreign countries and work to make contributions to solving world problems, including the North-South gap and global environmental destruction.

(13) Democratic transformation will be achieved by the force of a united front comprising all people who aspire to achieve
national independence, democracy, peace, and better living conditions, including workers, working citizens, farmers, fishers, small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs, intellectuals, women, youth, and students. The united front will come into being, grow, and develop as a result of strengthened cooperation and unity of democratic parties, public organizations from various fields, and democratic individuals through fighting against parties of political reaction. Common efforts and unity in action for the immediate tasks should be promoted regardless of outlook on the world, historical view, and religious belief.

The JCP must take on the role as the foremost promoter of the movement toward the national common effort and unity. The JCP’s growth, backed by high-level political and theoretical capabilities as well as great organizational strength with close ties with workers and other strata of the people, is indispensable for the development of the united front.

To achieve the demands of the people and to make progress in the cause of transformation, it is important for the JCP and the united front forces to actively increase their seats in the Diet to fight in cooperation with extra-parliamentary movements.

If the JCP and the united front forces, supported by a majority of the people, win the stable majority in the Diet, a united front government, which is a democratic coalition government, will be established. A political party that has worked on the consistent principle that “people are the key players,” the JCP fights to establish a democratic coalition government supported by a parliamentary majority.

In the course of the development of the united front, there can be a case in which conditions emerge for building a united front based on several goals agreed upon, although the agreement may not cover all the main tasks needed for democratic change. If such a common effort is an alternative that is useful to meet the interests of the people and defeat the present reactionary rule, the JCP will do its best to help form a united front and establish a united front government within the scope of immediate goals that are agreed upon.

Establishing progressive and democratic local self-governments throughout the country will provide the main vehicle that carries the demands of residents of regions and communities; they
will also serve as an important power propelling the democratic and progressive currents.

The establishment of a democratic coalition government will be made possible through struggles backed by a majority of the people to defeat obstructions and resistance from the present ruling forces that represent the rule of monopoly capitalism and Japan’s subordination to the United States. We cannot belittle possible obstacles by the ruling forces of the United States, which clings to its continued domination of Japan.

This struggle does not end when a government is established. In advances that follow, it is important that the united front government bring under control the whole of state organizations both in name and in deed to make sure that the administrative organizations will be in charge of new national policies.

A democratic coalition government will be based on a democratic alliance of all strata of the people including workers, working citizens, farmers, fishers, small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs, intellectuals, women, youth, and students, as well as their organizations. It will have political power to develop a new path that will implement the tasks of recovering Japan’s genuine independence and carrying out its democratic transformation.

14) Democratic transformation to build an independent, democratic, and peaceful Japan will mark a milestone in the Japanese people’s history. Japan will no more be in subordination to the United States, and the Japanese people will regain their true sovereignty and become the protagonists in the country. Democratic changes will help Japan cease to be a source of war or military tension and become a firm foundation for peace in Asia and the world, and will pave the way for new political, economic, and cultural development using the vitality of the Japanese people.

A democratic and peaceful change in Japan’s course will play a significant role in forming a peaceful order in Asia and mark an important turning point in the evolution of the situation in Asia and the world in the twenty-first century.

V. For a socialist/communist society

15) In the next stage of Japan’s social development, the task is to overcome capitalism and carry out socialist transformation
and advance to a socialist/communist society. In the hitherto seen world, there has been no real socialist transformation taking place on the basis of the advanced economic and social achievements of the capitalist era. Working in a capitalist country on ways to advance toward socialism/communism is a new historic task in the twenty-first century.

The key element of socialist transformation is socialization of the means of production, a transfer of control and management of the main means of production to society. Socialization only concerns the means of production; as far as the means of subsistence is concerned, the right to private property will be protected throughout all stages of social development.

Socialization of the means of production will pave the way for the abolition of exploitation of man by man, advancement of life for all people, and eradication of poverty from society, thus securing the human development of all members of society.

Socialization of the means of production will take the driving force for production and the economy away from capitalists’ quest for profits and redirect it into the sustainable development of society and the material and spiritual life of members of society, thus making it possible to use planned management of the economy to stave off the repeated economic recession and effectively control further environmental destruction, the widening social gap, and other problems.

Socialization of the means of production will release the economy from the narrow framework of profit-first approaches and create conditions for a new rapid development of material productive power that supports human society.

A socialist/communist Japan will inherit and further develop all valuable gains of the capitalist era, including those of democracy and freedom. The “freedom of exploitation” will be restricted, and its abolition will be sought in the course of changes to be carried out. Abolition of exploitation will pave the way for a society in which humankind becomes the key players of society in the true sense of the word. The idea that “the people are the key players” will become a social phenomenon in all fields, politics, the economy, culture, and society.
The freedom of various ideologies and beliefs as well as political activities, including those by opposition parties, will be rigorously protected. Giving a particular political party privileges as the “leadership” party in the name of “socialism” or defining a particular outlook of the world as “state-designated philosophy” is an act that has nothing in common with socialism and therefore must be categorically rejected.

When a socialist/communist society achieves a higher degree of development and when the majority of its population is made up of generations who are alien to exploitation and oppression, real prospects will be developed for advancing to a society in principle free of all forms of coercion in which state power is unnecessary and a commune of equal and free human relationships without exploitation of man by man and free of oppression and war.

This is how humanity will achieve conditions for humane existence and living conditions in the true sense of the word, and take steps toward a new stage of development of human history.

(16) Socialist transformation will not be carried out in a short period of time; it will be a long process that needs a stage-by-stage progress based on national consensus.

Such a transformation begins with forming a consensus among a majority of the people in support of an advance toward socialism/communism; socialist power will be established with a backing of a stable parliamentary majority. Building a national consensus is prerequisite for taking action throughout these stages.

The JCP will stick with its united front policy of cooperating with all parties and individuals that are in favor of an advance to socialism. The JCP will respect the interests of working citizens, farmers, fishers, and small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs in an effort to follow the road of socialist transformation accepted and supported by a majority of the population.

The road to socialism in Japan will be a process of new challenges and exploration along which many emerging problems will be solved by the wisdom and creativeness of the Japanese people. The JCP will pay particular attention to and defend the following points:

(i) Socialization of the means of production can take on a variety of forms of ownership, control, and management according to
the situation and conditions. Although it is important to explore forms that fit in with Japanese society, we must not depart from the socialist principle that producers are the key players. The error committed by the former Soviet Union in imposing bureaucratism that oppressed producers under false pretenses of “nationalization” and “collectivization” must not be repeated.

(ii) Advancing toward socialism through a market economy is a legitimate way of development of socialism conforming to the Japanese conditions. In carrying out socialist changes, it is important to run the economy effectively with flexibility by combining the elements of the planned economy and the market economy, and to continue efforts and exploration that respect private initiatives by farmers, fishers, and small- and medium-sized producers and traders. A “controlled economy” in which the people’s spending practices are controlled or made uniform will totally be rejected in Japanese economic life under socialism/communism.

(17) A quest for socialism/communism is not exclusive to Japan.

The twenty-first century world will be an era characterized by an increase in currents towards overcoming capitalism and advancing to socialism. It arises from the sharpening economic and political contradictions and the rise of popular movements in the developed capitalist countries; it arises from efforts to explore their peculiar ways to socialism in countries that broke away from capitalism; and it arises from the popular movements in many countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America that are unable to find their way for future economic development within the framework of capitalism, even after achieving political independence.

The JCP will make every effort to make the twenty-first century a century in which humanity records a historic advance toward building a commune free of exploitation or oppression, while making efforts to fulfill those tasks of transformation to meet the needs of Japanese society at each stage of social development.

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ABSTRACTS

*Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski, “Klaus Fuchs and the Humanist Task of Science”*—Blending his own recollections with the views of his grandfather, Pastor Emil Fuchs, the author discusses the humanist motivations that led his uncle, Klaus Fuchs, to share with the Soviet Union the knowledge he acquired as a leading physicist in British and U.S. atomic and thermonuclear bomb development. The importance of Klaus Fuchs’s contributions to physics is also discussed. Fuchs’s work provided the theoretical basis for microelectronics. In addition, recently disclosed information has led one Russian historian of science to refer to Fuchs as the grandfather of the Soviet, American, and British hydrogen bombs.

*Herman and Julia Schwendinger, “Big Brother Is Looking at You, Kid: InfoTech and Weapons of Mass Repression. Part 2”*—Part 1 of this article appeared in volume 16, no. 1, of *Nature, Society, and Thought*. The article demonstrates that U.S. government policies use advanced information technology in an unprecedented demolition of civil liberties. Since the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the U.S. war on Iraq, Bush and Ashcroft have used the “war on terror” to justify increasingly blatant non-Constitutional actions. Part 2 brings the story up to date with attention to resistance strategies.

*E. San Juan Jr., “Spinoza, Marx, and the Terror of Racism”*—Spinoza’s philosophy, reflecting the worldview of a rising bourgeoisie in Europe, equates right with power. This worldview of liberalism provided legitimacy to the struggle of merchant capitalists against feudal obscurantism. Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” and his critique of Hegel’s state-centered historicism demonstrate the limits of investing civil society with the promise of liberation from capital. The critique of racism as a product of civil society.

and bourgeois citizenship needs to combine Spinoza’s natural-right position with Marx’s historical-materialist critique of alienation and private property.

“Revised Program of the Japanese Communist Party”—The Twenty-Third Congress of the Japanese Communist Party in January 2004 adopted an amended version of the Party program. The program, in reformulating strategy for the socialist transformation of Japan, reviews the current socioeconomic and political situation in Japan and projects a course of activities for dealing with domestic and international problems.

ABREGES

Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski, « Klaus Fuchs et la tâche humaniste de la science » — En joignant ses propres souvenirs avec les vues de son grand-père, le pasteur Emil Fuchs, l’auteur discute les motivations humanistes qui ont conduit son oncle, Klaus Fuchs, à partager avec l’Union Soviétique les connaissances qu’il avait acquises en tant que physicien de premier plan dans le développement de la bombe atomique et thermo-nucléaire aussi bien en Grande-Bretagne qu’aux États-Unis. Il examine aussi l’importance des contributions de Klaus Fuchs à la physique en général. Les travaux de Fuchs ont fourni les bases théoriques de la micro-électronique. De surcroît, des informations publiées récemment ont conduit un historien russe, spécialiste de la science, à parler de Fuchs comme du grand-père des bombes hydrogène soviétique, américaine et britannique.

Herman et Julia Schwendinger, « Big Brother te regarde, mon enfant : l’info-tech et les armes de répression massives. Deuxième partie » — La 1ère partie de cet article a paru dans le volume 16, n° 1, de Nature, Society, and Thought. L’article démontre que la politique du gouvernement américain utilise les technologies d’information de pointe au service d’une démolition sans précédent des libertés civiques. Depuis l’attaque du 11 septembre 2001 sur les tours du World Trade Center et la guerre
américaine en Irak, Bush et Ashcroft ont utilisé la “guerre contre le terrorisme” afin de justifier des actions non-conformes à la constitution de plus en plus flagrantes. La 2ème partie met ce sujet à jour en tenant compte des stratégies de résistance.

**E. San Juan Jr., « Spinoza, Marx et la terreur du racisme »** — La philosophie de Spinoza, qui reflète les vues d’une bourgeoisie ascendante en Europe, assimile le droit au pouvoir. Cette vue du libéralisme a pourvu une légitimation au combat des capitalistes marchands contre l’obscurantisme féodal. “La question juive” de Marx et sa critique de l’historicisme de Hegel concentré sur les états démontrent les limites des chances d’une société civile de se libérer du capital. La critique du racisme en tant que produit de la société civile et de la citoyenneté bourgeoise a besoin de combiner la position des droits naturels de Spinoza avec la critique historique-matérialiste de l’aliénation et de la propriété privée de Marx.